Professional Documents
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GEMINI
MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
INCLUDING EXPERIMENT RESULTS
MIDPROGRAI_ CONFERENCE
EVA-Extravehicular activity
GATV-Gemini-Agena target vehicle
GLV-Gemini launch vehicle
TLV-Target launch vehicle
GEMINI
MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
HOUSTON, TEXAS
V
CONTENTS
PART I
Page
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 3
By Robert R. Gilruth and George M. Low
A. Spacecraft
By Walter F. Burke
10. SPACECRAFT RELIABILITY AND QUALIFICATION .................. 89
By William H. Douglas, Gregory P. MeIntosh, and Lemuel S. Menear
B. Launch Vehicle
By Robert J. Goebel
16. DEVELOPMENT OF THE GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICLE ............... 147
By Richard C. Dineen
vii
°°°
Vlll CONTENTS
C. Flight Operations
Page
17. GEMINI MISSION SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT ........................ 153
D. Mission Results
By Edgar C. Lineberry
Concluding Remarks
By James C. Elms
PART II
Page
34. EXPERIMENT S-8/D-13, VISUAL ACUITY AND ASTRONAUT VISI-
BILITY ............................................................. 329
By Seibert Q. Duntley, Ph.D., Roswell W. Austin, John H. Taylor, and
James L. Harris
By Burden Brentnall
By ROBERT R. GILRUTH, Director, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center, and GEORGE M. Low, Deputy Director,
NASA Manned Spacecra# Center
In our first manned space-flight program, Space Systems Division's National Range Di-
Project Mercury, man's capability in space vision and the Navy Recovery Forces are well
was demonstrated. In the Gemini Program our known. All of the astronauts who have flown
aim has been to gain operational proficiency in to date in the Gemini Program have been trained
manned space flight. At the midpoint in the as test pilots by either the Air Force or the
Gemini flight program this aim has, in a large Navy. In addition, the Air Force has provided
measure, been achieved. the Gemini launch vehicle, which has performed
The Gemini Program has produced numerous with near perfection. There have been many
technical and management innovations through other contributions by the military services in
contributions of a large number of space- support of ejection-seat tests, centrifuge tests,
oriented organizations. At the peak of the and weightless trajectories utilizing the KC-135
Gemini activities more than 25 000 people in aircraft.
the aerospace industry were involved. This Within NASA, every center has participated
document will highlight the technical results in direct technical support and, in many in-
of the program at the midpoint, with the stances, in sponsorship of experiments. Of par-
management aspects to be reported more fully ticular note is the contribution of the Goddard
at a later opportunity. Space Flight Center in the implementation and
The papers presented are representative of operation of the worldwide network of track-
the contributions of the Gemini team. Par- ing stations. Many nations of the free world
ticipation by industry in the Gemini Program have augmented or otherwise supported these
has been led by McDonnell Aircraft Corp., stations, which are so vital to the manned space-
Martin-Marietta Corp., Lockheed Missiles & flight program. Sponsorship of experiments
Space Co., and all of their associates. This par- and consultation services have been provided by
ticipation has included more than 50 major universities and other institutions whenever and
contractors, more than 150 subcontractors, and, wherever they were needed. The Gemini Pro-
of course, a host of vendors and suppliers. The gram is truly a national enterprise with inter-
excellent performance of both the flight sys- national cooperation and support.
tems and the ground systems demonstrates The Gemini team has been led by one of
graphically the strong capabilities of American this country's outstanding engineers and pro-
industry in its support of these exploratory gram managers, Charles W. Mathews. Under
flights. Each of the companies involved de-
his direction, significant advances have been
serves special recognition and credit for these
made in this Nation's manned space-flight pro-
accomplishments.
gram. Gemini achievements in 1965 include
Many Government agencies have also been
five manned flights, yielding more than 1300
deeply involved in Gemini. In addition to
hours of manned flight in space; long-duration
NASA, the program has received support from
the Department of Defense; the State Depart- flight in steps of 4, 8, and 14 days; extra-
ment; the Department of Health, Education, vehicular activity, including the use of a self-
and Welfare; the Department of Commerce; propelled maneuvering gun ; precise maneuvers
the Atomic Energy Commission; and many in space, culminating in rendezvous; and con-
others. The contributions of the Air Force trolled landing of a lifting spacecraft.
4 GEMINI _IDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
The results of the Gemini Program contribute sons which have been learned, and the knowledge
directly to the Apollo Program and to other gained, have been rewarding, and give us con-
manned space-flight programs, such as the Air fidence as we meet the problems and the
Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory. The les- programs of the future.
2. GEMINI PROGRAM FEATURES AND RESULTS
By CHARLES W. MATHEWS, Manager, Gemini Program, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center; KENNETH S.
KLEINKNECHT, Deputy Manager, Gemini Program, IVASA Manned Spacecra]t Center; and RICHARD
C. HENRY, Manager, Office o] Program Control, Gemini Program O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra#
Center
dundancy because of the critical nature of this the digital computer, the radar, and the flight-
mission phase. Many systems not required for director display drew heavily on previous de-
essential mission phases are basically single sys- velopments. Reliability, system operating life,
tems with internal _edundancy features com- and the sizing of consumables were also selected
mensurate with the requirements for overall to afford durations corresponding to the require-
mission success. The spacecraft g_idance sys- ments of oncoming programs.
tem is an example of this application. Certain These ground rules were applicable to many
systems have sufficient inherent reliability, once other systems. In the case of the Gemini launch
their operation has been demonstrated, that i_o vehicle, great benefit was obtained from the
special redundant features are required. The Titan II development program, even to the ex-
heat protection system is one of this type. tent of validating certain Gemini-peculiar modi-
fications in the test program prior to their use
Future Mission Applicability in Gemini.
In the selection of systems and types of op- Minimum Flight Qualification Tests
I 1962 I 1963 11964 I 1965 I 1966 I around the spacecraft and minimize damage
A J MJAD
Development test
P AAUUE while testing or replacing equipment.
R NRNGC
Spacecraft
Although repetitive testing still exists, it has
Launch vehicte been possible to curtail it because of the preser-
vation of integrity features previously discussed
Qualification test
and because of the improvement in test flow, to
Spacecraft
be discussed later. An outcome of the Gemini
Launch vehicle
Program experience is that system reliability is
Flight qualification
achieved as a result of the basic development,
GT GLV systems-SC structure 4
qualification, and reliability testing; conse-
Gn" SC systems validation .eb
tb
quently, repetitive testing of the space vehicle
GITr Crew interface validation
need not be used for this purpose.
Operational demonstration Another important aspect of the program is
GtV" 4 days-EVA the delivery of flight-ready vehicles, including
GV 8 days-fuel cell-radar Government-furnished equipment, from the
GVI-A Rendezvous
manufacturer's plant. This objective dictates
G'oll" 14 days
complete integrated testing at the factory and
Operational demonstration 8, application includes crew participation in system tests, sim-
G _ through X I I rendezvous- docking - EVA - ulated flights, stowage reviews, and altitude-
experiments
chamber runs. Equally important, it means the
FIGURE 2-2.--Gemini test program. delivery of vehicles with essentially zero open
items. All elements of the Gemini team, both
launch vehicle and spacecraft, have worked ex-
the ground testing could be completed earlier,
tremely hard to achieve this end.
but the problems that were isolated and the re-
At Cape Kennedy the checkout plans have
quired corrective action prevented earlier ac-
not been inflexible. They are continuously un-
complishment. In spite of the great effort in-
der review and are changed when the knowledge
volved, it was better to utilize a ground-test
gained shows that a change is warranted. Some
program to ferret out problems than to encoun-
of the testing required for the first flights is no
ter them in flight.
longer required or, in some cases, even desirable.
The ability to minimize flight qualification
Improvements in test sequences have also been
tests is also indicated in figure 2-9. Two un-
achieved, and these avoid excessive cabling-up
manned flights were required prior to the first
or cabling-down, or other changes in the test
manned flight, and one manned flight test was
configuration. These alterations in test plans
required before proceeding into the operational
are carefully controlled and are implemented
program. No problems that significantly im-
only after detailed review by all parties
pacted following flights were encountered on
concerned.
these early flights.
Buildup of Mission Complexity
Streamlined Launch Preparations
the spacecraft, the majority of equipment was this buildup possible. The progressive buildup
placed outside the pressure vessel, with large in mission duration is obvious from figure 2-2,
removable doors providing a high percentage of but this philosophy also applies to most cate-
equipment exposure during tests. Connectors gories of the flight operations and will be dis-
were designed integral with each piece of equip- cussed in more detail in subsequent papers. It
ment so that, when aerospace ground equipment can be stated that, from systems considerations
was required for tests, the flight wire bundles alone, the 14-day flight of Gemini VII might
need not be disconnected. These and similar not have been possible without the prior experi-
features allow multiple operations to take place ence of the 8-day flight of Gemini V.
218-556 0--66------2
8 GEMINI MIDPP,.OGRAM CONFERENCE
Another aspect of the buildup idea is the con- adequate capability and flexibility of simulation
trol of configuration to avoid flight-to-flight facilities.
impact. The fuel cells and the cryogenic stow- Complex Mission Operations
age of their reactants are by far the newest de- The fundamentals of manned-mission opera-
velopments of all the Gemini systems. They
tions were demonstrated in the Mercury Pro-
were first flown "off-line" on Gemini II to ob-
gram where the flight-control functions of
tain information on prelaunch activation and
orbital insertion, orbit determination, systems
on their integrity in the launch and weightless
monitoring, retrofire time, orbital landing-point
environment. The next planned use was on
prediction, and recovery were developed. These
Gemini V, where a fuel-cell power system was
features also apply to Gemini flight control, but
a mission requirement. To permit concentra-
in a greatly expanded sense. There are many
tion on the basic flight objectives, the intermedi-
reasons for the increased requirements. On a
ate flights were planned with batteries as the
rendezvous mission, the Gemini space vehicle
source of electrical power. Similarly, the is launched on a variable azimuth that is set-in
Gemini VI-A spacecraft utilized battery power
just prior to launch, and the vehicle yaw-steers
so that possible results of the Gemini V flight
into orbit. These features affect both the flight-
would not impact on the first space rendezvous.
control function and the recovery operations for
This arrangement resulted in an excellent inte-
launch aborts. Also during rendezvous mis-
gration of these new systems into the flight pro-
sions, flight control must be exercised over two
gram. The good performance of the fuel-cell
vehicles in orbit at the same time, both of which
systems now warrants their use on all subse-
have maneuvering capability. The orbit ma-
quent flights.
neuvering further complicates the recovery
Flight Crew Exposure operation by requiring mobility of recovery
Gemini objectives require that complex forces. These factors, combined with the rela-
operational tasks be demonstrated in earth tively higher complexity of the Gemini space-
orbit, but it is also desired to provide the maxi- craft, require the rapid processing and display
mum number of astronauts with space-flight of data and a more centralized control of the
experience. As a result, no flight to date has operation. The maneuvering reentry is another
been made with crewmembers who have flown aspect of the Gemini Program that complicates
a previous Gemini mission. In fact, two sig- the flight control and recovery operations.
nificant flights, Gemini IV and VII, were made The long-duration missions have required
with crews who had not flown in space before. shift-type operations on the flight-control teams
In the other three flights, the command pilot and their support groups. This mode of opera-
had made a Mercury flight. The results tion increases the training task and introduces
achieved attest to the character and basic capa- additional considerations, such as proper phas-
bilities of these men and also reflect the impor- ing from one shift to the other.
tance of an adequate training program. Again, The Mission Control Center at Houston was
a more detailed discussion of the subject will designed to support these more complex func-
be presented in subsequent papers. tions, and these functions have been carried out
The flight crew require detailed familiarity with considerable success. It is felt th[tt the im-
with and confidence in their own space vehicle. plementation and demonstration of this part of
This is achieved through active participation in the Gemini capability will be one of the largest
the flight-vehicle test activities. The flight contributions in support of the Apollo Program.
crews require many hours of simulation time to
Flexible Flight Planning
gain proficiency in their specific mission tasks,
as well as in tasks common for all missions. Another facet of the Gemini flights is flexi-
With short intervals between missions, the bility in flight planning and control. Require-
availability of trained crews can easily become ments for flexibility have existed in both the
a constraint, and careful planning is necessary preflight activities and in the manner in which
to avoid this situation. Much of this planning the actual flight is carried out. The prime
is of an advanced nature in order to insure the example of preflight flexibility is the implemen-
GEMINI PROGRAM FEATURES AND RESULTS
tation of the Gemini VII/VI-A mission subse- period of approximately 2 weeks following each
quent to the aborted rendezvous attempt of the mission. All problems are not necessarily
original Gemini VI mission. Although stren- solved at the end of the 30-day period, but iso-
uous effort was required in all areas, these ac- lation of problems, evaluation of their impact,
tivities did take place essentially in accordance and initiation of corrective action have been
with the plan. possible.
During actual flights, the need has often In carrying out these activities, a formal task
arisen to alter the flight plans. These changes group is set up. Rather than having a perma-
have been implemented without affecting the nent evaluation team, personnel are assigned
primary objectives of the mission. They have who have been actively working in the specific
also been initiated in a manner to obtain a high areas of concern before the flight and during
degree of benefit from the mission in terms of the flight. This approach provides personnel
all the predetermined flight objectives. In already knowledgeable with the background of
some cases, new tasks have been incorporated the particular flight. Corrective action is in-
in the flight plan during the flight, as was the itiated as soon as a problem is isolated and de-
phantom rendezvous and ground transponder fined. At this point in the program, impact of
interrogation on Gemini V when difficulties one flight on another has not proved to be a
forced abandonment of the rendezvous-evalu- major constraint.
ation-pod exercise. While detailed premission
Personnel Motivation
flight planning is a requirement, the ability to
modify rapidly has been of great benefit to the Although good plans and procedures are
program. needed in a major program, well-motivated
people must be behind it. Teamwork comes
Postflight Analysis and Reporting
primarily from a common understanding
In a manned operation, it is necessary to iso- through good communications. In the Gemini
late and resolve problems of one flight before Pi'ogram, an effort has been made to facilitate
direct contact at all levels. Good documen-
proceeding with the next. In the Gemini Pro-
gram, an attempt has been made to establish an tation is necessary but should not constrain
analysis and reporting system which avoids this direct discussions. Individual people, right
potential constraint. The general plan is down to the production line, must fully realize
shown in figure 9-3. In targeting for 2-month their responsibility. This effort starts with
launch centers, the publication of the mission special selection and training, but it is necessary
evaluation report was set at 30 days. In turn, to sustain the effort. With this in mind, a
a major part of the data handling, reduction, number of features directly related to the indi-
and analyses activities takes place during a vidual have been included in the flight-safety
programs. The launch-vehicle program is an
Data reduction '_ outstanding example of this effort. People
Data analysis working on Gemini hardware are given a unique
Anomaly m badge, pin, and credentials. Special awards
investigations
are presented for outstanding work. Special
Failure analyses,/
programs are held to emphasize the need for
Crew debriefing Z_
zero defects. A frequent extra feature of such
Corrective action I programs is attendance and presentations by
Reports Z_ A Z_ the astronauts. Much interest has been ex-
Summary Quick Mission hibited in this feature, and it serves to empha-
look evaluation
I size the manned-flight safety implications of
t
i
Anomaly reviews ZX _ ZX the program.
Before leaving this subject, the effect of in-
End of FOM +50 days Start
mission next centive contracts should also be pointed out.
mission
All major Gemini contracts, although differing
FZOtrSE 2-3.--Postflight analysis and evaluation. in detail, incorporate multiple incentives on
10 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
H.-Gemini
FIGUBE VI1 flight crew onboard recovery
ship.
.*- -.
FIGURE
%%-View through spacecraft window during
reentry.
SPACECRAFT
3. SPACECRAFT DEVELOPMENT
By DUNCANR. COLLINS,Manager, Ofice of Spacecraft Management, Gemini Program Ofice, NASA
Manned Spacecraft Center; HOMERW. DOTTS,Deputy Manager, Ofice of Spacecraft Management,
Gemini Program Ofice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; WILBURNE
F. HOYLER,Gemini Program
Ofice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; and KENNETHF. HECHT,Gemini Program Ofice, N A S A
Manned Spacecraft Center
Summary
The flight sequence of the two-man Gemini
spacecraft from lift-off through reentry and
landing is similar to that of the Mercury space-
craft ; however, additional capabilities are in-
corporated in its design for each phase of flight.
The Gemini spacecraft has the capability of
adjusting its own insertion velocity after sep-
arating from the launch vehicle. It also can
maneuver in space, as well as control its trajec-
tory during reentry. The Gemini spacecraft is
configured to facilitate assembly, testing, and
1
servicing. I t s two-man crew has provided the
capability to accomplish complicated mission
objectives. I t s built-in safety features cover all
phases of flight and have greatly increased the
confidence in the practicality of manned space
vehicles.
Introduction
The Gemini spacecraft with its launch vehicle,
shown in figure 3-1, is the second generation of
manned space vehicles produced in the United
States. The Gemini launch vehicle is a modified
version of the Air Force Titan I1 ballistic
missile. The spacecraft incorporates many con-
cepts and designs that were proved during Proj-
ect Mercury, as well as new designs required by
the advanced Gemini mission objectives and
more operational approach.
Flight Sequence
FIQURE
3-l.-Gemini space vehicle at lift-off.
Launch
The combined length of the Gemini launch diameter of the spacecraft decreases forward of
vehicle and spacecraft is approximately 110 feet. the interface.
The maximum diameter of both vehicles is 10 The launch vehicle consists of two stages:
feet, which is constant from their common inter- the first stage separates approximately 155 sec-
face to the base of the launch vehicle. The onds after lift-off; the second-stage engine is
15
16 GEMINI ]_[IDPROGRA)_ CONFERENCE
shut down approximately 335 seconds after lift- tion and the equipment-adapter section. The
off. These values vary somewhat depending retrorocket-adapter section contains the four
upon performa/_ce, atmospheric conditions, and retrorockets, and the equipment-a&tpter section
the insertion velocities required for a particular contains systems or parts of systems which are
mission. Separation of the spacecraft from the used only in orbit and are not required for
second stage is initiated by the crew approxi- reentry and recovery. The reentry vehicle con-
mately 20 seconds after second-stage engine tains the pressurized cabin, the crew, flight con-
shutdown. This time delay assures that the trols, displays, the life-support system, and the
thrust of the second-stage engine has decayed crew provisions. It also contains the reentry-
sufficiently to prevent recontact between the control-system section and rendezvous and re-
two vehicles during separation. Two 100- covery section. Other systems, some used only
pound thrusters, located at the base of the space- for reentry and some used during all flight
craft, are used to separate the two vehicles. phases, are installed in the reentry vehicle.
These thrusters are nominally fired for several The Gemini spacecraft has the capability to
seconds; however, this time may be extended, if maneuver in space with an orbital attitude and
necessary, for insertiou velocity adjustment. maneuver system, which is located in the
On two missions, this time was held to a mini- adapter section. Spacecraft attitude is con-
mum to permit launch-vehicle station-keeping trolled with eight 95-pound thrusters, and trans-
exercises. lation along any axis is accomplished with
six 100-pound thrusters and two 85-pound
In-Orbit Configuration and Capability
thrusters. This system has been used ex-
Figure 3-9 shows the in-orbit configuration tensively during all Gemini flights to make
of the spacecraft. The spacecraft is manufac- in-plane and out-of-plane maneuvers. The suc-
cessful rendezvous between the Gemini VI-A
tured in two major assemblies: the reentry
vehicle and the adapter. These assemblies are and VII spacecraft was accomplished with this
system and the associated guidance system.
held together by three structural straps spaced
approximately 190 ° apart at the interface. Reentry Sequence
"rR-50 see
(2) The adapter skin and stringers provided 3-4) causes the vehicle to trim aerodynamically
a radiutor for the environmental control system at an angle of attack, thus providing a lift vec-
in orbit. The configuration of this structure, tor normal to the flight path. A controlled
which was designed for the launch and orbit trajectory to a desired touchdown point (fig.
environment, made it easily adaptable as a 3-5) is made by varying the bank angles to the
radiator. right or to the left. A maximum-lift trajec-
(3) Space and center-of-gravity constraints tory is obtained by holding a zero bank angle
do not exist in the adapter sections to the degree through reentry. A zero-lift ballistic trajec-
they do in the reentry vehicle; therefore, the tory is obtained by rolling the vehicle continu-
adapters are less sensitive to equipment loca- ously at a constant rate, which nullifies the lift
tion and design changes. vector. When making a controlled reentry,
(4) It provided a configuration with much bank angles greater than 90 ° are avoided (ex-
flexibility. The design of systems located in cept when flying a zero-lift trajectory) to pre-
the adapter has varied considerably with each clude excessive heating rates and loadings. A
mission. As an example, the Gemini III and controlled reentry may also be executed using
VI-A systems were designed to support a 2-day a combination of the zero-lift trajectory and
mission using battery power. Gemini IV de-
bank technique.
sign supported a 4-day mission using battery
power. Gemini V and VII were powered with
Fliqhl pa1'h .......
fuel-cell electrical systems which supported
0" Bank Lift vector ..... ,7
long-duration missions of up to 14 days.
Although the configuration of the systems
installed in the adapter varied to a great extent,
little change was required in the reentry vehicle.
Left Drag vector--,
The Gemini reentry vehicle is provided with
i
the capability to control the reentry trajectory
J C.g. offset ......
and to land at a predetermined touchdown
point. An asymmetric center of gravity (fig. FZOT.raZ 3-4.--Reentry vehicle trim.
18 GEI_IINI MIDPROGRA_ CONFERENCE
lOOK ,_ngle between the recovery section and the main para-
-- - Continuous roll -- _ 6
-Constant rate I chute will not occur during descent. After the
I I t
-1200 -1000-800 -600 -400 -200 200 400 crew observes that the main parachute has de-
Range, n.mi. ployed and that the rate of descent is nominal,
repositioning of the spacecraft is initiated.
FIOURE 3-5.--Reentry control.
The spacecraft is rotated from a vertical posi-
tion to a 35 ° noseup position for landing. This
Landing Sequence
landing attitude reduces the acceleration forces
A single-parachute landing system is used on at touchdown on the water to values well below
Gemini spacecraft, with the ejection seats serv- the maximum which could be tolerated by the
ing as a backup. In the normal landing se- crew or by the spacecraft.
quence (fig. 3-6), an 8-foot-diameter drogue
parachute is deployed manually at approxi- Spacecraft Design
mately 50 000 feet altitude. Below 50 000 feet,
Reentry Vehicle
this drogue provides a backup to the reentry
control system for spacecraft stabilization. At The reentry vehicle (fig. 3-7) is manufac-
10 600 feet altitude, the crew initiates the main- tured in four major subassemblies: the ablative
parachute deployment sequence, which imme- heat shield, the section containing the pressur-
Drogue
deploy
50,000 flalt
Drogue
release
p!lot deploy
(reefed)
10,600 ft air
Rendezvous
and
recovery
section separation,
main chute
deploy
Spacecraft
repositioned
FIGURE3-6.--Landing sequence.
SPACECRAFT DEVELOPMENT 19
Heat
The structure of the reentry vehicle is pre-
A_. shield
dominately titanium, and it is skinned inter-
nally to the framing. The vehicle is protected
HatchX
from the heat of reentry by a silicone elastomer
ablative heat shield on the large blunt-end fore-
body of the vehicle, by thin Ran4 41 radiative
Reentry control _lJ'f4"_ shingles on the conical section, and by beryllium
shingles which provide a heat sink on the small
end of the vehicle. MIN-K insulation is used
as a conductive barrier between the shingles
and the structure, and Thermoflex blankets are
Side used as a radiative barrier. Flat, double-
equipment
access skinned shear panels form a slab-sided pressure
Rendezvous 8_ doors
recovery section vessel, within the conical section, for the crew.
Two large, hinged hatches provide access to the
FXOURE 3-7.--Reentry vehicle structure.
cabin. The reentry vehicle structure is de-
signed with an ultimate factor of safety of 1.36.
ized cabin, and the reentry control system and The highest reentry heating rates are attained
the rendezvous and recovery sections. The if the spacecraft aborts from a launch trajectory
vehicle was sized to house the pressurized cabin several thousand feet per second short of the
with two crewmembers and associated equip- orbital insertion velocity and reenters along a
ment, and other systems required to be located ballistic trajectory, whereas the highest total
in the reentry vehicle. The use of two crew- heat is sustained during reentry from orbit
members on Gemini flights, as opposed to the along a maximum-lift trajectory (fig. 3-8).
one-man crew in Project Mercury, has resulted The Gemini spacecraft was designed for a max-
in expanded flight accomplishments and flexi- imum stagnation-point heating rate of 70 Btu/
bility in flight planning and operation. For ex- ft2/sec and a maximum total heat of 13 138
ample, experiment activity would have been Btu/ft 2. Maximum total heat is the critical
sharply curtailed had only one crewmember design condition for the ablative heat shield and
been aboard. With only one crewmember, ex- for the beryllium shingles located on the small
travehicular activity would have been unlikely end of the vehicle, while maximum heating rate
as an added objective. Teamwork in prepara- is the critical design condition on the Ren_
tion for each flight is considered to be a major shingles on the conical section.
asset in the crew training programs. Further- The trajectory for the Geh_ini II mission was
more, the number of trained crew personnel is tailored to produce high heating rates as a test
expanded, and this will substantially assist the of the critical design condition on the Ren6
Apollo Program. Many major program ob-
jectives involving inflight control and crew 14 - 7Or-
.... Heating rote
management of spacecraft systems could not
12 - . 60 I-
have been accomplished had only one crew-
member been aboard. = I0 - _"-5o L Total
.'
! Heating
heat
""
/
/
v/
"
-._
.....
Retrograde
161 n. mi. circular
from o
orbit
,_ =
The Mercury blunt-body concept was selected o 8 - "_ 40t- rate
",.. /i Maximum lift
o
for the Gemini spacecraft and provides a con- o
i ,.,,." ",<" Variation of heating
-L
figuration which is compatible with the design 6- so - i/
i i'....
i
•..
",,
__ rate and total heat
during reentry
a mode .3 abort
from
requirements necessary to meet mission objec- "5 4- .E201- .',_ . s., ".
' : (zero lift)
tives. From a reliability, cost, and schedule
standpoint, the advantages of using this con-
2 -'r IOI- .'
""
i
I I I I
'.,..
\ "k I I
cept are obvious, as much of the experience and 0 - 0 L 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
technology gained on Project Mercury could be Time from 400,000 ft,
hundreds of seconds
directly applied to the development and de-
sign of the Gemini spacecraft. _IGURE 3-8.--Spacecraft reentry heating versus time.
20 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
shingles. Based on the Gemini I1 trajectory, corded as 1032O F, against a predicted value of
the stagnation heating rate reached a calculated 1109O F.
value of 71.8 Btu/ft2/sec, slightly in excess of With the exception of the suit-circuit module
that predicted. The R e d shingle temperatures in the environmental control system and that
mere generally as expected. However, in one equipment which must be accessible to the crew,
localized area-in the wake of a fairing located all other major system components in the re-
on the conical section near the heat shield on the entry vehicle are located in accessible areas
most windward side (fig. 3-9)-several small outside the cabin (fig. 3-10). This concept
holes were burned in the shingles. An addi- was used on the Gemini spacecraft t o reduce the
tional wind-tunnel test was conducted on a 10- size of the pressurized cabin and to provide
percent model, and results indicated that minor better access to the equipment during manufac-
changes in the fairing configuration would not turing assembly and during the entire test
decrease the heat intensity. The intensity was, phase up to launch. This arrangement also
however, a function of Reynolds number and allows manufacturing vork tasks and tests to
of the angle of attack. As a result of this test, be performed in parallel, thus shortening sched-
the trim angle on subsequent spacecraft was ules. It has the added advantage of "unclutter-
slightly reduced, and the thickness of two R e d ing" the cabin, which is the last area to be
shingles aft of the fairing was increased from checked out prior to launch.
0.016 to 0.025 inch. The suit-circuit module in the environmental
Heat-shield bond-line temperatures a n d control system is located in the cabin to circum-
beryllium shingle temperatures were lower than vent the possibility of oxygen leakage to am-
those predicted. The hottest area at the heat- bient. The module is installed in an area
shield bond line measured only 254' F at land- below the crew and, for servicing or replace-
ing, although i t was predicted to be 368" F. ment, it is accessible from the outside through
The peak temperature of the beryllium was re- a door located in t,he floor of the cabin. This
" v-__( " "*- - "-*"*-,"
results in a minimum of interference with other
activities.
Adapters
3-9.-Eff'ects
FIGURE of reentry heating on the Gemini FIGURE
3-lO.-Installation of equipment in the reentry
I1 spacecraft. vehicle.
SPACECRAFT DEVELOP)IENT 21
/ Equipment adapter
/ section They perform a variety of operations including
//
/ _Retrograde adapter separation of structure, jettisoning of fairings,
cutting tubing and electrical cables at separa-
;i,ion tion planes, dead-facing electrical connectors,
functioning and sequencing the emergency es-
/rocke)s
cape system, and initiating retrograde and re-
entry systems.
Because of the varied applications of the py-
rotechnics, the individual designs likewise vary.
However, all pyrotechnics have a common de-
sign philosophy : redundancy. All pyrotechnic
devices are powered redundantly or are redun-
dant in performing a given function, in which
\\Retrorocket case the redundant pyrotechnics are ignited
blast shield
separately. For example, in a drogue-
parachute cable cutter where it is not practicable
I_GUaE 3-11.--Spacecraft adapter assembly.
to use redundant cutters, two cartridges, each
ignited by separate circuitry, accomplish the
This isolation protects these units from shrap-
function (see fig. 3-13) ; whereas, for cutting a
nel in the event a tank ruptures in the equip-
wire bundle at a separation plane, two cutters,
ment-adapter section. In addition, when the
each containing a cartridge ignited by separate
retrorockets are fired in salvo in the event
circuitry, accomplish the function redundantly.
of an abort during launch, the blast shield pre-
vents the retrorocket blast from rupturing the Escape Modes
tanks located in the equipment-adapter section
and the launch-vehicle second-stage tank. Ejection seats, as shown in figure 3-14, pro-
Such an event could possibly damage the retro- vide a means of emergency escape for the flight
rocket cases before the firing was complete. crew in the event of a launch vehicle failure on
Systems not required for reentry and recovery the launch pad, or during the launch phase up
are located in the equipment-adapter section. to 15 000 feet. Above 15 000 feet, retrorocket
Most of this equipment is mounted on the aft salvo firing is used to separate the spacecraft
side of the retrorocket blast shield. The sys- from the launch vehicle, after which the para-
tems in this area are designed and assembled as chute is used to recover the spacecraft.. The
modules to reduce assembly and checkout time. seats, however, remain a backup to that escape
The adapter section is a conventional, ex- ]node up to approximately 50 000 feet, and were
ternally skinned, stringer-framed structure. designed and qualified for the higher altitudes
The skin stringers are magnesium, and the and for the condition of maximum dynamic
frames are aluminum alloy. The stringers in- pressure. In addition, the seats provide a back-
corporate passages for the environmental- up landing system in the event of a main para-
control-system coolant fluid and are intercon- chuts failure, and become the primary landing
nected at the ends. This structure provides the system if the reentry vehicle is descending over
radiator for the environmental control system, land during landing. The usual function of
and its external surface is striped to provide the seat, however, is to provide a contoured
temperature control within the adapter. The couch for the crewman and adequate restraint
retrorocket blast shield is a fiber-glass sand- for the forces attendant to launch, reentry, and
which honeycomb structure. The adapter struc- landing.
ture is designed with an ultimate factor of Extensive tests were conducted on the ejection
safety of 1.36. seat system early in the program before it was
qualified for flight. These tests included simu-
Pyrotechnic Applications lated off-the-pad ejections, sled runs at maxi-
As shown in figure 3-12, pyrotechnics are mum dynamic pressure, and ejection from an
used extensivel_ in the Gemini spacecraft. F-106 airplane at an altitude of 40 000 feet.
\
\
\
218-556 0 - 6 6 - 3
4. GUIDANCE, CONTROL, AND PROPULSION SYSTEMS
By RICHARD R. CARLEY, Gemini Program O_ice, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center; NORMAN SCHULZE,
Propulsion and Power Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; BENJAMIN R. DRONE, Gemini
Program 01rice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; DAVID W. CAMP, Gemini Program O_ice, NASA
Manned Spacecraft Center; and JOHN F. HAI_AWAY,Guidance and Control Division, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center
Guidance and Control System Features equipped with a digital command system to
relay information to the spacecraft digital
In the development of an operational ren- computer.
dezvous capability, the geographical constraints The control system consists of: (1) redundant
on the mission are minimized by providing the horizon-sensor systems, ('2) an attitude con-
capability for onboard control of the terminal troller, (3) two translation-maneuver hand
rendezvous phase. To complete the rendezvous controllers, and (4) the attitude-control and
objectives, the spacecraft must be capable of maneuvering electronics which provide com-
• maneuvering, with respect to the target, so that mands to the reentry-control and to the orbit-
the target can be approached and a docking or attitude and maneuvering portions of the
mating operation can be accomplished.
propulsion system. The retrorocket propulsion
For failures in the launch vehicle, such as
engines are normally fired by a signal from the
engine hardover and launch vehicle overrates,
spacecraft time-reference system.
where effects are too fast for manual reaction,
Figure 4-'2 shows the arrangement of the
the automatic portion of the launch-vehicle
guidance, control, and propulsion equipment in
malfunction-detection system switches control
the spacecraft. The locations are shown for the
from the primary to tile secondary system. The
secondary system receives command signals thrust chamber assemblies, or engines, for the
from the spacecraft system for launch guidance. reentry control system, and for the orbital at-
To develop all operational guided reentry, on- titude and maneuver system. The attitude con-
board control has been provided. The use of troller is located between the two crewmembers,
25
26 GEMINI _d[IDPROGRA_ CONFERENCE
actuator _ i
-E_ -_
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F--S_-,_-_s;7;;_
.... !
}_ Computer "_._t .
Gemini Launch _1 i = I Maneuver I OAMSII
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and a translation controller is located on each for launch guidance, rendezvous, reentry, and
side of the cabin. other calculations.
Two attitude display groups, located on the
Control System
instrument panel, use an eight-ball display for
attitude orientation, and are equipped with The control system (fig. 4-3) is basically a
three linear meter needles called flight director redundant rate-command system with the flight
indicators. During launch or reentry, these crew establishing an attitude reference and clos-
needles can be used to indicate steering errors ing the loop. Direct electrical commands to
or commands and permit the flight crew to the thrusters and a single-pulse-generation
monitor the primary system performance. The capability are also provided. The control sys-
needles can also be used to display attitude tem can be referenced to either of the two
errors and to provide spacecraft attitude- horizon-sensor systems to provide a redundant,
orientation commands. The radar range and low-power, pilot-relief mode. This mode con-
range-rate indicator used for the rendezvous trols the vehicle to the local vertical in pitch
missions is located on the left panel. and in roll. Either horizon sensor can also sup-
ply the reference for alining the platform in a
Gemini Guidance System
gyrocompassing-type automatic or manual
The inertial guidance system provides back- mode as selected by the crew. To achieve the
up guidance to the launch vehicle during ascent. desired degree of reliability, the spacecraft is
This system also determines the spacecraft orbit equipped with two separate reentry-control
insertion conditions which are used in comput- systems which include propellants, engines, and
ing the velocity increment required for achiev- electrical-control capability. Either reentry-
ing the targeted orbit apogee and perigee. control system is adequate for controlling space-
This computation is performed using the inser- craft attitude during the retrofire and reentry
tion velocity adjust routine. phases of the mission.
k low-gain antenna, interferometric, pulsed The control system was designed to operate
radar utilizing a transponder on the target ve- with on-off rather than proportional commands
hicle was selected to generate the information to the propulsion engine solenoids. This sim-
used 'by the computer to calculate the two im- plified operation reduced the design require-
pulse maneuvers required to achieve a rendez- ments on the system electronics, solenoids, and
vous with the target. valves, and on the dimensions and injector de-
The need to reference acceleration measure- sign of the thrust chamber assemblies, and also
ments and radar line-of-sight angles, as well as allowed the use of simple switch actuation for
to provide unrestricted attitude reference to the direct manual control. The engine thrust levels
crew, resulted in the selection of a four-gimbal selected were those which would provide trans-
stabilized platform containing three orthogo- lation and rotational acceleration capability
nally mounted accelerometers. It provides an adequate for the completion of all tasks even
inertial reference for launch and reentry, and a with any one engine failed, and which would
local vertical earth-oriented reference for orbit allow reasonable limit-cycle propellant-con-
attitude, using orbit-rate torquing. sumption rates for a long-period orbit operation.
The inertial guidance system also generates
Propulsion System
commands which, together with a cross-range
and down-range steering display, are used to The orbital attitude and maneuver system
reach a landing point from dispersed initial con- (fig. 4-4) uses a hypergolic propellant com-
ditions. Either an automatic mode, using the bination of monomethylhydrazine and nitrogen
displays for monitoring, or a man-in-the-loop tetroxide which is supplied to the engines by a
reentry-guidance technique can be flown. regulated pressurization system that uses helium
The digital computer utilizes a random-access gas stored at 2800 psi. The choice of these pro-
core memory with read-write, stored program, pellants, along with the on-off mode of opera-
and nondestruct features. This memory has a tion, minimized ignition requirements and per-
capacity of 4096 39-bit words. The computer mitted simplification of engine design. Con-
system provides the data processing necessary trolled heating units prevent freezing of the
28 GE_IINI B_IDPROGRAI_I CONFEREI_CE
_F...............
Orbital attitude and -11
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Window
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Pressurant
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r-z_.lTemperature
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Legend.
_Pressurant
9 and I0 95
....... Fuel
II and 12 79
_Oxidizer Oxidizer
13 thru 16 95
tanks
propellants. A brazed, stainless-steel plumbing Flight units were delivered to the prime con-
system is used so that potential leakage points tractor with the flight computer program
and contamination are eliminated. Positive loaded, for installation in the spacecraft prior
expulsion bladders are installed in the propel- to spacecraft systems tests. During the devel-
lant tanks. Table 4-I shows the system char- opment of the guidance and control hardware,
acteristics for steady-state engine operation. it was established that temperature and random
The reentry-control system is of similar de- vibration environments were needed as part of
sign to .the orbital attitude and maneuver sys- the predelivery acceptance testson each flight
tem. _.blative-type engines to limit reentry unit to verify system capabilityand to establish
heating problems are used on the reentry vehi- and maintain effectivequality control. A two-
cle. To reduce hardware development require- sigma flightenvironment was used to uncover
ments and to permit a clean aerodynamic con- conditions not apparent in the normal testing
figuration, submerged engines, similar in design environment. Unsatisfactory conditions were
concept, are used in the orbital attitude and corrected, and the units ret_sted until proper
maneuver system. operation was obtained as a means for insuring
The separate retrograde propulsion system high reliability of the flight equipment.
consists of four spherical-case, polysulfide-am- For the Gemini guidance and control pro-
monium-perchlorate, solid-propellant motors. gram, many special tests were developed. As
The system is designed to assure safe reentry an example, a special inertial component run-in
after any three of the four motors have been test procedure (fig. 4-5) was used to determine
fired. The design also allows the system to be gyro normal-trend data and also to reject
.unstable gyros before installation in plat-
used for emergency separation of the spacecraft
from the launch vehicle after lift-off. forms. After a 40-hour run-in period, five
runup-to-runup drift measurements are ob-
Development Program tained, followed by subsequent sets of run-in
During tile development phase, each guidance and runup-to-runup measurements. The units
and control component underwent a compre- are rejected as having unstable characteristics
hensive series of ground tests, both individually if the drift trend is excessive, or if the effect of
and after integration with interfacing compo- the run-in and the storage-temperature-soak on
nents. These included engineering tests beyond the performance of the gyro creates an unusual
the qualification level; qualification tests; and spread within the sets of measurement bands
overstress, reliability, and complete systems tests or the amount of shift of the bands. Tests of
at the vendor's plant. The computer and in- this nature assure ade/quate selection of inertial
ertial-measurement-unit systems, engineering components and, along with 100 percent in-
models as well as flight hardware, were inte- spection of parts and similar techniques, have
grated at the computer manufacturer's plant. significantly improved system reliability.
• lb_=pounds of force.
b Ibm=pounds of mass.
3O GEMINI I_IIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
¢
MAC SCD
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Analysis for understanding
t 4000
I 7090 simulation
computation
runs heck
rates,
cases,
logic flow)
scaling,
!
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'Revise system math flow
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Assem b_y debug
Run operational program on 7090 FIOURE 4-9.--Engine firing capability.
SDC simulation program (compare check cases,
roundoff and truncation, scaling incompatibilities)
unable to power-down the computer system in stage II flight and ,assuming that no insertion
using normal procedures. Power was removed correction had been m,_te. A range of apogees
using an abnormal sequence which altered the from 130 to 191 nautical miles was targeted on
computer memory and, therefore, prevented its the flights. Comparison of the actual values
subsequent use on the mission. Subsequent in- with those in the IVAR column shows that,
flight cycling of the switch reestablished normal after the Gemini III mission, the insertion ve-
power operation. During postflight testing of locity adjust routine would have reduced the
t:he computer, 3000 normal cycles were demon- dispersion of the actual from nominal. The IGS
strated, both at the system level and with the column shows that, had the backup system been
system installed in the spacecraft. This testing selected, it would have given insertion condi-
was followed by a component disassembly pro- tions resulting in a safe orbit and a go-decision
gram which revealed no anomalies within the for all flights. Although the primary guidance
computer, auxiliary computer power unit, or the was adequate on all flights, the inertial guidance
static power supply. system, subsequent to the Gemini III mission,
The primary horizon sensor on the Gemini V would have provided guidance values closer to
spacecraft failed at the end of Che second day of nominal than the primary system. The use of
the mission. The mission was continued using the insertion velocity ,_ljust routine would have
the secondary system. The horizon-sensor head further reduced these dispersions.
is jettisoned prior to reentry, which makes post- Table 4-IV compares the nominal, actual, and
flight analysis difficult; however, the remaining inertial-guidance-system insertion values of
electronics which were recovered operated nor- total velocity and flight path angle. The actual
mally in postflight testing. value was computed postflight from a trajectory
During ascent, the steering-error monitoring, which included weighted consideration of all
along with selected navigation parameters which available data. The comparison indicates that,
are available as onboard computer readouts, has for missions after the Gemini III mission, the
given adequate information for onboard switch- interial-guidance-system performance has been
over and insertion go--no-go decisions. Table well within expectations.
4-III contains a comparison of the nominal pre- During the orbital phases of flight, the iner-
flight targeted apogee and perigee altitudes, tial guidance system was utilized for attitude
with the flight values actually achieved. The control and reference, for precise translation
table also shows, in the IVAR column, the values control, and for navigation and guidance in
which would have resulted from the use of the closed-loop rendezvous. Performance in all of
insertion veloci.ty adjust routine (IVAR) after these functions is dependent upon platform
insertion with the primary guidance system, alinement. The alinemen¢ technique has proved
and, in the IGS column, the values which would to be satisfactory, with the residual errors,
have been achieved had switchover to iuertial- caused by equipment, in all axes being on the
guidance-system (IGS) steering occurred early order of 0.5 ° or less.
GUIDANCE_ CONTROL_ AND PROPULSION SYSTEMS 33
Nominal Inertial
Mission Insertion condition (targeted) Actual guidance
system
Figure 4-10 contains a time history of the ments for an easy manual approach and dock-
radar digital range and computed range rates ing with the target vehicle. Solid lock-on was
during the rendezvous approach for the Gemini achieved at 232 nautical miles and was main-
VIA mission. Rendezvous-approach criteria tained until the spacecraft had closed with the
limit the permissible range rate as a function target and the radar was powered down.
of range for the closing maneuver. The figure The rendezvous performed on the Gemini
shows that, prior to the initial braking ma- VI-A/VII missions was nominal through-
neuver, the range was closing linearly at ap- out. A computer simulation has been completed
proximately 40 feet per second. If the effect of in which actual radar measurements were used
the braking thrust is ignored, an extrapolation to drive the onboard computer program. A rep-
of range and range rate to the nominal time resentative value of the computed total velocity
of interception indicates that a miss of less than to rendezvous is compared with the telemetered
300 feet would have occurred. A no-braking values and shown in table 4-V. The close agree-
miss of this order is well within the require- men't verifies onboard computer operation. A
trajectory simulation has verified total system
Sl operation. Using the state vectors obtained
from the available tracking of the Gemini VI-A
and VII spacecraft prior to the terminal phase,
and assuming no radar, platform, alinement, or
-°0 5 Radar \ \\ .Permissible range rate
50 0 range_--'_ _" from radar range- thrusting errors, the values of the total velocity
40 -_ ^_ \ rate indicator to rendezvous and the two vernier midcourse
corrections were computed. The simulated
o50 - _ 5 closure / \ _ ,o,.
velocity,' _.% "_ .o..-_. values and the actual values agree within the
_' 20 -- _ 2 Initial )4_, ,0.
uncertainties of the spacecraft ground track-
broking.'" _
o I0- I thrust _- ing for the conditions stated. The flyby miss
I
n- O-- 0 I
548
I
5:49 5:50
t
5:51 5:52
I
5:55
I I
5:54 5:55 distance resulting from this simulation was 96.6
Ground elapsed time, hr:min feet.
The Gemini VI-A and VII spacecraft both
FIGURE 4-10.--Radar trajectory range comparison for
Gemini VI-A and VII rendezvous. demonstrated successful onboard-controlled re-
Computer simulation
Time from lift-off Radar, nautical miles Simulated AVt. = feet per Data acquisition /xV t."
second feet per second
5:15:20 36.20 70 69
Trajectory simulation
First midcoursc correction, incremental velocity indicators Second midcourse correction, incremental velocity indicator
Simulated, feet per second Actual, feet per second Simulated, feet per second Actual, feet per second
entries. The cross-range and down-range error planned technique. The onboard computer
indications of the flight director indicator per- predicted this condition and gave the correct
mitted both flight crews to control the space- commands to permit the flight crew to achieve
craft landing point to well wi'thin the expected the correct landing point. The Gemini IV re-
tolerance of 1"2nautical miles. entry dispersion is that resulting from reentry
Table 4-VI is a summary of reentry naviga- from a circular orbit and being flown without
tion and guidance performance. The first line guidance. The Gemini V reentry miss was
on the figure shows the inertial-guidance-system caused by an incorrect quantity being sent from
navigation error after the completion of steer- the ground. This quantity was used to initial-
ing at 80 000 feet and is obtained from compari- ize the inertial guidance system prior to reentry,
sons with the best estimate trajectory. These and the incorrect quantity caused the inertial
values show that the system was navigating ac- guidance system to show the incorrect range to
curately. The next line shows the miss dis- the targeted landing area. The flight crew
tances as a difference between the planned determined that a discrepancy existed in the
and actual landing points. The Gemini II system and, at that time, started flying a con-
mission had an unguided reentry from a stant bank-angle reentry. The last two lines
low-altitude-insertive reentry condition which in table 4--VI indicate some of the factors caus-
tended to reduce dispersions. Gemini III ing shifts in the landing-area footprints for the
was planned and flown so that a fixed-bank Gemini missions. This table indicates gener-
angle, based on the postretrofire tracking as ally good system performance.
commanded from the ground, was held until
the cross-range error was brought to zero. Control and Propulsion System Performance
During this flight, however, the aerodynamic
The control system has been thoroughly exer-
characteristics and the velocity of the retro-
cised, and all design objectives have been dem-
grade maneuver performed with the orbital at-
titude and maneuver system differed from those onstrated. The platform mode has proved well
expected. This difference reduced the space- suited for in-plane translations, for platform
craft lifting capability to such an extent that, alinement, and for general pilot relief in busy
with the open-loop procedure flown, the targeted exercises such as station keeping. The rate-
landing area could not be reached using the command capability has been most useful for
Retrofire 14 48 50 d 22 41
• Not determined.
b With corrected value for ground update.
Based on extrapolated radar data.
d Preretrofire and retrofire.
36 GEMINI _vIIDPROGRA_ CONFEREI_CE
translations, such as retrofire and rendezvous TABLE 4-VII.ITypical Gemini Retrofire Ma-
maneuvers, and for damping aerodynamic os- neuver Velocity Comparison
cillations during reentry in order to ease the
[Values in parentheses are differences from nominal]
reentry guidance task. Pulse mode has pro-
vided the fine control necessary for manual _X, AY, 5Z,
platform alinements, for station keeping, and Flight feet per feet per feet per Total
second second second
for experiments and maneuvers requiring ac-
curate pointing. Reentry rate command has
been used on the Gemini II and IV missions for Gemini VI-A___ -- 308 0 117 329. 5
(i_ (--1) (. 6)
reentry control. The wide deadbands mecha- (-_)
Gemini VII .... -- 296 113 316. 8
nized in this mode conserve propellants while (3) (-1) (1.6)
retaining adequate control
The horizon mode has been utilized exten-
sively to provide pilot relief through automatic propulsion system maneuvering capability was
control of pitch and roll attitude based upon used for the rendezvous maneuvers during the
horizon-sensor outputs. Performance, in gen- Gemini VI-A mission.
eral, has been excellent, although several in- There have been two flights with known
stances of susceptibility to sun interference have anomalies which could definitely be attributed
been noted. On the Gemini VI-A mission, to the propulsion systems. The two yaw-left
this mode operated unattended for approxi- engines in the orbital attitude and maneuver
mately 5 hours while the flight crew slept. The system of the Gemini V spacecraft became in-
final or direct mode has been utilized effectively operative by the 76th revolution, and neither
by the crew when they wished to perform a engine recovered. Rate data also showed that
maneuver manually with the maximum possible other engines exhibited anomalous behavior but
control authority. subsequently recovered, and this suggested the
Typical retrofire maneuver performance is cause to be freezing of the oxidizer. During
shown in table 4-VII. l-hiring the first manned this flight the heater circuits had been cycled to
mission, the Gemini III spacecraft retro- conserve power. During the Gemini VII mis-
fire maneuver was performed with the roll sion, the two yaw-right engines in the orbital
channel in direct mode and with the pitch and attitude and maneuver system were reported
yaw channels in rate command. This method inoperative by the crew approximately 283
of operation provided additional yaw authority hours after lift-off. Postflight analysis of rate
in anticipation of possible high-disturbance data verified this condition. However, because
torques. Only nominal torques were experi- these engines are not recovered, failure analysis
enced, however, and the remaining missions is difficult, and inflight testing was insufficient
utilized rate-command mode in all axes. Atti- to identify the cause of the failure on Gemini
tude changes during retrofire have resulted in V and VII. Further studies are being con-
vel_ity errors well within the lifting capabil- ducted in an attempt to isolate the cause.
ity of the spacecraft and would not have con- On the Gemini IV spacecraft, one of the pitch
tributed to landing-point dispersions for a engines in the reentry control system was in-
closed-loop reentry. A night retrofire was operative; however, postflight examination re-
demonstrated during the Gemini VI-A and VII vealed a faulty electrical connector at the mating
missions. In summary, the performance of the of the reentry-control-system sectiou and the
attitude-control and maneuvering electronics cabin section.
has been exceptional during ground tests as The propellant quantity remaining in the
well as during all spacecraft flights. spacecraft during the flight is determined by
The Gemini III spacecraft demonstrated the calculating the expanded volume of the pres-
('apat)ility to provide orbital changes which in- surizing gas using pressure and temperature
cluded a retrograde maneuver that required a measurements. Flight experience has shown
Ill-second firing of the aft engines in that, due to inaccuracies in this quantity-gaging
the orbital attitude and maneuver system. The system, a significant quantity of propellants
GUIDANCE, CONTROL, AND PROPULSION SYSTE_IS 37
39
218-556 0--66----4
40 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
Retro-adapter section
HF whip D
VHF whip
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Cabin section
HF whip
antenna
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C-band V
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elements kX )
_'_nd--_
_c_r;
VHF
Recovery
Descent
antenna
stub [_
Quodriplexer t'i't
"°'"ooo
_reOInes_m';treyr C_s°wa "_
antenna
ILl)"-1-;;;;:_:I --Acqu's'''on
o,dbeacon / \\
I¢-c3",,_,, ,,_::Itil--I --'_°°x'a'
-: ....... sw'tch
: ........ / I \Recovery
i light power supply
/ Digital command system (DCS) "''. / ../ / i i'_ ....... Recovery antenna
_\w;_:'ll:'-i
,,X°°""°
.......
-Descent
antenna
h _ y / \/i/ _ -y'_._ ._..-'Voice COntrol center
\ \ Jk" l'_.. / r-_%,.:"X ,C°axia_
sw,ch
Detail 'A' "_i._'<<t_'_ _// Ah \ _ltd.__. ,.il_..._l ljl _,Cooxiol switch
C-band annular slot antenna" _""_:_,_._. _ .'_!_.,. ,,I"_ _/// I /" _ _¢ ___.
Real-time (low-frequency) VH_ ',,,,hln n._' .... "" _"'l_i(_"'.""- "t1_! \ _ J _ ]
telemetry transmitter VHF whip ontenne" _ _I..X "_ II_ C _-ll'_- _.
very minor significance. All of these effects der is mounted in the adapter for orbital use,
combined have not significantly interfered with and the other in the reentry section for .use
mission operations. during launch and reentry (fig. 5-2). The
A high-frequency voice transmitter-receiver adapter transponder peak-power output is
is included in the spacecraft communications 600 watts to the slot antenna mounted on the
system to provide an emergency postlanding bottom of the adapter. The reentry transpon-
long-distance voice and direction-finding com- der peak-power output is 1000 watts to the helix
munications link for use if the landing position antenna system mounted on the reentry section.
of the spacecraft is unknown. It can also be The power is divided and fed to three helix
used for beyond-the-horizon transmissions in antennas mounted at approximately 120 ° inter-
orbit, and as a backup to the very-high- vals around the conical section of the reentry
frequency communications link. The high- assembly, forward of the hatches. Flight re-
frequency link operates on a frequency of sults have been very satisfactory. The ground-
15.016 megacycles with an output power of based C-band radar system is capable of beacon-
5 watts. Manmade electromagnetic interfer- tracking the spacecraft completely through the
ence is of primary concern to communication reentry-plasma blackout region, and has done
links utilizing the high-frequency range for so on more than one occasion.
long-range transmission. Many occurrences of A 250-milliwatt acquisition-aid beacon is
interference at the Gemini frequency are re- mounted in the adapter section. The beacon
ported during each mission. The need for the signal is used by the automatic antenna-
high-frequency communications link would oc- vectoring equipment at the ground stations to
cur with land-position uncertainties of several acquire and track the spacecraft prior to turn-
hundred miles or greater. However, the high- ing on the telemetry transmitters. This system
frequency direction-finding equipment is usu- has operated normally on all flights.
ally tested during the postlanding phase, and The digital command system aboard the
postlanding high-frequency voice communica- spacecraft consists of a dual-receiver single-
tions between Gemini VI-A and the Kennedy decoder unit and two relay packages mounted
Space Center were excellent. Transmissions in the equipment section of 'the adapter. The
from Gemini VI-A and VII were received with two receivers are fed from different antennas,
good quality at St. Louis, Mo. Many good thus taking advantage of complementary an-
direction-finding bearings were obtained on tenna patterns which result in fewer nulls. The
Gemini VI-A and VII. Figure 5-3 is an illus- receiver outputs are summed and fed to the de-
tration of bearings made on Gemini VI-A. coder, which verifies and decodes each com-
The spacecraft tracking system consists of mand, identifies it as being a real-time or stored-
two C-band radar transponders and one program command, and either commands a
acquisition-aid beacon. One radar transpon- relay operation or transfers the digital data,
as indicated by the message address. The de-
4O coder sends a message-acceptance pulse, via the
telemetry system, to the ground when the mes-
sage is accepted by the system to which it is
30 addressed. The probability of accepting an
invalid message is less than one in a million
_20 at any input signal level. The stored-program
"o
mand because of noise imerference or other The recovery beacon transmits a pulse plus
reasons has not caused a problem. Completion continuous-wave signal on the international dis-
of the transmission is an indication that all tress frequency. The signal was specifically de-
commands have been accepted at the spacecraft. signed to be compatible with the AN/ARA-25
The telemetry transmission system consists of and the search and rescue and homing
three transmitters: one for real-time telemetry, (SARAH) direction-finding systems but is also
one spare transmitter, and one for delayed-time compatible with almost all other direction-
recorder playback. Either the real-time or the finding equipment. The transmission range is
delayed-time signal can be switched to the spare limited to horizon distances and, therefore, lim-
transmitter by the digital command system or ited by the altitude of the recovery aircraft.
by manual switching. Recorder playback is also The Gemini recovery-beacon signal is received
accomplished by command or by manual switch- by all aircraft within line of sight and has been
ing. The transmitters are frequency-modulated received by aircraft at distances up to 200
with a minimum of 2 watts power output, and nautical miles.
solid-state components are used throughout. The flashing recovery light is used as a visual
Transmitter performance has been normal dur- location aid during the postlanding phase. It
ing all flights through Gemini VII. The de- is powered by a separate 12-hour battery pack
layed-time transmitter on Gemini III failed a composed of several mercury cells, and can be
short 'time before launch; however, the spare turned on and off by the crew. The flashing
transmitter functioned throughout the short rate is approximately 15 flashes per minute.
mission. The telemetry signal strengths re- The performance of all communications sys-
ceived at the network stations have been ade- tems has met or exceeded the design criteria.
quate. However, some data have been lost by Ground acquisition of both voice and telemetry
the ground stations losing acquisition and fail- signals has always occurred on the approach
ing to _rack the spacecraft. This was usually horizon and has been maintained with excellent
due to signal fades, which were sometimes circuit margins to the departing horizon. No
caused by localized manmade electromagnetic significant design objectives remain to be
interference or multipath signal cancellation. achieved.
A recovery beacon is energized when the
spacecraft goes to two-point suspension on the Instrumentation System
cy voice transmitter, and, if necessary, a signal tion system on spacecraft 2, and the standard
is available from the high-frequency voice production system used on spacecraft 3 and
transmitter for long-range direction finding. subsequent spacecraft.
The PAM-FM-FlY[ system was employed on recording system which require a constant input
spacecraft i to determine the Gemini spacecraft for operation. Pressure transducers_ tempera-
launch environment. This system measured the ture sensors, accelerometers, a carbon-dioxide
noise, vibration, and temperature characteristics partial-pressure sensing system, and synchro-
of the spacecraft during launch and orbital repeaters are provided to convert physical phe-
flight. Excellent data were obtained through- nomena into electrical signals for handling by
out the mission. the system.
To obtain launch and reentry environment Biomedical instrumentation sensors were at-
data in addition to flight performance data on tached to each astronaut's body, and signal con-
ditioners were contained within the astronaut's
spacecraft 2, it was necessary to use special in-
strumentation as well as the standard produc- undergarments. Physiological parameters were
tion instrumentation system. Data on crewman supplied by these sensors and signal conditioners
simulator functions, structural dynamics meas- to the biomedical tape recorders and to the data
urements, many of the temperature measure- transmission system for transmission.
ments, and photographic coverage of the The delayed-transmission recorder/repro-
instrument panels and of the view out of the ducer records data during the time the space-
left-hand window were obtained. These con- craft is out of range of the worldwide tracking
tributed materially to evaluation of other stations. When the spacecraft is within range
onboard systems. of a tracking station, the recorder/reproducer
The spacecraft instrumentation and record- will, upon receiving the proper signal, reverse
ing system also serves as a significant tool in the the tape direction and play back the recorded
checkout of the spacecraft during contractor data at 22 times the real-time data rate.
systems tests and Kennedy Space Center tests. The data transmission system is composed of
During flight, the standard instrumentation sys- the pulse-code-modulation (PCM) multiplexer-
tem provides operational data and facilitates encoder, the tape recorder/reproducer, and the
diagnostic functions on the ground. telemetry transmitters. The PCM multiplexer-
The instrumentation system (shown in fig. encoder includes the PCM programer, two
5-4) is composed of a data acquisition system low-level multiplexers, and two high-level
and a data transmission system. Instrumenta- multiplexers. The programer provides the
tion packages contain signal-conditioning mod- functions of data multiplexing, analog-to-
ules which convert inputs from various space- digital conversion, and d_gital data multiplex-
craft systems into signals which are compatible ing, while also providing the required timing
with the data transmission system. Redundant and sampling functions needed to support the
dc-to-dc converters provide controlled voltages high-level and low-level multiplexers. The two
for those portions of the instrumentation and high-level multiplexers function as high-level
analog commutators and on-off digital data
multiplexers_ providing for the sampling of
I
0-to-5-volt dc measurements and bilevel (on-off)
Signal events. The two low-level multiplexers func-
conditioners Multiplexers Programmer
tion as differential input analog commutators
and provide for the sampling of 0-to-20-milli-
volt signals.
The PCM multiplexer-encoder is made up
reproducer
Recorder i
of plug-in multilayered motherboards. Each
l motherboard
modules
contains
which employ
numerous
the cordwood
solid-state
construc-
Delayed-
tion techniqu% and each module performs spe-
time
transmitter cific logic functions. The data transmission sys-
tem contains approximately 25 000 parts, giving
Data transmission system
a component density of approximately 37 000
FIGURE 5-4.--Block diagram of the instrumentation parts per cubic foot, or over 90 parts within each
system. cubic inch.
44 GEMINI _IDPROGRA3_ CONFERENCE
The PCM system accepts 0-to-20-millivolt tion-isolation mount. After the Gemini II
signals, 0-to-5-volt dc signals, bilevel event sig- flight-vibration data were obtained, a vibration
nals, and digital words from the onboard com- specification was established for the operation
puter and time reference systems, as shown in of the PCM tape recorder and was met.
table 5-II. The total system capacity of 338 During spacecraft systems tests, switching
measurements has been more than adequate, functions caused inductive transients on the
since the manned missions have not required voltage supply buses, introducing spurious re-
more than 300 measurements. sets into the multiplexers which caused a loss of
To meet program objectives, three significant data. A simple modification which inserted
problems had to be overcome. These are shown diodes in the reset drive lines eliminated most
in table 5-III. of the problem. Unfortunately, this modifica-
The PCM tape recorder would not perform tion lowered the reset drive voltage to a level
properly at the specification vibration levels which made the multiplexers susceptible to
during the development tests. This problem "lockup," or not sending data out to the PCM
was one of the most difficult development prob- programer in the proper sequence. The reset
lems encountered. The final solution required drive and counterdrive circuitry in the pro-
over 10 major modifications, numerous minor gramer and the remote multiplexers were modi-
modifications, and a special ball-socket vibra- fied and flown in spacecraft 3 and subsequent
spacecraft.
TABLE 5-II.--Instrumentation System Capacity _ During spacecraft 3 testing, it was found that
the combination of the Gemini PCM prime-
Number of Type of signal Sample rate, frame format with the bit jitter of the tape
signals samples/see recorder would not allow optimum recovery of
the recorded data. By changing the output of
6 the tape recorder from non-return-to-zero-
6 160
640 change to non-return-to-zero-space, recovery of
9 80
the dump data during high bit-jitter periods
16 0-20 mV dc
48
l 1.25
• 42 was enhanced by a factor of 15 to 1. The non-
3 return-to-zero-space code tends to give an out-
3 20 put which is optimum for the Gemini data
6 10
0-5 V dc format and also minimizes the sync adjustment
96 1.25
sensitivities of the PCM ground stations.
120 Bilevel 10
1 Digital 10 For all Gemini missions to date, the instru-
24 Digital • 416 mentation system has performed exceptionally
well. Out of the 1765 measurements made, only
• Available channels: 10 parameters were lost, or 0.57 percent. A
Analog .............................. 193 summary of the real-time telemetry data
Bilevel .............................. 120
actually received for Gemini missions II
Digital .............................. 25
through VII reveals that the usable data exceed
Total .............................. 338 97.53 percent.
multiplexer-eneoder
Tape recorder Development Failed in vibration Major modifications made
Table 5-IV summarizes the delayed-time data This bearing seizure resulted from a design defi-
quality. During orbital flight, 416 data dumps ciency which allowed the bearing shield to cut
have been made. Of these, 135 data dumps have into an adjacent shoulder, generating metallic
been processed and evaluated. The results chips which entered the bearing itself. Modifi-
show that 96.57 percent of the evaluated data cations to correct this problem have been made
was completely acceptable. in the remaining flight recorders. The other
failures could not be verified because the failure
TABLE 5-IV.--Summary o/ Delayed-Time Pulse- modes could not be reproduced, or because the
Code-Modulation Data Dumps _ suspect components were jettisoned prior to
reentry.
Dumps Percent of data retrieved The Gemini instrumentation system has met
from evaluated
dumps the mission requirements on all flights and has
Total Evaluated been of significant importance in preflight
checkout of spacecraft systems. The design
416 135 96. 57 criteria which established parameter capacity,
sampling rate, circuit margin, et cetera, proved
• Data for 5 missions. to be completely adequate throughout the
missions to date. The instrumentation system
The failures which occurred during Gemini accuracy of 3 percent has been more than ade-
flights are shown in table 5-V. The majority of quate to satisfy the program requirements.
the problems are associated with the playback The problems encountered to date have all been
tape recorder, the most significant of which was resolved, and no major objectives remain to be
due to a playback clutch ball-bearing seizure. achieved.
Gemini IV .......... Recorder stopped running Lost data after 2000 feet Cause undetermined
during descent and landing (possible bearing seizure)
Gemini V ........... Oxide flaked off tape Poor delayed-time data, Improved assembly pro-
revolutions 30 through 45 eedures
Gemini VI-A and Recorder bearing seized Lost delayed-time data Rework bearing clearances
Gemini VII
Gemini VI-A ....... Possible solid-state switch Lost 5 parameters, regained Cause undetermined (still
malfunction after retrofire under investigation)
Gemini VII ......... Transducer stuck at 910 After 170 hours lost data on None (failure analysis
psi reactant-supply-system impossible)
oxidizer supply pressure
6. ELECTRICAL POWER AND SEQUENTIAL SYSTEMS
By PERCY MIGLICCO, Gemini Program O_ice, Manned Spacecra# Center; ROBERT COHEN, Gemini Program
Office, Manned Spacecraft Center; and JESSE DEMING, Gemini Program Office, Manned Spacecraft
Center
47
48 GEMINI _IDPROGRA_ CONFERENCE
Cam mon-'-'_'_
Communications system
control ..._
bus _ Main
• bus
Test Instrumentation system
4 Reentry 1_._2 ff
batteries I On
Insert/abort
I I tie _/___ I
Squib
Umbflicol
ooof, l,
_ I
El.....
I switch
: I Sooih
I " I
I Retrofire landing
and post landing
_
_"
Squib
busses
baflery
I
"""-i'_' l I I I I ? Io
' ' I I -.AAIE.aerimen Insert/abort
Blockhouse
control == _ _ _ I _.,_/__J_ Experiment °l
Attitude thrusters
Urnobilic°l "E _ _
Squib
beltery ._._._____o 0 f f Power sys control
3 On Auto retrofire
Agena control
TABLE 6-I.--Main Power Source.for Gemini the fuel cell has the advantage of low weight
Spacecraft and low volume over a silver-zinc battery
system.
Estimated The fuel-cell power system (fig. 6-2) consists
Spacecraft Power source usage,
ampere-hours
of two sections, plus an associated reactant sup-
ply system. Each section is approximately 25
inches long and 1'2.5 inches in diameter, and
3 .......... 3 silver-zinc batteries =___ 354. 3
4 .......... 6 silver-zinc batteries .... 2073. 0
weighs approximately 68 pounds inclu_ling ac-
5 .......... 4215• 8
cessories. The section contains 3 stacks of 32
Fuel-cell power system___
6 .......... 3 silver-zinc batteries .... 1080. 0 cells and can produce 1 kilowatt at 96.5 to 23.3
7 .......... 5583. 6
Fuel-cell power system___ volts. The .system is flexible in operation.
Each stack or section can be removed from the
• Each silver-zinc battery had a capacity of 400 bus at any time. A section can be replaced on
ampere-hours.
the bus after extended periods of open circuit.
Two stacks are required for powered-down
Table 6-II shows load sharing of the batteries
flight (17 amperes), and five stacks are needed
and gives the ampere-hours remaining in each
for maximum loads. To provide electrical
reentry and squib battery after completion of
power, each cell must interface with the hydro-
the mission. The highest usage of squib bat-
gen and oxygen supply system and with the
teries was 59.2 percent on spacecraft 5, whereas
the highest usage of reentry batteries was 29 water system.
percent on spacecraft 7. The oxygen and hydrogen reactants for the
The fuel-cell power system provided Gemini fuel cell are stored in a supercritical cryogenic
with a long-duration mission capability. For state in tanks located in the spacecraft adapter
missions requiring more than 800 ampere-hours, section. Each tank contains heaters for main-
ELECTRICAL ]POWER AND SEQUENTIAL SYSTEMS 49
TABLE 6-II.--Reentry and Squib Batteries Post flight Discharge Data "
Spacecraft
Silver-zinc batteries rated
capacity
tion point. Ribbed metal current carriers are regulators that control the flow of the oxygen
in contact with both sides of the electrodes to and hydrogen gases to the fuel-cell sections.
conduct the produced electricity. Another system which interfaces with the
The water formed in each cell during the con- fuel cell is the coolant system. The spacecraft
version of electricity is absorbed by wicks and has two coolant loops: the primary loop goes
transferred to a felt pad located on a porcelain through one fuel-cell section, and the secondary
gas-water separator at the bottom of each stack. loop goes through the second section. In each
Removal of the water through the separator is section the coolant is split into two parallel
accomplished by the differential pressure be- paths. For the coolant system, the stacks are
tween oxygen and water across the separator. in series, and the cells are in parallel. The
If this differential pressure becomes too high or coolant-flow inlet temperature is regulated to a
too low, a warning light on the cabin instrument nominal 75 ° F.
panel provides an indication to the flight crew.
Ground Test Program
The telemetry system also transmits this infor-
mation to the ground stations. A similar warn- To achieve the necessary confidence required
ing system is provided for the oxygen-to-hydro- before a completely new system is certified for
gen gas differential pressure so that the appro- flight, considerable ground testing of the fuel-
priate action may be taken if out-of-specification cell power system was necessary (table 6-III).
conditions occur. As part of the development program, two fuel-
The water produced by the fuel-cell system cell sections were operated at electrical load
exerts pressure on the Teflon bladders in water profiles simulating prelaunch and rendezvous,
tanks A and B. Water tank A also contains followed by powered-down flight. The first
drinking water for the flight crew, and the section lasted 1100 hours_ and the second
drinking-water pressure results from the differ- section lasted 822 hours. A third section
ential between the fuel-cell product-water pres- endured 10 repeated rendezvous missions. In
sure and cabin pressure. Tank B has been qualification, one _ction was subjected to ran-
precharged with a gas to 19 psia, and the fuel- dom vibration, and a month later it was placed
cell product water interfaces with this gas. in an altitude chamber at -40 ° F for 4 hours.
However, the 19-psia pressure changes with Still another section successfully experienced
drinking-water consumption, fuel-cell water acceleration, and a month later it was placed
production, and temperature. Should the pres- in an altitude chamber with chamber-wall tem-
sure exceed 20 psia, the overpressurization is peratures cycling each 24 hours from 40 ° to 160 °
relieved by two regulators. This gas pressure F. This section was supplying power to a simu-
provides a reference pressure to the two dual lated 14-day-mission electrical load.
1516 ..... Ambient ..................... Prelaunch simulation rendez- 1100 hours' duration
vous powered-down
1519 ..... Ambient .................... Prelaunch simulation rendez- 822 hours' duration
vous powered-down
1524 ..... Ambient ..................... Repeated 2-day rendezvous ..... 10 cycles
1514 ..... Vibration (random) (7.0g RMS 30 amperes ................... Satisfactory
for 8 minutes per axis)
Altitude (1.47 X 10 -5 psia) ...... 7.5 amperes, 4 hours ........... Satisfactory
1527 ..... Acceleration linearly from 1 to 45 amperes ................... Satisfactory
7.25g in 326 seconds
Altitude (1.6410-6 psia) ; tem- 14-day mission profile .......... Monitored with cockpit instru-
perature cycled 40 ° to 160 ° F mentation; successfully com-
every 90 minutes pleted mission
ELECTRICAL POWER AND SEQUENTIAL SYSTEMS 51
25.5 volts.
>2 B •_._l_'_ ./First day
Section, per/ormance.--The performance of
the fuel-cell section 1 is shown in figure 6-3.
Between the first launch attempt and the actual ==First day °
ond activation of the section on August 18, 1965, FIGURE 6-4.--Fuel-cell section 2 performance for the
these three periods, was 0.27 volt. A compari- shown in table 6-IV. While the inflight per-
son of the performance following each open- formance of section 2 declined, the performance
circuit period shows a net rise of 0.15 volt in of section 1 impioved and resulted in a shift of
section 2 performance. 7.7 percent in load sharing between the two
sections.
The purge sensitivity exhibited during the
mission was found to be normal. An average Reactant-usage rate and water-production
rate.--Since the Gemini V mission was the first
recovery of 0.1 volt resulted from the oxygen
mission to use the fuel-cell power system, it was
and hydrogen purge sequences.
Three differential-pressure warning-light in- important to future mission planning that the
dications occurred: during launch, during the reactant-usage rates be determined and com-
first hydrogen purge of section 1, and during an pared with theoretical and ground-test experi-
attempt to purge section 1 without opening the ence (table 6-V). The reactant-usage rate and
crossover valve. These pressure excursions water-production rate agreed within 2 and 4
caused no apparent damage to the fuel-cell percent, respectively, with the theoretical, and
power system. within 5 percent in each case with ground-test
Load sharing of the six fuel-cell stacks is observations.
• These are averages of 4 caleulatedrates taken at 15,24, 30, and 34.5 hours afterlift-off.
ELECTRICAL POWER AND SEQUENTIAL SYSTE_IS 53
The cryogenic-oxygen heater circuit failed in a zero-gravity environment and the internal
after about 26 minutes of flight. Therefore, the arrangement of the container. A more detailed
oxygen-usage rate was calculated from hydro- postflight analysis indicated that, at all times
gen data, applying the ratio of 8 to 1 for the during the mission, the extracted fluid, by
chemical combinations of oxygen and hydrogen. weight, was more than 60 percent low-energy
The water-generation rate of the fuel cell was liquid. The energy balance between extraction
determined by two different methods. In and ambient heat leak permitted a gradual pres-
method 1, hydrogen and oxygen usage rates sure increase to 960 psia at the end of the mis-
were combined, assuming that all of the gases sion. The mission was completed with an esti-
produced water. In method 2, the amount of mated 73 pounds of the oxygen remaining in the
drinking water consumed by the flight crew was tank. Postlandings tests of all associated cir-
added to the amount required to change the gas cuits and components in the reentry portion of
pressure in the water storage tank over a given the spacecraft did not uncover the problem. To
interval of time, and the ratio of this water prevent a similar occurrence on spacecraft 7, a
quantity to the associated ampere-hours resulted crossfeed valve was installed between the
in the production rate. environmental-control-system primary-oxygen
Prior to the Gemini V launch, the hydrogen tank and the fuel-cell reactant-supply-system
tank in the reactant supply system was filled oxygen tank.
with 23.1 pounds of hydrogen to satisfy the pre-
Gemini VII
dicted venting and the power requirements of
the planned mission. Prelaunch testing of the The 14-day Gemini VII flight was the second
hydrogen tank showed that it had an ambient mission to use a fuel-cell power system. This
heat leak greater than 9.65 Btu per hour, and mission would not have been possible without
this provided data for an accurate prediction the approximately 1000-pound weight saving
of inflight performance. The tank pressure provided by the fuel cell. In addition to the
increased to the vent level of 350 psia at 43 hours man-bus loads, during orbital flight, fuel-cell
after lift-off. Venting continued until 167 power was switched to the squib buses, and the
hours after lift-off, with a brief period of vent- squib batteries were shut down. During this
ing at approximately 177 hours. At the end mission the maximum load supplied by the fuel-
of the mission, 1.51 pounds of hydrogen re- cell power system was 45.2 amperes at 23.4 volts.
mained. The oxygen container in the reactant Section per/o_'mance.--Figure 6-5 shows the
supply system was serviced with 178.2 pounds performance of the fuel-cell section i during its
of oxygen and pressurized to 815 psia. Opera- second activitation and on the first and last,
tion was normal until 25 minutes 51 seconds days of the Gemini VII mission. During these
after lift-off when the heater circuitry failed. periods the voltage decay averaged 3 and 5
The pressure then declined gradually until
stabilization occurred at.approximately 70 psia,
29
f
around 4 hours 29 minutes after lift-off.
Although 70 psia was far below the 900 psia 28
specified minimum supply pressure, the gas reg- _,_. jPre-iaunch (second activation)
energy liquid instead of high-energy vapor. FIGURE 6-5.--Fuel-cell section 1 performance for the
This was a result of the characteristics of a fluid Gemini VII mission.
54 GEMINI I_IIDPROGRAI_I CONFERENCE
millivolts per hour at 10 and 24 amperes, re- hours after lift-off, a maximum storage fluctua-
spectively. These decay rates are within the tion of 8 pounds occurred around the gradual
range experienced in the laboratory section life storage reduction. The gradual storage reduc-
tests. Through the first 127 hours of the mis- tion, totaling 12 pounds at the end of the mis-
sion, the performance decay rate of the fuel-cell sion, is attributed to losses of water during
section 9 was also within the range experienced purges of oxygen and hydrogen or to a possible
in the laboratory section life tests. At that time, loss of nitrogen in the water-reference system.
the first of several rapid performance declines A significant observation is that, when periods
was observed, with each decline showing severe of maximum product-water storage occurred,
drops in stack 2C performance. At 259 hours the section current characteristics at a constant
after lift-off, the last rapid performance decline voltage show good fuel-cell performance.
in section 2 began and resulted in 'the removal When periods of minimum or decreasing prod-
of stacks 2A and 2C from the spacecraft uct-wa_er storage occurred, section .2 and, to a
electrical-power bus. lesser extent, section 1, had very low or degrad-
During all but 16 hours of the mission, the ing performance. The responses to the correc-
oxygen-to-water differential pressure warning tive actions were significant increases in stored
light of section 2 indicated an out-of-limit water (presumably from see. 2) and immediate
oxygen-to-water pressure across the water sep- return to normal performance.
arators. With an out-of-tolerance differential Photographs of the Gemini VII spacecraft,
pressure, the extraction rate of water from tlle taken by the Gemini VIA flight crew during
section would have been severely reduced. the rendezvous exercise, revealed an ice forma-
Therefore, when the performance of stack 2C, tion around the hydrogen-vent port on the
which was carrying 45 to 50 percent of the sec- equipment adapter (fig. 6-7). The presence of
tion load, started dropping, it was concluded this ice formation raised questions about the
that water was accumulating in section 2. Ex- ability to purge hydrogen from the fuel-cell
cessive water reduces the active membrane area sections. Purge effects were not discernible
in each cell by masking; consequently, section from the data. The Gemini VII flight crew
•2 was purged more often in order to move water did report water crystals going by the space-
out through the ports. In addition, this section craft window during hydrogen purges late in
was placed on open circuit to stop the produc- the mission. At these particular times, the vent
tion of water while permitting water removal to port was at least partially open. The hydro-
con'tinue. gen-to-oxygen differential-pressure light, nor-
Figures 6-6(a) and 6--6(b) show the devia- molly illuminated during hydrogen purging,
tions in product-water storage with the per- did not illuminate during this flight or the
formance of the fuel-cell sections as a function Gemini V mission. Freezing of the purge
of time from lift-off. Between 100 and .265 moisture at the vent port could cause restriction
.a
0
._ _-4
hl' % Ill '(9 ,h _ water loss - --
E _-8
3
Minimum
in
storage
storage
of produc
tank
,? _'_ 'LF+X]\n---- _ '_ _"_"_"water
,-g -12
121
I I [ ___±__ L 2 __l J___[ I I I 1 I I J I I I I I 1_ I [ _
H6(_
20 40 60 80 IO0 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 500 520 540
(al
Ground elopsed time, hr
14
- Section I normal oxygen purge r-Approximate normal fuel-cell
with 56-sac hydrogen purge ..... -, / performance decay
_\ / characteristics
12
_8 characteristics
at I _ i _, _" _, I '_ /? X_', _
constant voltage (27 volts) k I _,_ _ X. ? _ i _ "%
Section I - _' _ ' -_ " _ I }:_ .... Open-circuit
c6 • _ q3 - _ _ _ i stacks 2 A
o Section ," o // _43 / i
• t / _ , L-lOpen _-_ _l and 2C
Purge event _ ] // _ reactant gas h_ihl -
03
4 Open-circuit stack 2C,or IO rain // /" _;_S2°lVh; _ Open circuit stack
and double purge section 2 ..... -" ' " _ ..... 2 C for 05hr
I
0 20 40 60 80 I00 120 t40 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 500 520 340
(b) Ground elapsed time, hr
Sequential System
218-556 0--66----5
_ GEMINI _IIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
Relay
guillotine
I i i
GLV-SC _
Relay SC
Guillotine
shapecherge 2
(GLV-SC) I "-""r'-"
SEP
120 /,' sec , ,,
time delay
i S Squib bus I
boost insert
switch I _,
\
240 p sec
time delay
T _elay_yro _
/ * switch 2 __ 50-70 # sec time delay
Squib bus 2
boost insert
i
Guilloline
2 1
(GLV-SC)
i
SEP
120 ,u sec _-_11,. Relay SC
Relay i_ I' [ _'I shapecharge 2
time delay
guillotine II
2
GLV-SC
wire bundles prior to severing, and to the initiators. Thus far in the program, all sequen-
shaped charges that break the structural bond tial timeotLts have been nominal.
between the launch vehicle and the spacecraft.
The sequential system is checked out fre- Concluding Remarks
quent|y before the spacecraft leaves the launch It can be concluded from Gemini flight ex-
pad. Each sequential function is performed perience that fuel cells and their associated
first with one circuit, then with the backup, and cryogenic reactant supply systems are suitable
finally with both. The timeout of all time and practical for manned space flight applica-
delays is checked and rechecked. High-energy tions. It can also be concluded that the man-
and low-energy squib simulators were fired to in-the-loop concept of manually performing
insure that the firing circuits were capable of non-time-critical sequential functions is a re-
handling the sure-fire current of the pyrotechnic liable mode of operation.
7. CREW STATION AND EXTRAVEHICULAR EQUIPMENT
By R. M. MACHELL, Gemini Program 01_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center; J. C. SHOWS, Flight Crew
Support Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; J. V. CORREALE, Crew Systems Division, NASA
Manned Spacecraft Center; L. D. ALLEN, Flight Crew Operations Directorate, NASA Manned Space-
craft Center; and W. J. HUFFSTETLER, Crew Systems Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
57
58 GEMINI MIDPOWRAM CONFERENCE
dimming controls and alternate selection of red The center stowage frame holds fiber-glass
or white light are provided. The cabin light- boxes containing fragile equipment. These
ing has been adequate for the missions to date; boxes are standardized, and the interiors are
however, during darkside operation, the crews filled with a plastic foam material molded to fit
have found it difficult to see the instruments the contours of the stowed items. This foam
without reducing their dark adaptation for ex- provides mechanical and thermal protection.
ternal visibility. Floodlighting is not well Figure 7-5 shows a typical center stowage box
suited to this requirement. with equipment installed. The concept of using
standardized containers with different interiors
Stowage Provisions
has made it possible to use the same basic stow-
The equipment stowage provisions consist of age arrangements for widely varying mission
fixed metal containers on the side and rear walls requirements.
of the cabin, and a large stowage frame in the
center of the cabin between the ejection seats, as
shown in figures 7 3 and 7-4. Food packages
and other equipment are stowed in the side and
a f t containers. All items in the aft containers
are normally stowed in pouches, with all the
pouches in a container tied together on a
lanyard.
/----' \c
,,/\
# /
Pressurized
envelope
FIQURE 7-6.-Spacecraft instrument panel: ( 1 ) secondary oxygen shut-off (1.h.) ; (2) abort handle; ( 3 ) left
s\\.itc.h/rircuit-breakerpanel ; ( 4 ) lower console ; ( 5 ) rommand pilot's panel ; ( A ) overhead switch/circuit-
breaker panel ; ( R ) right s\~itch/circuit-breker panel; ( C ) secondary oxygen shut-off (r.h.); ( D ) main
c.onsole ; ( E ) e n t e r cwnsole ; ( F ) pilot's panel ; ( G ) n-a ter management panel ; (I?) coninland encoder.
60 GEI_IINI k'YIIDPROGRAlV[ CONFERENCE
The left instrument panel (fig. 7-7) contains is also installed in the right instrument panel.
the flight command and situation displays and The right switch panel contains switches and
the launch-vehicle monitoring group. The ma- circuit breakers for the electrical power system
neuver control ]mndle is located under the left and experiments. Below the right switch panel
instrument panel. The left switch panel con- is the right-hand maneuver control handle.
tains the sequential bus and retrorocket arming These displays and controls are operated by the
switches, as well as circuit breakers for elec- pilot.
trical-sequential functions and communications The center instrument panel (fig. 7-9) con-
functions. The abort control handle is just be- tains the communications controls, the environ-
low the left switch panel. These displays and mental displays and controls, and the electrical-
controls are normally operated only by the com- sequential system controls. The pedestal panel
mand pilot. contains the guidance and navigation system
The right instrument panel (fig. 7-8) con- controls, the attitude and maneuvering system
tains displays and controls for the navigation controls, the landing and recovery system con-
system, the electrical power system, and experi- trols, and the space-suit ventilation flow con-
ments. A flight director and attitude indicator trols. The attitude control handle and the
Left switch/circuit-
breaker panel
J
J
Pilaf's panel
Right switch/circuit.
breaker panel
cabin and suit temperature controls are located The launch-vehicle monitoring group, or the
on the center console. The water management malfunction-detection-system display, consists
controls are located on a panel between the ejec- of launch-vehicle tank-pressure gages, thrust-
tion seats. The overhead switch panel contains chamber pressure lights, an attitude overrate
switches and circuit breakers for the attitude light, and a secondary guidance light.
contrc __and maneuvering systems, the environ- The primary-navigation-system display and
mental control system, and the cabin lighting. control unit is the manual data insertion unit
These controls and displays are accessible to located on the right instrument panel. Guid-
both pilots and may be operated by either one. ance computer values may be inserted or read
out with the manual data insertion unit.
Displays
The environmental and propulsion system
The primary flight displays consist of the displays and the electrical-power-system moni-
flight director and attitude indicator, the incre- tor display all utilize vertical scales on which
memal velocity indicator, and the radar indi- deviations from nominal are readily detected.
cator. The flight director and attitude indi- In the electrical power system, the current val-
cator is composed of an all-attitude sphere and ues for all six stacks of the fuel cell are dis-
flight director needles for roll, pitch, and yaw. played simultaneously. The concept of a single
The incremental velocity indicator provides the ammeter with a stack-selector switch did not
command pilot with either the command-ma- prove satisfactory, since frequent monitoring of
neuver velocities from the guidance computer the stack currents is required. For relatively
or the velocities resulting from translation ma- static parameters such as cryogenic tank pres-
neuvers. The radar indicator displays the ren- sures and quantities and propellant tempera-
dezvous-target range and range rate when the tures, the use of one display and a selector
radar is locked on. switch for several parameters was adequate.
62 GEMINI _IDPROGRA]K CONFERENCE
Center panel
©
Center console
Overhead
switch/circuit-
breaker
panel
Pedestal
C
E Yaw axis //-_\
Stowed position --_, / \
, Yaw right
_/ ./Communications
i Palm pivot
r - Integrated vent
Space Suits and Accessories ,‘ poss through
disconnect
G3C Space Suit ; bearing
4
\
\
the crew t o carry out their mission tasks. This
I
\ \
\
equipment included flight data items, photo-
\
L---- Felt layer HT-I graphic and optical equipment, and a large
number of miscellaneous items such as small
dJ tools, handheld sensors, medical kits, wrist-
watches, pencils, and pens. A 16-mm sequence
camera and a 70-mm still camera were carried
BYGURE 7 - 1 4 . 4 m i n i extravehicular space suit. on all the flights. Good results were obtained
with these cameras.
this discomfort increased significantly with An optical sight was used for alining the
time. -4fter the Gemini I V and V missions, it spacecraft on specific ground objects or land-
was concluded that the characteristics of a space marks, and it was also effective in aiming a t the
suit designed for extravehicular operation were rendezvous target. The backup rendezvous
marginal for long-term intravehicular wear. techniques being developed depend on the aim-
ing and alinement capabilities of the optical
G5C Space Suit
sight. The extensive use of this sight for
The G5C space suit \t-as developed for intra- experiments and operational activities made i t
vehicular use only, and it was used on the a necessary item of equipment for all missions.
Gemini V I 1 mission. It mas designed t o pro- All of the flight-crew equipment served useful
vide maximum comfort and freedom of move- purposes in flight and contributed to the crew’s
ment, with the principal consideration being capability to live and work in the Spacecraft
reduction in bulk. As shown in figure 7-15, for short or long missions. The large number
the G5C suit is a lightweight suit with a soft of items required considerable attention to do-
fabric hood. The hood, which is a continua- tail to insure adequate flight preparation. The
tion of the torso, incorporates a polycarbonate most important lesson learned concerning
visor and a pressure-sealing zipper. The zip- flight-crew equipment was the need for early
per installation permits removal of the hood definition of requirements, and for timely delir-
for stowage behind the astronaut’s head. The ery of hardware on a schedule compatible with
G5C suit provided much less bulk, less resist- the spacecraft testing sequence.
66 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM C O N F E m E 7 E
I
Ly
FIGTJBE
7 - 1 5 . 4 m i n i G5C space suit.
Food, Water, Waste, and Personal sponding to their daily schedule. Occasional
Hygiene System leakage of the food bags occurred in use. Be-
cause of the hand pressure needed to squeeze the
Food System food out of the feeder spout, these leaks were
The Gemini food system consists of freeze- most prevalent in the chunky, rehydratable
dried rehydratable foods and beverages, and items. A design change has been made to in-
bite-sized foods. Each item is vacuum packed crease the spout width. The bite-sized foods
in a laminated plastic bag. The items are then were satisfactory for snacks but were undesir-
combined in units of one or two meals and able for a sustained diet. These items were
vacuum packed in a heavy aluminum-foil over- rich, dry, and, in some cases, slightly abrasive.
wrap. (Seefig. 7-16.) The rehydratable food I n addition, some of the bite-sized items tended
bag incorporates a cylindrical plastic valve to crumble. I n general, the flight crews pre-
which mates with the spacecraft water dis- ferred the rehydratable foods and beverages.
penser for injecting water into the bag. A t the Drinking-Water Dispenser
other end of the bag is a feeder spout which is
unrolled and inserted into the mouth for eating The drinking-water dispenser (fig. 7-17) is
or drinking the contents. a pistol configuration with a long tubular barrel
A typical meal consists of two rehydratable which is designed to mate with the drinking
foods, two bite-sized items, and a beverage. port on the space-suit helmet. The water shut-
The average menu provides between 2000 and off valve is located a t the exit end of the barrel
2500 calories per man per day. The crews fa- to minimize residual-water spillage. This dis-
vored menus with typical breakfast, lunch, and penser was used without difficulty on Gemini
dinner selections a t appropriate times corre- 111,IV, and V.
CREW STATION AND EXTRAVEHICULAR EQUIPMENT 67
FIQUBE
7-l6.-Gemini food pack.
Personal hygiene items included hygiene tis- trol module, was developed for control of the
sues in fabric dispenser packs, fabric towels, wet space-suit pressurization and ventilation flow
cleaning pads, toothbrushes, and chewing gum (fig. 7-19). Existing Gemini environmental-
for oral hygiene. These items were satisfactory control-system components were used where pos-
in flight use. sible, since they were already qualified. The
Feed-port adapter_ _
Manual
emergency .-'"
C_valve-"
.......... Shutoff
valve
i/"
"Oxygen "''Pressure
bottle regulator
tank
ventilation control module consisted of a Gem- a hatch-closing lanyard. These provisions and
ini demand regulator, a 3400-psi oxygen bottle, all the equipment were evaluated in mockup
and suitable valving and plumbing to complete exercises and zero-gravity aircraft flights.
the system. The ventilation control module was Flight-crew training was also accomplished as
attached to the space-suit exhaust fitting and a part of these tests and evaluations.
maintained the suit pressure a t 4.2 psia. The The extravehicular equipment for the Gemini
nominal value was 3.7 psia ; however, the pres- I V mission was subjected to the same rigorous
sure in the space suit ran slightly higher be- qualification test program as other spacecraft
cause of the pressure drop in the bleed line hardware. Prior to the mission, the flight and
which established the reference pressure. The backup equipment was tested in a series of
reserve-oxygen bottle in the ventilation control altitude-chamber tests, following the planned
module was connected by an orificed line to a mission profile and culminating in altitude runs
port on the helmet. When manually actuated, with the prime and backup pilots. These alti-
this reserve bottle supplied oxygen directly to tude-chamber tests, conducted in a boilerplate
the facial area of the extravehicular pilot. spacecraft a t the Manned Spacecraft Center,
The handheld maneuvering unit consisted of provided the final system validation prior t o
a system of manually operated cold-gas thrust- flight.
ers, a pair of high-pressure oxygen bottles, a Flight Results
regulator, a shutoff valve, and connecting The flight results of Gemini I V confirmed
plumbing (fig. 7-20). The two tractor thrust- the initial feasibility of extravehicular opera-
ers were 1 pound each, and the single pusher- tion. Ventilation and pressurization of the
thruster was 2 pounds. The flight crew re- space suit were adequate except for peak work-
ceived extensive training in the use of the hand- loads. During the initial egress activities and
held maneuvering unit on an air-bearing plat- during ingress, the cooling capacity of the
form, which provided multiple-degree-of- oxygen flow at 8.2 pounds per hour did not keep
freedom simulation. the extravehicular pilot cool, and overheating
The principal spacecraft provisions for extra- and visor fogging occurred at these times.
vehicular operation in the Gemini I V spacecraft During the remainder of the extravehicular
were the stowage provisions for the ventilation period, the pilot was comfortably cool.
control module and the handheld maneuvering The mobility of the G4C space suit was ade-
unit, the oxygen supply line in the cabin, and quate for all extravehicular tasks attempted
during the Gemini IV mission. The extravehic- reference coordinate system. At no time did he
ular visor on the space-suit helmet was found become disoriented or lose control of his
to be essential for looking 'toward the sun. The movements.
extravehicular pilot used the visor throughout The ingress operation proceeded normally
the extravehicular period. until the pilot attempted to pull the hatch
The maneuvering capability of the handheld closed. At this time he experienced minor dif-
maneuvering unit provided the extravehicular ficulties in closing the hatch because one of the
pilot with a velocity increment of approxi- hatch-locking control levers failed to operate
mately 6 feet per second. He executed short freely. The two pil(_ts operated the hatch-clos-
translations and small angular maneuvers. Al- ing lanyard and the hatch-locking mechanism
though the limited propellant supply did not together and closed the hatch satisfactorily.
permit a detailed stability evaluation, the re- The cabin repressurization was normal.
sults indicated that the handheld device was The results of this first extravehicular opera-
suitable for controlled maneuvers within 25 feet tion showed the need for greater cooling capac-
of the spacecraft. The results also indicated the ity and grea'ter propellant duration for future
need for longer propellant duration for future extravehicular missions. The results also
extravehicular missions. After the maneuver- showed that extravehicular operation could be
ing propellant was depleted, the e_ctravehicular conducted on a routine basis with adequate
pilot evaluated techniques of tether handling preparation and crew training.
and self-positioning without propulsive con-
trol. His evaluation showed that he was unable Concluding Remarks
to establish a fixed position when he was free Evaluation of the crew station and the re-
of the spacecraft because of the tether reaction
lated crew equipment was somewhat subjective,
and the conservation of momentum. Any time
with varying reactions from different crews. In
he pushed away from the spacecraft, he reached
summary, the crew station, as configured for the
the end of the tether with a finite velocity, which
in turn was reversed and directed back toward Gemini VI-A and VII missions, met the crew's
'the spacecraft. Throughout these maneuvers needs adequately, and the flight results indicate
the extravehicular pilot maintained his orienta- that this configuration is satisfactory for
tion satisfactorily, using the spacecraft as his continued flight use.
8. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
By ROBERT L. FROST, Gemini Program O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra/t Center; JAMES W. THOMPSON,
Gemini Program O_ice, NASA Manned Spacecra/t Center; and LARRYE. BELL, Crew Systems Divi-
sion, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center
71
218-556 0--66-----6
72 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFEFtENCE
the present design was adopted. ically in figure 8-4, consists of two completely
redundant circuits or loops, each having re-
_'aste-Water Disposal System
dundant pumps. For clarity, the coolant lines
Waste-water disposal is accomplished by two for the secondary loop are omitted from the fig-
different methods. Condensate from the suit ure. All heat exchangers and cold plates, ex-
heat exchanger is routed to the launch-cooling cept for the regenerative heat exchangers and
heat exchanger for boiling, if additional cool- the fuel cells, have passages for each loop. On
ing is required, or is dumped overboard. Urine spacecraft 7, the secondary or B pump in each
is dumped directly overboard, or it can be coolant loop was equipped with a power supply
routed to the launch-cooling heat exchanger that reduced the coolant flow rate to approxi-
should the primary systems fail or additional mately half that of the primary or A pump.
cooling be required. To prevent freezing, the This change was made in order to reduce total
outlet of the direct overboard dump is warmed power consumption, to maintain higher adapter
by coolant lines and an electric heater. temperatures during periods of low power
b-.
oxygen
Fuel-cell J_
J T
Reentry Primary
module oxygen
section 2 heat
cold
Fuel-cell l
plates exchanger
t ,
Cabin Regenerative
cold heat
plate exchanger
Selector
't
I . I . and relief . I
Ground
Cabin ()valve
cooling
heat heat Radiator
heat
exchanger exchanger
exchanger
Suit J
J i I i cooling '_ I
heat
_'J Launch coolant
--Primary coolant loop exchanger
usage, and also to allow greater flexibility in changer outlet temperature to a nominal 46 ° F.
maintaining optimum coolant temperatures for The spacecraft radiator (fig. 8-5) is an in-
the resultant variations in thermal loads. tegral part of the spacecraft adapter. The
Battery-powered spacecraft require the use coolant tubes are integral parts of the adapter
of only one coolant loop at a time, whereas the stringers, and the adapter skin acts as a fin.
fuel-cell-powered spacecraft require both loops, Alternate stringers carry coolant tubes from
as each fuel-cell section is on a different loop. each loop, and all tubes for one loop are in
By using both coolant pumps simultaneously, series. Coolant flows first around the retro-
one loop is capable of handling the maximum section and then around the equipment section
cooling requirements should the other loop fail. of the adapter. Strips of high-absorptivity
The coolant loops have two points of automatic tape are added to the outer surface of the
temperature control: radiator outlet tempera- adapter to optimize the effective radiator area
ture is controlled to 40 ° F, and fuel-cell inlet for the cooling requirements of each spacecraft.
temperature is controlled to 75 ° F. Prelaunch
cooling is provided through the ground-cooling Test Programs
heat exchanger. The launch-cooling heat ex-
changer provides cooling during powered flight The environmental-control-system program
and during the first few minutes of orbital flight consisted of development, qualification, and re-
until the radiator cools down and becomes ef- liability tests, covering 16 different environ-
fective. The heat exchanger also supplements ments, conducted by the vendor, and of systems
the radiator, if required, at any time during tests conducted by the spacecraft contractor and
flight by automatically controlling the heat-ex- by Manned Spacecraft Center organizations.
.................
Primary inlet
.......
Secondary inlet
Primary
outlets._
Coolant
'/" flow
sage
FIGURE
8-5.--Spacecraft radiator.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM 75
During the development of the components chemical and the outer shell of the canister.
for the environmental control system, designs Also, the estimate of the metabolic rate was
were verified with production prototypes rather reevaluated and was reduced based on the re-
than with engineering models. For example, sults of previous flights. Test reruns then used
if a pressure regulator was to be produced as metabolic rate inputs of 370 and 450 Btu per
a casting, the test model was also produced as a hour per man. The new design successfully
casting. As a result, additional production met all mission requirements.
development was eliminated, and confidence Early in the Gemini Program, a boilerplate
with respect to flightworthiness was accumu- spacecraft was fabricated to simulate the cabin
lated from developmental tests as well as from portion of the reentry assembly, with adequate
later qualification and system reliability tests. safety provisions for manned testing under any
Development tests included manned altitude operating condition. Sixteen manned tests were
testing on a boilerplate spacecraft equipped conducted--four at sea level, six at altitude with
with the suit and cabin portion of the environ- a simulated coolant subsystem, and six at alti-
mental control system. tude with a complete system, except that the
Where possible, qualification of the environ- radiator was simulated only by pressure drop.
mental control system has been demonstrated at System cooling was provided through the
the system level, rather than at the component ground-cooling heat exchanger. After satisfac-
level, because of the close interrelationships of tory completion of the spacecraft contractor's
components, especially with respect to thermal test program, the boilerplate model was shipped
performance. Test environments included hu- to the Manned Spacecraft Center, where it was
midity, salt-water immersion, salt-solution, used in numerous manned tests.
thermal shock, high and low temperature The boilerplate proved a valuable test article,
and pressure, proof, burst, vibration, accelera- as it pointed out several potential problems
tion, and shock. which were corrected on the flight systems. The
System qualification tests were followed by most significant of these was the crew discom-
simulated mission reliability tests consisting of fort caused by inadequate cooling during levels
eight 2-day, three 7-day, and eight 14-day tests of high activity. The inadequate cooling was
of a single environmental control system. In determined to be a result of excessive heat gain
these tests, all the environmental-control-system in the coolant fluid between the temperature
components mounted in the cabin and space- control valve and the suit heat exchanger. In-
craft adapter section were exposed to simulated sulation was added to the coolant lines and to
altitude, temperature cycling, and temperature the heat exchanger. In addition, a flow-limit-
extremes in an altitude chamber. Moisture and ing orifice was added between the suit and cabin
carbon-dioxide atmospheric conditions were heat exchangers to assure adequate flow of cool-
provided by crewman simulators. After each of ant in the suit heat exchanger. Also, the capa-
these tests, the oxygen containers were serviced, bility to run both suit compressors was added to
and the lithium hydroxide canisters were re- cover any activity level. With these changes,
placed; otherwise, the same components were the environmental control system was demon-
used for all tests. strated to have adequate capability.
These tests revealed that heat transfer from During the boilerplate tests at the Manned
the lithium hydroxide canister to ambient was Spacecraft Center, no problems were en-
greater than expected. This increased heat countered with the environmental control sys-
transfer caused chilling of the gas stream near tem. The boilerplate played a valuable role in
the outer periphery of the chemical bed, suffi- qualification of the Gemini space suit, the
cient to cause condensation of water from the Gemini IV extravehicular equipment_ and the
gas stream. The condensation reduced the life extravehicular life-support systems for future
of the chemical bed by approximately 45 per- missions.
cent based on a metabolic input rate of 500 Btu Static article 5 was a production spacecraft
per hour per man. The canister was redesigned reentry assembly and was used in flotation and
to include a layer of insulation between the postlanding tests. The portions of the environ-
76 GEMINI I_IDPROGRA_I CONFERENCE
mental control system required for use after Spacecraft Center initiated the design and
landing were operated during manned tests in fabrication of a humidity-control device that
the Gulf of Mexico. This testing demonstrated could be installed in the cabin. In the interim,
satisfactory cooling and carbon-dioxide remov- the spacecraft contractor took immediate pre-
able for up to 19 hours of sea recovery time. cautions by applying a moisture-absorbent ma-
A series of three thermal qualifica_tion tests terial on the interior cabin walls of the Gemini
was conducted on spacecraft 3A, which was a IV spacecraft. During the Gemini IV mission,
complete flight-configuration spacecraft with humidity readings were taken, and no moisture
the exception of fuel cells. Fuel-cell heat loads was observed. Consequently, development of
were simulated with electric heaters. The en- the humidity-control device was terminated
tire spacecraft was placed in an altitude chamber after initial testing, as condensation did not ap-
equipped with heat lamps for solar simulation pear to be a problem during orbital operation.
and with liquid-nitrogen cold walls to enable The validity of the thermal qualification test
simulating an orbital day-and-night cycle. program has been demonstrated on the first five
During the first test, which lasted 12 hours, manned flights. The high degree, of accuracy
the adapter temperatures were colder than de- in preflight predictions of thermal performance
sired, indicating that the radiator was oversized and sizing of the radiator area is due, in large
for the thermal load being imposed by the space- part, to the spacecraft 3A test results.
craft systems. As a result, the drinking and
waste-water lines froze, and the oxidizer lines Flight Results
and components in the propulsion system be- Performance of the environmental control
came marginally cold. After the data from the
system has been good throughout all flights,
first test were analyzed, resistance heaters were with a minimum number of anomalies. Crew-
added to the adapter water lines, flow-limiting
man comfort has been generally good. A re-
valves were installed in tile fuel-cell tempera-
view of the data from all flights shows that an
ture-control-valve bypass line, and provisions
indicated suit inlet temperature of 52 ° to 54 °
were made to vary the effective radiator area.
F is best for maintaining crew comfort. Actual
The second test lasted 135 hours, and the
suit inlet temperatures are 10 ° to 20 ° F higher
spacecraft maintained thermal control. The re-
than indicated because of heat transfer from the
sistance heaters kept the water lines well above
cabin to the ducting downstream of the tempera-
freezing, but the propulsion-system oxidizer
ture sensor. Suit inlet temperatures were in
lines remained excessively cold, indicating the
need for similar heaters on these lines. or near the indicated range on all flights ex-
cept during the Gemini VI-A mission. During
The most significant gains were the successful
this flight, except for the sleep period, the tem-
raising of the adapter temperature and the im-
perature increased to over 60 ° F, causing the
proved e.nvironmental-control-system perform-
crew to be warm. Detailed postflight testing of
ance with the reduced effective area of the radi-
the environmental control system showed no
ator. By adding strips of high-absorptivity
failures. The discomfort is attributed to a high
tape, tile effective area of the radiator can be
crewman metabolic-heat rate resulting from the
optimized for each spacecraft, based on its spe-
heavy workload during the short flight. The
cific mission profile.
design level for the suit heat exchanger is 500
Excellent thermal control was maintained for
Btu per hour per man. Experience gained
the entire 190 hours of the third test, demon-
since the design requirements were established
strating the adequacy of the environmental con-
has shown that the average metabolic rate of
trol system with the corrective action taken after
the crew is around 500 Btu per hour per man on
the first and second tests. The only anomaly
short flights and between 330 and 395 Btu per
during the test was condensate forming in the hour per man on long-duration flights. (See
cabin. The spacecraft contractor and NASA fig. 8-6.)
both studied the possibility of condensate form- The most comfortable conditions proved to
ing during orbital flight, and two approaches to be during the suits-off operation of the Gemini
the problem were examined. The Manned VII flight. Preflight analysis had determined
:ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM 77
6OO
again at 315 hours. Also, a buildup of conden-
sation was noted on the floor and on the center
5OO
pedestal at this time. The exact cause has not
J:
been determined, but two possibilities are that
m 400
0 0 z_ some ducts experienced local chilling as a result
d o A 0
0 <> <> []
of spacecraft attitude and that a degradation
" 3OO or failure occurred in the condensate removal
Respiration quotient = 0.82
system. Circumstances both support and re-
2OO Gemini flights
ject these possibilities.
go
Vostok flights Cabin temperature has not increased during
i Mercury fUghts
I00
Chamber test reentry as was originally expected. Initial cal-
culations showed an increase of 70 ° to 190 ° F
during reentry, whereas the actual increase has
I I I I I I I
0 2 4 6 8 I0 12 14 been less than 10 a F. The thermal effectiveness
Mission duration, days
of the insulation and structural-heat flow paths
FiGui_ 8-6.--Crewman metabolic rate. is greater than could be determined analytically.
During the Gemini II mission, the pressure in
the cryogenic containers dropped approximately
that, because of insufficient gas flow over the
30 percent just after separation of the space-
body, the crew might not be as comfortable as
craft from the launch vehicle. Extensive post-
would be desired. However, the crew found that
flight testing determined that the pressure drop
relatively little air flow over the body was neces-
resulted from thermal stratification within the
sary. The suits-off operation had very little
effect on the cabin environment. Cabin air and cryogen. The separation maneuver caused
mixing, which reduced the stratification and
wall temperatures were between 75 ° and 80 ° F,
which was normal after stabilization on all resulted in a lower stabilized pressure. The
flights. Cabin relative humidity was between prelaunch procedures have been modified to
48 and 56 percent during suits-off operation, bring the container pressure up to operating
which was lower than the 50 to 72 percent ex- levels at a much slower rate, thus minimizing the
perienced on other flights. This was as expected stratification. A pressure drop has been ex-
because the sensible-to-latent cooling ratio was perienced on only one mission since Gemini II.
higher with the suits off than with the suits on.
Condensation has not been a problem during Concluding Remarks
flight, contrary to the indications during the
The excellent flight results to date, with a
spacecraft 3A testing. Spacecraft 3A testing
minimum number of anomalies, confirm the
assumed a fixed spacecraft attitude. This
value of the extensive ground test program con-
would cause greater temperature gradients in
ducted on the system. Condensation in the
the cabin than the drifting mode normally used
during the missions. Sig_dficant condensation cabin has not been a problem, as was originally
has occurred only once during the program. indicated. Also, it appears that the metabolic
During the Gemini VII mission, the crew re- heat load of the crew during periods of high
ported free moisture leaving the suit inlet hoses activity may be more than 500 Btu per hour
at approximately 267 hours after lift-off and per man.
9. SPACECRAFT MANUFACTURING AND INPLANT CHECKOUT
By WALTERF. BURKE,Vice President and Genera2 Manager, Spacecraft and Missiles, McDonneU Aircraft
COrp.
9-l.-McDonnell
FIQUBE Aircraft Corp., St. Louis, Mo.
79
80 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
factory arrangement for getting corporate-wide (3) Establishing process development re-
action at a very fast response rate. quirements.
The officers in charge of the functional sec- (4) Training of persolinel to productionize
tions are responsible for providing the required new manufacturing processes.
number of personnel to accomplish the various (5) Determination of facility requirements.
disciplines in all the programs, to evaluate the (6) Arrangement of spacecraft production
caliber of the individual’s effort, and to establish lines and associated facilities.
means of crossfeeding information between (7) Tool manufacture.
projects. (8) Production planning (preparation of
Project Organization individual operation sheets).
( 9 ) Production control.
Upon receipt of a specific contract, a project (10) Mockup construction.
organization is set up with its project manager (11) Final assembly.
reporting directly to the vice president and (12) Test participation.
general manager for that line of business. The (13) Preparation for the shipping of com-
nature of the Gemini Program made it desirable pleted vehicles.
for this to be one and the same person. The I n addition, the Gemini Program Technical
project organization, in a sense, is a company Director, Procurement Manager, Spacecraft
within a company. The project manager is re- Product Support Manager, and Program Sys-
sponsible for all decisions on that particular tems Manager have similar authority in the
project and has full authority over the personnel project organization.
assigned t o the task. It is this line organization
which has proven so successful, enabling man- Gemini Modular Concept
agement t o concentrate all necessary attention
From the very beginning, the Gemini space-
*toproblem areas as quickly as they arise, and craft was designed to be an operational vehicle
to carry out the necessary action at a very with capabilities for late mission changes and
rapid pace. I n the project organization, for rapid countdown on the launch pad. Based on
example, the manufacturing manager is experience with Project Mercury, this definitely
responsible for all of the following functions: dictated the use of a modular form of space-
(1) Establishment of the manufacturing craft in which complete systems could be
plan. added to, subtracted from, or replaced with
(2) Tool design. a. minimum impact on schedule. Figure 9-2
FIQURE
%.-Gemini spacecraft modular assembly.
SPACECRAFT mANUFACTURING AND INPLANT CHECKOUT 81
shows how this was accomplished in the an aerospace-ground equipment test plug, bring-
Gemini spacecraft, where, reading from left to ing those necessary test parameters right to the
right, the individual sections are the-- surface of the box, and permitting the hooking-
(1) Rendezvous and recovery. up of the test cabling with no disruption of the
(2) Reentry control system. spacecraft wiring to the box. In this way,
(3) Reentry cabin. particularly during the development phase, it
(4) Retrograde-adapter a n d equipment- was possible to evaluate the performance of
adapter sections (adapter assembly). each component while it was connected directly
Each of these sections is fabricated and assem- into the spacecraft wiring and to minimize the
number of times connections had to be made or
bled in the manufacturing area of the Space
broken.
Center, and furnished with its equipment and
checked as a separate entity in the Gemini white
Gemini Manufacturing Work Plan
room before being mated with any of the other
sections. With this form of modular construc- With the modular concept established and
tion, it is possible to accomplish the work as a with the engineering progressing, manufactur-
series of parallel tasks, thus permitting a larger ing planners, under the manufacturing man-
number of personnel to be effectively working ager, began the layout of the manufacturing
on the total spacecraft on a noninterference work plan, as shown in figure 9-3. The bottom
basis, thereby greatly reducing the overall cost of figure 9-3 shows the work plan for the
of such a vehicle. In addition, during the test adapter, with subassemblies of the retrorocket
program, the effect of a variation in test results support structure, the panels of the space radi-
will affect only that section, and not slow down ator, the buildup of the basic adapter structural
the overall test program. In like manner, when assembly, and the time span allotted to installa-
a spacecraft has been mated, any module may tion. This workload was broken down into
be removed from a section and replaced by three units--A3, A2, and A1---each of which is
another with little or no impact on the launch a station for installation of .the equipment
schedule, as has been evidenced on several occa- spelled out in the attached blocks of the dia-
sions during the Gemini Program to date. gram. Upon completion of these installations,
Care was paid in design, particularly in the an engineering review was held prior to begin-
reentry section, so that no components are in- ning the sectional spacecraft system tests.
stalled in a layered or stacked condition. In In a similar manner, the rendezvous and re-
this way, any component can be removed or in- covery section and the reentry control system
stalled without disturbing any other. Another section have been displayed. The longest cycle
requirement was that each wire bundle be so time and, therefore, the critical path involve the
designed that it could be manufactured and reentry section. Because of the complexity of
electrically tested away from the spacecraft, this section, it is broken down into many more
and that its installation primarily be a lay-in subassemblies, beginning with hatch sills, main
operation. No soldering is planned to be done frames, left-side and right-side panels, cabin
on the spacecraft during the installation and structural weld assemblies, and the cabin inter-
assembly period. This provided for much mediate assembly. Upon completion of this
greater reliability of terminal attachments and portion of _the manufacturing, the assembly is
permitted the manufacture of many wire submitted to a detailed inspection and cleanup
bundles to proceed simultaneously without in- and transported to the white room. In the
terference. As a measure of its effectiveness in white room, the components which will be in-
providing a quality product, spacecraft 5 had stalled in the cabin are first put through a pre-
zero defects in the 6000 electrical check points installation acceptance test and then mounted in
monitored. It was also required that each the cabin as defined by the attached planning
component be attached in such a manner that sequences shown in figure 9-3. Upon comple-
access to it be possible by the technicians with- tion of these installations, an engineering re-
out the use of special tools. For ease of testing, view is again performed, and then the reentry
each black-box component was designed with section is subjected to a very detailed space-
8_ GEMINI _ImPROGRA!_ CONFERENCE
i :
I
FZGURE 9-3.---Gemini spacecraft 4 manufacturing work plan.
craft systems test at the module level. At this stallation areas. The key for this breakdown
point in the manufacturing cycle, the three is shown in the lower left corner of figure 9-4
sections and the adapter assembly are assembled and is self-explanatory.
and the end-to-end spacecraft systems tests per- Manufacturing production control is respon-
formed. From this manufacturing work plan, sible for bringing the necessary parts to the jig
it can be seen that activities can be conducted or installation station in time to meet the
on many zones of the spacecraft simultaneously, schedule. As an aid in the performance of this
thus permitting significant reduction in the job, the status of the equipment for each zone
overall cycle time and minimizing the impact of was maintained in the form shown on the right
problems arising in the individual sections. side of figure 9-4, where zone 9 is typical.
Here, it can be seen that production control has
Control of Work Status determined the number of pieces of equipment
Manufacturing planners have the responsi- required, the number on hand, what additional
bility for determining the sequence in which in- pieces are still expected to arrive on the required
dividual installations are made. Obviously, schedule date, and, most significant, what
this requires an evaluation of the time to make pieces of equipment are at that particular time,
a particular installation and requires the as- to be late for installation. Each piece of late
signment of the tasks to prevent delays due to equipment is analyzed as to its point of normal
interference between the production personnel. installation and the amount of delay expected,
and then a decision is made as to its installation
To accomplish this, the spacecraft was divided
into work zones as shown in figure 9-4, which is at a point farther down the line. Along with
a typical work sheet. In each one of these this information, the time required to install
numbered areas is work that can be accom- the late pieces of equipment is tabulated so that
plished, either in the structural assembly or in- the production supervisor will be constantly
SPACECRAFT _v[ANUFACTURING AND INPLANT CHECKOUT 83
_ELIINIZOY,"CI',ART
TOPVIEW
2. u-BrlEY KS BNOLE
_L FlmWMmdE& C0g(
4. ¢EBTER[HmBEM BY
LT B MMFq[| 4JEA
aware of any overload of work coming to his red-flag items; then management directives are
station, and therefore, making the necessary issued.
provisions, either of added manpower or In a similar manner, the technical staff con-
overtime. ducts a daily meeting, chaired by the Engineer-
ing Manager. Here, the design is coordinated
Management Control
in compliance with customer technical inputs,
While figures 9-3 and 9-4 have shown the study assignments are made, and test f_dback
formal nature in which the work is planned and is discussed as to its effect on engineering spec-
ifications.
controlled, it still takes personal action on the
part of all levels of supervision to accomplish A configuration control board meets on a
the task. At McDonnell Aircraft Corp., this is bidaily interval, clmired by the Project Control
Mani_ger. Here, engineering change proposals
accomplished through the medium of three par-
are discussed, thus keeping up to date all ele-
ticular action centers, as shown on figure 9-5.
ments of the project regarding the spacecraft
A project management meeting is held daily,
configuration. Analyses of the schedule impact
chaired by the Project Manager. In this meet- of these changes are made, and a spacecraft
ing are discussed the manpower assignments, effectivity for the change incorporation is
comparison of the work accomplished versus established.
the man-hours expended, status of the space- As shown by the arrows on figure 9-5, there
craft to the schedule, and situations resulting in is a three-way distribution of this information
84 GEMINI _IIDPROGRAlV[ CONFERENCE
Project management
Doily chairman- project manager
communication by a direct hot line to an iden-
['7-'. _ /_ Manpower assigned
tical room at the Manned Spacecraft Center.
In addition to the phone communications there
_J.__ Work accomplished
is a Datafax transmission link because much of
_i-_ I manhour:Sxpended the information cannot be readily transmitted
• y/-_\ tl _ Schedule status verbally. With this form of communications
It \\ link,
tremely
the Manned
up-to-date
Spacecraft
information
Center has ex-
of every facet of
the Gemini operation under the contractor's di-
rection, whether it be fiscal, engineering, manu-
facturing, developmental test, or subcontractor
performance.
Spacecraft Assembly
Doily Bi-doily
Technical staff Configuration control board The Gemini spacecraft uses titanium almost
Choirrnan- eng manager Chairman -project
exclusively for the basic structure. One of the
Control manager
Design interesting manufacturing processes involves
coordinator Engineering
change proposal the spot, seam, and fusion welding of this ma-
Customer
technical Schedule irnpoct terial. Of particular interest is the weld line
inputs Change where the titanium sheets, ranging from 0.010
S tudy i ncorporotion to 0.180 inch in thickness, are prepared for spot
assignment effectivity
and seam welding. In preparing sheets of the
Test feedback
0.010-inch-gage titanium for spot welding, it
FIGURE 9-5.--Management control. was found necessary to overlap and then cut
with a milling-type slitting saw to secure the
parallelism required to gain the quality type
as decisions in any one of these meetings have
welding needed. In addition, it was found
their effects on the others. Only with the
necessary to supply an argon atmosphere right
project-manager concept has it been found pos-
at the seam to prevent oxidation, and, by the
sible to keep this form of control in the hands
use of these two devices, it was possible to per-
of a sufficiently small group which can be
form this operation with the result that there
counted on for rapidity of response.
has been no inflight structural problem through-
out either the Mercury or the Gemini Program.
Management Control Communications
Typical of the care taken to obtain this result
Because of the short development time and is the assembly welding machine. Here the
the short elapsed time between launches, it is components are jig mounted and fed through
essential that almost an hour-by-hour status of the electrodes. To prevent spitting during this
the program be available to the Gemini Pro- welding with the consequent burn-throughs, the
gram Office at the Manned Spacecraft Center. weld fixtures are mounted on air pads, and air is
To assist in making this possible, the Project provided to lift the fixtures a few thousandths
Manager at McDonnell Aircraft Corp. and the of an inch off the ground surface plates over
Program Manager at the Manned Spacecraft which they travel. This eliminates any pos-
Center are kept in close communication by sibility of a jerky or intermittent feeding of the
means of the establishment of two identical con- work through the electrodes. There are many
trol centers. At McDonnell Aircraft Corp. in instances where welding is required in places not
St. Louis, the project group keeps detailed track accessible with the welding machines. In these
of spacecraft manufacturing, assembly, test instances, fusion welding is employed, and the
status, schedule, and cost, primarily based on welds are made in a series of boxes as shown in
the action of the three activity centers described figure 9-6. These boxes are m,ade of Plexiglas.
in figure 9-5. A Gemini control room in which Argon is fed into the box to provide an inert gas
these results are under constant attention is in atmosphere. The rubber gloves seen in the fig-
SPACECRAFT MANUFACTURING AND INPLANT C m C K O U T 85
FIQURE
9-7.-White room at the McDonnell Space Center.
86 GEMINI I_IDPROGRAIYI CONFERENCE
(2) The area shall be supplied with clean fil- (7) Recessed or fiush-mounted light fixtures
tered air. The filters used in the circulating shall be used.
system shall be capable of removing 99.9 per- This is typical of the type area provided for
cent of all particles above 1 micron in size and
work on environmental control systems, and
90 percent of all particles 0.3 to 1 micron in size. those components such as valves which may
(3) A positive pressure shall be maintained
have extremely fine orifices.
in this area at all times. Pressure in the max-
imum cleanliness area shall be higher than the Spacecraft Systems Tests Flow Plan
pressure in adjacent areas.
The environment of space is one demanding
(4) The area shall be maintained at a tem-
near perfection of operation of the equipment
perature of not over 75 ° F and a relative hu-
in the spacecraft. The spacecraft systems tests
midity of not over 55 percent. flow plan of figure 9-8 describes in sequence
(5) Vinyl floor coverings shall be used. the actual tests performed on each of the space-
(6) The walls shall be painted with gloss craft. The reactant supply system module in
white or a light pastel color enamel. the adapter contains the tanks and valves sup-
RSS module
funct lanai equipment
0 acceptance
S validation (K386I)
InstalIRSS in adapter
OAMS
f unctionol equipment
0 acceptance
MS vali_t (D393)
Install i_ adapter
Adapter I I
0 bcceptonce
VS_WR( K 342 )
OAMS (D 393)
Weigh (0417)
i___Reentry WeKJht and'balance (G417) Run 3-manned ambient stowage-backup crew (H 383)
Run 4-manned altitude-prime crew (H 383)
Heat shield L_JMate cabin , R and R ,RCS(K416)
t Run .5- manned altitude -backup crew (H 383)
ing and checkout De-service (K 506)
I ,__Electricol (C311)
', _L_IEcs vo,da,= (C_,)
_r__ VSWR( K 342)
r____JGSO acceptance
L_JPIA fur_tianal equipment
plying the cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen to under conditions simulating as closely as pos-
the fuel cells. The first step is to make a com- sible the space environment in which they must
plete functional test of each individual com- operate. As previously discussed, each com-
ponent before assigning it to the spacecraft for plete Gemini spacecraft undergoes the final
installation into the module or section. Fol- simulated flights at altitude. This capability
lowing this, the test data are reviewed by the has been made possible by the provision at
contractor and the customer, and the equipment McDonnell Aircraft Corp. of a sizable number
is then actually installed. When the submod- and variety of space simulation chambers.
ule has completed buildup, it is then subjected These vary in size from 32 inches to 30 feet in
to two systems-level tests, each defined by a de- diameter. The large altitude chamber (fig.
tailed, documented test plan which has had en- 9-9), in which the complete spacecraft is put
gineering review and concurrence by the CUS- through manned simulated flight test, is 30 feet
tomer. Each section follows this pattern, with in diameter by 36 feet in length. It has the
the number of tests obviously dependent upon
capability for emergency repressurization from
the amount of equipment installed. Upon
completion of the section-level tests, the space- vacuum t o 5 psia in 18 seconds. This latter
craft is erected into a vertical stand (fig. 9-7) capability permits access through a special lock
and a complete end-to-end series of tests con- for conduct of emergency operations should
ducted in the order shown in figure 9-8. Here such ever be required. The chamber also has
again each individual test is done in an 0x- numerous observation hatches.
tremely detailed manner, thoroughly docu-
mented and reviewed both by McDonnell Air- Spacecraft Delivery
craft Corp. and NASA engineering and quality A t the conclusion of the manned simulation
personnel before proceeding to the next step. run in the chamber, the spacecraft is delivered
All test discrepancies are submitted to a review
board jointly manned by NASA and McDonnell-
Aircraft Corp. for evaluation and resolution. /
.I complete log is maintained of all the test
results on each spacecraft and forwarded to the
launch site for ready reference during launch-
site tests. Among the numerous tests shown on
figure 9-8 is listed simulated flight. I n this
test the spacecraft, with the aotual selected
astronaut crew, is put into a flight condition
functionally, and the equipment is operated in
the manner planned for its mission from launch
through landing. This test includes not only
those functions which would occur in a com-
t
pletely successful flight, but also evaluates all
emergency or abort capabilities as well. When
the spacecraft lias successfully passed this t a t ,
it is then prepared for a simulated flight test in
the space simulation chamber, where altitude
conditions are provided, and both the prime
crew and the backup crew have an opportunity
to go through the complete, test.
218-556 0 - 6 6 7
88 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
via aircraft furnished through NASA direct to the early stage of loading into the aircraft, and
the Kennedy Space Center. Figure 9-10 shows is typical of the manner in which all spacecraft
have been delivered. The goal of delivering
vehicles in as near to flight-ready condition as
practical has been met for each of the seven
production spacecraft shipped to the launch site.
Concluding Remarks
By WILLIAM H. DOUGLAS, Deputy Manager, O_ce o/ Test Operations, Gemini Program O_ice, NASA
Manned Spacecra]t Center; GREGORY P. MCINToSH, Gemini Program O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra]t
Center; and LEMUEL S. MENZAR, Gemini Program Adviser, Flight Sa/ety O_ice, NASA Manned
Spacecra]t Center
89
9O GEMINI MIDPROGRA_ CONFERENCE
(3) Redundant coolant subsystems are in- Mission Success and Crew Safety
corporated in the environmental control system.
A numerical design goal was established to
(4) Duplicate horizon sensors are incorpo-
represent the probability of the spacecraft per-
rated in the guidance system.
forming satisfactorily for the accomplishment
(5) Six fuel-cell stacks are incorporated in
of all primary mission objectives. The arbi-
the electrical system, although only three are
trary value of 0.95, which recognizes a risk of
required for any long-duration mission.
failing to meet 1 primary objective out of 90 on
Redundant systems or backup procedures
each mission, was selected. The 0.95 mission-
were provided where a single failure could be
success design goal was included in the prime
catastrophic to the crew or the spacecraft.
contract as a design goal rather than a firm
Concurrent with design and development, an
requirement, which would have required dem-
integrated ground-test program was estab-
lished. Data from all tests were collected and onstration by mean-time-to-failure testing.
The prime contractor calculated numerical ap-
analyzed to form a basis for declaring the
portionments for each of the spacecraft systems
Gemini spacecraft qualified for the various
and incorporated the apportioned values in
phases of the flight test program. The inte-
major system and subsystem contractor require-
grated ground-test program, shown in figure
merits. Reliability estimates, derived primarily
10-1, shows the density of the test effort with
from component failure-rate data and made
respect to the production of the flight
during the design phase, indicated that the de-
equipment.
sign would support the established mission-
Development tests were initially performed
success design goal. The reliability estimates,
to prove the design concepts. Qualification
by major spacecraft system, for the Gemini III
tests were conducted to prove the flight-config-
spacecraft, are shown in table 10-I.
uration design and manufacturing techniques.
Crew safety design goals were also established
Tests were then extended beyond the specifica-
but for a much higher value of 0.995 for all
tion requirements to establish reasonable design
missions. Crew safety is defined as having the
margins of safety. The unmanned flight tests
flight crew survive all missions or all mission
were conducted to confirm the validity of design
attempts.
assumptions, and to develop confidence in space-
Planned mission success, gross mission suc-
craft systems and launch-vehicle interfaces
cess, and crew safety estimates were also made
prior to manned flights.
prior to each manned mission, using the flight
Specific test-program reviews were held at
data and data generated by the integrated
the prime contractor's plant and at each major
ground-test program; each program reflected
subcontractor's facility to preclude duplication
assurance of conducting the mission successfully
of testing, and to insure that every participant
and safely.
in the Gemini Program was following the same
A detailed failure mode and effect analysis
basic guidelines.
was conducted on the complete spacecraft by
the prime contractor and on each subsystem by
1,962 1,963 1,964 1,965 1,966 t the cognizant subcontractor, to investigate each
failure mode and assess its effect on mission
Development tests
success and crew safety. The analysis included
Quolificetion tests an evaluation of--
(1) Mode of failure.
Integroted system tests
(2) Failure effect on system operation.
(3) Failure effect on the mission.
Reliobiltty tests
(4) Indications of failure.
Gemint I (5) Crew and ground action as a result of
t the failure.
Gemini "r[
Q (6) Probability of occurrence.
Corrective action was taken when it was de-
FIGrRE 10-1.--Gemini test Program. termined that the failure mode would grossly
SPACECRAFT RELIABILITY AND QUALIFICATION 91
Planned miss:'on success is having the spacecraft b Gross mission success is inserting the spacecraft
function as necessary and perform the objectives of into orbit, having the capability of completing the
the mission as established in the mission directive. prescribed orbital duration, and recovering the flight
crew and spacecraft.
affect mission success or jeopardize the safety regulator would have caused the loss of a fuel-
of the crew. cell section. Therefore_ it was necessary that
A single-point failure mode and effect anal- each of the two regulators which control the
ysis was conducted for all manned missions to reactant supply be capable of supplying re-
isolate single failures which could prevent re- actants to both fuel-cell sections. The cross-
covery of the spacecraft or a safe recovery of over provided this capability. Figure 10-3
the crew. The single-point failure modes were shows the electrical power system reliwbility
evaluated, and action was taken to eliminate the slightly increased for the 2-week mission. The
single-point failure or to minimize the probabil- reliability was increased from 0.988 to 0.993 for
ity of occurrence. an assumed failure rate of 10 .4 failures per
98 -
c Without regulator ,,*' ?
v)
crossover capobility a
i
.-
-
t
-
I 97 -
-
._
Regulator failure rate. per hr
5
c
m
96 -
FIGURE
10-3.-Fuel-cell power system reliability for a
2-weekmission.
95 -
hour. Figure 1 0 4 shows the reliability p t l y
increased for the 2-day mission.
It cannot be overemphasized that reliability is 10-5
an inherent characteristic and must be realized Regulator failure rote per hr
as a result of design and development. In-
10-4.-Fuel-cell power system reliability for a
FIGURE
herent reliability cannot be inspected or tested
2-day mission.
into an item during production; at best, that
which is inherent can only be attained or main- electrical-electronic interface, radiofrequency
tained through a rigid quality control. These interference, and system-design compatibility.
reliability design reviews and the numerical When production prototype systems became
analyses were conducted as early as November available, a complete spacecraft compatibility
1962, prior to the fabrication of the first produc- test unit was assembled a t the prime contractor's
t ion prototypes. facility (fig. 10-5). During these tests, sys-
tem integration was accomplished by end-to-end
Development Tests
test methods. These tests permitted the reso-
Development tests using engineering models lution of problems involving mechanical inter-
were conducted to establish the feasibility of de- face, electrical-electronic interface, radiofre-
sign concepts. These tests explored various de- quency interference, spacecraft compatibility,
signs and demonstrated functional performance final-test-procedures compatibility, and com-
and structural integrity prior to committing patibility with aerospace ground equipment
production hardware to formal qualification (AGE), prior to assembly a.nd checkout of the
tests. In some cases, environmental tests were first flight vehicle.
conducted on these units to obtain information
prior to the formal qualification.
plants during the initial qualification phase of modes. The tests were designed to confirm the
the program. The objective of the reviews was design margins or to reveal marginal design
to aline the respective system test program to characteristics, and they included exposure to
conform to an integrated test philosophy. The environmental extremes such as-
original test reviews were followed with peri- (l) Temperature and vibration beyond the
odic status reviews to assure that the test pro- design envelope.
grams were modified to reflect the latest pro- (£) Applied voltage or pressure beyond the
gram requirements and to assure the timely normal mission condition.
completion of all testing which represented con- (3) Combined environments to produce more
straints for the various missions. severe equipment stress.
The qualification test environments required (4) Endurance beyond the normal mission
for Gemini equipment are shown on table 10- duty cycles.
II. This chart, which was extracted from the The reliability tests conducted on the digital
spacecraft qualification status report, shows the command system are shown in table 10-III.
qualification status of the digital command sys- These tests overstressed the digital command
tem and provides a typical example of a sup- system in acceleration, vibration, voltage, and
plier's qualification test requirements. All en- combinations of altitude, temperature, voltage,
vironmental requirements are not applicable, and time. These overstress tests confirm an
since the digital command system is located in adequate design margin inherent in the digital
the adapter and will not experience such en- command system.
vironments as oxygen atmosphere and salt- Typical reliability tests on other systems and
water immersion. Those environments which components included such environments as
were required are noted with a "C" or "S" in proof pressure cycling, repeated simulated mis-
the appropriate column. The "C" designates sions, and system operation with induced con-
that the equipment has successfully completed tamination. The contamination test was con-
the test, and the "S" designates that the equip- duoted on the reentry control system and the
ment has been qualified by similarity. A com- orbital attitude and maneuver system because
ponent or assembly is considered qualified by these systems were designed with filters and
similarity when it can be determined by a de- pressure regulators which contained small ori-
tailed engineering analysis that design changes rices susceptible to clogging.
have not adversely affected the qualification of Some reliability tests were eliminated when
the item. Gemini flight data revealed that in some in-
Reliability Testing stances qualification tests had actually been
overstress tests. This was particularly true
For programs such as Gemini, which involve
with respect to vibration qualification, where
small production quantities, the inherent relia-
the overall rms acceleration level of 12.6g
bility must be established early in the design
(fig. 10-7) exceeded the actual inflight vibra-
phase and realized through a strict quality con-
trol system. It was not feasible to conduct
(0.20)
classical reliability tests to demonstrate equip- 0.20 Permissible variation
due to fillers
ment reliability to a significant statistical level u
"- .16 -- 12.6g rms
c_
of confidence. Consequently, no mean-time-to- 2.0g rms
failure testing was conducted. Confidence in 8.4g rrns
.I2
Gemini hardware was established by analyzing
the results of all test data derived from the o .08
g (0.05)
integrated ground and flight test program, and Q.
u_
.04 (0.065) =_
by conducting additional reliability tests on (0.02)
(0.008)
selected components and systems whose func- Q._
--F---7 "1 I L J I I I l J
tions were considered critical to successful 0 200 400 600 800 IO00 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
l J
mission accomplishment. 20 500
Frequency, cps
Equipment was selected for reliability tests
after evaluating the more probable failure FIGURE lO-7.--Spacecraft random vibration test.
SPACECRAFT RELIABILITY AND QUALIFICATION 95
0i! o
e_
sB_ F
co
o:loldmo 0
uo;_oldmoo potm_I_I : I
on'i II II
•_uoo "duzo j_
•mooo(_ "dx_
'_ona_s
•mini "._'8
o doJc_ .sos_ I I I I
_ _ .soJ,t ,_o,I I I 1 I
_ "so_v _o I I I I
_ _I r_ _ _ co
M "dx_ _ _ _ co
.;
_ hi ol_snoov _ _ _ co
g_
I (ado) pImnH [ ] ] [
)-.-4
II II
@
v*-4 Z "IoOov _ _ co m
gfl
"_IV "dtao,L _ _ co co
"¢
_0oqB _ _ co co
"qlA _ _ co co
•dtao_ o_I _ _ m co
._ "duIo_ IH _ 0 co co
c_
I I I i
_ _'_,'_ _
_8 n # #
r,-
96 GEMINI _ImPBOGRAM CONFERENCE
tion levels by a significant margin. Conse- For the most part, the reliability tests were
quently, the test level was reduced to an overall conducted as a continuation of the formal quali-
rms acceleration level of 7g for the adapter fication tests on the same test specimens used in
blast shield region and to 8.8g in the reentry the qualification tests after appropriate refur-
assembly region (figs. 10-8 and 10-9), respec- bishment and acceptance testing. When the
tively. Equipment which had been subjected previous testing expended the test specimen to
to the initial requirement, therefore, did not a state that precluded refurbishment, additional
require additional testing. new test units were used.
All failures which occurred during the relia- Quality Control
bility tests were analyzed to determine the cause
A rigid quality control system was developed
of failure and the required corrective action.
and implemented to attain and maintain the
Decisions to redesign, retest, or change proc-
reliability that was inherent in the spacecraft
esses in manufacturing were rendered after
design. This system required flight equipment
careful consideration of the probability of
to be produced as nearly as possible to the
occurrence, mission performance impact, sched-
qualified configuration.
ule, and cost.
02
0.2
.I
(0.09)
.I
(0.06) 05
% o5
>,
oJ entry
rail
.02 rms acceleration
.O2 level = 8.Sg
u
level aSpectrum_
= 7.0 g 8O0
o_
.01 (o .oo8)
L (0.008)
aJ
mm--_-- T
o
cz iOr bit spectrum _.00_
005
c overall rms 13
o
"Orbit spectrum,
acceleration
overall rms
level = 2.0g
acceleration
.001 I I l I
.001 J I i J I
20 50 I00 200 500 I000 2000 20 50 I00 200 500 Iooo 2000
Frequency, cps Frequency , cps
FIGURE 10-8.--Random vibration of test adapter blast- FIGURE 10-9.--Random vibr&tton test of reentry as-
shield region. sem_bly region.
SPACECRAFT RELIABILITY ABTD QUALIFICATION 97
The unique features of the quality control spection "buy-off" prior to making or breaking
system which contributed to the success of the any system interfaces.
Gemini flight program am: Formal spacecraft acceptance reviews are con-
(1) Configuration control. ducted _t strategic stages of the spacecraft as-
(2) Material control. sembly and test profile. The reviews are con-
(3) Quality workmanship. ducted with both the customer and the contrac-
(4) Rigid inspection. tor reviewing all test data and inspection records
(5) Spacecraft acceptance criteria. to isolate any condition which occurred during
Configuration control is necessary to maintain the preceding manufacturing and test activity
spacecraft quality; therefore, the contractor and and may adversely affect the performance of the
customer management developed and imple- equipment.
mented a rigid and rapid change-control system All failures, malfunctions, or out-of-tolerance
which permitted required changes to be docu- conditions that have not been resolved are
mented, approved, implemented, and verified by brought to the attention of the management re-
quality control, with the inspector being fully view board for resolution and corrective meas-
aware of the change before it is implemented on ures. The reviews are conducted prior to final
the spacecraft. When a change is considered spacecraft system tests at the contractor's plant,
necessary, and the program impact has been immediately prior to spacecraft, delivery, 'and
evaluated for design value, schedule, and cost, approximately 10 days preceding the flight.
the proposed change is formally presented to
Flight Equipment Tests
the management change board for approval and
implementation. All changes made to the space- A series of tests are conducted on all flight
craft are processed through the change board. articles to provide assurance that the reliability
Each article of flight equipment is identified potential of the design has not been degraded
by a unique part number. Components, such as in the fabrication and handling of the hard-
ware. The tests conducted on flight equipment
relay panels, tank assemblies, and higher orders
include--
of electrical or electronic assemblies, are serial-
(1) Receiving inspection.
ized, and each serialized component is accounted
(9) In-line production tests.
and recorded in the spacecraft inventory at the
(3) Predelivery acceptance tests (PDA).
time it is installed in the spacecraft. (4) Preinstallation acceptance tests (PIA).
Exotic materials such as. titaniun_ Ren6 41, (5) Combined s p a c e c r a f t systems tests
and explosive materials used in pyrotechnics (SST).
are accounted for 'by lots to permit identifica- (6) Spacecraft-launch vehicle joint com-
tion of any suspect assembly when it is deter- bined system tests.
mined that a part is defective because of ma- (7) Countdown.
terial deficiency. In receiving inspection, critical parts are
Inspection personnel and fabrication techni- given a 100-percent inspection which may in-
cians who require a particular skill such as clude X-ray, chemical analysis, spectrographs,
and functional tests.
soldering, welding, and brazing are trained and
certified for the respective skill and r6tested While the equipment is being assembled, addi-
tional tests are performed to detect deficiencies
for proficiency at regular intervals to retain
early in manufacturing. Mandatory inspection
quality workmanship.
points are established at strategic in'tervals dur-
The very strict control of parts and fabri-
ing the production process. These were estab-
cated assemblies is maintained by rigid inspec-
lished at such points as prior to potting for
tion methods. All deficiencies, discrepancies, or potted modules and prior to closure for hermet-
test anomalies are recorded and resolved regard- ically sealed packages. As an example, certain
less of the significance that is apparent to the electronic modules of the onboard computer re-
inspector at the time of occurrence. All equip- ceive as many as 11 functional tests before they
ment installations and removals require an in- go into the final acceptance test.
98 GEMINI MmPROGRAM CONFERENCE
A predelivery acceptance test to verify the craft is ready for flight. It should be pointed
functional performance of the equipment is per- out again that any abnormality, out-of-toler-
formed at the vendor's plant in the presence of ance condition, malfunction, or failure resulting
vendor and Government quality control repre- from any of these tests is recorded, reported,
sentatives. Many of these tests include and evaluated to determine the cause and the
environmental exposure to vibration and low effect on mission performance.
temperature whenever these environments are
considered to be prime contributors to the me- Failure Reporting, Failure Analysis, and
Corrective Action
chanics of failure. For complex or critical
equipment, spacecraft contractor engineering
Degradation in the inherent reliability of the
and quality control and Government engineer-
spacecraft systems is minimized through the
ing representatives were also present to witness
rigid quality control system and a closed-loop
the test for initial deliveries.
failure-reporting and corrective-action system.
Prior to installation in the spacecraft, the unit
All failures of flight-configured equipment that
is given a preinstallation acceptance test to ver-
occur during and after acceptance tests must be
ify that the functional characteristics or cali-
reported and analyzed. No failure, malfunc-
bration has not changed during shipment. This
tion, or anomaly is considered to be a random
test is conducted identically to the predelivery
failure. All possible effort is expended to deter-
acceptance test when feasible, unless a difference
mine the cause of the anomaly to permit imme-
in test equipment necessitates a change. When
diate corrective action.
differences in test equipment dictate a difference
Comprehensive failure-analysis laboratories
in the testing procedure, the test media (such
were established at the Kennedy Space Center
as fluids, applied voltages, and pressures) are
and at the spacecraft contractor's plant to pro-
identical, and test data are recorded in the same
vide rapid response concerning failures or mal-
units of measure in order to compare test results
functions which occur immediately prior to
with previous test data. This permits a
spacecraft delivery or launch.
rapid detection of the slightest change in _he
However, in cases where the electronic or
performance of the equipment.
electromechanical equipment is extremely com-
Spacecraft systems tests are performed on
plex, the failed part is usually returned to the
the system after installation in the spacecraft,
vendor when the failure analysis requires spe-
prior to delivery. They include individual
cial engineering knowledge, technical skills, and
systems tests prior to mating the spacecraft sec-
sophisticated test equipment.
tions, integrated systems tests, simulated flight
A tabulated, narrative summary of all fail-
tests, and altitude chamber tests after mating
ures which occur on the spacecraft and space-
all of the spacecraft sections. These tests use
craft equipment is kept current by the prime
special connectors built into the equipment to
contractor. This list is continuously reviewed
prevent equipment disconnection which would
by the customer and the contractor to assure
invalidate system interfaces.
acceptable and timely failure analyses and re-
Similar systems tests are repeated during
sulting corrective action. The contractor has
spacecraft premate verification at the launch-
established a priority system to expedite those
site checkout facility. After the spacecraft has
failure analyses which are most significant to
been electrically connected to the launch vehicle,
the pending missions.
a series of integrated systems functional tests is
A simplified flow diagram of the corrective
performed. Upon completion of these tests,
action system is shown in figure 10-10. A mate-
simulated flights, which exercise the abort mode
rial review board determines the disposition of
sequences, are conducted in combination witl3
the failed equipment, and an analysis of the
the launch vehicle, the Mission Control Center,
failure may be conducted at either the supplier's
the Manned Space Flight Network, and the plant, the prime contractor's plant, or at the
flight crew. Kennedy Space Center, depending on the
The countdown is the last in a series of sys- nature of the condition, the construction of the
tems functional tests to verify that the space- equipment, and the availability of the facilities
SPACECRAFT RELIABILITY AND QUALIFICATION 99
Corrective
Failure or Analysis of action
evaluated to determine whether qualification
malfunction failure
responsibility status of the equipment has been affected. If
Supplier's Suppl ier's .
the equipment cannot be considered qualified by
plant q _--" plant"_ r ,_- Des,gn similarity, additional environmental tests are
• _ Material/ _ Materiel /_ ionufac- conducted to confirm the qualification status.
Prime _Revew /Prime , _ Rev ew _ turing
contractor's I | contractor s I t[
plant / Board _ plant [ Board __ Quality Unmanned Flight Tests
/ oation
\ / action\-- aontrol
Kennedy Kennedy
_pace
/,_w _
_Space
' y._/ L. Acc_p,o°ae The final tests conducted to support the
Center Center testing
manned missions were the unmanned flights of
Gemini I and II. Gemini I verified the struc-
Fiou_ 10--10.--Gemini corrective action flow schematic.
tural intergrity of the spacecraft and demon-
strated compatibility with the launch vehicle.
at each of the respective locations. If the anal-
Gemini II, a suborbital flight, consisted of a
ysis of a supplier's equipment is conducted at
production spacecraft with all appropriate on-
the prime contractor's plant or at the Kennedy
board systems operating during prelaunch,
Space Center, the respective supplier's repre-
sentative is expected to participate in the launch, reentry, postflight, and recovery. Each
analysis. system was monitored by special telemetry and
When the failure-analysis report is available, cameras that photographed the crew-station in-
the recommended corrective action is evaluated, strument panels throughout the flight. The
and a decision is rendered to implement the re- flight demonstrated the capability of the heat-
quired corrective action. This may require protection devices to withstand the maximum
management change board action to correct a heating rate and temperature of reentry. The
design deficiency, a change in manufacturing successful completion of the Gemini II mission,
processes, establishment of new quality control combined with ground qualification test results,
techniques, and/or changes to the acceptance- formed the basis for declaring the spacecraft
testing criteria. Each change must also be qualified for manned space flight.
B
LAUNCH VEHICLE
11. LAUNCH VEHICLE MANAGEMENT
By WILLIS B. MITCHELL, Manager, O_iee o Vehicles and Missions, Gemini Program O_ice, NASA Manned
Spaeeera]t Center; and JEROME B. HAMMACK,Deputy Manager, O_ee o/ Vehicles and Missions,
Gemini Program O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center
103
104 GE_IINI ]KIDPROGRAI_ CONFERENCE
Air Force management office and is responsible all Gemini launch vehicle program. The Aero-
for the launch vehicle coordination and integra- space Corp. also supplies the launch-vehicle
tion activities within the Manned Spacecraft guidance equations and predicted payload capa-
Center. The Test Operations Office in the bilities, and performs the postflight evaluation.
Gemini Program Office has the responsibility The airframe contractor is the Martin Co.,
for the integration of the launch vehicle into with 38 major subcontractors. The Aerojet-
the overall pl,an for preflight checkout, count- General Corp. and its five subcontractors sup-
down, and launch of the combined Gemini space ply the engine system. The General Electric
vehicle. In order to accomplish these tasks, the Co. produces the airborne guidance system com-
Test Operations Office works closely with Ken- ponents, and the Burroughs Co. supplies the
nedy Space Center organizations and with the ground computer and implements the guidance
Gemini Program Office Resident Manager at the equations. The Air Force 6555th Aerospace
Kennedy Space Center. Test Wing at Patrick Air Force Base, Fla., has
The magnitude of the management task is been assigned the responsibility for preflight
illustrated in figure 11-1, which shows the con- checkout of the launch vehicle at Cape Kennedy
tractor and Government organizations involved and for the launch operations. In the NASA
in the launch vehicle effort. For completeness, organization, this responsibility is supported by
the Manned Spacecraft Center organizations the Kennedy Space Center and by a Gemini
which are directly concerned are also shown. Program Office Resident Manager assigned
The figure shows that 2 major Government from the Manned Spacecraft Center.
agencies, 5 major industrial contractors, and 43 Within the Manned Spacecraft Center, or-
industrial subcontractors participate in the ganizations other than the Gemini Program
Gemini launch vehicle development program. Office involved in the progra m are the Flight
The major Government agencies involved in the Operations Directorate, which is responsible for
program are the two NASA centers (the Ken- operational mission planning and for the over-
nedy Space Center and the Manned Spacecraft all direction and management of flight control
Center) and the Air Force Systems Command and recovery activities; the Flight Crew Opera-
(AFSC). Within the Air Force, the Gemini tions Directorate, which is responsible for the
launch vehicle program is managed through the flight crew training and crew inputs to the
Space Systems Division Program Office, which launch vehicle systems; and the Engineering
is supported strongly by the Aerospace Corp. and Development Directorate, which is responsi-
The Aerospace Corp. is responsible to the Space ble for additional technical support as required
Systems Division Program Office for systems for the Gemini Program. The spacecraft con-
integration and technical direction on the over- tractor, the McDonnel Aircraft Corp., is ,also
shown on the figure because interface relation-
ships are maintained with this contractor, es-
NASA AFSC 1
pecially in the areas of the malfunction detec-
tion system and backup guidance.
FIGURE ll-l.--Management structure (Gemini launch termining the ramifications of these solutions on
vehicle ). all interfacing hardware and procedures.
LAUNCH VEHICLE I_ANAGE_ENT 105
Communication and control are also problems in which is devoted to panel meetings. On the
the identification and transmittal of interface second day, reports from the panel chairmen
requirements among the groups involved. The are presented to the assembled committee, and
interfaces are not only physical but many times recommendations for courses of action are pro-
are philosophical or ideological in nature. posed. This is followed by a Government ses-
When these management problems were fur- sion devoted to discussions of action items and
ther considered in the light of the relatively financial matters. Meetings were originally
short time allowed for development and pro- held at intervals of 2 weeks, later increased to
curement of the launch vehicle, both the NASA 3 weeks, and then monthly. Presently, one
and the Air Force recognized early in the Gem- meeting is held before each mission. The pres-
ini Program that a system of cooperative pro- ent frequency of meetings indicates the ma-
gram direction and problem reporting would be turity of the program. The key results of the
beneficial. Time simply was not available for meetings are translated into action items which
the conventional chain-of-command operation. are put into a telegram format. After coordi-
Consequently, a launch vehicle coordinating nation with responsible groups within the
organization was formed, headed by a Chair- NASA Gemini Program Office, the action items
man from the NASA Gemini Program Office are approved by the NASA Gemini Progrum
and an Associate Chairman from the Space Sys- Manager and are implemented. Other study
tems Division Program Office. The group is items and records of discussions are put into
composed of representatives of all the Gov- abstract form and mailed to responsible agencies
ernment and industrial organizations which and participants.
participate directly in the launch vehicle pro- In operation, the coordination group provides
gram, plus representatives of all Govern- the status monitoring required to properly as-
ment or industrial groups which have an sess the progress of the launch vehicle program.
interface with the launch vehicle program. It also makes possible the rapid identification
The organization of this group went through a of problem areas in hardware development, and,
number of changes and eventually arrived at more importantly, it allows the talents of a large
the form shown in figure 11-2. This panel- group of knowledgeable people to be brought to
type organization has the advantage of group- bear on these problems. The effects of pro-
ing people of like specialties, and it results in posed solutions on other facets of the total pro-
smaller discussion groups which allow more gram are evaluated quickly, and knowledge of
detailed treatment of problems. A normal changes is disseminated rapidly. While a de-
coordination meeting lasts 2 days, the first of tailed discussion of the function of each of the
Guidance Costs. 1
and Systems contracts, J
control panel and schedulesJ
panel
pane I
panels is not appropriate, the implications of Configuration Control Board exists, the NASA
the work of three of the groups is important be- Gemini Program Manager chose to delegate
cause of their interrelation with the other ele- the detail authority for launch vehicle change
ments of the Gemini Program : control to the Air Force Configuration Change
(1) The interface control, panel brings to- Board, which is operated by the Space Systems
Division in accordance with Air Force Manual
gether the appropriate members of the indus-
trial contractors representing the Gemini AFSCM-375-1. This manual specifies the con-
launch vehicle and the spacecraft for the inter- figuration management system for Department
change of information and requirements. The of Defense programs during the definition and
actions of this panel led to the preparation of development phases. To provide the necessary
the interface specification and the interface integration of launch vehicle changes into the
drawings. These drawings were the joint prod- general program development plan, ,a member
uct of the two engineering departments and of the NASA Gemini Program Office has been
are indicative of the cooperation which was appointed to sit with the Air Force Configura-
achieved. tion Change Board as an associate member. It
(2) The abort panel outlines the required is his function to provide the liaison between
studies of the flight-abort environment, makes the two boards. Generally, all Gemini launch
hazard analyses, and recommends abort pro- vehicle changes are well coordinated with the
cedures. Test programs to define the magni- NASA through the coordination group; conse-
tude and extent of a launch-vehicle fireball were
quently, the primary action of the NASA
conducted under the surveillance of the abort
Change Board, concerning Gemini launch ve-
panel. These activities were the basis of the
hicle changes, is to review the key actions of
crew-escape procedures.
the Air Force Change Board and to act on
(3) The guidance and control panel is con-
those changes referred to the NASA Change
cerned with the airborne and ground-based
Board. This latter group of changes are those
guidance equipment, as well as the interfacing
specifically requested by the NASA, those which
requirements of the launch vehicle flight-control
equipment with the redundant spacecraft iner- affect the interface with the spacecraft or affect
tial-guidance-system equipment. This panel is pilot safety, and those which materially affect,
concerned with both hardware and software launch schedules or funding.
requirements.
Concluding Remarks
A coordination activity at the Air Force
Eastern Test Range has also proved to be a use- It is axiomatic that no organization will func-
ful tool. This group, the Gemini Launch tion well, no matter how carefully devised are
Operations Committee, brings together all ele- the organization charts nor how well docu-
ments that participate in the Gemini Program
mented are the authorities and responsibilities,
at the Air Force Eastern Test Range. The
unless it is manned with well-motivated and
main purpose of this group is to resolve all
dedicated people who work cooperatively
launch-complex-oriented problems and, where
toward the objective. On the Gemini launch
necessary, to submit action requests back
vehicle program, a spirit of cooperation has been
through the NASA Gemini Program Office.
developed between the two Government agencies
Configuration Management involved that has extended throughout the con-
tractor structure and has generally surmounted
Tile NASA-DOD agreement provides to the
NASA the authority to establish a configura- any differences that arose. This cooperation and
tion management system for the launch-vehicle excellent communication, together with the
program. This includes the establishment of competence of the Air Force Space Systems
a reference configuration, a configuration con- Division and its associated contractors, is the
trol board, and a change-status accounting key to the successflfl Gemini launch vehicle
system. Although an overall Gemini Program program.
12. GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT
ground rules under which they were made, how Separation point ......... t
Oxidizer tank ........... /
the principal systems were initially baselined, GLV stage ]E
how they evolved, and how they have per- Equipment bay .......... 19 ft
formed to date.
Fuel tonk _
Introduction
Stage ]E engine .._
thrust chamber _---_"
An original concept of the GLV program was
to make use of flight-proven hardware; spe- I0 ft_
cifically, the modified Titan II would be used
to insure a high level of crew safety and reli- GLV stage I
ability. This decision was based on the fact Oxidizer tank ........... 71 ft
that more than 30 Titan II vehicles were sched-
uled to be flown prior to the flight of the first
GLV, and, as a result of these flights, a high
level of confidence would be established in the Fuel tank
107
108 (}E_IINI MIDPROGRA_ CONFERENCE
Stages
Stages
MDS sensed
I B TT engine
I B Tr propellant
Overrates (pitch,
parameters
underpressure
tank
yow,&
pressure
roll )--7
I} " I
:i :1
_'1
o,fonct,on
display
II II instruments/
SpacecroftI
I siologico I
sw itFc_ogvHr/Cs°n:rc_lboc k /, / _-
Loss of pressure
i Hydraulic actuator
hordover I._._
........... i .......................................
existed for them on the GLV. These deletions data-trend-monitoring program, and others
resulted in a valuable weight savings and an have been beneficial.
increase in mission reliability.
Pilot Safety
(6) A new stage II oxidizer-tank forward
skirt assembly was designed to mate the launch The pilot-safety problem was defined early in
vehicle to the spacecraft. the Gemini Program by predicting the failure
(7) The Titan II equipment-support truss modes of all critical launch-vehicle systems.
was modified to accommodate GLV equipment For the boost phase, the problem was managed
requirements. by developing an emergency operational concept
(8) Devices were added to the GLV stage ] which employed concerted efforts by the flight
propellant lines to attenuate the launch vehicle crew and ground monitors, and which employed
longitudinal oscillations, or POGO effect. automatic airborne circuits only where neces-
(9) The Titan II range-safety and ordnance sary. Detailed failure-mode analyses defined
systems were modified, by _he addition of cer- functional requirements for sensing, display,
tain logic circuitry and by changes to the communications, operator training, and emer-
destruct initiators, to increase crew safety. gency controls (fig. 12-3).
A modification not found in this listing but, During two periods of stage I flight, escape
from violent flight-control malfunctions in-
nevertheless fundamental to the GLV, .was the
application of special techniques which signi- duced by failure of the guidance, control, elec-
tric, or hydraulic power systems is not feasible;
ficantly increased vehicle reliability. Several
therefore, the GLV was designed to correct
of these techniques will be mentioned later, but
these failures automatically by switching over
no attempt will be made to detail all the facets
to tbe backup guidance and flight-control sys-
as they apply to the GLV. However, disci-
tems which include the guidance, control, elec-
plines such as the critical-component program, tric, and hydraulic power systems. Sensing
the personnel training-certification and motiva- parameters for the malfunction detection system
tion program, the component limited-life pro- and switchover mechanisms were established.
gram, the corrective-action and failure-analysis Component failure modes were introduced into
program, the procurement-control program, the breadboard control system, tied in with a
GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICL]_ DEVELOPMENT 109
52
L). No wind nominal (stage I)
u .... T-5 nominal (winds biased)
o No wind nominal (stage TT)
o Gemini 1[ actual
o
Gemini 1T constraints
16
load
r \
/ T-5 winds
biased nominal
dispersion
ellipse
line
.380 ° F
RGS
angle warning/.
T-5 structural
.°° ,
k_
Abort /
i40 (downrange)
box
t I I 1 J I i 1 J I
8.2 10.2 12.2 14.2 16.2 18.2 20.2 22.2 24.2 26.2. 28.2 30.2
complete airborne-syatem functional test stand Throughout the entire abort operation, crew
and an analog simulation of vehicle behavior, safety required certain configuration changes
to verify the failure mode analysis of system to curb excessive escape environments. The
and vehicle effects and to optimize adjustments GLV strength envelope was adjusted to loads
of the malfunction-detection-system sensors. induced by malfunctions, so that structural fail-
Isolation and analyses of the other time-criti-
ures during attitude divergence would be
cal failure modes established engine chamber
isolated to the section between stages.
pressures, tank pressures, and vehicle overrate
Pilot safety has been actively pursued during
as malfunction-detection-system sensing param-
eters for direct spacecraft display and for the operational phase of the program in the
manual abort warning. form of astronaut training, development of a
110 GEMINI _IIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
I manufacturing splice. Strengthening of this levels of +__0.38g were recorded, was due to
splice minimizes the possibility of a between- improper preflight charging of the oxidizer
tanks breakup, with subsequent fireball, in the standpipe. Charging methods and recycle pro-
event of certain malfunctions. cedures were subsequently modified, and, on
Titan II operational storage in silos is both GLV-6 and GLV-7, POGO levels were within
temperature and humidity controlled. Weather the _0.95g requirements. The new oxidizer
protection of the GLV is provided only by the standpipe remote-charge system has eliminated
vehicle erector on launch complex 19. To pre- a difficult manual operation late in the count-
vent structural corrosion, the vehicle is selec- down, and has provided increased reliability
tively painted and is subjected to periodic cor- and a blockhouse monitoring capability.
rosion control inspections. Stringent corrosion Figure 19-4 shows the history of success in
control procedures were established after cor- eliminating POGO. With one exception, all
roded weld lands and skins were experienced Gemini results are below +__0.25g, and an order
on GLV-1 during its exposure to the Gape Ken- of magnitude less than the first Titan II
nedy environment. vehicles.
Electrical
Propulsion
plate set of functions wired through each quencing subsystem is shown in figure 12--6. To
connector. insure that the critical stage II shutdown func-
The redundant electrical sequencing sub- tion will be implemented when commanded, a
system consists of relay and motor-driven backup power supply is provided.
switch logic to provide discrete signals to the The electrical system has performed as de-
vehicle systems. A block diagram of the se- signed on all GLV flights. The 400-cps power,
eta
actuators
eI
[
_illlilllllilllllllllllllllll
s-l[-
hydraulic
I system I
I spacecraft[ J co rol J
IPS [_
battery [
autopilot
Program
_1 Primary 8_ secondary
initiate control staging I I I gain changes
Lift-off
relay ! relay 1 switch
Separation nut-
Program Staging
Staging _ IPS
APS [ stages ]an
initiate cant rol staging
Lift-off_'I
relay 2 relay 2 switch
engine J
J start J
Shutdown
switch
1 Stage I
manual l
engine
Ii Shutdown shutdown
shutdown Shutdown
bus
switch
2
Stage rl engine
shutdown
solenoid
RGS
IGS
(SECO) ._._
(SECO) _
Switchover
relay
H Guidance
shutdown
relay 1
?and I
Redundant
detection stage TI
Malfunction ,, t i shutdown-
squib valve
shutdown
L Guidance
relay 2 /k
FIGURE12-_.--Sequencing subsystem.
GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICLE DEVELOP_r£ENT 118
which is required by the primary guidance there is partial redundancy during stage II
flight-control system for timing reference, has flight.
not deviated by more than -----0.5percent, al- (2) Switchover can be implemented auto-
though the specified frequency tolerance is ±1 matically or manually during either stage of
percent. The discrete timing functions of the powered flight.
sequencing subsystem have been well within the (3) Flight-proven hardware from Titan I
specified ___3seconds. Power system voltages, and Titan II is used wherever possible.
with auxiliary and instrumentation power sup- (4) There is complete electrical and physical
ply, have been within the specified 27- to isolation between the primary and secondary
31-V dc range. Thus, if switchover to the sec- systems.
ondary guidance and control systarn had oc,- (5) The relatively simple switchover cir-
curred, the instrumentation power supply cuitry is designed for the minimum possibility
would have performed satisfactorily for of a switchover-disabling-type failure or an
backup operations. inadvertent switchover failure.
stage I
rate gyros
Primary
I--------I
I GE 1 _ I'--"--'1 Primary
I
[ RGS ]_ autopilot Hydraulic pressure loss I
Primary
stage I I I Hardover I
hydraulic
system ll[i Few
Swi,cho.r
L----1 Po er Stage
- hydraulic
SecondarYhydraulicStage
I I II II Switchoverrelay
I Spacecraft I Secondary
system Switchback /
I I GS autopilot
I j
Secondary
stage I
rate gyros
The actuators are tandem units with a primary information sent by ground-monitoring per-
and secondary system section. Each section is sonnel, that a primary system malfunction has
a complete electrohydraulic serve, capable of occurred.
driving the common piston rod. The major Upon receipt of a switchover signal, the in-
components comprising each servoactuator are ertia] guidance system performs a fading opera-
the same as those used in Titan II actuators. tion which reduces the output to zero, and then
The tandem actuator (fig. 12-8) contains a restores the signal to the system according to
switchover valve, between the two servovalves an exponential law. This minimizes vehicle
and their respective cylinders, which deactivates loads during the switchover maneuver.
the secondary system while the primary system Flight per/o_w_nce.--All GLV flights have
is operating, and vice versa, following switch- been made on the primary system, and perform-
over to the secondary system. ance has been satisfactory, with no anomalies
Switchover.--There are four methods for ini- occurring. All flight transients and oscilla-
tiating a switchover to the secondary system, tions have been within preflight analytical
and all modes depend on the malfunction de- predictions.
tection system. Although there has not been a switchover to
(1) The tandem actuator switchover valve the secondary flight-control system, its per-
automatically effects a switchover to the stage I formance has been satisfactory on all flights.
secondary hydraulic system when primary sys- Postflight analysis indications are that this
tem pressure is lost, and initiates a signal to the system could have properly controlled the
malfunction detection system which completes launch vehicle if it had been necessary.
switchover to the secondary guidance and con- During the program, the capability of
trol system. variable-azimuth launch, using the three-axis
(2) The malfunction detection system rate- reference system variable-roll-program set-in
switch package automatically initiates switch- capability, has been demonstrated, as has the
over when the vehicle rates exceed preset limits. closed-loop guidance steering during stage II
(3) The tandem actuator preset limit flight.
switches detect and initiate a switchover in the Malfunction Detection System
and circuits and isolated installation of redun- engine-underpressure sensors are provided in
dant elements to minimize the possibility of a redundant pairs for each engine subassembly.
single or local failure disabling the system. The warning signal circuits for these are con-
Also, probable failure modes were considered nected to separate engine warning lights in the
in component design and selection and in cir- spacecraft. Upon decrease or loss of the thrust-
cuit connection in order to provide the malfunc- chamber pressure, the redundant sensor switches
tion detection system with a greater reliability close and initiate a warning signal.
than that of the systems being monitored. Except" for the pressure operating range, all
The total malfunction sensing and warning malfunction detection system propellant-tank
provisions, including the malfunction detection pressure sensors and signal circuits are identi-
system, and the interrelation of these are shown cal. A redundant pair of sensors is provided
in figure 12-2. for each propellant tank. Each sensor supplies
Monitoring techniques.--The malfunction an analog output signal, proportional to the
detection system is a composite of signal cir- sensed pressure, to the individual indicators on
cuits originating in monitoring sensors, routed the tank pressure meters in the spacecraft.
through the launch vehicle and the interface, Launch-vehicle turning rates, about all three
and terminating in the spacecraft warning- axes, are monitored by the malfunction detec-
abort system (fig. 12-9). tion system overrate sensor. In the event of ex-
Stages I and II malfunction detection system cessive vehicle turning, a red warning light in
Stage I 41 I_ Stage I1
24 Vdc 28 Vdc
APS/IPS bus APS/IPS buses
) 0 200 V, 400cps
APS bus
t _T
ddize Fuel I 0 ddiz
MDS tank tank tank
Sensors essL I pl esst
iI I_:_L
,-.-.,
Fv-- ----v--v-l
I Stage II tank I
I pressure I
t J
the spacecraft is energized. Simultaneously There have been several significant changes
and automatically, a signal is provided to ini- made to the malfunction detection system since
tiate switchover to the secondary flight-control the beginning of the program. These entailed
system. The overrate sensor is the malfunction addition of the switchback capability, a change
detection system rate-switch package, consisting to the stage I flight switch settings of the rate-
of six gyros as redundant pairs for each of the switch package, and deletion of the staging and
vehicle body axes (pitch, yaw, and roll). In stage-separation monitoring signals. Figure
the malfunction detection system circuits, the 12-10 shows the location of the malfunction
redundant rate switches are series connected, detection system components.
and simultaneous closure of both switches in the Flight performance.--All malfunction detec-
redundant pair is required to illuminate the tion system components have undergone a simi-
warning light in the spacecraft and to initiate lar design verification test program which
switchover. included testing at both the component and
The dual switchover power-amplifiers are system levels. At the component level, evalua-
self-latching solid-state switching modules used tion, qualification, and reliability tests were con-
to initiate a switchover from the primary to the ducted. System verification and integration
secondary guidance and control system. On the with other launch-vehicle systems were per-
input side, signals are supplied either from the formed in the airborne systems functional test
malfunction detection system overrate circuits;
set. In addition, flight performance verification
from the stage I hydraulic actuators, low pres-
was accomplished by means of the Titan II
sure or hardover; or from the flight crew in the
piggyback program. Table 12-I presents the
case of a malfunction. An unlatching capabil-
flight performance of the malfunction detection
ity is provided for the switchover power ampli-
system components. With the exception of two
tiers to permit switchback from the secondary
to the primary guidance and control system problems which were corrected (a minor oscil-
during the stage II flight. lation problem occurring on two tank sensors
Launch-vehicle engine shutdown can be manu- prior to the first manned flight, and a slightly
ally initiated by the flight crew in the case of a out-of-tolerance indication on one rate-switch
mission abort or escape requirement. operation during the second Piggyback flight),
Truss 1- 1
Oxidizer
l_ J "--2--5 k__,__
Compartments
the malfunction detection system has performed tern. It has also served as a valuable training
as intended. ground for personnel who later assumed opera-
tional positions at the test fixture and at Cape
Test Operations
Kennedy. Many of the procedures considered
Airborne Systems Functional Test Stand to be important to the program, such as mal-
function disposition meetings, handling of
The airborne systems functional test stand is
time-critical components, and data analysis
an operational mockup of essentially all of the
techniques, were initiated and developed in the
electrical-electronic-hydraulic elements of the
test stand.
launch vehicle, complete with engine thrust
System verification testing with other launch-
chambers and other associated engine hardware.
vehicle systems was performed in the test stand
In some systems, such as flight control and the
using flight hardware. This testing was per-
malfunction detection system, the aerospace
formed on two levels: functional performance
ground equipment is integrated into the test
and compatibility with other systems, and per-
stand, while in other systems, the aerospace
formance in controlling the launch vehicle in
ground equipment is simulated.
simulated flight.
The initial purpose of the airborne systems
functional test stand was to verify the GLV Vertical Testing at Baltimore
syste m design; specifically, systems operation,
Vehicle checkout and acceptance testing in
interface compatibility, effects of parametric
the Martin-Baltimore vertical test fixture was
variations, adequacy of operational procedures,
initiated on June 9, 1963. The baseline test
etc. This was accomplished early in the pro-
program started with a post-erection inspection
gram so that the problems and incompatibilities
followed by power-on and subsystem testing.
could be factored into the production hardware
After an initial demonstration of the combined
before testing GLV-1 in the vertical test fixture
systems test capability, GLV-1 underwent a
in Baltimore. Even though the formal test-
comprehensive electrical-electronic interference
stand test program has been completed, the
measurement program during a series of com-
facility has been used continuously to investi-
bined systems test runs. Based on recorded
gate problems resulting from vertical test fix-
and telemetered system data, several modifica-
ture and Cape Kennedy testing, and also to
tions were engineered to reduce electrical-elec-
verify all design changes prior to their incor-
tronic interference effects. As part of this pro-
poration into the production hardware. gram, both in-sequence and out-of-sequence
The test stand has proved to be an extremely umbilical drops were recorded wih no configura-
valuable tool, particularly in proving the major tion changes required. Following electrical-
system changes such as guidance and control electronic interference corrective action, GLV-1
redundancy and the malfunction detection sys- was run successfully through a combined sys-
118 GEMINI _IDPROGRAM COI_FEKENCE
terns acceptance test. Test acceptance was based during system tests of GLV-2 and spacecraft 2.
primarily on several thousand parameter values The only hardware change was a spacecraft cor-
from aerospace ground equipment and telemetry rection for a launch-vehicle electronic inter-
recordings. ference transient during switchover. As a re-
Electrical-electronic interference testing was sult, further testing on subsequent vehicles was
reduced on GLV-2 because GLV-1 data showed not considered necessary.
noise levels well within the established criteria. A streamlining of all system tests resulted
Test results on GLV-2 confirmed the GLV-1 in a test time of 6 to 7 weeks. This program
modifications, and the electrical-electronic in- replanning increased the proposed firing rate
terference effort on subsequent vehicles was and allowed overall program objectives to be
limited to monitoring power sources. attained in 1965.
A summary of vertical test fixture milestones Gemini operations with GLV-5 included the
is presented in table 12-II. first simultaneous countdown with the Atlas-
The vertical test fixture operational experi- Agena as part of a wet mock simulated launch.
ence confirms the importance of program The changes arising from this operation were
disciplines such as configuration _mtrol, rigid verified with GLV-6 and resulted in a no-holds,
work control, and formal investigation of mal- joint-launch countdown.
functions as factors establishing test-article ac- When the first attempt to launch GLV-6 was
ceptability. The detailed review of acceptance scrubbed because of target vehicle difficulties,
test data, including the resolution of every an earlier Martin Co. proposal for rapid fire of
single data anomaly, also facilitated the ac- two launch vehicles in succession from launch
ceptance process. complex 19 was revived. The decision to imple-
Testing at Cape Kennedy ment this plan resulted in GLV-6 being placed
in horizontal storage from October 28 to De-
GLV-1 was erected on launch complex 19 at
cember 5, 1965. In the interim, GLV-7, whose
Cape Kennedy on October 30, 1963, and an
schedule had been shortened by the deletion of
extensive ground test program ill both side-by-
the flight configuration mode test and wet mock
side and tandem configurations was initiated.
simulation launch (a tanking test was sub-
The program included a sequence compatibility
stituted for the latter), was launched on De-
firing, in which all objectives were achieved. cember 4. GLV-6 was reerected on December 5
Testing in the tandem configuration included
and launched successfully on December 15 after
fit-checks of the erector platforms, umbilicals,
an initial launch attempt on December 12. The
and white room. A series of electrical-elec-
technical confidence which justified such a
tronic interference tests, using a spacecraft
shortened retest program was based upon the
simulator with in-sequence and out-of-sequence
previous successful GLV-6 operation, the main-
umbilical drops, and an all-systems test were
tenance of integrity in storage, and the reliance
conducted as part of the program for complex
on data trend analysis to evaluate the vehicle
acceptance.
readiness for flight. During retests, only one
The GLV-2 operations introduced a number
item, an igniter conduit assembly, was found
of joint launch-vehicle-spacecraft test events.
to be defective.
These included verification of wiring across
Major test events for GLV-1 through GLV-7
the interface; functional compatibility of the
are presented in table 12-III.
spacecraft inertial guidance system and the
launch-vehicle secondary flight-control system; Test Performance
an integrated combined-systems test after mat-
The vertical test fixture performance is
ing the spacecraft to the launch vehicle; a
exemplified by indicators such as the number
similar test conducted by both the spacecraft
and launch vehicle, including umbilical dis- of procedure changes, the equipment operating
connect; and final joint-systems test to establish hours, the number of component replacements,
final _light readiness. (See table 12-III.) and the number of waivers required at the time
The electrical-electronic interference meas- of acceptance. These factors, presented in
urements and umbilical drops were recorded figure 12-11, show a significant reduction fol-
GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT 119
o Z
_N NN : ' '4NN
¢q
' _ ¢9 o
=g -_'!_,a
_ge
_ _._
218-5560--66--9
190 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
Test event
1 2 4 5 7 6-A 8 and
up •
x x x x
!i!!!
Umbilical drop ............................. - X - -- X x
Flight configuration mode test umbilical drop__ X XX
Tanking ................................... x x x -X----
• Current plan.
b Modified.
0 o
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
GLV G LV
3 4 5 6 7 8
GLV
lowing the first test fixture operation. This flects the rapid stabilization of the testing
performance improvement is due largely to the configuration.
vigorous corrective actions initiated to correct Schedule performance at Cape Kennedy is
the early problems. As such, this action helped subject to environment, special testing, and pro-
produce increasingly reliable hardware and gram decisions, and does not indicate improve-
thereby reduced testing time and operating ment in the testing process as effectively as
hours. The decrease in procedure changes re- equipment power-on time and component
GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT 121
changeout, other than for modification (fig. in detail during seven prelaunch test opera-
12-12). The operating time reductions indi- tions, which cover a period of 4 to 5 months,
cated in figure 19-12 stem primarily from the and then entering these values into special data-
elimination of one-time or special tests, a de- trend books. Because _hese data have already
crease in redundant testing, and improvements been analyzed and shown to be within the al-
in hardware reliability. The reduced number of lowed specification limits, this second screening
discrepancies when the launch vehicle is re- is to disclose any trend of the data which would
ceived from the vertical test fixture, as well as be indicative of impending out-of-tolerance
minimal field modifications, also contributed to performance or failure, or even performance
improved test efficiency. which is simply different from the previous
As shown in figure 12--1'2, the decrease in test data.
complexity and the refinement of the testing On a number of occasions, equipment has
process are indicated by the decreasing number been removed from the vehicle, and at other
of procedure change notices generated per times special tests were conducted which re-
vehicle. moved any shadow cast by the trend. In such
An overall measure of test and hardware cases, the history of the unit or parameter, as
performance per vehicle is presented in figure told by all previous testing on earlier vehicles,
12--13, which shows that the number of new was researched and considered prior to package
problems opened for each launch vehicle had di- replacement. A typical data-trend chart for
minished from 500 to 5 through the launch of the electrical system is shown in table 19-IV.
Gemini VII. The launch-vehicle data-trend monitoring
Data-Trend Monitoring program has been of particular significance on
two occasions: when GLV-2 was exposed to a
A data-trend monitoring effort is maintained
lightning storm, and when deerection and re-
as part of the launch-vehich test program. The
erection were necessary after a hurricane at
purpose of the program is to closely examine the
Cape Kennedy. A number of electrical and
performance of components and systems at spec-
electronic components in both the aerospace
ified intervals. This is done by having design
ground equipment and airborne areas, some of
engineers analyze all critical system parameters
lO00
which were known to be damaged and others
which were thought to have been degraded due
750
to overvoltage stress, were replaced. During
500
o. the subsequent retesting, an even more com-
250
prehensive data-trend monitoring program was
I 2 3 4 5 6, 6A 7 implemented to insure that the integrity of the
GLV
launch vehicle had not been impaired due to the
prior events. All test data were reviewed by
lO00
750 50O
.5 2
_ 5OO
0
I 2 $ 4 5 6,6A 7
GLV *Open problems os of 1-13-66
6O
!o I00
3
0 7 8*
I 2 3 4 5 6,6A 7 I 2 3 4 5 6,6A
GLV GLV
Fmua_. 12-12.--Cape Kennedy testing performance. FIGURE 12-13.--Overall measure of test performance.
1_ GEMINI _IDPR0_RAI_ CONFERENC_
i "
; 1
v
z
I. iiiii!!ii!!ii
I
Z
GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICLE DEVELOP_I'ENT 193
design engineers, and any peculiar or abnormal only thing that was going to make this program
indication or any data point falling in the last better than any other program was properly
20 percent of the tolerance band was cause for trained and motivated people.
a comprehensive review, with hardware trouble- To meet these challenges, personnel training
shooting as required. and certification (fig. 12-14) was used to maxi-
After the launch-vehicle storage period at mum advantage, with five specific areas of
Cape Kennedy and prior to the launch, all test- concentration :
ing data were reviewed in a similar manner. (1) Orientation of all program and staff sup-
Additionally, a digital computer program was port personnel toward the program goals and
used to print-out the simulated flight-test data objectives.
points which differed between the prestorage ('2) General familiarization of top manage-
and poststorage simulated flight tests by more ment to aid in making decisions.
than three telemetry data bits, or approximately (3) Detailed technical training for all pro-
1 percent. All such differences were reviewed gram personnel to a level commensurate with
and signed-off by design engineers when the job position, with training continuously avail-
able.
investigations were completed.
The data-trend monitoring program has (4) Certification of the launch-vehicle pro-
duction team.
added materially to launch confidence by adding
an extra dimension to test data analysis. (5) Certification of the test and the checkout
and launch crews.
Personnel Training, Certification, Within 3 months from the program go-ahead,
and Motivation orientation lectures were being presented in
Baltimore, Denver, and Cape Kennedy. At-
From the inception of the Gemini Program,
tendance was not confined solely to launch-
it was recognized that the high-quality stand-
vehicle personnel; personnel from staff support
ards needed could not be achieved by tighter-
groups also attended. It was necessary that the
than-ever inspection criteria alone. Personnel manufacturing planning, purchasing, shipping
working on the program had to know what was and receiving, and production control personnel
required for the program, and had to person- understand firsthand that to attain perfection
ally desire to achieve those requirements. In would involve stringent controls and proce-
view of these factors, it was realized that the dures.
Purpose
selection
Personnel ]
Study guides
Standboards
t Individual
performance
interim
1- evaluation
1
certification
sk"'t
training
=
:
Individual
certification
Crew
performance
evaluation
_ [I GLVtraining
systems I
-2
:
:
1
Crew
certificotion
_=
l QualificatiOnexoms
=
Some of the promotional methods employed have resulted in more than 7000 course comple-
were: motivational posters; an awards pro- tions. The majority of these have been famil-
gram which recognized significant meritorious iarization courses_ the others being detailed.
achievements; letters written by the program courses specifically designed for the test and
director to the wives of employees explaining launch personnel.
the significance of the program; vendor After completing written examinations_ test
awards; special use of the Martin-originated personnel are issued interim certifications, per-
zero defects program; visits to the plant by mitting them to perform initial test operations.
astronauts; broadcasting accounts of launch Following this_ a performance evaluation is
countdowns to the work areas; and programed made by a review team which results in formal
instruction texts for use by personnel on field certification of the technical competence of the
assignments. In these ways, the personnel were individual to perform his job functions.
continuously kept aware of the importance of Through the processes of the motivational
the program and of the vital role that each in- programs_ training_ and certification, the
dividual played achieving the required success. launch-vehicle team has achieved the desired
In obtaining people for the program_ careful results. However_ so long as humans are per-
screening of potential personnel was conducted forming tasks_ mistakes will be made. It is
in an effort to select people with Titan experi- these mistakes that command continued em-
ence. After selection, the people were trained; phasis so that the success of the remaining
for example, some 650 classroom presentations launch vehicles will be insured.
13. PROPULSION SYSTEM
By E. DOUGLAS
WARD,Gemini Program Manager, Aerojet-General Corp.
Engine frame -
Pump, injector
gimbal region
I
Horsepower: 7,800,000 maximum
Thrust: 430,000 Ib
’. Lifts: 351,000 Ib
Thrust chamber. Duration. More than two minutes
Propellant Approximately 9360
Throat- ----- consumpticin : gal per min
Width : 8 f t I I in
Tube for cooling- l o f t 3in
More than 3500 I b
Expansion skirt -
125
126 GEMINI _IIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
/_ropellont generator El
Gemini Unique Engine Components
xidizer starter .-'"
Stage II Engine
A malfunction detection system was incor-
The stage II engine system (figs. 13-4 and porated to provide a warning to the astronauts
13-5) is a scaled-down version of a stage I en- in case of an engine performance degradation.
gine subassembly. The stage II engine does in- The malfunction detection system provides an
clude a thrust-chamber nozzle extension for ad- electrical signal to a spacecraft light as a visual
ditional efficiency at high altitudes and a vehicle warning to the astronaut. This is accomplished
roll-control nozzle. The stage II engine fuel- by pressure switches installed in the engine cir-
---___--_-_-
Pump
Injector _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ----------
Thrust c h am be r -- - --- - ---- -
Throat----------- --____________
E”ronm 134.-U.S. Air Force second-stage spacestart engine for Gemini Program.
cuit. These switches monitor the engine system system switches on a given thrust chamber must
pressures, which are a direct function of engine close to complete the electrical circuitry.
performance level. I n the event of an engine
Prelaunch Malfunction Detection System
performance decay or termination, the engine
system pressure level would also decay and cause The stage I engine supplies the pressurizing
the switches to complete the electrical circuitry gas for the oxidizer and fuel propellant tanks,
to the spacecraft light. Reliability of operation and a prelaunch malfunction detection system
is increased through the use of redundant mal- was developed to monitor the proper operation
function detection system switches on each
thrust chamber. Both malfunction detection
-Stage I[ fuel tank
Roll control nozzle, Thrust-chamber Contractor
Oxidi
Fuel‘
I
I valve actuator ‘-Turbine inlet
I
Fuel Pressure manifold
of these systems prior to lift-off. The prelaunch during flight, from external temperatures up to
malfunction detection system consists of pres- 3600 ° F.
sure switches installed in the oxidizer and fuel
Qualification and Demonstration
tank pressurization lines. The actuation of
Test Program
_¢hese s_dtches during the engine start transient
verifies that the stage I oxidizer and fueltank Each of the redesigned systems successfully
pressurization gas flow is satisbaetory. These met their component qualification and flight
switches are monitored prior to lift-off and must certification requirements. In addition, a Gem-
actuate before lift-off can occur. ini propulsion system test program and a
Titan II piggyback flight test program were
Gemini Stability-Improvement-Program Injector
conducted. The propulsion system test pro-
As a result of a NASA/Department of De- gram was devised to evaluate and demonstrate
fense requirement to develop a stage II injector satisfactory operation of the Gemini unique
for the Gemini Program that would have an components and requirements for the stage I
even higher reliability than the Titan II injec- and II propulsion systems. The test program
tor configuration, the Gemini stability im- was conducted on special test stands in Sacra-
provement program evolved. This program mento, whose "battleship" tankage simulates the
brought forth significant advances in the knowl- flight vehicle. The program was successfully
edge of liquid rocket engine combustion stability concluded during the early part of 1964.
and has resulted in the development of an in- The Titan II piggyback flight test program
jeotor which fulfills the requirements of dynamic was a Titan II flight test demonstration of the
stability, while maintaining the performance of malfunction detection system and prelaunch
the Titan II and Gemini model specifications. malfunction detection system. This program
The injector is considered to be dynamically demonstrated the satisfactory operation of these
stable, as a result of having met all of the pre- components under a flight environment prior to
determined program objectives defining dy- a Gemini launch.
namic stability. Tile injector design, using In addition to these hardware changes, fur-
cooled-tip ejecting baffles, was developed ther action was taken in the areas of reliability
through extensive thrust-chamber assembly and and quality in an effort to achieve the 100-per-
engine testing, and has been incorporated in the cent success goal. Among the most noteworthy
stage II engines on Gemini launch vehicles 8 of these actions was the implementation of a
through 12. pilot safety program.
of stringent controls in the application of pilot- Each component built into a Gemini assembly
safety principles_ and of the active participation and engine is reviewed_ selected_ and certified by
by management in each organization of the the Aerojet-General Corp. pilot-safety team.
team. All documentation applicable to the components
The Pilot Safety Program (fig. 13-7) is a acceptability was reviewed for assurance of
program that strives for the qu.ality and reliabil- proper configuration_ design disclosures, and ac-
ity necessary to assure the success of manned ceptability for manned flight.
spacecraft launch systems. The Gemini Pro- A documentation packet is maintained for
gram established specific controls, responsibili- each critical component and assembly installed
ties_ procedures_ and criteria for acceptance on a Gemini engine. In includes all documen-
of the critical components and engine systems tation applicable to the acceptance and certifi-
to meet and fulfill the requirements of pilot cation of the component to include discrepancy
safety. The acceptance of a Gemini engine sys- reports, test data_ certification of material con-
tem and spare components has been accom- formance, and manufacturing planning with in-
plished by a team composed of personnel from spection acceptance. The documentation in-
the Aerojet-General Corp., the Air Force Space cludes certification by the Aerojet-General
Systems Division_ and the Aerospace Corp. Corp. pilot-safety review team. The documen-
The acceptance is based on a careful considera- tation packet includes a history of all rework
tion of the following criteria. operations at Sacramento and field sites.
The discrepancies noted during all phases of A critical-components program is directed to-
the acceptance of components and engine sys- ward additional controls on 97 components o_
the Gemini engine which, if defective or mar-
tems are documented) evaluated_ and resolved,
ginal, could jeopardize the reliability or safety
and corrective action is taken prior to closeout
of a manned flight. This program includes the
of each item. In addition, discrepancies which
Aerojet-General Corp. suppliers on vendor
occur on other Titan-family engine systems and
items as well as the facilities and personnel at,
which have an impact on Gemini system re- Sacramento and field sites. Additional com-
liability are evaluated and resolved as to the ponents are included in the program as neces-
corrective action required for the Gemini engine sary_ based on reliability studies. Containers in
system. which spare critical components are shipped are
clearly labeled "critical component." Certain
Purpose: Insure qualily and reliability of flight critical components are sensitive to life span--
hardware for each GLV engine system
primarily_ accumulated hot-firing time during
engine and assembly testing; therefore, a com-
Engine ossy hcce_
nce
_g
accepton(
Engine
plete history of all accumulated firing time is
segregated area tes
for fl gh
kept on each affected component. These com-
ponents receive special consideration prior to
report e, test
Post review
engine
_ Discrepancy
analysis _ Verification
certification
the release of an engine for flight.
for test Gemini critical components and engine sys-
review
_[ Air Force
acceptance t*" tems were assembled in segregated controlled
selection areas within the precision assembly and final
assembly complex. Personnel assigned to the
d_t Critical ports L
assembly and inspection operations were desig-
control I
nated and certified for Gemini. Documents ap-
..[ reviews
Preflight I_"
plicable to the fabrication of components were
_1 Component
pedigree _
stamped "Gemini critical component" to em-
readiness
._ Launch
review I_ ' phasize the importance and care necessary in
Tirndc_ycle ])) the processing. Approval to proceed with en-
gine acceptance testing is withheld until the ac-
'_1 Component-
assembly data
ceptance of the critical components and engine
assembly are reviewed and verified by the En-
FX6URE 13-7.--Pilot Safety Program. gine Acceptance Team. Following the accept-
130 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
ance test firings, all test parameters are sub- ity assurance, test, and field product support
jected to a comprehensive review and analysis. requires constant attention to achieve inherent
Special emphasis is directed in the balancing of reliability in a total system. The Gemini Pro-
an engine to assure optimum performance and gram requires the highest degree of personal
mixture ratio for successful flight operation. technical competence and complete awareness
Hardware integrity is recertified through rec- of individual responsibility for zero defects.
ords review and/or physical inspection. This necessitates a training, certification, and
The engines are then presented to the Air motivation program designed and administered
Force, and acceptance is accomplished subse- with substantially more attention than is usual
quent to a comprehensive review of the docu- in industry. This required--
mentation. The engines are then delivered to (1) The complete and enthusiastic support
the launch vehicle contractor's facility, where and personal involvement of top management
they become an integral part of the Gemini personnel.
launch vehicle. After the launch vehicle is de- (2) The selection, training, and certification
livered to Cape Kennedy, and prior to commit- of the company's most competent personnel to
ting the engines to launch, further reviews are work on the program.
conducted to evaluate the results of the launch (3) The development of a Gemini team, each
preparation checkouts. These reviews are de- member of which is thoroughly aware of his
tailed and comprehensive and include participa- responsibility to the total effort.
tion by Aerojet-General Corp. top management. (4) Continuous attention to the maintenance
The engines are released for flight only after and upgrading of technical competence and the
all the open items or questions are resolved. motivation of each Gemini team member to de-
The concept and principles of a pik_t safety vote his best to the program.
program can be incorporated into any space At the inception of the program, all Gemini
systems vehicle, if the management of the or- Program personnel in the Aerojet plant at Sac-
ganizations involved agree to the procedures, ramento met with an astronaut, key Air Force
controls, and criteria of acceptance. Specific personnel, and company top management. Pro-
contractual guidance, negotiation of agree- gram orientation, mission, and importance were
ments, and design requirements should be es- duly emphasized. Followup problem-solving
tablished in the development phase of a pro- meetings were held with line supervision to
gram to assure the attainment of the objectives identify areas for special attention and to em-
prior to the production and delivery of a sys- phasize the supervisors' responsibilities with
tem to the Air Force. The responsibility for their men.
adherence to the requirements and procedures A coordinated series of technical courses was
has to be established by top management and developed which permitted 218 hours of class-
directed to all personnel and functions that sup- room and laboratory training, administered by
port the program. In addition, management instructors qualified by extensive experience
participation in the procedural application as- with the engine. To qualify for a Gemini as-
sures the success of the objectives and purpose signment, all personnel had to be certified.
of the program. Certification was accomplished by extensive
Reliability of the Gemini propulsion system training and testing, using actual engine and
has been demonstrated by seven successful support hardware.
launches. The reliability of the Gemini engine Team membership and awareness of individ-
system is largely attributed to the pilot safety ual responsibility were continuously empha-
program and personnel motivation in imple- .sized. The Program and Assistant Program
menting the requirements of the program Managers talked to all Gemini team members
throughout the entire Gemini team. in small personal groups. All team members
participated in program status briefings after
Personnel Training, Certification, each launch.
and Motivation
As the program has progressed, training has
The potential variability of the human com- been extensively used as a means of discussing
ponent in system design, manufacturing, qual- human-type problems and in reacting quickly
PROPULSION SYSTEM 131
to their solution through skill development and dictions of the engine operation with the actual
knowledge acquisition. operation obtained is an indicator of the high
More than 1200 Gemini team members have degree of repeatability of the engines.
successfully completed over 3600 courses. The Of interest is the unparalleled record of no
courses have ranged from 1.5-hour program engine instrumentation losses on any of the
orientations to 40 hours for certification. Gemini flights. There have not been any losses
The high level of personal proficiency and of telemetered engine parameters out of 206
pride in work attained in the Gemini training_ measurements to date on the Gemini Program.
certification_ and motivation program are at- This is an average of almost 30 engine param-
tested to by supervision. Since people arey in eters per vehicle.
any man-machine system_ the component in The success of the engines on the Gemini I
greatest need of constant attention, the con- through VII missions is not only due to their
tinued high level of concern evidenced for the design and simplicity of operation, but is also
human factor in this program is probably the a result of the Air Force/contractor team effort
most significant single effort required for the in assuring that everything humanly possible
success of the Gemini Program. that will enhance the chances of a perfect flight
is accomplished prior to launch. The pilot-
Flight Results
safety operation, previous flight da_a review,
The successful operation of the engines on hardware certification, failure analysis pro-
the launches of the Gemini I through VII mis- gram, and the primary ground rule of not flying
sions is evidenced by the accuracy of the burn a particular vehicle if any open problem exists
duration obtained versus the duration pre- to which there has not been a satisfactory ex-
dicted_ since duration is dependent upon proper planation are all a part of the plan employed
operation and performance. The fraction of to check and doublecheck each and every item
a percentage error in comparing the flight pre- prior to flight.
14. GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICLE GUIDANCE AND PERFORMANCE
By LEON R. BUSH, Director, Systems and Guidance Analysis, Gemini Launch Systems Directorate,
Aerospace Corp.
This paper will review flight-test results in Guidance system changes which are unique
terms of success in meeting the overall system to Gemini have been mainly in the areas of the
performance objectives of the Gemini launch Burroughs computing system and auxiliary
vehicle program. Areas which will be discussed guidance equations developed by the Aerospace
include guidance system development, targeting Corp. for targeting. The computing system
flexibility, guidance accuracy, trajectory pre- was modified by the addition of a data exchange
diction techniques, and achieved payload unit to provide a buffering capability for the
capability. computing system to communicate in real time
Introduction with the launch facility, the spacecraft inertial
guidance system, and the NASA Mission Con-
The guidance system and guidance equations trol Center at the _vfanned Spacecraft Center.
used for the Gemini Program are very similar A block diagram showing computer inter-
to those which were used in Project Mercury. faces and information flow is shown in figure
The basic guidance scheme is shown in block- 14-2. Some of the unique functions which are
diagram form in figure 14-1. The General provided include the following :
Electric Mad III system generates rate and (1) Automatically receive and verify target
position data which are fed to the Burroughs ephemeris data from the Mission Control
computer. Pitch-and-yaw steering commands Center.
are computed in accordance with preprogramed
guidance equations and transmitted to the
Gemini launch vehicle in order to achieve the
IGS targeting Mission
proper altitude and flight path angle when the Control dote verify Control
required insertion velocity is reached. A dis- Center IGS update Center
crete command is generated to initiate sustainer Mission IGS targetingdata R, A, E, I_, _(_:, [
position and |
Gemini launch vehicle velocity data, slow |
Real-lime remoted |
malfunction
Real- time parameters J
remoted date
GE/ IPPM for Gmt
!
i I velocity data
Burroughs
Goddard
A-I Space
Flight Blockhouse
computer angle ,verify
Center
Platform release
Fmv_ 14v-1.---Gemini launch vehicle gui(lanoe _ystem. FIGURE 14-2.--RGS computer interfaces.
138
134 GEMINI _IDPROGRA]K C01_IFEREI_ICE
(2) Perform targeting compWtations and out-of-plane velocity error indicated that the
transfer them to the inertial guidance system for spacecraft center of gravity was considerably
use in ascent guidance (backup mode only). offset from the longitudinal axis of the launch
(3) Compute the required launch azimuth vehicle, and this induced attitude drift rates
and transmit the corresponding roll program late in flight which were not sensed by the guid-
setting to both the block house (for the launch ance system in time to make proper corrections.
vehicle) and to the inertial guidance system. As a result, equations were modified to include
(4) Transmit guidance parameters to the a center-of-gravity compensator, and a Vv bias
Mission Control Center for use in slow-mal- constant was added to trim out residual errors.
Insertion errors,
weights are derived from weighings of each Analysis of vehicle performance at the Aero-
launch vehicle made at the factory just prior to space Corp. was accomplished using the best
shipment to Cape Kennedy. On recent flights, estimate of engine parameters, as shown in the
predictions have included measured pitch pro- block diagram of figure 14-8. This technique
gramer variations based on ground tests, rather uses engine acceptance data combined with
than using a nominal value for all vehicles. measured pressures and temperatures from in-
Once the nominal trajectory has been gener- flight telemetry data to compute postflight pre-
ated for a given mission, dispersions are then dictions of thrust and specific impulse versus
introduced to evaluate possible violation of tra- time. Actual thrust and specific impulse are
jectory constraints. Constraints which are obtained by combining radar tracking data,
carefully checked for each mission include meteorological data, and vehicle weights. Fig-
pitch-and-yaw radar-look angles, heating and ure 14-4 shows the stage I thrust and specific
loads during first-stage flight, range safety lim- impulse dispersions for all of the Gemini flights
its, abort constraints, maximum allowable en- to date. The data have been reduced to stand-
gine burning time, and acceleration and ard inlet conditions to eliminate effects of vari-
dynamic pressure at staging. Trajectory sim- ables such as tank pressures and propellant
ulation results are also used to establish guid- temperatures. Although the first three flights
ance constraints, and to determine payload showed a definite positive bias in both thrust
capability throughout the launch window as a
function of propellant temperatures and launch Pc - _ r ........ "I Postflight
azimuth. memp 8_press-.I-- I=Fa; i _) " predicted
II Ir-nglne , _"
........ "l
I 'es''I F,o.ro,es _
mode,=Fv.,
L__.,..J I.^ vst
,|
Flight-Tests Results Press,temp tr-_ :
and specific impulse, the sample size was con- considerably reduced for GLV-4 and subse-
sidered too small for use in determination of quent, and that dispersions in all parameters are
engine model prediction corrections. Data considerably less than the predicted maximums.
were therefore obtained from TRW Systems on The use of the revised engine models also led
their analyses of seven Ti.tan II flights and care- to a hardware change, in that the pitch pro-
fully normalized to account for differences in gramer rates for GLV-4 and subsequent were
prediction models. Based on this increased increased to compensate for the lofting caused
sample size, it was determined that the predic- by the higher stage I t'hrust levels.
tion models should use an increased thrust of
Payload Performance
1.92 percent and an increased specific impulse
of 1.7 seconds to provide an empirical agreement Factors Influencing Payload Capability
with flight-test results. This was done on
Many factors affect the launch vehicle pay-
Gemini launch vehicle 4 and subsequent vehi-
load capability. Some of these are mission
cles, and it can be seen from figure 14-4 that the
oriented, such as requirements on insertion ve-
bias errors have been considerably reduced.
locity and Mtitude, launch azimuth, and amount
A similar technique was also used to analyze
of yaw steering required to achieve insertion in
stage II engine performance. "The results can
the required target plane. Other factors are
be seen in figure 14-5. In this case, no bias
characteristics of the launch vehicle subsystems,
was observed in specific impulse, but a correc-
including engine thrust and specific impulse,
tion of -4-0.9 percent in thrust was indicated.
vehicle dry weight, loadable propellant volumes,
The effect of Vhese changes to the stage I en-
and pitch programer rates. Finally, there are
gine model on trajectory dispersions at first-
those factors due to external causes such as
stage engine cutoff can be seen in table 14-II.
winds, air density, and propellant temperatures.
Note that the altitude dispersions have been
-um-N
................................................... _I_'G_'_ ,_. 214 O/O
i H m| []
- _° - -0: m
.........................................................
m
" - O_ ml _ m m.
_o / m IM m R _ m __,_ m m
-_*[_ ............................................................
-5 -50"=-2.5 sec
FIGURE 14-4.--Gemini launch vehicle stage I engine FZGVaE 14-5.--Gemlni launch vehicle stage II engine
dispersions (normalized to standard inlet conditions). dispersions (normalized to standard inlet conditions).
Altitude, ft ..................... 4- 13 226 -- 580 12 742 14 637 6413 4765 453 3383
Velocity, ft/sec .................. 4- 192 --58 154 95 --78 --153 --30 125
Flight path angle, dog ............ 4-2. 51 --0. 40 0.69 I. 73 I. Ii O. 90 --0.64 --0.42
Burning time, sec ................ 4-4.6 0.7 --1.8 --1.7 --I. 0 --1.3 0. 83 0. 16
• Preliminary.
GE_[INI LAUNCH VEHICLE GUIDANCE AND PERFOR]_fANCE 137
Dispersions in all these factors will cause resulted in a 50-pound increase in payload capa-
corresponding dispersions in payload capabil- bility. Finally, the pitch program change and
ity. Sensitivities to these dispersions are shown revised engine parameters discussed previously
in table 14-III. As can be seen in the table, resulted in a combined payload capability in-
outages and engine specific impulse have the crease of 175 pounds.
greatest influences on payload capability.
TABLE 14-IV.--Summary o] Gemini Launch-
TABLE 14-III.--Gemini Lawnvh-Vehivle Pcty-
Vehicle Performance Improvements
loctd Dispersion Sensitivities
3-s_gma payload Gemini Payload
Parameter : dispersion, lb Parameter launch capability
Stage II outage ...................... 457 vehicle increase,
effectivity lb
Stage II specific impulse .............. 197
Stage I outage ....................... 187
Stage I specific impulse .............. 121
Reduced ullages ............. 1 330
Pitch gyro drift ..................... 109 5 130
Weight reduction ............
Winds .............................. 103
Propellant temperature con-
Pitch programer error ................ 96 1 190
ditioning ..................
Stage I thrust misalinement .......... 89 Low-level sensor removal ..... 2 180
Stage I thrust ........................ 71 Engine mixture ratio optimi-
Other ............................... 54 zation .................... 5 5O
Pitch program change ........ 4 65
Performance Improvement Program Revised engine model ........ 4 110
Since the inception of the Gemini Program, a Total increase .................... 1055
vigorous program of payload capability im-
provement to meet the ever increasing require-
Real-Time Performance Monitoring
ments has been pursued. To date, this effort
has resulted in a payload capability increase of
Although the use of chilled propellants has
over 1000 pounds, over half of which was effec-
greatly increased launch-vehicle payload capa-
tive prior to the GLV-1 launch. A summary
bility, unequal heating of fuel and oxidizer
of the significant improvement items is shown tanks could result in nonnominal mixture ratios
in table 14-IV. A special engine-staG test pro- and thus have a significant effect upon outages
gram, and analysis of structural loads and abort and payload capability. Therefore, a technique
considerations permitted loading of additional
was developed for predicting payload capability
propellants to reduced ullages, thereby increas- through the launch window by monitoring the
ing payload capability by 330 pounds. Rede-
actual temperatures during the countdown.
sign of telemetry and other equipment and re-
The information flow is shown in block diagram
moval of parts formerly used on Titan II and
form in figure 14-6. Prior to loading, weather
not needed for Gemini resulted in payload gains
of 130 pounds. Propellant temperature-condi-
tioning equipment was installed at Cape Ken- Wear.her r "1
nedy to allow chilling of propellants prior to I sso, I
loading. This allowed a greater mass to be
I Weather data
I er°soace
|Data
I review|
loaded for a given volume and resulted in a pay-
load capability increase of 190 pounds. Analy- I (Dataph°ne)
Propellent _ Tank [
sis of Titan II flights indicated that it was safe '_. .. I ..... _ Blockhouse
to go to propellant depletion rather than have Ma.,0/ I '°nK'em'I Martin/
l 'emp
I couple,
19
Baltimore I Payload J L.ape J Payload J
shutdown initiated by a low-level tank sensor. I marg,o
"I
Removal
bility
Corp. targeting
of this
increase
of the nominal
function
of 180 pounds.
stage I engine
gave a payload
Aerojet-General
capa-
I Payload margin
for plotboard disploys
G
_ u. NASA/MCC
_1
'
I Mission director
Houston
(Dotafox) 0
mixture ratio at acceptance test to a value more
compatible with launch vehicle tank size ratios FIGURE 14-6.--Real-time performance monitoring.
138 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM COHERENCE
predictions of ambient temperature, dew point, justment in these temperatures early in the
and winds are sent from Patrick Air Force Base countdown by the use of polyethylene wrap on
to the Martin Co. in Baltimore where they are the stage II tanks and by opening and closing
used in a computer program to predict propel- of curtains at the various levels of the erector.
lant-temperature time histories from start of
loading until the end of the launch window. Flight.Test Results
Payload capability is also predicted as a func- A summary of achieved payload capability
tion of time in the launch window. Once load- compared to the predicted mean payload capa-
ing has been accomplished, the predictions are bility and 3-sigma dispersions is shown in figure
updated using actual measured temperatures 14-8. The predicted values for the Gemini I,
and weather data. The final performance pre- II, and III missions have been adjusted to
dictions are reviewed by the Air Force Space reflect the increased specific impulse and thrust
Systems Division and the Aerospace Corp. prior determined from flight-test analysis. It can be
to transmission to the Mission Control Center.
seen that in all cases the actual payload capa-
The Martin Co.'s program also includes the ef- bility falls very close to the mean prediction
fects on payload margins of launch azimuth and and well above the actual spacecraft weights.
yaw-steering variations through the launch Table 14-V is a summary of the differences be-
window.
tween the actual capability and predicted mean
Typical variations of fuel and oxidizer bulk for each flight. These figures have been normal-
temperatures are shown in figure 14-7. As long ized to reflect the current prediction model.
as the temperatures remain close to the optimum Note that the mean error is only 18 pounds
mixture ratio line, the payload variations are higher than the predictions, and the dispersions
small. If deviations in excess of 2 ° F occur,
are relatively small, indicating an extremely
the payload degradation can be appreciable.
accurate prediction technique. Even without
Procedures at Cape Kennedy allow for some ad-
normalizing, the mean would be + 55 pounds,
with a sample standard deviation of 138 pounds.
6O
Since the dispersions about the mean are some-
what lower than the maximums predicted by
theoretical analysis, current efforts are being
55
directed toward understanding the causes of the
Payload
reduced dispersions prior to their incorporation
in future payload capability predictions.
o_
.o
fq
(2.
Gemini I D Ill
April 8, 1964 Jan 19, 1965 Mar 23, 1965 June 3, 1965 Aug 21,1965 Dec 4, 1965 Dec 15,1965
By ROBERT J. GOEBEL, Chief, Configuration Management Division, Gemini Launch Vehicle System Pro-
gram O_ice, Space Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command
141
142 GEMINI _mPROGRA_I CONFERENCE
rective action is considered to be complete, the end case, the test specimens are stressed at qual-
package is submitted to the customer for re- ification test levels with time as the variable
view and approval. This review includes an until failure occurs. Through an understand-
evaluation of the action taken to assure that ing of the physics of failure under these con-
the occurrence no longer represents a hazard to ditions, the state of maturity of these com-
the Gemini launch vehicle. Only when this ponents was essentially raised to that of the
conclusion is reached mutually by the con- other critical components. Production monitor
tractor and customer is the problem officially re- tests are performed on 54 items. This test is
moved from the books. Frequently, problems part of the component acceptance requirements
occur during the last stages of test at. the launch and consists of a vibration test at slightly less
site and time may not permit the stepwise proc- than half-qualification test levels. This has
essing which is normally accomplished. In this plSoven to be severe enough to uncover latent de-
case, the return of the failed part is expedited fects without inducing damage to the uriits as a
to a laboratory either at Baltimore, Sacramento, result of the test. The malfunction detection
or the vendor's plant which has the capability to system was the only subsystem which was com-
do a failed-part analysis. The engineering pletely new on Gemini. The piggyback pro-
failure analysis is completed, establishing the gram provided for flying a complete malfunc-
mode and cause of failure, and then the flight tion detection system, as well as several other
hazard is evaluated with respect to this known Gemini-peculiar components, on five Titan
condition. Frequently, it is possible to take flights. The successful completion of this pro-
short-term corrective action on a vehicle in- gram signaled the acceptability of the malfunc-
stalled on the launch pad. This may be a one- tion detection system as a subsystem for flight.
time inspection of that vehicle, an abbreviated
Limitation of Repair and Test
test of some one particular condition, or it may
be that the probability of occurrence is so low It is generally recognized that components
that the risk is acceptable. The point is that, which have undergone repeated repairs are less
while final actions may not be accomplished, desirable than those which have a relatively
the problem is brought to the attention of that trouble-free history. The intent was not to fly
level of management where launch decisions can a component wbich had been repaired to the
be made. This system has been extremely use- extent that potting compound had been removed,
ful in permitting an orderly working of prob- and connections had been soldered and re-
lems and it does present a status at any time of soldered a large number of times. On the other
exactly what problems are outstanding, who is hand, it is not reasonable to scrap a very ex-
working them, and the estimated dates of
pensive piece of equipment which could be re-
resolution.
stored to service by resoldering an easily acces-
Maximum Component Maturity sible broken wire. The precise definition of this
idea proved to be all but impossible. The solu-
The basic airworthiness of components has tion was to cover the subject in the quality plans
been established by qualification test and flight as a goal rather than a requirement. The state-
on Titan missiles. Gemini components whose ment, "Insofar as possible, excessively repaired
environmental use was identical to Titan usage
components will not be used on Gemini," may
were considered qualified by similarity. All not be enforceable from a contractual stand-
others were qualification tested. Qualification
point, but it did represent mutual agreement
test reports were subject to review and approval
between the contractor and the customer as a
by the customer. In addition, a reliability test basis for internal controls.
program was established for 10 critical com-
Both operating time and vibration were rec-
ponents which were unique to Gemini and hence
ognized ms influencing the probability of survi-
had no flight history. This special testing con-
sisted of failure mode and environmental life val of the component during flight. Those com-
testing. In the first case, the test specimens are ponents subject to wearout wel_ identified
made to undergo increasingly severe levels of together with a maximum useful operating life
environment until failure occurs. In the sec- of each. A system of time recording was estab-
PRODUCT ASSURANCE 143
lished which would pinpoint any component points during this cycle at which review would
whose operating time would exceed its maximum be conducted. These are:
allowable operating time prior to lift-off and (1) Engine acceptance.
would therefore have to be changed. The pro- (9.) Tank rollout.
duction monitor tests are essentially a vibration (3) Vehicle acceptance.
test at levels deliberately chosen to prevent dam- (4) Prelaunch flight-safety review.
age. However, the integrated effect of vibra- The engine acceptance activity consists of the
tion from multiple production monitor tests was following sequence of events:
considered to be deleterious and a limit of five (1) A detailed subsystem-component review
production monitor tests was set. This control is conducted by Aerojet-General Corp. and by
principally affected repair and modification, the Space Systems Division/Aerospace Team
since a good, unmodified unit would normally prior to start of engine buildup. All critical
be production monitor tested only once. components must be approved by the review
In some cases tests were used to determine the team prior to initiation of engine buildup.
condition as well as the function ability of (2) A detailed system review is conducted
equipment. As an example, there were instances prior to acceptance firing of the assembled
of rate-gyro spin motors failing to spin up im- engine. The review team reviews the final en-
mediately on application of power. An im- gine buildup records and confirms the accept-
proved motor bearing preload manufacturing ability of the engine for acceptance firing.
process was implemented for all new gyros. (3) A preacceptance test meeting is
Data indicated that a correlation existed be- conducted.
tween the condition of the bearings and the (4) Following completion of acceptance fir-
time required to come up to and drop down from ing, a performance and posttest hardware re-
synchronous speed. An on-vehicle test was in- view is conducted.
stituted to monitor rate gyro motor startup and (5) & formal acceptance meeting is
rundown times, and thus provide assurance the conducted.
gyro would spin up when power was applied for The tank rollout review is aimed at determin-
the next test operation or countdown. ing the structural integrity and freedom from
weld defects which could later result in leaks.
No Unexplained Transient Malfunctions
A set of criteria which defined major repairs
Permitted
was first established. Stress analyses on all
A_ frequent course of action, in the face of a major repairs and also on use-as-is minor dis-
transient malfunction, is to retest several times crepancies were reviewed, and the X-rays were
and, finding normal responses each time, to reread. Only after assuring that the tanks
charge the trouble to operator error or other- could do the job required for Gemini were they
wise disregard it. A ground rule on the Gemini shipped to Baltimore for further buildup as a
Program has been that a transient malfunction Gemini launch vehicle.
represented a nonconformance which would The next key point at which a customer re-
probably recur during countdown or flight at view is conducted is at the time of acceptance
the worst possible time. Experience has shown of the vehicle by the Air Force. After the
that failure analysis of a transient in almost vehicle has undergone a series of tests (pri-
every case did uncover a latent defect. In those marily several mock countdowns and flights)
cases where the symptom cannot be repeated or in the vertical facility in Baltimore, the S'pace
the fault found, the module or subassembly Systems Division and Aerospace vehicle ac-
within which the trouble must certainly exist ceptance team meets at Baltimore for the pur-
is changed.
pose of totally reviewing the vehicle status.
Customer Review Principal sources of information which are
In order to be assured that the fabrication, used by the vehicle acceptazlce team _re the
test, and preparation for launch were progress- following:
ing satisfactorily, Air Force Space Systems (1) Launch vehicle history.
Division and Aerospace Corp. chose several key (2) Assembly certification logs.
144 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
(3) Vertical test certification logs. takes the final look at the launch vehicle from
(4) Gemini problem investigation status. a performance capability and a reliability stand-
(5) Subsystem verification test data. point. The factory history of the vehicle is
(6) Combined system acceptance test data. reviewed again, as is its response to tests on
(7) Configuration tab runs. launch complex 19 at Cape Kennedy. The
(8) Critical component data packages. contractors' representatives are asked to state
(9) Engine logs and recap. the readiness of their equipment to support the
(10) Equipment time recording tab run. mission, and at this time the vehicle is com-
(11) Logistic support status. mitted to launch.
(19) Vehicle physical inspection.
The review of these data in sufficient depth Configuration Management of the Gemini
Launch Vehicle
to be meaningful represents a considerable
task. For the first several vehicles, the team Configuration control is the systematic
consisted of approximately 40 people and lasted evaluation, coordination, approval and/or dis-
5 to 6 days. As procedures were streamlined approval of all changes from the baseline con-
and personnel became more familiar with the figuration. In addition to Air Force System
operation, the time was reduced to 4 days. Command Manual (AFSCM) 375-1, Gemini
During the review of test data, every response Configuration Control Board Instructions, in-
of every system is gone over in great detail. cluding Interface Documentation Control 'be-
Anomalies must be annotated with a satisfac-
tween associate contractors, were implemented.
tory explanation, or the components involved To insure configuration control of the launch
must be replaced and the test rerun. After the vehicle subsequent to the first article configura-
systems tests are over and while the data are tion inspection of Gemini launch vehicle 1
being reviewed, the vehicle is held in a bonded (GLV-1), a Gemini launch-vehicle acceptance
condition. There can be no access to the vehicle
specification was implemented, requiring a
either by customer or by contractor personnel formal audit of the as-built configuration of the
without signed permission by the resident Air launch vehicle against its technical description.
Force representative at the contractor's plant. In the area of configuration control, this formal
The purpose is to assure that if a retest is neces- audit consists of airborne and aerospace ground
sary, the vehicle is in the" identical configura-
equipment compatibility status, ground equip:
tion as when the test data were generated. If ment complete status, ship comparison status,
it is not, and someone has replaced a component airborne engineering change proposal/specifica-
or adjusted a system, it may be impossible to tion change-notice proposal status, ground
determine the exact source and cause of an
equipment open-item status, airborne open-item
anomaly. status, specification compliance inspection log,
The customer review of Gemini problems was Gemini configuration index, drawing change
mentioned earlier in connection with the failure
notice buy-off cards associated with new engi-
analysis and corrective action system. Those neering change proposals, and a sample of
few problems which remain open at time of manufacturing processes. Worthy of note is
acceptance and do not represent a constraint to the fact that con,tractors' configuration account-
shipping the vehicle are tabulated for final ac- ing systems are capable of routinely supplying
tion by personnel at both Baltimore and Cape this body of data at each acceptance meeting.
Kennedy after the vehicle is shipped. It
A first-article configuration inspection was
should be understood that, even though a prob-
conducted on all end items of aerospace ground
lem may be open against a vehicle, every test re-
equipment, and equipment and facilities com-
quired for that vehicle has been passed satis-
prising launch complex 19. The baseline hard-
factorily. The problems referred to may be on
related systems or may represent a general ware consisted of 60 Aerojet-General end items,
weakness in a class of components, but, insofar 24 General Electric end items, and 94 Martin
as the individual vehicle is concerned, there is Co. end items.
nothing detectably wrong with it. Prior to During September ]963, the Air Force
each launch, the Flight Safety Review Board Gemini Program Office conducted the first-
PRODUCT ASSURANCE 145
By RICHARDC. DINEEN, Director, Gemini Launch Vehicle System Program O_ice, Space Systems Division,
Air Force Systems Command
147
148 GEI_IINI _IIDPROORAM CONFERENCE
must be recognized. The tail-plug and dust- delay a launch. On the positive side of the
cover incidents which occarred during the ledger is the fact that planning included the
Gemini VI-A aborted launch are examples from systems to sense a malfunction and to prevent
which to learn. The philosophy of the pilot- lift-off with a malfunctioning system.
safety program is not only to prevent mistakes, One of the most valuable lessons of the
but to plan for mistakes and minimize their Gemini launch-vehicle program has been that
effect. The procedures and training have again success is dependent upon the early establish-
been reviewed since the abort of the Gemini ment of managerial and technical disciplines
VI-A mission, and further reviews will be ac- throughout all phases of the program, with
complished in the future, but it cannot be vigorous support of these disciplines by all
guaranteed that human mistakes will not again echelons of management.
C
FLIGHT OPERATIONS
218-556 0--66_---11
17. GEMINI MISSION SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT
By CHRISTOPHERC. KRAFT, JR., Assistant Director ]or Flight Operations, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center,
and SmuRn SJOBER(;, Deputy Assistant Director ]or Flight Operations, NASA Manned Spacecra]t
Center
153
154 GEMINI MIDPROGRA_[ CONFERENCE
The complexity of these activities, which stems ity, which was n_t available during Project
both from consideration of operational con- Mercury, provides both control-center and
straints and from the capability for inflight flight-control personnel with selectable, detailed
maneuvering, ideally requires lead times of data in convenient engineering units for r_pid,
many months prior to the mission. In order real-time analysis of flight-systems perform-
to apply the experience gained from each mis- ance and status.
sion to the following one, it has been necessary To the maximum extent possible, the Mission
to provide flexibility in both the computer pro- Control Center at Houston has been designed
grams and the operational procedures for in- on a purely functional basis. In this manner,
flight control. This flexibility also provides the the data-handling and display systems are es-
capability to perform real-time mission plan- sentially independent of the program they sup-
ning, which allows timely adjustments to the port, and can be readily altered to support
flight plan to accommodate eventualities as they either Gemini or Apollo missions, as required.
occur during the mission. Although the Gemini flight-control concepts
The original Mercury Control Center at Cape are similar to those used for Project Mercury,
Kennedy was inadequate to support the Gemini the degree of flight-control support to the Gem-
rendezvous and Apollo missions. A new mis- ini missions has not been as extensive as the
sion control center was built with the necessary support given to the Mercury missions. With
increased capability and flexibility and was increased flight experience and confidence in
located at the Manned Spacecraft Center, the performance of flight hardware, it is no
Houston, Tex. This location enhanced the con- longer necessary to provide the same minute-by-
tact of the flight-control people with the pro- minute continuous support to the longer dura-
gram offices in correlating the many aspects of tion Gemini missions as was provided for the
mission planning to the flight systems and test early Mercury missions. Extensive efforts are
programs as they were developed. The Mer- made_ however, to insure that maximum ground
cury Control Center at Cape Kennedy, however, support is provided during flight periods of
was modified to permit support of the early time-critical activity, such as insertion, in flight
single-vehicle Gemini missions while the new maneuvers, retrofire, and reentry, and, of
mission control center was being implemented. course, during the launch phase of the mission.
In the description of the Mission Control Cen- These activities require flight-operations sup-
ter at Houston and the present tracking net- port somewhat different from that for Mercury
work, a number of innovations will be apparent. flights, in that multiple-shift operations are
The most important innovations are: the staff necessary both in the Mission Control Center
support rooms, which provide support in depth and at the network stations. In general, three
to the flight-control personnel located at con- shifts of operations personnel are utilized in
soles within the mission operations control the Mission Control Center, and two shifts sup-
room; the simulation, checkout, and training port the somewhat less active operations at the
systems, and the associated simulated remote remote sites. Providing this flight support to
sites, which provide the capability to conduct multiple-vehicle, long-duration missions on a
flight-controller training and full mission net- 24-hour basis requires many more flight-control
work simulations without deployment of per- personnel than were utilized in Project Mer-
sonnel to the remote sites; and the remote-site cury. However, careful consideration is given
data processors located at the network stations, both to limiting these requirements and to
which provide onsite data reduction for im- streamlining flight-control readiness prepara-
proved capability to perform real-time analysis tions as much as possible.
of flight systems. The phase-over to the Mission Control Center
One of the most significant changes in the at Houston was conducted in an orderly fashion
ground-support systems has been the use of over a period of several missions, prior to the
automatic, high-speed processing of telemetry rendezvous mission, and was highly successful.
data, which has required a largo increase in the The performance of the hardware and software
Real Time Computer Complex. This capabil- of both the Mission Control Center and the net-
GEMINI MISSION SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT 155
work in supporting Gemini long-duration and filled. The knowledge and experience in mis-
rendezvous missions has been very satisfactory. sion analysis and planning and in computer-
As might be expected in a system as complex and program development and checkout are con-
widespread as this, operational failures did tinuously expanding. Experience is increasing
occur, particularly during long-duration mis- in the operation of the Mission Control Cen-
sions, but they were very minor and extremely ter and the network, and in the exercise of flight-
few. For the most part, the nature of these control functions in support of increasingly
failures was such that, with the planned back- more complex space-flight missions. This
up systems, the alternate routing of communica- shakedown of operational systems and accumu-
tions, and the alternate operational procedures, lation of flight experience continuously enhances
these problems were readily corrected with es- the capability to more effectively plan for and
sentially no interruption or degradation in mis- provide support to the Apollo missions.
sion support. This basically trouble-free com- The performance of the total Government-
munications network would not have been pos- industry organization involved in flight opera-
sible without the cooperative and effective sup- tions has been completely satisfactory. The
port of the Goddard Space Flight Center and mission-support preparations prior to each
the Department of Defense in developing the launch have been accomplished effectively. In
network and in managing its operation during particular, the concerted response by the entire
mission periods. team to the operational problems associated
with the rapid preparations for the Gemini VII
Concluding Remarks and VI-A missions in December 1965 and the
With the success of each mission, it becomes unqualified success of these missions attest to
increasingly apparent that the flight-operations the professional competence and personal dili-
objectives of the Gemini Program are being ful- gence of the team.
18. MISSION PLANNING
By WYENDELL B. EVANS, Gemini Program O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; HOWARD W. TINDALL,
JR., Assistant Chief, Mission Planning and Analysis Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center;
HELMUT A. KUEHNEL, Flight Crew Support Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; and ALFRED
A. BISHOP, Gemini Program Office, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
157
158 GE_fINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
e 178 &14 F
-%, c
o
ft.
89 {.zF
g
e,,
¢::
I
iN/,,,
I
\// \
,V,i,
/ I
I
0 °.01
4O 20 0 20 40 60 80 I00 120
Launch delay, min
minute window to two 33-minute windows (fig. FIGURE 18-3.--Variable-azimuth launch windows for
18-3). From these two curves it can be seen target orbit inclination of 30 ° .
:MISSION PLANNIN0 159
445,0 - 1.0 112
556.0 - "E .8
F
:- .E Parallel a
,,*596
_ o
,_ 178.0 - _ .4 "g 8S_-" / / .... Biased azimuth
-Launoh window--- 1
17 minutes | " 18F i°. _ 80_/ X/
altitudes--125, 150, 160, and 175 nautical 0 20 40 60 SO I00 120 140 160 180
Launch window, min
miles--were evaluated. A rendezvous target
orbit altitude of 161 nautical miles was selected. FIGURB 18-5.--Space-vehicle launch windows for ren-
Experiments .............................. 0 0 3 13 17 3 2
• Primary objective.
O Secondary objective.
entry ; and the execution of three inflight experi- included a demonstration of closed-loop reentry
ments. The plans for Gemini IV included the guidance.
first long-duration objective (4 days), extra- The development of operational mission
vehicular activity, further development of the plans for implementing the mission objectives
rendezvous procedures, a demonstration of a requires that extensive analyses be performed
in the trajectory and flight-planning areas. In
closed-loop reentry, and the execution of 13 in-
Gemini, detailed trajectory and flight planning
flight experiments.
has been found to be essential for mission suc-
Gemini V, an 8-day flight, was the second step
cess and must be done in such a way as to afford
in the development of the long-duration capabil-
mission flexibility.
ity. Other objectives planned for this flight
were the final qualification of the rendezvous Trajectory Planning
systems and procedures necessary for the Gem- During Project, Mercury, a major part of the
ini VI mission, evaluation of the fuel-cell power trajectory-planning effort was spent in the de-
system required for long-duration flights, the velopment of the philosophy and techniques _or
demonstration of the capabilities of the closed- monitoring the powered-flight trajectory, for
loop reentry guidance, and the execution of 17 determining when launch abort action was nec-
inflight experiments. Designating the primary essary, and for establishing get--no-go criteria
objectives of the first five flights as nonrendez- for the accep_bility of the orbit after the com-
vous permitted the development of efficient pletion of launch-vehicle thrusting. These
checkout and launch procedures, a requirement Mercury analyses were directly applicable to the
for on-time launch. Early development of these Gemini Program. Generally, it was merely
procedures was mandatory to satisfy the rendez- necessary to identify the most limiting trajec-
vous objective of the Gemini VI mission. The tory criteria--that is, the trajectory conditions
primary objective of Gemini VII, of course, was beyond which abort action is not safe due to
long duration (14 days). Three experimetnts such factors as exceeding spacecraft reentry
were planned for Gemini VI and 20 experiments heating, or aerodynamic load-design limits that
for Gemini VII. Plans for both of these flights were applicable to the Gemini spacecraft. The
MISSION PLANNING 161
I I
,RCS,7,7h,,
tu r:a_':und
I
_
_
I
45 _;cT'r -F ....
,sec
°f
2O
_-4Ol-
--Over-
speed
i t / .Nominal
trajectory 'C _.
_,.,_.._._ .. Nominal trajectory
-.8
Heating limit -----_-
I _o.er jet, ison I I I I I I I -I.2 I I I I 1 I I I I I I
0 .I .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0 .90 .91 .92 .95 .94 .95 .96 .97 .98 .99 1.00 1.01 1.02
(a) Velocity ratio,V/V R (a} Velocity ratio, V/V R
FIGUI_ 18-6.--Abort limit lhms launch trajectory FIGURE 18-7.--Go---n0-go criteria for acceptability of
(a)
ACTION
TIME COMP PLAT CNTL
HR:MIN:SEC MODE COMMAND PILOT PILOT
CNV-REPORT LIFT-OFF
0:00:00 ASC FREE
A-_ CLOCK START
(EVENT TIMER)
0:00:19 ASC FREE A-REPORT ROLL PROGRA/_
iNiTIATED
0:00:20 ASC FREE A-REPORT ROLL PROGRA/V
COMPLETE
0:00:23 ASC FREE A-J_..P_.Q_R_
PITCH PROGRAM
INITIATED
0:00:50 ASC FREE CNV-GIVE 50 SECTIME-
HACK FOR CHANGE TO
DELAYED-LAUNCH
MODE 1-r
A-CONFIRM REPORTED A-RELEASE 'D' RING.
CHANGE TO DELAYED- UNCLIPKEYING SWITCH
LAUNCH MODE IT
RELEASE 'D'-RING NOTE
'D'-RING STOWED AFTER INSERTION. CMD PILOT WILL
USE THE KEYING SWITCH ON THE HAND CONTROLER
A-CONFIRM REPORTED
CHANGE TO LAUNCH
MODE I-[
0:01:45 ASC FREE A-RESET DCS LIGHT. REPORT
DCS UPDATE RECEIVED
CRO HAW
Go-no-go 17-1 17-1T R
OhO0 03:00
Platform -off
CAL
post- station-keeping checklist
-GYM
-TEX
T CNV Critical delayed -time
-BDA telemetry tape playback
Asc
I
CAL
-GYM Experiments
-TEX MSC-2 and -3--on
Communications check
CNV
2 01:40 03:40
Critical delayed-time
BDA
telemetry tape playback
TAN
Perigee -adjust maneuver
I Experiments D-4/D-7
ASC Power-down spacecraft
void measurement
02:00 04:00 (biG-meal recorder no. 2- off)
350
525
/ Booster station keeping, 04 / D7
/I maneuver, and lifetime maneuver
500
275
__ ..Experiments and operational
250
225
. Circularizotion
200
_- 175
a. 150
125
,Gemini _'T-A station keeping and attitude control
/
,, during rendezvous
/
lOG /
Purpose
To verify calculated warm-up and cool-down curves for the transponder and as an
operational check.
2. AC POWER - ACME
Procedure
l, Temperature Check
TRANSPONDER - ON AT AOS
TRANSPONDER - OFF AT LOS
Operational Check
TRANSPONDER - ON
Align spacecraft on radar located at Cape Kennedy.
TRANSPO}_ER - OFF after LOS.
Note: The operation check will be conducted on passes whieh occur at approximately
VII lift-off plus 48 hours and VI-A lift-off minus 72 hours
(total of 2 runs required).
Propellant Required
2 runs x i ib run = 2 ib
218-556 0--66------12
19. MISSION CONTROL CENTER AND NETWORK
By HENRY E. CLEMENTS, Chie/, Flight Support Division, NASA Manned Spacecra/t Center; RICHARD L.
HOLT, Flight Support Division, NASA Manned Spacecralt Center; and DOUGLAS W. CARMICrIAEL,
Flight Support Division, NASA Manned Spacecra/t Center
169
170 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
r
monitor guidance computations and propulsion
224 ft-- I
capability.
Service I Service (3) To evaluate the performance and capa-
bilities of the space-vehicle equipment systems.
(4) To evaluate the capabilities and status of
the spacecraft crew and life-support system.
Reo1 Time
( 5 ) To direct and supervise activities of the
I68 f Computer ground-support systems.
(6 ) To direct recovery activities.
(7) T o conduct simulation and training ex-
ercises.
(8) To schedule and regulate transmission of
recorded data from sites.
PCM Inter comm
(9) To support postmission analyses.
First floor
Development of Mission Control Center
Equipment Systems
-
Service
area
I
,
Viewing
large increase in computer capacity to support
actual and simulated missions. This increase
was made necessary by the mounting number of
F L -i I I mathematical computations required by the
Second floor
complex flight plans of the Gemini rendezvous
missions.
The Real Time Computer Complex (fig.
19-2) was designed for data and display proc-
essing for actual and simulated flights. This
computer complex consists of five large-capacity
Service digital computers. These computers may be
area functionally assigned as a mission operations
I
Third floor
FIQURE
l!+l.-Floor plan of Mission Control Center,
Houston, Tex.
computer, a dynamic standby computer, a simu- ter, the Manned Space Flight Network, and
lation operations computer, a ground support the spacecraft.
simulation computer, and a dynamic checkout The Mission Control Center communications
computer; or they may be taken off-line and system (fig. 19-3) monitors all incoming or out-
electrically isolated from the rest of the Real going voice and data signals for quality;
Time Computer Complex. records and processes the signals as necessary;
During a mission, the flight program is loaded and routes them to their assigned destinations.
into both a mission operations computer and a The system is the terminus for all incoming
dynamic standby computer. This system allows voice communications, facsimile messages, and
the outputs of the computers to be switched, teletype textual messages, and it provides for
thus providing continued operation if the mis- voice communications within the control center.
sion operations computer should fail. As the Telemetry data, routed through telemetry
flight progresses, the vast amount of data re- ground stations, are sent to the Real Time Com-
ceived in the Real Time Computer Complex puter Complex for data display .and telemetry
from the Manned Space Flight Network is summary message generation. Some of the
translated into recognizable data displays that processed data, such as biomedical data, are
enable mission controllers to evaluate current routed directly to the display and control sys-
mission situations and make real-time decisions. tem for direct monitoring by flight controllers
During a mission, the remaining computers and specialists. Incoming tracking data are
can be utilized for a follow-on mission simula- sent to the Real Time Computer Complex for
tion and development of a follow-on mission generation of dynamic display data. Most
program. command data and all outgoing voice commu-
Communications
nications, facsimile messages, and teletype tex-
tual messages originate within the system.
The design of the Mission Control Center at
Houston enables communications to enter and
Display
leave over commercial common-carrier lines,
which are divided into five categories : The Mercury Control Center display capa-
(1) Wideband data (40.8 kbps) lines handle bility required modification to support the
only the .transmission of telemetry data. Gemini flights. Additional flight controller
(2) High-speed data (2 kbps) lines carry consoles were installed with the existing Mer-
command, tracking, and telemetry data. cury consoles and resulted in increased video,
(3) Teletype (100 words a minute) lines analog, and digital display c.apability. The
carry command, tracking, a_uisition, teleme- world map was updated, both in Gemini
try, and textual message traffic. network-station position and instrumentation
(4) Video lines carry only television signals. capability. A large rear-projection screen was
(5) Audio lines primarily handle voice com- installed for display of summary message data.
munication between the Mission Control Cen- A second large screen was provided for display
External I Internal
i
I
I
Voice Intercom
Voice "_"_'11 4 J
control keysets
i
L
I
I
Message
Teletype -_.--_ t it
center
I
I
Wide-band I
hi it
data P PCMstation
ground Facilities m Communications
I
I control processor Real Time
H ig h-speed I Computer
i_1 IL i
data I Complex
- - -Display Cons o Ie
play subsystem is made up of wall display
screens in the Mission Operations Control Room
- - -
requested Video TV
switching (fig. 19-5). This system provides flight dy-
Digital to matrix Projection namics, mission status information, and refer-
TV TV
Real conversion ence data displayed in easily recognizable form.
II
The system consists of seven projectors which
I I-+
Projection
L plotters project light through glass slides onto the large
ret:;:c
10- by 20-foot screens. By selection of appro-
Complex
- support room
lo tboards
Digital
d i sp Iays
priate filters, the composite picture can be shown
in any combination of seven colors.
Console subaystem.--The console subsystem
is made up of consoles with assorted modules
added to provide each operational position in
FIQURE
194.-MCC-H display/control subsystem. the Mission Control Center with the required
control and data display. The subsystem also
Computer interface subsystem.-The com- provides interconnection and distribution facil-
puter interface subsystem and the real-time ities for the inputs and outputs of all these com-
computer complex function together to provide ponents, except those required for video and
the displays requested by flight controllers dur- audio signals.
ing actual or simulated missions. The inter-
face subsystem detects, encodes, and transmits
these requests to the real-time computer com-
plex and, in turn, generates the requested dis-
plays, utilizing the output information from
the computer complex.
Timing subsystem.-The timing subsystem
generates the basic time standards and time dis-
plays used throughout the control center. The
master instrumentation timing equipment uti-
lizes an ultrastable oscillator and associated
t,iming generators referenced t,o Station WWV
and generates decimal, binary-coded decimal,
and specially formatted Greenwich mean time FIQURE19-5.-Mission Operations Control Room,
for various individual and group displays. MCC-H.
MISSION CONTROL CENTER AND NETWORK 173
Comnl_nd
etry contact with the spacecraft from lift-off
In the Gemini spacecraft, the amount of on- through orbital insertion. Inputs from three
board equipment requiring ground control acti- telemetry ground stations at Cape Kennedy are
vation and termination has increased many multiplexed with the downrange telemetry
times over that in the Mercury spacecraft. from the Eastern Test Range and are trans-
mitted over wideband communciation lines to
Project Mercury used radio tones for the trans-
the Mission Control Center at Houston. In
mission of command data; however, the number
of available radio tones is limited by bandwidth addition, real-time trajectory data can be sent
to the l_Iission Control Center at Houston on
and was found inadequate to support Gemini
high-speed communications lines.
flights. Therefore, a digital system was sub-
bit encoding is used to meet the Gemini com- Simulation Checkout and Training System
mand requirements.
At the Mission Control Center, the digital The simulation checkout and training system
at the Mission Control Center in Houston allows
command system (fig. 19-6) can accept, vali-
the mission control team to perform either par-
Real-time commands,
tial or total mission exercises. It provides for
", _ Bermuda the development of mission operational pro-
cedures, the training of all personnel involved
I _.tr_= I I R=u' ..... J ,_, I Eastern in controlling the mission, practicing the re-
Display v ,=-,e,.-
I _on!_, _- --1_:;:: L,.JCO,.muniC_tionsl. Te_t
Rome quired interfaces between flight crew and mis-
I LTransmit_D.
...... I I I processor / sion control teams, and validation of support
I I request I I " _ _
_ C6mmanas systems and control teams necessary during a
mission.
diqital
command
system sites Development of the Manned Space-Flighl
Network
......... _ .... command
Reol:-time commands. _I elype/_ / Digital J
Request validated by tel system If the requirements of the Gemini orbital
and rendezvous missions were ¢o be supported
FIGURE 19-6.--Digital command system.
by the Manned Space Flight Network, major
modifications of the network were necessary.
date, store (if required), and transmit digital Gemini missions required increased capability
command data through the'real-time sites of the from all network systems, with exacting param-
Manned Space Flight Network and to the re- eters and an exceedingly high reliability fac-
mote sites equipped with digital command capa- tor. To guarantee this reliability, the network
bilities. The command data are transmitted to was modified with proved systems that were con-
inflight vehicles or, at Cape Kennedy only, to a structed with off-the-shelf items of equipment.
vehicle waiting to be launched. The system (See figs. 19-7 and 19-8.)
can also perform a simulated mode of operation The network was required to provide the
similar to the operational modes. following functions necessary for effective
Commands can be introduced into the dig- ground control and monitoring of a Gemini
ital-command control logic from the Real flight from lift-off to landing :
Time Computer Complex, from teletypewriter (1) Communications between the network
stations and the control center.
punched paper tape, or by manual insertion
from the digital-command control consoles as (2) Tracking and control of two vehicles
other antenna positions so that he can slave his range, angle, and time data directly to .the com-
equipment in azimuth and elevation to any other puters at the control center. These data are
antenna. transmitted via teletype and high-speed data
Radar tracking system.--The radar tracking circuits.
system provides the network and the control The network radars consist of long-range,
center with real-time information; that is, as standard tracking radars that have been modi-
soon as the radar has acquired the spacecraft, fied to meet manned space flight requirements.
the operator enables a circuit and transmits the The network radar stations are equipped with
I o
o
o
o o
o
e_
°_
Station Station o
_0
symbol =
O
_9 v
By JOHN D. HODGE, Chief, Flight Control Division, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center; and JONES W.
ROACH, Flight Control Division, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center
Flight control is the portion of mission con- Mission Definition and Design
179
180 GEMINI ]YlIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
(3) Spacecraft systems schematics telemetry and tracking information. The de-
(4) Remote-site and control-cemer proce- sign of computer display formats for the new
dures control center in Houston was a delicate task,
(5) Integrated overall spacecraft countdown requiring data of the proper type and quantity
(6) Trajectory working papers to aid, and not clutter, the evaluation and deci-
The mission rules document is cited as an sionmaking process. Personnel unfamiliar
example of how a typical mission control docu- with computers and computer data processing
ment is developed. Other mission documenta- had to master this new field to optimize the com-
tion has been developed in a similar fashion. puter as a flight-control tool. To learn about
The primary objective of the mission rules computers, personnel interfaced directly with
document is to provide flight controllers with computer programers and witnessed the com-
guidelines to expedite the decisionmaking proc- puter-subsystems testing to verify proper mis-
ess. These guidelines are based on an expert sion data flow. Remote-site teams began utili-
analysis of mission equipment configurations zation of the remote-site processor computing
for mission support, of spacecraft systems op- system. They witnessed the advance in speed
erations and constraints, of flight-crew proce- and accuracy available to them in telemetry and
dures, and of mission objectives. All these radar-data formatting and transmission to the
areas are reviewed and formulated into a series Mission Control Center for evaluation. This
of basic ground rules to provide flight-crew was a vast improvement over Project Mercury
safety and to optimize the chances for mission operations, when spacecraft data were viewed on
success. These mission rules are then put to the analog devices, and the selected values were re-
final test during an extensive series of premis- corded and transmitted to the control center by
sion simulations prior to the flight test. Some a low-speed teletype message. Remote-site and
rules may be modified as a result of experience control-center personnel understood the im-
gained from simulations. To assure a consist- portance of being able to use the computing
ent interpretation and a complete understanding facilities effectively. The flight controllers de-
of the guidelines, a semiformal mission-rules re- fined mission-control computing requirements at
view is conducted with the primary and backup dates early enough to insert these requirements
flight crews and with the flight-control teams into the computer to be utilized for maximum
prior to mission deployment. For final clari- mission support.
fication and interpretation of the mission rules, Some changes to the real-time compu¢er pro-
all personnel are involved in a review conducted gram for the control center and the remote sites
by the flight director and the flight-control were necessary, due to adjustments in mission
teams 2 days before launch and during the objectives and to mission control technique im-
terminal count on the final day. provements. These changes posed some prob-
Real-time simulation exercises were a neces- lems because the new requirements could not be
sary part of procedural development, mission integrated into the real-time computer system
rules evaluation, and flight-crew and flight-con- in the proper premission time period. In these
trol-team integration. instances, some off-line computing facilities
have been utilized to fill in gaps, again without
Initial Gemini Development Problems any compromise to flight-crew safety or mission
safety. The flexibility inherent in the flight-
Flight-control personnel were faced with the
control organization and its ground-support-
responsibility of expanding their own knowl-
facilities design played a vital role in the
edge to meet the greater demands of the more
flight-control response to adjustments made in
complex Gemini missions and ground-support
the mission objectives. During 1965, the deci-
equipment. Flight controllers found they sion to conduct Gemini missions with "2-month
needed to expand their technical backgrounds launch intervals required adjustmen.ts and flexi-
beyond those skills required in Project Mercury. bility at the launch sites and in the mission
Mission control personnel found that com- objectives as the launch date neared.
puter processing was a necessity to handle the In July 1963 the question was asked as to
vast quantities of spacecraft and launch-vehicle how fast the flight-control organization could
182 GE_IINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
complete one mission and turn around to sup- ground rules for the new mission control
port the following mission. A preliminary facility in Houston, Tex.
study reported a complete turnaround time of It became apparent that the new control
12 weeks would be required. But, as the entire center in Houston should be made available as
Gemini effort gained more experience and con- soon as possible to support the more ambitious
fidence in its personnel and systems, 'the turn- flight tests that were scheduled. The decision
around time shortened to launch minus 8 weeks, was made for this facility to support the Gem-
without compromising mission success or flight- ini II and III missions as a parallel and backup
crew safety. This allowed adequate time for operation to the Kennedy Space Center. The
debriefing and refinement of the previous mis- success obtained from this support enabled the
sion control operation for the following flight. flight-control organization to use this new con-
To validate the expanded knowledge and trol center to direct and control the Gemini IV
procedural development necessary to interface flight test, two missions ahead of the original
flight-control personnel properly with their schedule. There is no substitute for the real-
ground-support equipment, several plans were time environment as an aid in assuring the readi-
developed and executed. ness of a new facility. The support of these
A remote-site flight-control team traveled to early missions undoubtedly enhanced the readi-
the first Gemini tracking station available_- ness and confidence level to support the later
Carnarvon, Australia. There, they developed more complex missions.
and documented remote-site operations pro- The Mission Control Center at Houston con-
cedures. At the conclusion of this develop- tains the largest computing system of its type
ment, a Mission Control Center team went to in the world. Along with other numerous auto-
the Mercury Control Center at the Kennedy mated systems, it enables flight-control person-
Space Center to develop and document, control- nel to work more effectively and to provide more
center operational guidelines. As each remote efficient mission support. This major achieve-
site 'became operational and was checked by ment was accomplished through an integrated
remote-site teams, the developed procedures team effort by NASA and its many support
were reviewed and refined. organizations.
During October 1964, a week of network
Mission Control Decisions
simulations was conducted with the Mission
Control Center at the Kennedy Space Center Flight-control personnel follow a logical pat-
and the new Gemini tr_cking network to inte- tern in each decision determination. A logic
grate and test the developed procedures and to diagram of the flight-controller decision-making
verify the correct mission information and data process is shown in figure 20-1. This diagram
flow. These tests were conducted in near-mis- traces the decision-making process from prob-
sion-type exercises to train personnel for the lem identification to data collection and correla-
first manned Gemini mission. They were tion and to the recommended solution.
scheduled so that adjustments to flight-control Anomalies or possible discrepancies are iden-
techniques could be accomplished prior to the tified to flight control personnel in the following
scheduled launch date of the first manned ways :
Gemini mission. (1) Flight-crew observations.
Training exercises such as these and other (2) Flight-controller real-time observations.
simulations involving the flight crew and the (3) Review of telemetry data received from
flight-control teams were conducted to verify tape-recorder playbacks.
this important interface. The proficiency of (4) Trend analysis of actual and predicted
the flight crews and of the flight-control team values.
was the result of the numerous training (5) Review of collected data by systems
exercises. specialists.
]_esults of these training and validation exer- (6) Correlation and comparison with previ-
cises were completely satisfactory and were put ous mission data.
to further use by flight-control personnel in- (7) Analysis of recorded daVa from launch-
volved with the development of the operating complex testing.
FLIGHT CONTROL OPERATIONS 183
In-flight
data
(real time)
I I
I
Prime
vehicle
parameter
performance
in view I J
parameter
performance
Secondary
Mission I I
rules =-=-={ Correlation H
_1_
normal
,@ No-go
I
Yes [
F,,gh,I
Noi-o,t_ ff
F,qhtcrew
I ''-.
astro/vehicle
I I I "'ss'on
systems
Continue
flight I
[ abort 1 I ano,ysisI_L___2_ I
Comp,eteIVl Como,ete
I
scheduled I compromised
'"_"' I I ,,,gh,
FIOURE 20-1.--The logic of flight-control decisions.
pounds of oxygen and pressurized to 810 psia. This decision allowed flight-control teams to
At the beginning of the second revolution, the evaluate the fuel-cell operation for an addi-
pressure had dropped from 810 to 450 psia un- tional 24 hours. The fuel cell reacted favorably
der a heavy electrical load and after purging of during the next 24 hours, and another "go" de-
both fuel-cell sections. The switch fur the tank cision was made at that time.
heater had been placed in the manual "on"
Gemini VI-A/VII ])remission Planning
position.
Over the Carnarvon tracking station, the On October 28, 1965, 3 days after the first
pressure was reported to be 330 psia and drop- Gemini VI mission was canceled and approxi-
ping rapidly. At the Hawaii tracking station, mately 6 weeks prior to the Gemini VII launch,
approximately 20 minutes later, the oxygen the proposed Gemini VI-A/VII mission plan
pressure had fallen to 120 psia. It was deter- was presented to key flight control personnel for
mined at the time that the oxygen-supply heater evaluation. From the initial review, the largest
had failed. In order to maintain the oxygen area of concern centered in the proper manage-
pressure, the spacecraft was powered down to ment of telemetry and radar data from two
13 amperes, and by the fourth revolution the Gemini spacecraft. The ground system was
oxygen pressure had stabilized at 71.2 psia. configured to support one Gemini spacecraft
This oxygen pressure was well below, the mini- and one Agena target vehicle for the Gemini
mum specification value for inlet pressure to the VI mission. The major problem was how to
dual pressure regulators, and it was not known utilize the system to support two Gemini space-
how long fuel cells would perform under these craft simultaneously without compromising
adverse conditions. The oxygen in the supply mission success or flight-crew safety. Prelimi-
bottle was also on the borderline of being a two- nary procedures for optimum data management
phase mixture of liquid and gas, instead of the were prepared and submitted in 3 days with the
normal homogeneous fluid mixtures. recommendation to support the Gemini VI-A/
The performance of the fuel cells was moni-
VII mission. Final plans and procedures were
tored with special emphasis during the fourth submitted 1 week later.
and fifth revolutions to detect any possible Real-time computer programs for the Gemini
degradation before the passing of the,.last VI-A/VII missions were made available in five
planned landing area for the first 24-hour pe- configurations by the Mission Control Center
rio& During this time, the orbit capabilities of at Houston. Two remote-site computer pro-
the reentry batteries were reviewed in order to grams, one for Gemini VII and one for Gemini
determine the maximum time that could be
VI-A, would match these five control center
spent in orbit if a total fuel-cell failure occurred configurations to do the necessary computer
as a result of starvation of reactant oxygen. processing and data routing. The Flight Direc-
The maximum time was calculated to be 13
tor, through his control center staff, directed
hours.
control center and remote sites of the proper
At, the end of the fifth revolution, the flight configurations to provide the desired data for
crew were advised of a "go" condition for at review by flight control personnel.
least 16 revolutions. This decision was based
on the following facts : Control Center
ble of receiving manual inputs of spacecraft preparation activities on Gemini VI-A at Cape
aerodynamic data. Kennedy.
(3) The Gemini VI-A program would con- Since both spacecraft contained identical on-
tain the weight, reference area, and aerody- board command and telemetry systems, these
namics for spacecraft 6. systems had to be reviewed with the flight
(4) The Gemini VII program would be iden- crews, and ground rules were established to
tical to the Gemini VI-A program, with the fol- eliminate any conflicts.
lowing exceptions :
Orbital Activities
(a) It would process only spacecraft 7
telemetry. Gemini VII---Water in Space Suits
(b) The spacecraft characteristics would
initially be those of spacecraft 7. After the power-down of spacecraft 7 at the
(c) The Agena weight and area would be conclusion of the rendezvous with spacecraft 6,
those of the Gemini VII spacecraft. the flight crew reported water draining from
(d) The Agena thruster characteristics their space-suit hoses when disconnecting the
would reflect the spacecraft 7 aft-firing suits. At first this was thought to be conden-
thrusters only. sate resulting from the chill-down of the space-
craft during the powered-down period. A
Remote Sites
cabin temperature survey reflected cabin hu-
In a manner similar to that for the control midity to be very high, approximately 90 per-
center, certain basic guidelines were established cent. Over the Hawaii tracking station on the
and followed by remote-site personnel in the 167th revolution, the crew reported water was
planning and execution of the combined Gemini still draining from the suit hoses, and the on-
VI-A/VII missions: board suit temperature gage was reading off-
(1) Two remote-site data processor programs scale on the low side. Although this was still
were written, one for Gemini VII and one for thought to be condensate from the chill-down,
Gemini VI-A. The original Gemini VI there was a possibility the suit heat exchanger
remote-site data processor program was opera- was flooded due to the water boiler (launch-
tional and was used. The Agena target vehicle cooling heat exchanger) being filled to the point
portion of this program was bypassed, and the that the differential pressure across the suit
new Gemini VII program was obtained by re- heat-exchanger plates was not sufficient to
compiling the Gemini VI program with the transfer water. The water boiler was not
spacecraft 7 calibration data. thought to be overfilled, since the evaporator
(2) Two mission telemetry-data distribution pressure light was not on.
frames would be provided. These telemetry- The result of the suit heat exchanger being
flooded could indicate that the lithium hy-
data-distribution-frame patchboards would
droxide canister was being filled with water.
switch and match the required spacecraft telem-
which would inhibit its carbon-dioxide absorb-
etry data to the proper flight control console.
ing capabilities. Thus, the decision was made
With these two patchboard arrangements and
to dump the water boiler by boiling the water
two remote-site data processor programs, re-
overboard. This was accomplished by bypass-
mote tracking stations were capable of monitor-
ing the coolant around the space radiator and
ing both spacecraft simultaneously. placing the cooling requirements on the water
At certain times the Gemini VII telemetry boiler.
frequencies to be observed by ground control Over the Rose Knot Victor tracking ship on
personnel were changed so that radiofrequency the 168th revolution, the following procedure
interference would be eliminated during launch was voiced to the crew :
186 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
By ROBERT F. THOMPSON, Chief, Landing and Recovery Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center;
DONALDE. STULLKEN, Ph. D., NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center; and PETER J. ARMITAGE,Chief,
Operational Evaluation and Test Branch, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
189
190 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
that was scheduled to last up to 36 hours. Wave landing systems were tested during a test period
heights of 5 to 6 feet and winds of 10 to 15 miles that included aircraft ranging and homing runs
per hour existed at the time. These conditions on the ultra-high-frequency location beacon,
were representative of the open-ocean con- and tests of the spacecraft high-frequency
ditions to be expected in recovery areas. Sys- direction-finding system, using the U.S. Navy
and Federal Communications Commission
tems problems were encountered soon after the
spacecraft was placed in the water; the first of networks.
these was the failure of the high-frequency Subsequent manned at-sea tests were con-
antenna, which bent due to the wave-induced ducted to develop a technique to allow better
cabin ventilation for crew comfort. It was
high rates of spacecraft motion. An abnor-
mally high current drain was encountered in found possible to open the high hatch a small
the electrical supply system, and, after approxi- amount even in relatively rough sea conditions,
mately 1 hour, one of the two fans supplying and this, in conjunction with suit removal, is
air to the space suits failed. Pronounced sea- the configuration that will be utilized in the
sickness of both test subjects was apparent event it becomes necessary for the fight crew to
within some 10 minutes after they entered the remain inside the spacecraft for long periods
water, and suit ventilation from the postland- after a water landing.
ing environmental control system was found to Environmental-Water-Tank Tests
be inadequate to provide crew comfort with
suits on and hatches closed. This inadequacy In the months just prior to the first manned
existed even though the water temperature, air fight, various degrees of concern existed rela-
temperature, and solar heat load were less than tive to the ability of the flight crew to sustain
that to be expected in daytime, subtropical the postlanding environment safely. The gen-
recovery areas. The test was terminated after erally high heat levels to be expected inside the
approximately 2 hours, primarily because of spacecraft cabin after reentry and landing, in
crew discomfort and worsening sea conditions. conjunction with heat stress placed on the flight
The posttest systems failure analysis brought crew due to seasickness and possible dehydra-
to light several areas of shorting in the elec- tion, had to be considered in addition to any
trical cabling installation, and corrosion prob- postflight problems caused by orthostatic hypo-
lems on battery straps, electrical connectors, and tension. One of the limitations of operational
spacecraft structural areas. The suit-fan fail- testing is the difficulty in obtaining simultane-
ure was found to be caused by sea water enter- ous occurrence at all desired environmental
ing the snorkel system, and this problem conditions. In order to gain a better feel for
subsequently was solved after many at-sea tests systems limitations in providing a habitable
with boilerplate spacecraft incorporating modi- postlanding environment, a water-test-tank
fied snorkel designs. Static article 5 was re- facility was built to provide for the following
worked during a 5-month period and made controlled envir,mmental conditions:
ready for another at-sea manned test with sys- (1) Air temperature at sea level.
tems modified as necessary. (2) Humidity.
The at-sea test was repeated, with two astro- (3) Water temperature.
nauts as test subjects. This time, the test lasted (4) Surface-wind simulation.
17 hours, and all spacecraft systems performed (5) Solar heat loading.
to specification except for a few problems of a (6) Wave-induced spacecraft motion (by
very minor nature. Crew comfort remained mechanical linkage).
generally inadequate throughout the test, even (7) Spacecraft cabin reentry-heat pulse.
though the test environmental conditions were It was decided to conduct tests tailored to the
again less than to b_ exi)ected in subtropical actual postlanding environment to be expected
recovery areas. With space suits removed, test- in the Athmtic recovery area for the Gemini IV
subject comfort was improved, but no sequenc- mission, which was the first long-duration flight
ing of the spacecraft environmental control in this program. In an effort to simulate the
system could be found that would provide ade- preconditioning effects of space flight, bed rest
quate cooling with the hatches closed. All post- was determined to be the most practical method
GEMINI POSTLANDING SYSTEMS TE8TS AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS 193
for the purpose of these tests. Three tests were
conducted using the static article 5 spacecraft:
the first, using two test subjects without pre-
conditioning; the second, two other subjects who
had received 4 days’ bed rest preconditioning;
and the third, using the original two test sub-
jects with bed rest preconditioning. Figure
2 1 4 ( a ) shows the suited test subjects being
transferred to the spacecraft inside the test xoyers are primarily used in abort and second-
chamber. The transfer is made in this position ary landing areas. A carrier has, as basic
in order not to compromise the preconditioning equipment, a crane capable of lifting weights
effects of horizontal bed rest. well in excess of that of the Gemini spacecraft ;
The tests commenced a t the simulated time- hence, the carrier retrieval techniques followed
of -reentry heat pulse and progressed through closely those previously developed in the Mer-
the spacecraft change-to-landing attitude into cury Program. Destroyers could retrieve the
an 18-hour postlanding phase, with the test Mercury spacecraft with existing boat davits.
crew egressing into life rafts a t the end of the However, the use of destroyers to retrieve the
test. Figure 2 1 4 ( b ) is a photograph taken Gemini spacecraft presented a problem because
during the postlanding test period. Biomedi- the existing equipment on this type of ship
cal data were taken before, during, and after the cannot lift the spacecraft. Trade-off studies
tests; and spacecraft systems data were moni- were made to determine the desirability and
tored during the test. I n general, the tests were feasibility of providing all destroyers with a
considered successful in that the spacecraft sys- special lift capability, compared with use of
tem, together with the developed postlanding destroyers only for crew retrieval and with the
flight-crew procedures, was shown to be capable spacecraft remaining at sea until a ship with
of maintaining adequate crew habitability for an inherent lift capability could arrive. The
a n acceptable postlanding period in a subtropi- latter Kould have meant long delays in space-
cal recovery environment. Thus, these tests craft retrieval time, especially in the abort land-
added to the confidence level for postlanding ing areas. It was concluded that destroyers
operations on the Gemini I V and subsequent should be provided with the full capability of
missions. spacecraft retrieval, with the design goal of a
simple retrieval crane which could be as-
Retrieval Equipment
sembled on a destroyer’s deck in a minimum of
An aircraft carrier is used for spacecraft re- time and with little structural change to the
trieval in the primary landing area, and de- ship. It was also decided a t this time that the
194 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
design should include the capability to retrieve crane can be installed or removed in approxi-
the Apollo spacecraft, thus providing for a fu- mately 4 hours.
ture requirement with an overall cost saving. T o obtain the best techniques, the other sup-
Therefore, the Apollo spacecraft weight pro- porting retrieval equipment, such as special
vided the main design criteria for all retrieval hooks, lines, dollies, and cradles, was designed
equipment presently used in the Gemini Pro- and operationally tested in much the same man-
gram. Two types of lifting crane were de- ner as the davit rig.
signed, manufactured, and operationally tested Auxiliary Flotation Device
aboard the NASA test-support vessel in the
Gulf of Mexico. Both prototypes were next Recovery plans call for an auxiliary flotation
evaluated aboard a destroyer in the Atlantic, device to be attached to the spacecraft as soon
and' one prototype, the davit rig, was selected after landing as feasible. The device is in-
for production manufacture. The davit rig stalled by helicopter-deployed swimmer teams
basically consists of a crane capable of lifting in the primary and launch-site landing areas
36000 pounds, which is the Apollo retrieval or by pararescue personnel, deployed from
weight plus 3g. The crane is mounted on fixed-wing aircraft, in other areas. Figure 21-
the side of the destroyer fantail (fig. 21-5) and 6 shows the device attached to the spacecraft.
is fully power operated, providing spacecraft, Basically, the flotation device provides the
lift and power rotation of the retrieved space- following :
craft onto the deck. I n addition, the design (1) Flotation to the spacecraft in case of
provides a power-operated holdoff arm which leaks from structural damage, which could re-
encircles the spacecraft during retrieval, pre- sult in possible spacecraft loss because of
venting pendulum spacecraft motions due to sinking.
rough seas. An important feature of the rig is (2) A relatively stable work platform for the
that the entire control operation is accomplished recovery personnel to provide any required as-
by one man, thus avoiding difficult human co- sistance to the flight crew while awaiting
ordination problems which are often a problem retrieval.
in rough sea operations. Destroyers have been The device is designed to be a form-fit t o the
modified with quickly detachable deck sockets spacecraft when inflated; thus, little or no rela-
in sufficient numbers to allow for Department tive motion exists between the spacecraft and
of Defense scheduling flexibility in both the the device. This provides a damping of space-
Pacific and Atlantic fleets. The entire davit, craft wave-induced dynamic motions without
difficult load-point or fatigue problems. The
design incorporates a redundant tube, installed
within the external tube, and a second inflation
system, as a backup to the primary external flo-
tation tube.
planning purposes, landing areas have been di- the spacecraft and rendering such assistance to
vided into planned landing areas and con- the crew as may be needed.
tingency landing areas. The planned landing The final phase of the recovery task is the
areas are further divided into launch-site land- retrieval of the crew and spacecraft and their
return to the home base. This is accom-
ing area, launch-abort (powered flight) land-
ing area, periodic emergency landing area, and plished in the primary landing area by using
the inherent capabilities of the aircraft carrier
the nominal end-of-mission landing area. Any
landing outside one of these planned landing to lift the spacecraft from the water. The crew
areas is considered a contingency landing. may remain in the spacecraft for transfer to
Department of Defense forces support all of the recovery ship, or they may be transferred
these various landing situations. The level of to the ship by helicopter earlier. Other ships,
support required is commensurate with the such as oilers and fleet tugs, regularly used in
the recovery forces, also have an inheren£ capa-
probability of a landing in the area and also
bility of retrieving the spacecraft. Destroyers,
with any special problems associated with such
which are also commonly used as recovery ships,
a landing.
do not have such an inherent capability and
Recovery Tasks
are fitted with the retrieval rig previously
The various recovery tasks can be divided described.
into three general categories. The first task is Launch-Site Recovery
P Bermuda DD - Destroyer
CVS - Aircraft carrier
North tlantic
"6 -Primary
p II _, /
•..., ---% are.°
I5 C_nrmhh
A/C 4"
6 A/ C ,,, ,,
f II
DD 5 / ,"
A/C 6/ DD 6"","
/
IO South America
8O 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40
West longitude, deg
40
35
.-_=
25 - _--,.
20 -- _ _
80 75 70 65 60 55 55 45 40 35 30 25 20 15
Longitude, deg West
positioned in the end-of-mission landing area. East Atlantic, West Pacific, and mid-Pacific.
Contingency forces consisted of aircraft located Landing areas were designated within these
at stations around the world in such a way that zones each time the ground track crossed the
they could reach any part of the worldwide zone (fig. 21-11). One of the zones, the West
ground track within 18 hours of a landing. Atlantic, was designated as the end-of-mission
For long-duration missions, a recovery zone landing area and was supported by an aircraft
concept was adopted in which ships were placed carrier as well as destroyers. The other three
in four zones around the world : West Atlantic, zones were supported by destroyers and oilers.
198 GEMINI _IDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
Houston
-_Okinawa
Hawaii RCC.
•Singapore j
Pacific forces
Albrook sub RCC-"
I
Perth"
Legend: _Planned
I
or contingency .... Contingency 0 Recovery control center RCC AAircraft staging bases typical
Mauritius I
E] sub RCC
FIGURE 21-11.--Recovery control centers and typical contingen('y force staging bases.
G round
t rack
nated "Air Boss," served as an on-scene com- forces on-station, allowed the flight to continue
mander and air controller. After the search until the electrical-power problem could be eval-
helicopters had located the spacecraft, swimmer uated. The electrical-power problem was even-
helicopters were vectored-in to provide the on- tually stabilized, and the mission was subse-
scene assistance and to return the crew to the quently flown to its planned duration.
carrier, if desired. In addition, fixed-wing The primary recovery ship is positioned near
communications-relay aircraft relayed all radio the target landing point; therefore, the dis-
transmissions in the recovery area back to the tances shown in table 21-I are a reasonable sum-
ship and to the various control centers on the mary of landing accuracies to date. Postland-
beach. ing recovery times are shown in the last three
The control of recovery forces is exercised columns of table 21-I. In all landings, these
through an arrangement of recovery control times have been well within planning require-
centers connected with the recovery forces ments, and the recovery force performance has
through a worldwide communications network. been very satisfactory. Electronic aids were
These centers are depicted in figure 21-11. The utilized in the location of the spacecraft for
primary interface between recovery and other all but the Gemini VII flight, which landed
mission operations'activities occurs in the Mis- within visual range of a deployed recovery air-
sion Control Center at the Manned Spacecraft craft. Even in this case the recovery aircraft
Center. The Mission Control Center also serves was alerted to the near presence of the space-
as the overall recovery control center. craft by an electronic aid. In general, loca-
Both planned and contingency recovery tion techniques have proved very satisfactory
forces in the Atlantic area are controlled and justify the close attention and training
through the Recovery Control Center at Cape devoted to this phase of recovery.
Kennedy, while Hawaii serves this function in For all Gemini missions, the landing area
the Pacific area. Contingency recovery forces weather has been good, partially due to the fact
in other command areas are controlled from that the target landing point is selected on the
recovery control centers in Europe for the basis of forecasts and weather reconnaissance
Afriea-Middle East area, in the Panama flights. On-scene assistance activities, includ-
Canal Zone for the South American area, and ing swimmer performance, has been very saris-
in Florida for the North American area. These factory, and the flotation collar has given no
centers were established in order to take ad- problems, again justifying the thorough opera-
vantage of existing Department of Defense or- tional evaluation and test program. Maximum
ganizations and arrangements. exposure of the spacecraft systems to the un-
A summary of the Gemini Program recovery assisted postlanding environment has been
operations to date is presented in table 21-I. 50 minutes, with most on-scene-assistance
All landings have been in the primary recovery times being considerably less. Overall experi-
area, with the distance from the primary re- ence has tended to confirm the possibility of
covery ship varying from approximately 11 to motion sickness and postlanding habitability
91 nautical miles, as shown. problems. However, for the short times in-
It is significant to note that, although all land- volved and for the weather conditions that have
ings have been in the nominal end-of-mission prevailed, no significant problems caused by
landing area in the Atlantic, the secondary land- the postlanding environment have been
ing areas in the Pacific were very beneficial dur- encountered.
ing the 8-day Gemini V mission. During the All flight crews except the Gemini VI-A crew
early orbits in this mission, trouble developed have been returned to the primary recovery ship
with the spacecraft electrical-power source. by helicopter. The Gemini VI-A crew chose to
Since the next several orbits did not pass remain with the spacecraft until it was re-
through the primary landing area, the presence trieved by the recovery ship. Ship retrieval of
of these secondary recovery areas, with recovery the spacecraft has been nominal in all missions.
218-556 O--66--14
200 GEMINI _IDPROGRA_ COHERENCE
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22. FLIGHT CREW PROCEDURES AND TRAINING
By DONALDK. SLAYTON, Assistant Director ]or Flight Crew Operations, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center;
WARRENJ. NORTH, Chie/, Flight Crew Support Division, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center; and C. H.
WOODLING, Flight Crew Support Division, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center
201
202 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
I
J
~ Q U B B-l.--Cockpit
E di8play8 and controls normally accessible to the command pilot.
Overhead
switch/circuit-
Water management panel
(_ Command
pilot's panel
_ IIll ,+he,
G Le _treSoki_
_hp/aCn
re;uit - '
Center console
...® .®
/
_ _--
(fig. 22-6), at the Manned Spacecraft Center. are presented to each pilot through an infinity
A second unit (fig. '22-7) is in the Mission Con- optics system. A spherical starfield is located
trol Center facility at Cape Kennedy, Fla. The within the crew-station visual display unit.
computer complex of both mission simulators The rendezvous target and the earth are gen-
consists of three digital computers with a com- erated remotely and are superimposed on the
bined storage capacity of 96000 words. Six- starfield scene by means of television, beam
degree-of-freedom computations are carried out splitters, and mirrors within the crew-station
during launch, orbit maneuvering either docked display unit. Figures 22-8 and 22-9 shows an
or undocked, and reentry. Maximum iteration indication of the view available to the crew
rate for the six-degree-of-freedom equations is through the window of the simulator at Cape
20 cycles per second. Digital resolvers are in- Kennedy. The rendezvous-target-vehicle scene
corporated to send analog signals to the various is generated electronically, and the earth scene
displays. Out-the-window visual simulation of is televised from a filmstrip. The simulator at
the stars, the earth, and the rendezvous target the Manned Spacecraft Center utilizes a 1/6-scale
204 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
T
I
\ T I /
\ I
\ T /
\ /
I
\ /
T
. \
T
I /
-
0
I
T
1-k - k -k -I- -I-- I - i- 4 - 4 - i - 4-4
I
c 1
0
I
I
0 1
/ I FIQUW
22-7.-Mission Simulator at the Kennedy Space
\
/
I Center.
1 \
/ I I
\
\
1 1 '
I
I
22-5.-Engineering
FIQURE Simulator.
model of the rendezvous target vehicle and a
gimbal-mounted television camera with air-
bearing transport. The earth scene is a televi-
sion picture of a 6-footo-diameterglobe.
The crew stations for the simulators contain
actual flight controls and displays hardware.
The simulator at Cape Kennedy, which the
crews utilize during the last 2 months prior to
a flight, contains the exact cockpit stowage con-
figuration in terms of operational equipment,
experiments, cameras, and food. T o provide
additional crew comfort during the longer
rendezvous simulations, the crew station was de-
signed t o pitch forward 30° from the vertical,
thereby raising the crewman's head to the same
level as his knees. Mission training is divided
28.-Mission
FIGURE Simulator at the Manned Space- into segments so that no training period exceeds
craft Center. 4 hours. The simulator also generates approxi-
F L I G H T CREW PROCEDURES AND T R A I N I N G 205
mat+ 300 telemetry signals which are trans- Retrofire and Reentry
mitted to the worldwide communications and
The retrofire maneuver involves manual at-
tracking network for use during integrated net- titude control during solid retrorocket firing.
work simulations.
The primary attitude reference is the “8-ball”
A part-task trainer which provides a full- attitude indicator. I n the event of inertial plat-
scale dynamic simulation of the close-in forma- form or indicator failure, the window view of
tion flying and docking maneuvers is the Trans- the earth’s horizon and the rate gyro displays
lation and Docking Simulator (&. 22-10). are used.
The Gemini Agena target vehicle mockup is
Associated with the retrofire maneuvers are
mounted on air-bearing rails and moves in two
the adapter separation activities. Approxi-
degrees of translation. The Gemini spacecraft mately 1 minute prior to retrofire, the
is mounted in a gimbaled ring on another air-
equipment adapter is separated to permit firing
bearing track and incorporates the remaining
of the solid retrorockets, which are fixed to the
four degrees of freedom. Cockpit controls ac- retroadapter adjacent to the spacecraft heat
tivate a closed-loop control system consisting of
shield. The equipment adapter is separated by
an analog computer, servo amplifiers, and hy-
three pilot actions : individual initiation of
draulic servos. This simulator, located in the
pyrotechnic guillotines for the orbital-attitude-
flight crew simulation ‘building a t Houston, has
and-maneuver-system lines, the electrical wir-
a maneuvering envelope defined by the size of
ing, and then firing of the shaped charge which
.the enclosure, which is 100 by 60 by 40
structurally separates the adapter from the
feet. Lighting configurations simulate day,
spacecraft. After retrofire, the retroadapter
night, and various spacecraft-target lighting
separation is manually sequenced.
combinations.
Reentry control logic is displayed to the
pilots as roll commands in conjunction with
down-range and cross-range errors. The
down-range and cross-range error displays in-
volve the pitch and yaw flight-director needles
(fig. 22-3), which are used in a manner similar
to the localizer and glide-slope display for an
aircraft instrument-landing system. During
the atmospheric deceleration portion of the re-
entry, the pilot must damp oscillations in pitch
and yaw and, in addition, must control the roll
in order to obtain proper lift-vector orienta-
tion. Good static and aerodynamic stability
22-9.-View through window of Mission Simu-
FIGURE characteristics create a relatively easy damping
lator at the Manned Spacecraft Center. task for the pilot.
Deployment of the drogue and the main
parachutes is accomplished by the crew, based
on altimeter readout and two discrete light in-
dications which are triggered by separate
barometric pressure systems.
The Gemini Mission Simulators have pro-
vided the majority of the training during the
retrofire and reentry phase. Early familiariza-
tion and procedures development were con-
ducted in the Gemini Part Task Trainer at the
Manned Spacecraft Center, and in the engineer-
ing simulator at the spacecraft contractor’s
%2-lO.-Translation
FICVRE and Docking Simulator. facility.
206 GEMINI MIDPROGR4M CONFERENCE
Overall management of spacecraft systems is The crew procedures associated with extra-
similar to the concept used for aircraft. As vehicular activity may be divided into two cate-
shown in figure 22-3, the flight parameters are gories : first, preparation for extravehicular ac-
displayed directly in front of the pilots; the tivity, which involves donning the specialized
circuit breakers are located peripherally on the equipment; and second, flying the maneuvering
left, overhead, and right consoles; and the en- unit and carrying out specific extravehicular
vironmental control, fuel-cell heater, propul- tasks. Prior to egress, both crewmembers re-
sion, communications, inertial platform, rate- quire approximately 2 hours of preparation for
gyro controls, and water-management panels extravehicular activity. This activity includes
are located on consoles between the pilots. The removing the umbilical, the chest pack, and all
spacecraft separation, adapter separation, retro- other extravehicular equipment, from stowage ;
rocket jettison, and deployment switches are then donning and checking out, the equipment
guarded and interlocked with circuit breakers in the proper sequence. Each crewmember
to prevent inadvertent operation during sleep checks the life-support connections of the other
periods, suit removal, and extravehicular crewman as each connection is made. Training
operations. for this phase of the extravehicular operation
The Agena control panel is located on the was carried out in specially prepared, static
right side of the spacecraft. The pilot normally spacecraft mockups (fig. 22-12) located in the
operates this control panel ; however, by using flight crew simulation building a t the Manned
a foot-long probe, called a swizzle stick, the Spacecraft Center, and in the Gemini Mission
simple toggle activities can be accomplished by Simulator a t Cape Kennedy. Also, training
the command pilot, even while he is wearing a for egress and ingress and for extravehicular
pressurized suit. experiments is carried out under zero-gravity
Prior to the initial systems training on the conditions in an Air Force KC-135 airplane
Gemini Mission Simulator, six breadboard- (fig. 22-13) at Wright-Patterson Air Force
t,ype Gemini systems trainers are used for early Base. Spacecraft cockpit, hatches, and adapter
familiarization. Figure 22-11 shows the elec- section are installed in the fuselage for use dur-
trical system trainer which portrays the control ing the aircraft flights. A 3-hour flight includes
circuits and operational modes. approximately 45 zero-g parabolas of 30 seconds’
22-ll.-Electrical
FIQTJRE Sydtem Trainer.
~
FIGURE
22-12.-Spacecraft mockup.
FIGURE
22-14.-Three-degree-of-freedom air-bearing
simulator.
FIQUBE
22-15.-Handheld maneuvering unit.
i, FIQURE
22-17.-Egrees training.
FIQURE
2%16.-Pamchute training.
achieved approximately 1 year after the start
E w h crew undergoes an egress training ses- of flight training, their pilot experience ranges
sion (fig.22-17) in the Gulf of Mexico. Space- from 13 to 18 years; total aircraft flight time in
craft systems procedures, egress techniques, wa- high-performance aircraft varies from approxi-
ter survival, and helicopter-sling techniques mately 3000 to 5000 hours; and active affiliation
are rehearsed. with the NASA manned space-flight program
Flight Crew Preparation
varies from 20 months to nearly 7 years, at the
time of launch. It is of interest to note that
Thirteen pilots were assigned as prime and the man with the lowest flight time has also
btickup crewmembers during the first five flown the X-15 rocket research airplane. They
manned flights. As a partial indication of ex- all obtained engineering degrees prior to or dur-
perience, t,lieir milit,ary aircraft pilot-rating ing the early stages of their engineer-pilot
date, total flight time, and assignment date to career. Age within the group ranges from 34
the astronaut program are listed in table 22-1. years to 42 years. All have undergone a three-
Considering that military aircraft ratings are part space-flight preparation program.
FLIGHT CREW PROCEDURES AND TRAININO 209
The initial training phase involved a 6- sented to the February 1964 group of astro-
month academic program, as shown in table nauts. Because of the dual Gemini/Apollo
22-II. This particular curriculum was pre- training requirement, the curriculum is some-
what more comprehensive than the courses
TABLE 22-II.--Astronaut Academic Program given to the first two groups.
Basic Curriculum
The second phase of crew preparation involves
Course : Class hours
Geology I ................................ 80 assignment to engineering specialty areas. A
Geology II (laboratory--fieldwork) ....... 80 typical breakdown of engineering categories is
Astronomy (laboratory--planetarium) ..... 30 as follows :
Math review ............................. 20 (1) Launch vehicles
Flight mechanics ......................... 50
(2) Flight experiments and future programs
Basic aerodynamics ...................... 36
Aerodynamics ........................... 20 (3) Pressure suits and extravehicular ac-
Rocket propulsion ........................ 34 tivity
Computers .............................. 16 (4) Environmental control system, radiation
Inertial systems .......................... 16
protection, and thermal control
Navigational techniques .................. 30
Guidance and control .................... 34 (5) Spacecraft, Agena, and service module
Communications ......................... 12 propulsion
Spacecraft control systems laboratory--
(6) Guidance and navigation
simulations ............................ 16
(7) Communications and tracking
Physics of the upper atmosphere and space_ 18
Basic physiology ......................... 32 (8) Electrical, sequential, and fuel cell sys-
Flight physiology and environmental sys- tems
tems ................................. 34
(9) Mission planning
Meteorology ............................. 10
(10) Crew safety, launch operations
Total ................................. 568 (11) Landing and recovery systems
210 GE_IINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
(12) Crew station integration prior to launch, the flight crew moves to Cape
(13) Space vehicle simulators Kennedy in order to participate in the final
The duration of this second phase, which ex- spacecraft checkout and to continue training on
the mission simulator.
tends to flight assignment date, varied from 8
Training time spent by the flight crews on the
months to 6 years. The Mercury flight assign-
ment periods were included in phase II of trainers and in the major areas is summarized
in table 29-III. Differences in the time spent
Gemini flight preparation. All pilots, and in
by the crews in the various activities are indica-
particular the Mercury-experienced crews, made
many contributions to the design and opera- tive of the type of missions and objectives.
tional concepts for the Gemini spacecraft. In preparation for the first manned flight, a
The final phase begins with flight assignment considerable number of hours were spent by the
and occurs approximately 6 months prior to crews in the spacecraft systems activities at the
launch date. At the start of this final phase, a spacecraft contractor's plant and with the
detailed training plan is formulated by the spacecraft at Cape Kennedy. The extensive
training personnel and the assigaaed flight crew. number of experiments carried out during the
A typical training schedule is summarized in Gemini V and VII missions are reflected by the
figure 22-18. The assigned crews begin with time spent in the preparation phase. For the
detailed systems reviews using the systems first planned docking mission on Gemini VI,
trainers at the Manned Spacecraft Center, and the prime crew spent 95 hours in the Translation
actual participation in systems checkout activity and Docking Simulator, developing the control
at the spacecraft contractor's plant. procedures for both formation flying and for
Training on the Gemini Mission Simulator docking.
starts about 3 months prior to launch. This
Evaluation of Training
training is carried out concurrently with all the
other preparation activities. The initial train- Although the adequacy of the astronaut train-
ing on the simulator is carried out at the Manned ing is difficult to measure, it is important that
Spacecraft Center. Approximately 6 weeks the value of the training facilities and activities
SC systems briefings B B
Zero g training B 0
Agena systems briefings _]
Experiments briefings _J D B
Mockup stowage reviews B Q
MAC eng,neering simulator BD _"_
EcJress training J_ _J
Parachute training _]
Spacecraft
tests s_'Lo,;[;/ r//////////////////////2
"///////////////////////
FIOURE 22-lB.--Flight crew training schedule.
FLIGHT CREW PROCEDUP_S AND TRAINING 211
Prime Backup Prime Backup Prime Backup Prime" Backup Prime b Backup
Mission simulator ........ 118 82 126 105 107 110 107 76 113 114
Launch vehicle simulator__ 17 15 22 22 15 16 6 8 6
Docking simulator ........ 1 5 6 6 2 12 25 17 4 4
Spacecraft systems tests
and briefings ........... 233 222 120 120 122 128 93 91 150 16(
Experiments training ...... 2 2 50 50 150 150 23 22 100 10(
Egress and parachute
training ............... 18 15 23 23 12! 12 6 6 13
be examined at this point in the program. Com- and this practice was found to be essential in
lnents made by the crews regarding their train- establishing final cockpit procedures.
ing are summarized as follows: Although the time spent in the spacecraft
(1) Gemini mission simulator tests and associated briefings varied with the
(a) Most important single training crews, all crewmembers agreed that, without this
(b) Visual simulation invaluable participation and insight gained into the sys-
(c) High fidelity required tems operation, the mission objectives could not
(d) Accurate crew station/stowage have been carried out as they were.
(2) Spacecraft systems tests and briefings Training for contingencies is considered by
(a) Active participation in major space- all as an essential part of the training for a
craft tests necessary flight. Water egress, as well as pad egress from
(b) Briefings essential the launch vehicle, is rehearsed by each pilot.
(3) Contingency training Launch-abort training, both on the Dynamic
(a) Egress and parachute training Crew Procedures Simulator at the Manned
required Spacecraft Center, and the integrated network
(_b) Launch-abort training essential simulations on the Gemini Mission Simulator
The crews were unanimous in their assess- at Cape Kennedy, are believed to be very
ment of the importance of the Gemini Mission important.
Simulator. The out-the-window visual simula-
Concluding Remarks
tion did not become fully operational until
Extension of Gemini mission objectives from
Gemini VI training at Cape Kennedy. The
the initial three-orbit systems-verification flight
crews agree that this visual simulation is inval-
to the long-duration missions with rendezvous
uable, particularly for the rendezvous training.
and extravehicular activities have required a
Fidelity of hardware and software has been of
corresponding increase in the scope of simula-
utmost importance and should not be compro-
tion capability. The equipment which has been
mised. Practice in stowing and unstowing all developed plus the experience gained on the sim-
the necessary cockpit gear, together with the ula¢ors and in flight will provide a broad base
operation of the total spacecraft systems, could from which to provide training for future
be done only in the Gemini Mission Simulator, Gemini flights as well as future programs.
23. SPACECRAFT LAUNCH PREPARATION
By WALTER J. KAPRYAN, Resident Manager, Gemini Program O_ice, NASA Kennedy Space Center, and
WXLEYE. WILLIAMS, Manager, Gemini/LEM Operations, NASA Kennedy Space Center
213
214 GEMINI _IDPROGRAI_I CONFERENCE
(5) The ground equipment to be used at the complex, and to preparing the spacecraft for its
prime contractor's facility and at the launch site move to the launch complex. Typical space-
craft industrial area activity is as follows:
would be identical, where practical, so that test
data could be more reliably compared than was (1) Receiving inspection.
possible in the Mercury program. (2) Cleanup of those miscellaneous manu-
(6) The complete spacecraft systems test facturing activities not performed at the prime
operation at the prime contractor's facility contractor's facility, and incorporation of late
FIQUBE
%l.-Spacecraft and Gemini Agena target vehicle undergoing tests tat radar range.
I
I modes and command links, both radiofrequency
and hardline.
(2) Part 2 consists of an ascent run through
second-stage engine cutoff, wherein there is a
switchover from primary to secondary guidance.
(3) Part 3 consists of a full-blown simulated
mission and involves a normal ascent on pri-
mary guidance, orbit exercises applicable to the
specific mission, and rendezvous and catchup
exercises. Finally, retrofire with a complete
reentry to landing is simulated. Suited astro-
nauts are connected to the environmental con-
trol system during this test. Thus, the joint
combined systems test is a comprehensive, func-
tional, integrated test of the entire space ve-
hicle and serves as the first milestone for alert-
F'IGURE 23-3.--Spacecraft reentry &ion with cables
ing the worldwide network and recovery forces
attached for systems test at launch complex. to prepare to man their stations for launch.
FIGURE
B-I.-Spacecraft adapter assembly with cat es attached for systems test at lsaunch complex.
SPACECRAFT LAUNCH PRDPARATION 217
Following the joint combined systems test, a launch. This test is a coordinated countdown
flight configuration mode test has been per- of the Atlas-Agena and the Gemini space ve-
formed. This test simulates an ascent run as hicles. It simulates an Atlas-Agena launch
close as possible to the true launch environment. and the first orbit of the Agena. As during wet
For this test, all of the ground equipment was mock simulated launch, the spacecraft and
disconnected, all launch vehicle arid spacecraft Gemini launch vehicle count runs to T-1 min-
umbilicals were pulled in launch sequence, and ute. The simultaneous launch demonstration,
the total vehicle was electrically isolated from however, does not include the servicing of any
the launch complex. All monitoring of systems of the vehicles, nor does it include the precount
performance was through cabin instrumentation and midcount. It is being performed closer to
and telemetered data. This test unmasked any launch than was the wet-mock-simulated launch
problems that may have been obscured by the and will be discontinued when experience shows
presence of the aerospac_ ground equipment it to be no longer necessary.
and demonstrated systems performance in flight The deletion of the wet-mock-simulated
configuration. A test such as this was very val- launch improves the launch-complex schedule
uable to the Gemini Program in its earlier by several days, and also eliminates the require-
phases; however, now that the program has ment for an early mechanical mate. Since the
reached its present phase of stabilized and erector is lowered during wet-mock-simulated
proved flight and ground equipment configura- launch, the spacecraft must be mechanically
'tion, the value of the test is somewhat dimin- mated to the launch vehicle for this test. There-
ished. For that reason, beginning with Gemini fore, its elimination permits integrated testing
VII the flight configuration mode test was no to continue while demated, by the utilization of
longer being performed. However, since certain an electrical interface jumper cable. Thus, any
sequential functions cannot be demonstrated activities requiring access into the spacecraft
without umbilical eject, the umbilical-pull por- adapter can be performed much later in the se-
tion of this test has been retained and has been quence of launch-complex operations than was
incorporated as an additional sequence of one o_ heretofore possible. Spacecraft 8, for example_
the other test days. is not scheduled to be mechanically mated until
The wet mock simulated launch is a dress after the completion of final systems test.
rehearsal of the launch operation itself. Both Following the wet-mock-simulated launch,
launch vehicle and spacecraft are serviced and final spacecraft systems tests are performed.
prepared exactly as though they were to be They encompass the same scope as during pre-
launched. The complete countdown is rehearsed mate verification. These tests provide final de-
and runs to T-1 minute. Astronaut ingress is tailed component-level data prior to launch.
performed exactly the same as on launch day. At this time, all data are closely scrutinized for
This operation actually includes all launch prep- any trends indicating degraded performance.
aration functions and starts on F-3 day. This Following the final systems test, the final simu-
test is primarily an operational demonstration lated flight is conducted. This test is very simi-
on the part of the launch team and serves as the lar to the joint combined systems test. The
second maj or milestone of an impending launch. runs are identical, and suited astronauts partici-
This test, too, is of greatest value in the early pate. One important additional function per-
operational phases of a program. As the pro- formed during this test is to utilize high-energy
gram progresses, the wet mock simulated launch squib simulators during appropriate sequenc-
provides diminishing returns. The last space- ing functions involving pyrotechnics. Thus, all
craft for which a complete wet-mock-simulated pyrotechnic circuits experience electrical loads
launch was performed was spacecraft 6 prior just as though actual squibs were being fired.
to its first launch attempt. It is doubtful that The simulated flight is the last major test of the
any further complete wet-mock-simulated spacecraft prior to launch. Immediately after
launches will occur. the simulated flight, final launch preparations
For the rendezvous phase of the program, begin, leading to the precount on F-3 day.
a simultaneous launch demonstration is being The primary purpose of the precount is to per-
performed in lieu of the wet-mock-simulated form power-on stray voltage checks prior to
218 GEMINI :M'IDPROGRA_ CONFERENCE
making final flight hookup of spacecraft ance of these tests basically added another joint
safety of the pyrotechnic configuration. The with other activities, but at times they do add
fuel cells are activated during the midcount and serially to the schedule.
remain powered up through launch. A significant portion of the effort expended
The final countdown is started early on launch at the launch complex is not directly related to
day and is of 6 hours' duration. During the the performance of tests. For example, the fol-
count, an abbreviated check of all systems is lowing servicing operations are required :
made and is timed to be completed prior to the (1) Hypergolic and pressurant servicing of
schedule target vehicle launch so that during the propulsion system.
the critical time period following that launch, (2) Cryogenic servicing for the fuel cells and
a minimum of test activity is required. This ap- the environmental control system.
proach has put us in the posture of being exactly (3) Servicing of secondary oxygen.
on time at T-0 for the two complete rendezvous (4) Replacement of the lithium hydroxide
countdowns thus far. canister within the environmental control
The sequence, of testing just described pro- system.
vides for several distinct milestones for gaging (5) Sterilizing and servicing of the water
test progress, and it also provides for the logical management system.
resumption of testing in the event a test recycle Certain experiments also have special servicing
is required, as was the case during the Gemini requirements and crew-station stowage exer-
VI mission. Following the inflight failure of cises are required, to name but a few of the non-
the Agena target vehicle and the subsequent de- test functions being performed. The incor-
cision to attempt a double spacecraft rendezvous, poration of a few configuration changes must
spacecraft 6 was removed from the launch com- also be anticipated. In order to project real-
plex and essentially placed in bonded storage. istic launch dates, sufficient allowances must be
Immediately after the launch of spacecraft 7, provided in the overall launch-complex schedule
spacecraft 6 was returned to the launch complex. for all of these activities.
Testing resumed with final systems test, in-
Scheduling
cluded the final simulated flight, and concluded
with the launch. Thus, in a mat.ter of days, a For a normal mission operation, launch-com-
complete new set of test data was obtained and plex test activities are scheduled on a two-shift,
correlated with the data from the previous 5-day-week basis. The third shift and week-
more-extended spacecraft 6 checkout operation ends are utilized for shop-type activity and
and permitted the spacecraft to be launched troubleshooting, as required. The weekend also
with a high degree of confidence. It goes with- serves as a maj or contingency period in the event
out saying that the Gemini launch vehicle test of failure to maintain schedules during the
plan was equally flexible, or the rapid recycle normal workweek. Daily scheduling meetings
could never have been performed. are held, during which all test and work activi-
The waterfall chart shown in figure 23-2 does ties are scheduled for the ensuing 24 hours.
not, of course, represent all of the spacecraft test Scheduling on this basis has resulted in meet-
activity at the launch complex. For example, ing projected launch schedules for most mis-
for the Gemini II and III missions an extensive sions, and has enabled management to make
electrical-electronic interference investigation realistic long-range program commitments.
was conducted. Special instrumentation was The only spacecraft for which there has been
in,_talled to monitor the critical spacecraft and any significant differences between projected
launch vehicle interface circuits. The perform- and actual schedules is spacecraft 2. Much of
SPACECRAFT LAUNCH PP_PARATION 219
By J. R. ATKINS, Chief, Sa/ety Division, NASA Kennedy Space Center; J. F. THOMPSON, Test Conductor's
O_ce, NASA Kennedy Space Center; and R. J. TETI, Test Conductor's O_iee, NASA Kennedy Space
Center
Summary (2) Inspection reports.
(3) The spacecraft test conductor's log.
In this report, the data of interest with regard
(4) Daily activity schedules.
to the processing of the Gemini spacecraft are
(5) l_Ieeting attendance.
analyzed. The _ime required for processing
(6) Systems engineering reports.
any particular spacecraft is dependent not only
(7) Operating personnel.
upon the tests required but also upon the num- Clarification of the source material was
ber of manufacturing tasks, the number of tasks
obtained from systems engineers and spacecraft
that can be worked concurrently, and the test conductors.
amount of time available. The effort required
to accomplish modifications, replacements, and Spacecraft Schedule Performance
repairs is accomplished in parallel with other A comparison of schedules with performance
activities and does not directly affect the (table 24--I) shows that spacecraft 2 was the
schedule.
only spacecraft that did not meet Vhe planned
The influence of discrepancies found during checkout schedule. However, the spacecraft
testing and the number of discrepancies per can be considered a special case for analysis
testing hour can be predicted. In addition, purposes, since it was the first to use the new
such other parameters as the number of proc- test facilities and flight hardware. This is sup-
essing tasks and the number of testing shifts ported by the fact that 102 aerospace-ground-
have been suitably combined with other factors equipment interim discrepancy records were
into a mathematical model for predicting the recorded, as compared with 36 spacecraft in-
number of days required at launch complex 19 terim discrepancy records. An interim dis-
at Cape Kennedy, Fla.
crepancy record is prepared whenever a prob-
Introduction lem is encountered on either ground equipment
or on the spacecraft. The spacecraft discrep-
The time required to complete the launch- ancies did not contribute significantly to the
pad processing of a Gemini spacecraft depends schedule slippage.
on several factors, such as testing, modification, The original schedule for spacecraft 5 was
part replacement, servicing time, and post- exceeded by 15 days. This was caused by a
testing activities. Data on these factors have 13-day extension due to several effects other
been analyzed and combined into a mathemati- than spacecraft testing, interim discrepancy
cal model which serves as a basis for predicting records, troubleshooting, servicing, or modifi-
the launch-pad processing time required before cation, and is not included in this discussion.
a Gemini spacecraft can be launched from Cape There was also a 2-day slip in the launch of
Kennedy, Fla. Monitoring of the elements of spacecraft 5 caused by a countdown scrub.
the mathematical model provides a means of
evaluating performance. Analysis of Spacecraft Processing Factors
This model has been prepared by the Space- Effects of Major Spacecraft Tests
craft Operations Analysis Branch at the Ken- The original checkout schedule consisted of 10
nedy Space Center, using the following sources major tests. Later, four of the tests were com-
of data :
bined into two, leaving eight major tests. The
(1) Spacecraft test and servicing procedures data from these tests form the basis for this
from the spacecraft prime contractor. phase of the evaluation.
221
222 GE)IINI _IDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
Countdowns
Spacecraft Prepad = Pad b Total Prepad = Pad b
1st 2d 3d
3 ................ 24 53 77 31 47 78
4 ................ 12 48 60 10 51 61
5 ................ 7 43 50 7 56 63 65 .........
6 ................ 30 53 83 36 47 83 131 ° 134
7 ................ 21 36 57 21 36 57 .....................
Testing before the spacecraft is installed on the o The third countdown for spacecraft 6 required an
launch vehicle at launch complex 19. additional 51 days--38 prepad days and 13 pad days.
b Testing after the spacecraft is installed on the
launch vehicle.
- I00
(1) Serial troubleshooting time can be esti-
mated as 0.9 shift for each shift of testing. 8o
..-p_..
¢q
f_
,-t
224 GEMI2_I _IDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
_',_
0 o
_._
"_ o
o9
_NNNNN_NN_N_N_N
e_
#
I
e_
I
g_
a
SPACECRAY_r LAUNCH-SITE PROCESSING 225
Of the total interim discrepancy records oc- (1) Ground equipment and unclassified in-
curring in a test sequence, 31 to 40 percent oc- terim discrepancy records comprise approxi-
curred during the first test of the sequence. The mately 70 percent of the total.
wide range of interim-discrepancy-record oc- (2) The incidence of the interim discrepancy
currence (28 to 60) in the initial test is caused records and the amount of serial troubleshoot-
by modifications made on the test complex be- ing time are not directly related. This indicates
tween missions and by methods which were, as that most of the interim-discrepancy-record
yet, insufficient for verifying that the complex tasks do not restrict further testing and are
is in optimum operational condition. In this resolved in parallel with other activities.
analysis, the first test has been deleted to avoid (3) An analysis of the interim discrepancy
biasing the test average. records with respect to their occurrence in a
Table 24-III shows the average number of test sequence (fig. 24--2) shows that 0.6 to 1.8 of
interim discrepancy records experienced by each these records per hour of testing can be ex-
spacecraft, exclusive of the first test. The high pected for the first test of a series and 0.5 per
incidence of these records for spacecraft 2 was hour of testing thereafter.
expected. The averages for spacecraft 3, 4, 6,
and 7 are considered normal (accumulative
,,o_
average: 8.8). However, the high average ex-
perienced on spacecraft 5 was not anticipated.
100 t
It is attributed to the large increase in ground
equipment and unclassified interim discrepancy
records which occurred during the last three
tests; prior to those tests, the number of these
records had been no higher than predicted. The
high incidence of records for spacecraft 5 might 90I8070 o_OD
-----_2_____Spocecr(]ft435
also be attributed to a normal life breakdown of so
the ground equipment.
TABLE 24-III.--Interim
Summary by Spacecr_
Discrepancy Record
ft to First Countdown
-°°I
4O
Total
tests
Average
IDR• per
Percent
AGE b and /%
Spacecraft test with unclassified
first test
deleted
IDR"
I
0 I I I _ I I I _ I I I I 1 I I _,1 I I
Test number I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 10. 4 Pre- EIIV & Finel Sire
10 6.3
mote joint JCST FCMT WMSL sys fit Launch
9 7.6 verif G 8t C
8 11.7
FIGURE 24-2.--43ecurrence of interim discrepancy rec-
8 8.4
ords for individual tests.
6 9.0
42XI0
40- o
2 ............
98 ...........................
99 ........ 183 24 38 Spacecraft 0
3 ............ o 2
4 ............ 129 34 207 27 36 n 3
85 40 242 29 0 4 0
5 ............
54 t, 5 0
6 ............ 81 33 180 28
32
7 ............
89 46 190 22
_ 3o
g, 22
Of approximately 216 items replaced on
spacecraft 2 through 7, 74 were classified as g 2o
major items. The major items replaced (table
24-V) as a result of launch-site testing repre-
sent only 9.8 percent of the total number re-
placed at the Kennedy Space Center. The _12
ous spacecraft. 2
I I t I I I I I I I I I I I I l I I I I
o 2 4 6 8 I0 12 14 16 18 20
z
E_i oo ,," _ _.. .,
I 1 I I I I I
0 25 50 75 I00 125 150 175
Elapsed shifts
2/28-3/08 12 9 3 40 7.5 1 99
light configuration mode test__
Tet-mock-simulated launch .... 3/04-3/08 14 14 11 47. 5 3.5 1 11{
IOOO
500
200
c
J 400
o
'_ I
25
I
50
I
75
I
I00
I
125
I
150
__I
175 i
Elapsed shifts 300
3 4 5 6 7 8
Spacecraft
The number of workdays necessary to process a Gemini spacecraft at the launch complex can be
established using the following formula:
7.0
Figure 24-8 is a plot of a, f_, and _ for space-
craft 3 through 7. These curves are the
60
important factors used in predicting future
spacecraft performance and processing time, as
50
well as determining the present performance
Total work units
of a spacecraft being processed. 7"
4.0 Total shifts worked
If no radical changes occur in spacecraft
processing at the launch complex, the chart
3O o =
Non-test work units
would infer that the following can be expected Non - test mission
preparation sheets
on the average:
20
(a) For every testing work shift, 0.2 of a Testing shifts -P
troubleshooting shifts
troubleshooting shift can be expected. .a=
1.0 Testing shifts
(b) A nontest mission-preparation-sheet task
will require three work shifts to accomplish. i
0 I I I [ [ I I I I
(c) Approximately 5.75 tasks can be in 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I0
Spacecraft
progress concurrently.
These are, of course, estimates based on aver- FIOVR_ 24-8.--Spacecraft processing estimators.
3 ......................... 26 41 14 83 15 4
4 ......................... 41 31 29 97 0 g
5 ......................... 44 44 51 89 7 12
a Mission preparation sheets released but not com- b Mission preparation sheets not identified as testing,
pleted at the end of the spacecraft hoisting operation servicing, replacement, or manufacturing.
at the launch pad.
MISSION RESULTS
25. MAN'S RESPONSE TO LONG-DURATION FLIGHT IN THE
GEMINI SPACECRAFT
By CHARLES A. BERRY, M.D., Chie], Center Medical Programs, NASA Manned Spacecra/t Center; D. O.
COONS,M.D., Chie], Center Medical O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center; A. D. CATTERSON, M.D.,
Center Medical 01_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra/t Center; and G. FRED KELLY, M.D., Center Medical
O_ce, NASA Manned Spacecra/t Center
235
236 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
TABLE
25-I.-U.S. Manned Space Flights the time of the original selection of the astro-
nauts and which has been added to with each
Astronauts Launch dates Duration, exposure to the simulated space-flight environ-
hr :min ment during spacecraft testing. Physicians
and paramedical personnel have been trained to
Shepard_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ May 5,1961 00:15 become a part of medical recovery teams sta-
Grissom _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ July 21,1961 00: 15 tioned in the launch area and at probable re-
Glenn_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Feb. 20, 1962 4:56
covery points in the Atlantic and Pacific
Carpenter_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ May 24,1962 4:56
Schirra_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Oct. 3,1962 9 : 14 Oceans. Flight surgeons have been trained and
Cooper _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ May 15,1963 34:20 utilized as medical monitors at the various net-
work stations around the world, thus making
4:52 possible frequent analysis of the medical infor-
mation obtained in flight. A team of Depart-
ment of Defense physician-specialists has also
96:56
been utilized to assist in the detailed preflight
and postflight evaluations of the condition of
190:56 the flight crews. Without the dedicated help
of all of these personnel functioning as a team,
the conduct of these missions would not have
330 :35
been possible (fig. 25-1).
A high set of standards has been adhered to
25 :21 in selecting flight crews. This has paid off very
well in the safety record obtained thus far. The
difficult role that these flight crews must play,
i Denitrogenation
The 5-psia cabin pressure and the 3.7-psia
inflated suit pressure create the potential for
the development of dysbarism, and this was
particularly true on the 4-day mission which
involved extravehicular activity. Care has been
taken to denitrogenate t,he crews with open-loop
breathing of 100 percent oxygen for at least 2
FIQURE25-2.-B i o s e n s o r harness and s i g n a 1 hours prior t o launch. No difficulty has been
conditioners. experienced with this procedure.
238 GEMINI _IDPROGRA_I CONFERENCE
180 o Meon --
_ 160 ALow -----
_ ,40 D
- _ 120
-r..Q
Cope 60
doy- 40
_/,Lift .off .....
night 20
k_] I I I I I '1'""1 I 'i'"'I ] "1""1 I "1"'1 I 'i'"l I ""l' I t
sleep 0 4 16 32 48 64 80 96 112 128 144 160 176192
-I 0 I 5 5 7 9 II 15 15 17 19 21 25 25 ' Ground elapsed time, hr
(al Ground elapsed time, hr (a) LPrelounch
(a) From lift-off to 24 hours ground elapsed time. (a) From lift-off to 192 hours ground elapsed time.
FIGURE 2F_4.--Physiological measurements for Gemini FmURE 25-5.--Physiological measurements for Gemini
IV pilot. VII pilot.
24O GEMINI _IDPROGRA_ CONFERENCE
"c 120
_oo 8 I00
f_- --,,_ r j" /_- -r
//-:.._, /- r _ _,.. 80 so _
60 Cope ---- _ ----_ -_ _-_ _- 60 o°
m
40 doy- 40
night
""" """ """......... ' """" """ 20 20
sleep
I I I I I I I I I I 0 I t I 1 I I 1 I I I I L 0
192 208 224 240 256 272 288 504 320 336 352 192 208 224 240 256 272 288 304 320 336 352 368 384
(b ) From 19'2 to 352 hours ground elapsed time. (b) From 192 to 384 hours ground elapsed time.
mature auricular and ventricular contractions. with heart rate, as evidenced by the 901 over 90
The detailed analyses have shown no significant blood pressure obtained after retrofire during
changes in the duration of specific segments of one of the missions. This was accompanied by
the electrocardiogram which are not merely rate a 'heart rate of 160, however, and is felt to be
related. On each of the long-duration missions, entirely normal.
a special experiment has involved observation Some blood pressures of particular interest
of the relationship of the Q-wave to the onset of were those determined on the 4-day mission:
mechanical systole, as indicated by the phone- (1) just after retrofire and while the crew was
cardiogram. These data, in general, have re- still in zero g; (2) just before the transition to
vealed no prolongation of this interwfl with an two-point suspension on the main parachute,
increase in the duration of space flight. which places the crew at about a 45 ° back angle;
(3) just after the transition to two-point sus-
Blood Pressures
pension; and (4) with the spacecraft on the
water and the crew in a sitting position. All of
The blood pressure values were determined
three times in each 24 hours during the 4- and these pressures were in the same general range
8-day missions, and two times each 94 hours on as the inflight blood pressures and were all cer-
the 14-day mission. These determinations were tainly normal, demonstrating no evidence of
made before and after exercise on the medical hypotension.
Body Temperature
data passes. The only truly remarkable thing
in all blood pressures to date has been the nor- The oral thermistor was used with each medi-
malcy with a lack of significant increase or cal data pass, and all body temperatures re-
decrease with prolonged space flight (fig. 25-6 corded have been within the normal range.
(a) and (b)). The blood pressures have varied Occasional spurious readings were noted on the
oral thermistor when it got misplaced against
220
-- Pre - exercise the body, causing it to register.
2OO
..... Post-exercise
180
1" Respiratory Bales
E 160
E 140 Respiratory rates during all of the long-
120
duration missions have tended to vary normally
_ I00
calibrated exercise load has been noted through established for this sleep (fig. 25-7), and it
the 14-day flight. In addition to these pro- worked out very well with their normal sched-
gramed exercise response tests, the bungee cord ule. In addition, both crewmen slept at the
has been utilized for additional exercise peri- same time, thus obviating any arousal reactions
ods. Daily during the 14-day mission, the crew from the actions of the other crewmember. The
performed 10 minutes of exercise, including the beginning of the scheduled rest and sleep pe-
use of the bungee cord for both the arms and riod was altered to move it one-half hour earlier
the legs, and some isometric exercises. These each night during the mission in order to allow
10-minute periods preceded each of the three the crew to be up and active throughout the se-
eating periods. ries of passes across the southern United States.
Sleep
Neither crewman slept as soundly in orbit as he
did on the earth, and this inflight observation
i great deal of difficulty was encountered in
was confirmed in the postflight debriefing. The
obtaining satisfactory sleep periods on the
pilot seemed to fall asleep more easily and could
4-day mission. Even though the flight plan
sleep more restfully 'than the command pilot.
was modified during the mission in order to
The command pilot felt that it was unnatural
allow extra time for sleep, it was apparent post-
to sleep in a seated position, and he continued
flight that no long sleep period was obtained
to awaken spontaneously during his sleep period
by either crewman. The longest consecutive
and would monitor the cabin displays. He did
sleep period appeared to be 4 hours, and the
become increasingly fa'tigued over a period of
command pilot estimated that he did not get
several days, then would sleep soundly and start
more than 71/_ to 8 hours' good sleep in the
his cycle of light, intermittent sleep to the point
entire 4 days. Factors contributing to this lack
of fatigue all over again. The cabin was kept
of sleep included: (1) the firing of the thrust-
quite comfortable during 'the sleep periods by
ers by the pilot who was awake; (2) the commu-
the use of the Polaroid screen and some foil
nications contacts, because the communications
from the food packs on the windows. The noise
could not be completely turned off; and (3) the
of the pneumatic pressure cuff for Experiment
requirements of housekeeping and observing,
M-1 did interfere with sleep on both the 8- and
which made it difficult to settle down to sleep.
14-day missions. The crew of the 4-day flight
Also the responsibility felt by the crew tended
were markedly fatigued following the mission.
to interfere with adequate sleep.
The 8-day crew were less so, and the 14-day crew
An attempt was made to remove a few of
the least fatigued of all. The 14-day crew did
these variables on the 8-day mission and to pro-
feel there was some irritability and loss of pa-
gram the sleep periods in conjunction with nor-
tience daring the last 2 days of the mission, but
mal nighttime at Cape Kennedy. This re-
they continued to be alert and sharp in their
quired the command pilot to sleep from 6 p.m.
responses, and no evidence of performance
until midnight eastern standard time, and the
decrement was noted.
pilot to sleep from midnight until 6 a.m., each
getting a 2-hour nap during the day. This
I00 - Cumulative Incremental
program did not work out well due to flight-
90 --o --Command pilot
plan activities and the fact that the crew tended 80 .... _ ..............
Pilot
to retain their Cape Kennedy work-rest cycles
7o I.,>
with both crewmen falling asleep during the
E_ 60
midnight to 6 a.m. Cape Kennedy nighttime
period. The 8-day crew also commented that 8_ 50
the spacecraft was so quiet that any communi-
30 _ "" "
cation or noise, such as removing items attached
S f 40 /
with Velcro, produced an arousal reaction.
On the 14-day flight, the flight plan was
_2 L I
0 _
designed to allow the crew to sleep during hours I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I0 II 12 13 14 15
Cape Kennedy. There was a 10-hour period FIGURE 25-7.--Sieep data for Gemini VII flight crew.
242 GE_IINI :b_mPROGRA:N£ CON'FEREI_CE
s&-
off periods*
Command
pilot suit-
o f f periods+-+
4 - -- flight. The system creates only a minimum
amount of difficulty during inflight use and is
an adequate method for the present missions.
On the 14-day flight, the system worked very
well and allowed the collection of all of the fecal
specimens for use with the calcium-balance
experiment.
Bowel habits have varied on each of the
three long-duration missions, as might be ex-
pected. Figure 25-11 lists the defecations re-
corded for these three missions, and the longest
inflight delay before defecation occurred was 6
- I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 IO II 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 days on the 14-day mission. The opportunity
s 1 1 1
Days, midnight to midnight (e.s.t.1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 to measure urine volume on the 14-day flight
0 48 96 144 192 240 288 336
Ground elapsed time, hr
has been of particular interest, as it had been
anticipated a diuresis would occur early in the
FIGWE2&8.-Water intake per day for Gemini VI1 flight. Figure 25-12 shows the number of uri-
flight crew.
nations per day and the urine volume as deter-
mined from the flowmeter utilized on the 14-day
mission. The accuracy of these data will be
compared with that from the tritium samples.
FIGURE
25-9.-Urine collection device.
Medications
Item Quantity
On the 14-day mission, a medical accessory connected with the program had done every-
kit, shown in figure 25-14, was carried to allow thing possible to assure their stay. There is
the reapplication of medical sensors should they some normal increased tension at lift-off and
be lost during the flight. The kit contained the also prior to retrorocket firing. There was
sensor jelly, and the Stomaseal and Dermaseal some normal psychological letdown when the
tape for sensor application. I n addition, the Gemini VI1 crew saw the Gemini VI-A space-
kit contained small plastic bottles filled with a craft depart after their rendezvous. However,
skin lotion, which was a first-aid cream. Dur-
the Gemini VI1 crew accepted this very well
ing the 14-day mission, this cream was used by
and immediately adjusted to the flight-plan
both crewmen to relieve the dryness of the nasal
mucous membranes and was used occasionally activity.
on certain areas of the skin. During the mis- A word should be said about overall crew per-
sion, the lower sternal electrocardiogram sensor formance from a medical point of view. The
was replaced by both crewmen, and excellent crews have performed in an exemplary manner
data were obtained after replacement. during all flights. There has been no noted
decrease in performance, and the fine control
Psychology of Flight tasks such as reentry and, notably, the 11th-day
Frequent questions are asked concerning the rendezvous during the Gemini V I 1 mission have
ability of the crewmembers to get along with been handled with excellent skill.
one another for the long flight, periods. Every
effort is made t o choose crewmembers who are Additional Inflight Observations of
compatible, but it is truly remarkable that none Medical Importance
of the crews, including the long-duration crews, The crews have always been busy with flight-
have had any inflight psychological difficulties
plan activity and have felt that their days were
that were evident to the ground monitors or that
complete and full. The 14-day crew carried
were discussed in postflight debriefings. They
have had some normal concerns for the inherent some books, occasionally read them in the pre-
risks of space flight. They were well prepared sleep period, and felt they were of value.
for the fact that 4, 8, and 14 days in space in Neither crewman completed a book. Music
such a confined environment as the Gemini was provided over the high-frequency air-to-
spacecraft would not be an easy task. They ground communications link to both the 8-day
had trained well, done everything humanly pos- and the 14-day crews. They found this to be a
sible for themselves, and knew that everyone welcome innovation in their flight-plan activity.
246 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
The crews have described a sensation of full- of retrofire and reentry. All the crews felt that
ness in the head that occurred during the first they were experiencing several g when the g-
24 hours of the mission and then gradually dis- meter was just beginning to register at reentry.
appeared. This feeling is similar to the in- However, when they reached the peak g-load,
crease of blood a person notes when hanging on their sensations did not differ from their cen-
parallel bars or when standing on his head. trifuge experience.
There was no pulsatile sensation in the head
Physical Examination
and no obvious reddening of the skin. The
exact cause of this condition is unknown, but it
A series of physical examinations have been
may be related to an increase of blood in the accomplished before each flight in order to de-
chest area as a result of the readjustment of the termine the crewmemhers' readiness for mission
circulation to the weightless state. participation, and also after each flight to eval-
It should be emphasized that no crewmembers
uate any possible changes in their physical con-
have had disorientation of any sort on any
dition. These examinations normally have been
Gemini mission. The crews have adjusted very accomplished 8 to 10 days before launch, 2 days
easily to the weightless environment and ac- before launch, on launch morning, and immedi-
cepted readily the fact that objects will stay in ately after the flight and have been concluded
position in midair or will float. There has with daily observations for 5 to 10 days after
been no difficulty in reaching various switches
recovery. These examinations thoroughly sur-
or other items in the spacecraft. They have
veyed the various body systems. With the ex-
moved their heads at will and have never noticed
ception of items noted in this report, there have
an aberrant sensation. They have ahvays been
been no significant wlriations from the normal
oriented to the interior of the spacecraft and
preflight baselines. The 14-day crew noted a
can orient themselves with relationship to the
heavy feeling in the arms and legs for several
earth by rolling the spacecraft and finding the hours after recovery, and they related this to
horizon through the window. During the ex- their return to a 1-g environment, at which time
travehicular operation, the Gemini IV pilot
their limbs became sensitive to weight. In the
oriented himself only by his relationship to the
zero-g condition, the crew had been aware of
spacecraft during all of the maneuvers. He
the ease in reaching switches and controls due
looked repeatedly at the sky and at the earth
to the lack of weight of the arms. The 8-day
and had no sensations of disorientation or mo-
crew also reported some heaviness in the legs
tion sickness at any time. The venting of hy- for several hours after landing. Both the 8-day
drogen on the 8-day fight created some roll and 14-day crews reported some muscle stiffness
rates of the spacecraft that became of such mag-
lasting for several days after recovery. This
nitude that the crew preferred to cover the
was particularly noted in the legs and was sim-
windows to stop the visual irritation of the roll-
ilar to the type of stiffness resulting from ini-
ing horizon. Covering the windows allowed
tial athletic activity after a long period of
them to wait for a longer period of time before
inactivity.
having to damp the rates with thruster activity. On all missions there has been minimum skin
At no time did they experience any disorienta-
reaction surrounding sensor sites, and this local
tion. During the 14-day flight, the crew re-
irritation has cleared rapidly. There have been
peatedly moved their heads in various directions
a few small inclusion cysts near the sternal sen-
in order Co try to create disorientation but to no
sors. In preparing for the 8-(lay flight the crews
avail. They also had tumble rates of 7 ° to 8 °
bathed daily with hexachlorophene for approx-
per second created by venting from the water
imately 10 days before the flight. In addition,
boiler, and one time they performed a spin-dry
the underwear was washed thoroughly in hex-
maneuver to empty the water boiler, and this
created roll rates of 10 ° per second. On both achlorophene, and attempts were made to keep
occasions they moved their heads freely and had it relatively free of bacteria until donning. The
no sensation of disorientation. 14-day crew showered daily with a standard
The crews of all three long-duration missions hexachlorophene-containing so'lp and also used
have noted an increased g-sensitivity at the time Selsun shampoos for a 2-week period. Follow-
:_IAN'S RESPONSE TO LONG-DURATI01_ FLIGHT I1_ THE GE_IINI SPACECRAFT 247
ing the 8-day and 14-day missions, the crew- they found it necessary to clear their ears fre-
members' skin was in excellent condition. The quently in inflight. Some of this nasal and
8-day flight crewmembers did have some dry- pharyngeal congestion has been noted in the
ness and scaling on the extremities and over long-duration space cabin simulator runs in a
the sensor sites, but, after using a skin lotion similar environment. It may be related to dry-
for several days, the condition cleared rapidly. ness, although the cabin humidity would not in-
The 14-day crewmembers' skin did not have any dicate this to be the case, or another cause might
dryness and required no treatment postflight. be the pure oxygen atmosphere in the cabin. It
After their flight, the 8-day crew had some may also be related to a possible change in blood
marked dandruff and seborrheic lesions of the supply to the head and thorax as a result of cir-
scalp which required treatment with Selsun for culatory adaptation to weightlessness.
a period of time. The 14-day crew had virtu- The oral hygiene of the crewmembers has
ally no dandruff in the postflight examination, been checked closely before each flight and has
nor was it a problem during flight. been maintained inflight by the use of a dry
The crew of the 14-day mission wore new toothbrush and a chewable dental gum. This
lightweight space suits and, in addition, re- technique provided excellent oral hygiene
moved them for a portion of the flight. While through the 14-day flight.
significant physiological differences between the
Weight
suited and unsuited crewman were difficult to
determine, it was noted that the unsuited crew- A postflight weight loss has been noted for
man exercised more vigorously, slept better, and each of the crewmembers; however, it has not
had higher urine output because fluid was not increased with mission duration and has varied
being lost as perspiration. The excellent gen- from 2.5 to 10 pounds. The majority of the
eral condition of the crewmembers, particularly loss has been replaced with fluid intake within
their skin condition, is to a large extent attrib- the first 10 to 12 hours after landing. Table
utable to the unsuited operations. 25-V shows the weight loss and postflight gain
Bacterial cultures were taken from each recorded for the crewmen of the long-duration
crewmember's throat and from several skin flights.
areas before and after the long-duration mis-
sions. The numbers of bacteria in the throat TABLE 25-V.--Astronaut Weight Loss
flora were reduced, and there was an increase in
the fecal flora in the perineal areas. All fungal Command Pilot weight
Gemini mission pilot weight loss, lb
studies were negative. These revealed no sig- loss, lb
nificant difference in the complexity of the mi-
croflora. No significant transfer of organisms
III ..................... 3 3.5
between crewmembers has been noted, and there IV ..................... 4.5 8.5
has been no "locking in" of floral patterns V ...................... 7.5 8.5
v)
25-VII. The significant changes noted will be
m_ I 0,000
discussed in the experiments report.
Blood Volume
5,000
30,000
of these results are summarized in figure 25-16.
Percent of total
It can be concluded that the decrease in red-cell
] count as
neutrophiles mass is not incremental with increased exposure
25,000
to the space-flight environment. On the 14-day
$ flight, the maintenance of total blood volume,
7=
20,000 by increasing plasma volume, and the weight
loss noted indicated that some fluid loss occurred
= 15,000 in the extracellular compartment but that the
loss had been replaced by fluid intake after the
flight. The detailed explanation of the de-
m_ I0,000
creased mass is unknown at the present time,
and several factors, including the atmosphere,
may be involved. This loss of red cells has not
5,000 interfered with normal function and is gen-
0
Pre R*2 R*8 Pre R÷2 R*8 Pre R*2 R+9 erally equivalent to the blood withdrawn in a
(a) Gemini T_T Gemini _ Gemini 3Z]I blood-bank donation, but the decrease occurs
over a longer period of time, and this allows
(a) Command pilots.
I I I ' '_
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
, _ , , ,
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
I : : I le_ I :
i..... !i i i oo i : _ I
: , }
¢o
cO
: i
O_
I.
' I
d a
m
r_ o0 ¢o
o_
, , , , _ , , , ,
, , , , ,
e_
250 GEMINI 1vImPROGRAI_I CO2ffFERENCE
Preflight Postflight
Tilt Studies
landing operation. Abnormal tilt-table re-
The first abnormal finding noted following sponses, when compared with the preflight
baseline tilts, have been noted for a period of
manned space flight was the postflight ortho-
static hypotension observed on the last two
Total
Mercury missions• Study of this phenomenon
blood Plasma Red cell
there
calf.
were no symptoms
On the 4-day, 8-day,
-20
I -44
140
Pre-tilt Tilt to 70 ° ;t-tilt Pre-tilt Tilt to 70 °
._S
Post-tilt
$ Izo
"c
7
o
E 80
E
EL 6O
I I I
4O 15 0 5
5 0 5 I0 15 0 5 0 5 0 5 I0
Prefllghl Postflight
(a) Elapsed time, min
4O
, ,1, I I I I I
0 5 0 5 IO 150 5 0 50 5 I0 15 0 5
(b) Elapsed time of postflight tilt studies,min
\
\
__J 1 I I I I I I I
4O
5 0 5 I0 150 5 0 50 5 I0 150 5
(al
Preflight tilt studies Postflight tilt studies
Elapsed time, min
__] I II I
0 5 0 5 I0 150 5 0 5 0 5 I0
(b) Elapsed time of postflight tilt studies,min
_T50 I
_140 Blood pressure
o Heart rate
:_100
E
E 90
ff 8o
3
_' 7O
&
60 ^
,go
N 5O
4O
0 5 0 5 10 15 0 5 0 5 0 5 IO 15 0 5 0 50 5 10 15 0 5
(C' Elapsed time of preflight tilt studies, min
(a) Preflight.
FIGURE25-20.--Tilt-table studies of Gemini V command pilot.
140 -
130 -
x: 120 -
_110 I
.90I w
i -
_. 70
I' ---Heart rate
60-
o --Blood pressure
D3
50-
m_Pulse pressure
40 --I I I I I I I
0 50 5 I0 15 0 5 0 5 0 5 I0 150 5 0 5 0 5 10 15 0 5
(b) Elapsed time of postflight tilt studies,.min
(b) Postflight.
FIeURZ 25-20.--Concluded.
MAN_S RESPONSE TO LONG-DURATION FLIGHT IN THE GEMINI SPACECRAI_ _55
J
O 5 0 5 I0 15 O 5 O 5 0 5 10 15 0 5 O 50 5 IO 15 O 5
(a) Elapsed time of preflight tilt studies, rain
(a) Preflight.
FZGURE25-21.--Tilt-table studies of Gemini V pilot.
/ _t v v \
Post-tilt
--Blood pressure
ImPulse pressure
I Jl I l IJl 1 I I I
5 0 5 IO 15 O 5 0 5 0 5 I0 150 5 O 50 5 IO 15 0 5
--
_l
Heart rate
Blood
Pulse
pressure
pressure
I Pre-tilt Tilt to 70 ° Post-tilt
i
0 5 0 5 I0 15 0 5 0 5 0 5 I0 15 0 5 0 5 o 5 I0 15 0 5
Elapsed time of pastfllght tilt studies,rain
(c) Studies conducted at 48, 73, and 104 hours after landing.
FTOURE 25--21.---Concluded.
160
o Command pilot Ist tilt
"---°_40L _ / Y
Lm?J" J
I I I I I I L I I i I I I I I I
0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 IO II 12 13 14 15
Missian duration, days
5 0 5 I0 15 0 5 0 5 0 5 I0 150
(a} Elapsed time of postflight tilt studies, rain
(a) Preflight.
FzegaE 25--23.--Tilt-table studies of Gemini VII command pilot.
I
I
FJ
I I I t L I I I
0 5 0 5 I0 15 0 5 0 5 0 5 I0 15 5
(b) Elapsed time of postflight tilt studies, mJn
.E
E 140
_13o Post-tilt
120
o I00
I
9O
E
E
- 80
_, 7O
4O I I I i l I I
5 0 5 I0 15 0 5 0 5 0 5 I0 15 0 5
(C) Elapsed time of postflight tilt studies, r_in
150
140
in
150
120
.z=
o =oo
I
E 90
E
v /
g BO
G, 70
J --Blood pressure
5O
IPulse pressure
I I J I II
4O 1 I/I I 1 I I
0 5 0 5 I0 150 5 0 5 0 5 IO 15 0 5
(a) Preflight.
I0 \
1,0 I
I
_0 I
_0 I
'O
;0
,0
.0
,0 .... Heart rote
--Blood pressure
0 Pulse pressure Procedure
0 discontinued
I I i
0 5 0 5
I L I I L. I I I I I I I
I0 15 0 5 0 5 0 5 I0 15 5
(b) Elapsed time of postflight tilt studies, rain
__J
5 0 I0 15 0 5 0 5 0 5 I0 15 0
(c) Elapsed time of postflight tilt studies,min
5O H entire mission
FI
-- h cuffs _--
t
] I ____ I
5 O 5 I0 15 0
Elapsed time of postflight tilt study, min
be stated with certainty that all crewmen have TABLE 25-IX.--Radiation Dosage on Gemini
performed in an outstanding manner and have Long-Duration Missions
adjusted both psychologically and physiologi-
[In millirads]
cally to the zero-g environment and then read-
justed to a 1-g environment with no undue
Mission Command pilot Pilot
symptomatology being noted. Some of the
findings noted do require further study, but it
Gemini IV a_ ....... 38.5± 4.5 42.5± 4.7
is felt that the experience gained through the 40.0± 4.2 45.7± 4.6
14-day Gemini VII mission provides great con- 42.5± 4.5 42.5± 4.5
fidence in any crewman's ability to complete an 45.0± 4.5 69.3± 3.8
Gemini V s_ ........ 190 =t=19 140 ± 14
8-day lunar mission without any unforeseen
173 ± 17. 3 172 ± 17. 2
psychological or physiological change. It also 183 ± 18. 3 186 ± 18. 6
appears that man's responses can be projected 195 ± 19. 5 172 ± 17. 2
into the future to allow 30-day exposures in Gemini VII b........ 178 ± 10 98. 8±10
105 ± 10 215 -4- 15
larger spacecraft. The predictions thus far
163 ± 10 151 ± 10
have been valid. Our outlook to the future is
extremely optimistic, and man has shown his
Values are listed in sequence: left chest, right
capability to fulfill a role as a vital, functional
chest, thigh, and helmet.
part of the spacecraft as he explores the uni- b Values are listed in sequence: left chest, right
verse. chest, and thigh.
26. DATA ANALYSIS AND REPORTING
By SCOTT H. SIMPKINSON, Manager, O_ce of Test Operations, Gemini Program Oj]ice, NASA Manned
Spacecra/t Center; VICTOR P. NESHYBA, Gemini Program O_ice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center;
and J. DON ST. CLam, Gemini Program O_ice, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center
tion of compression methods for the presenta- Real time ............... 51 200 bits
263
218-556 0--60------18
264 GEl_INI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
target vehicle contractor, the Air Force, and The percentage of flight data processed for post-
NASA--should closely monitor the flight by flight evaluation was substantially decreased
using the real-time information facilities in the after the first manned, three-orbit flight.
Mission Control Center at Houston and the fa-
Reduction Operations
cility at the Kennedy Space Center. This close
monitoring of engineering data would permit Even with the reduced percentage of flight
the selection of only those segments of the mis- data processed, the magnitude of the task can-
sion data necessary to augment or to verify the not be discounted. Table 26-IV shows the
real-time information for postflight evaluation. data processing accomplished in support of the
All the data for periods of high activity cover- postflight evaluation of the 8-day Gemini • V
ing dynamic conditions such as launch, rendez- • mission. More th_'m 165 different data books
vous, and reentry would be reduced and ana- were produced in support of the evaluation
lyzed. Any further data reduction would be team. For this mission, the Central Metric
accomplished on an as-required basis. The out- Data file at the Manned Spacecraft Center re-
come of these plans is shown in table 26-III. ceived 4583 data items.
Computer-processed data
Kennedy Space
Mission Center
Manned Spacecraft McDonnell Aircraft Air Force
Center Corp.
Gemini I .......... Backup, spacecraft Prime, spacecraft Launch vehicle Quick-look oscillo-
graphs, spacecraft
and launch vehicle
Gemini II___ Prime, spacecraft BaCkup, spacecraft Launch vehicle Quick-look oscillo-
graphs, spacecraft
and launch vehicle
Gemini III through Launch and orbit, Reentry, spacecraft Launch vehicle Quick-look computer
Gemini VII spacecraft plots :
Launch
Real-time, space-
craft
Delayed-time,
spacecraft
(Cape Kennedy
passes)
Very few data reduction centers have grown specified time interval along with the maximum
as fast as the one at the Manned Spacecraft and minimum values during the interval or
Center. Just 4 years ago this Center was only presentation of only data that go beyond a pre-
a field of grass, and, today, combining the Mis- determined value of sigma. Also possible is
sion Control Center and the Computation and the presentation of only the data falling outside
Analysis Division computer complexes, it a predetermined band having a variable mean
houses one of the largest data processing and as a function of time or as a function of other
display capabilities in the world. Figure 26-1 measured or predetermined values. Smooth-
shows a floor plan and some of the major de- ing and wild-point editing may also be applied
vices employed for data processing in the Com- in a judicious manner. An example might be
putation and Analysis Building. the presentation of all valid points of the fuel-
It became very clear during the evaluation cell voltage-current curve falling outside a pre-
of the first three flights that it would be impos- determined band. This involves bus voltage
sible to plot or tab all of the selected data from multiplied by the sum of the stack currents in
the longer duration flights. Computers can a section along a predetermined degradation
look at volumes of data in seconds, but they re- curve for given values of total section current.
quire many hours to print data in a usable form. Systems evaluation during the flight for se-
Many more tedious hours are required to man- lection of requirements, combined with com-
ually scan the data for meaningful information. pression methods for data processing, made pos-
Recognizing these facts, the data processing sible the processing of the mass of recorded data
programs were revised to include compression for support of the mission evaluation team on
methods of the presented data. These methods a schedule consistent with the Gemini Program
include presentation of the mean value over a requirements.
145' ,I
Memory words
CDC 5200 computer
r-7 2.3x I05 core
V--7 I
and disk
r7
1'!
UNIVAC [] 15,000 lines/min
]1 2.3X107 drum
1107 print/plot
computer
'---1 38 digital tape
D
transports
In-house backup
(not shown)
D!I
I l- UNIVAC IlOS
CDC 5800 computer I-2-IBM
CDC :3600
IBM 7044/7094 7094
r--1 t transports
I
I
I ground
Telemetry _
II
II
Tape copying focilies
I station
II I0 record/playback units
:D[]Z]
I F-7
II
II
HIE]
I JL--
Plan, which documented the procedures for but are released as soon as their report section
mission evaluation and outlined the format of is approved. The sequence of reporting is
Evaluation Team
Manager
MSC/GPO
I
I I
I
Editorial Staff Head I Data Support Group Head
MSCIGPO ] MSCIGPO
I
Vehicle
Senior Editor
' I'
Description
MSC/GPO
I
Spacecraft
Senior Editor
Performance
MSC/GPO
I
LI11'I Senior
Crew
Editor
I
Performance
MSC/FCOD I Senior Editor
I
MSC/EXPO
Experiments
Aeromedica I Performance
I Mission
Senior Editor Description
MSC/FOD Managing Editor MSC/GPO Performance Senior Editor MSC/CMO
_..J Launch and Target Vehicle Mission Support I
Senior Editor MSC/FOD
_] Gemini Editor
Senior Launch AFSS
Vehicle D
_] Senior
Target Editor
Launch MSC/GPO
Vehicle
__ Target Vehicle
Operations During the Mission Report Development During the Postmission Period
Team operations during tile mission have One of the most important evaluation func-
been modified as requirements for change have tions for the team is 'to obtain the observations
become obvious with experience. Initially, of the flight crew and to discuss performance
team members had no evaluation-team function characteristics with them. This must be accom-
to perform during the mission. However, as the plished quickly and effectively, and a high de-
missions became more complex, a requirement gree of organization is required. As soon as
for mission monitoring became evident. Team possible after the mission ends, the onboard
members had to follow the mission closely in flight log is microfilmed and sent to the Manned
order to optimize and expedite the evaluation. Spacecraft Center where it is reproduced and
The experience gained on longer flights indi- copies distributed to team members. Voice
cated a need for system specialists to act as transcriptions of recorded onboard and air-to-
consultants to 'the flight controllers.. Again, the ground conversations are expedited and dissemi-
personnel who were most capable of providing nated. A schedule for debriefing of the flight
this support were those who were instrumental crew is approved in advance of the mission and
in the design, test, or operation of the systems. rigidly followed. Table 26-VI shows a typical
A large number of these personnel had been schedule for debriefing the flight crew at the
working on the evaluation team, and the two end of a mission.
functions were consolidated. During the mis- Within a period of 9 weeks, each mission re-
sion, this flight monitoring and evaluation effort port author must accouiplish the following
is continuously provided to the flight director. tasks: examine all necessary data; define data
The consultant-team concept has proved to be reduction requirenlents; read technical debrief-
very effective and has been used many times ing; read air-ground and onboard voice tran-
ill support of the flights. Working around the scripts; read crew flight log; attend systems de-
unexpected drop in fuel-cell oxygen supply briefing; correlate findings with other team
pressure on Gemini V and restoring the delayed- members; submit special test requests for failure
time telemetry recorder to operational status on analysis; and prepare report section. Evalua-
the same flight are examples of this support. tion cutoff dates are assigned and firmly adhered
268 GEMINI _IDPROGRA/_ CONFEREI_CE
_)
TABLE
26-VI.--GeminiTypical Postflight Crew Special test Data Documented
made
Management and project debriefing-_ 5
Technical debriefing, photograph (b) Postflight activities.
identification ................... 6 FIGURE 26-3.--Concluded.
_'o tatZ_e ana3.yze _ _ape I(ecorder to aeteraCne c_e of poor qaalltx delayea.
The evaluation required to formulate and im- t_ data _=pl d_lr_ at_alon.
etry tape dump during revolution/-- 30, poor qual- 2. If anL14_l= c_ot be completed at Ncn_ll-St. _ut=, recorder ahall be
lent to Xaalo Corpo=att_ of Siertca in C_en, N_ Jersey, tar ccm_letl_
ity data were received by the worldwide network of Iml.k_le.
stations. As a result of mission evaluation team 3. _er I_Lll be =ent to _ e_nde_ Storage am_y_n
St'tZ_al"' m.Jo_l
0k:Do_eZl pZLnt) Lrter ccHplett_ at falZ_e • a.
anomaly _ action _ to unused _ operation Gove_nt _onded Stor_e, N_e_, st. I_ual, Kta8o_
Re¢_
Analysis by Corrective Continued Preliminary
formulated o$
cility for additional tests to determine the cause cal for all missions. Despite the rapidity with
of the flaking. It was discovered that the flak- which the report is completed_ the formalized
ing was caused by an epoxy having been inad- content and presentation format_ implemented
vertently splashed on one of the rollers during by a well coordinated and motivated team_ has
the final record/playback head-alinement pro- resulted in a series of mission evaluation reports
cedure. This epoxy had softened the binder which are thorough and timely.
used to adhere the iron oxide to the tape base_ The completion of the mission evaluation
and the iron oxide had peeled away from the within a time frame compatible with the rela-
tape. The vendor duplicated the failure mode_ tively short interval between missions is a no-
and the results of the tests and the recommended table accomplishment. A concentrated effort by
corrective action were submitted in a failure the most knowledgeable specialists has been ex-
analysis report to the spacecraft contractor. pended to reveal all anomalies_ to find their
As a reply to the NASA Spacecraft Test Re- cause_ and to formulate corrective action in a
quest_ the contractor reported the findings and timely manner. The evaluation is not con-
the corrective action to be taken. sidered complete_ however_ until all the facts
Figure 26-5 is the actual schedule of work and figures from each mission have been thor-
for the Gemini V mission evaluation and is typi- oughly documented for future reference.
EOM
LO+
Report sections
_AYOF WK
1.0 Mission Summary
2.0 Introduction
Vehicle Interface
8.0 Experiments
9.0 Conclusions
I0.0 Recommendations
I I.C References
12.C Appendix A
15.0 Distribution
Final typing
By VIRGIL I. GmSSOM, Astronaut, Astronaut OJ_ce, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; JAMES A. McDIVITT,
Astronaut, Astronaut O_ice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; L. GORDON COOPER, JR., Astronaut,
Astronaut O_ice, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; WALTER M. SCHIRRA, Astronaut, Astronaut 01lice,
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; and FRANK BORMAN, Astronaut, Astronaut O_ice, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center
271
272 GE_IINI _IDPROGRAIE[ CONFERENCE
during this period. A typical example of one The second stage of the launch vehicle ignites
of the heavy prelaunch activities was the prepa- prior to separation from _he first stage. This
ration for the medical experiment M-7 by the causes the flame pattern to be deflected and
Gemini VII flight crew. The preparation in- apparently to engulf the second stage and the
volved a rigid diet, complete collection of all spacecraft. The crew of Gemini VI-A indi-
body wastes, and two controlled distilled-water cated that the flame left a residue on the exte-
baths each day. The diet went well; the food rior of the window, and every crew has reported
was well prepared and tasty; however, the col- a thin film on the outside of the window. The
lection of body wastes was difficult to integrate pilot of Gemini VI-A noted that a string of
with other activities, because the waste could cumulus clouds was very white and clear prior
only be collected at the places most frequented to staging and that the clouds were less white
by the flight crew, such as the launch complex, and clear afterward, indicating that the port
the simulator, and the crew quarters. Fortu- window obscuration could have occurred during
nately, the fine cooperation of the M-7 experi- staging.
menters resulted in a minimum number of The horizon is in full view during second-
problems. stage flight while the radio guidance system is
Even though some of the flight crews, espe- guiding the launch vehicle. Each correction
cially the Gemini V crew, had a comparatively that the guidance system initiates can be readily
limited time to prepare for their missions, observed by the crew. It would appear that,
they were well trained in all phases and were given proper displays and an automatic veloc-
ready to fly on launch day. ity cutoff, the crew could control the launch
During the prelauneh period, the backup crew vehicle into a satisfactory orbit.
is used extensively in the checkout of the space- Second-stage engine cutoff is a crisp event.
craft, and, at the same time, this crew must pre- The g-level suddenly drops from approximately
pare to fly the mission. But their prime re- 7 to zero, and in no case has any tail-off been
sponsibility, by far, is spacecraft testing and felt by the crews.
monitoring. The powered-flight phase has been closely
Powered Flight duplicated on the dynamic crew procedures
simulator trainer at the Manned Spacecraft
All fight crews have reported lift-off as being Center. After the first flight, the vibration
very smooth. The Gemini VI-A crew indi- level and the sounds were changed to correspond
cated that they could tell the exact moment of with what the pilots actually heard during
lift-off by the change in engine noise and vibra- launch. The simulation has such fidelity that
tion, and all crews agree that vertical motion there should be no surprises for the crew during
is readily apparent within seconds of lift-off.
any portion of powered flight.
Even without clouds as a reference, it is easy to
determine when the launch-vehicle roll program Orbit Insertion
starts and ends.
The insertion into orbit has been nominal for
The noise level is quite low at lift-off, increas-
ing in intensity until sonic speed is reached. At every flight. The separation and turnaround
that time, it becomes very quiet and remains of the spacecraft and the operation of the
quiet throughout the remainder of powered onboard computer have been as planned.
flight. At spacecraft separation and during turn-
With one exception, the launch has been free around, there is quite a bit of debris floating
from any objectionable vibration. On the all around the spacecraft. Some of these small
Gemini V flight, longitudinal oscillations, or pieces stay in the vicinity for several minutes.
POGO, were encountered. The crew indicated During insertion, the aft-firing thrusters can-
that the vibration level was severe enough to not be heard, but the acceleration can be felt.
interfere with their ability to read the instru- The firing of the attitude and translation thrust-
ment panel. However, POGO lasted only a ers can be heard, and the movement of the space-
few seconds and occurred at a noncritical time. craft is readily apparent.
ASTRONAUTS' REACTIONS TO FLIGHT "273
task is not required. It is better than drifting pressurized suit outside the spacecraft and can
flight because it controls the spacecraft through use a maneuvering unit to move from one point
a wide dead band in pitch and roll, although it to another. The maneuvering unit used short
has no control of yaw. Drifting flight is per- bursts of pulse mode. During extravehicular
fectly acceptable for long periods of time, as activity, the pilot used the spacecraft as a
long as the tumbling rates do not become exces- visual, three-dimension orientation reference.
sive (5 ° per second or more). Spacecraft con- At no time did the pilot experience disorienta-
trol with the reentry control system is very tion. The pilot made general observations and
similar to that of the orbital attitude and ma- investigated tether dynamics. Control with the
neuver system. Slightly more authority is tether was marginal, but it was easy to return
available with the orbital attitude and maneu- to the hatch area using the tether. When the
pilot pushed away, the spacecraft ])itched down
ver system than with both rings of the reentry
at rates of 2 ° per second from the resultant
control system. This results in some tendency
force, and the pilot moved perpendicular to the
to overcontrol and waste fuel. Actually the one-
surface of the spacecraft. It was difficult to
ring reentry control system operation is satis-
push away from the surface of the spacecraft
factory for most tasks. All pilots used both
at an angle. After the pilot had reentered the
rings for retrofire, but some used only one ring spacecraft, the hatch was to be closed, but the
for reentry. The reentry rate-command mode latch handle malfunctioned. However, the
has not been used by any crew except that of pilot had been trained thoroughly in both the
Gemini IV. The automatic reentry mode also normal and failure modes of the hatch and was
has not been employed. able to close it successfully.
274 GEI_IINI _IDPROGRA_ CONFEREI_CE
to remove his hood because it interfered with whip to the crew. After the Gemini III flight,
his vision of the horizon. all crews have been prepared, and there have
been no problems.
Landing and Reentry The impact of landing has varied from a very
soft impact to a heavy shock. The amount of
The drogue parachute is normally deployed at
50 000 feet to stabilize the spacecraft prior to spacecraft swing, and at what point during the
s_intz the landing occurs, changes the landing
main parachute deployment. After deploy-
loads. The amount of wind drift, the size of
ment, the spacecraft appears to oscillate about
20 ° to 30 ° on each side. The onboard record- the waves, and the part of the wave contacted
also vary the load. Even the hardest of the
ings indicated that these oscillations have never
exceeded -+ 10% landings has not affected crew performance.
By EDGARC. LINEBERRY, Mission Planning Analysis Division, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center
This paper discusses the mission planning ef- Prior to the selection of the Gemini VI-A
fort for the Gemini VI-A mission which ap- mission plan, three significantly different plans
plied directly to rendezvous. Included are a (fig. 28-1) were analyzed to the extent necessary
discussion of the basic design criteria and a brief to permit a realistic choice consistent with the
history of the considerations which led to the desired flexibility criteria. The first of these
selection of the particular Gemini VI-A mis- was the tangential mission plan. The salient
sion plan. A comparison between the nominal feature of this plan was a final tangential ap-
and actual flight trajectories is also presented. proach to the target vehicle, preceded by several
orbits during which midcourse maneuvers
Introduction
would be commanded from the ground. The
The basic Gemini VI-A mission design cri- last maneuver in the ground-controlled sequence
teria were, in effect, quite simple. Considera- would be designed to place the spacecraft on an
tion was given almost exclusively to the develop- intercept trajectory. The onboard system
ment of a plan which would provide the highest would be utilized to correct this final trajectory
probability of mission success. The desire was to effect rendezvous. The second plan investi-
to develop a plan which could routinely depart gated the coelliptic plan, utilized the same mid-
from the nominal in response both to trajectory course-maneuver sequence as the tangential
dispersions and to spacecraft systems degrada- plan, except that the final maneuver in the
tion, while minimizing dispersed conditions ground-con.trolled sequence would be designeM
going into the terminal phase of rendezvous. to place the sp_ecraft in an orbit with a con-
More specifically, the plan would provide flexi- stant differential altitude below the target orbit.
bility without introducing undue complexity; The onboard system in this plan would be uti-
that is, the flight controllers would have the lized to establish an intercept trajectory depart-
capability, in the event of dispersed conditions, ing from the coelliptic orbit. The third plan
to select alternate maneuver sequences that which was investigated incorporated a rendez-
would not be dissimilar to the basic maneuver vous at the first spacecraft apogee. In effect, a
sequence. nominal insertion would place the spacecraft on
577
278 GE_IINI MIDPROGRA_ CONFERENCE
an intercept trajectory, and the onboard system tory for the backup procedures with no degra-
would be utilized to correct for dispersed condi- dation of the primary inertial-guidance-system
tions, thereby placing the spacecraft on a final closed-loop rendezvous-guidance technique.
intercept trajectory. Since it is possible to select any particular
As can be seen, two of these three plans incor- transfer trajectory to serve as a standard, 'ex-
porated a parking-orbit mode of operation prior tensive analyses were performed to provide a
to the establishment of a final in'tercept trajec- transfer trajectory with certain desired char-
tory, whereas the third plan incorporated a acteristics. It was desired, first of all, that the
direct intercept mode. Based upon various transfer initiation maneuver for a nominal
analyses conducted for the plans, a recommen- coelliptical trajectory be alined along the line
da'tion was made to adopt the coelliptical mis- of sight to the target. This procedure has the
sion plan. Two major considerations, as well as obvious advantage of providing the crew with
a number of lesser ones, influenced this an excellent attitude reference for this critical
recommendation. maneuver, should it be needed. The second
First of all, the mission plan for rendezvous characteristic desired in the transfer trajectory
at first apogee was eliminated as a contender, was a compatibility between the closed-loop
as compared with the other plans, for the Gem- guidance mode and the final steering and brak-
ini VI-A mission because of its increased space- ing performed manually by the flight crew.
craft propellant requirements for reasonable Based upon the transfer initiation criteria, the
trajectory dispersions. Secondly, the terminal desired feature in the resultant trajectory
phase initiation conditions of the coelliptical would be a situation in which the nominal tra-
plan afforded a certain advantage over the tan- jectory would create low inertial line-of-sight
gential plan. Without going into detail, the rates during the time period prior to and in-
basic desired feature of the coelliptical plan is cluding braking. Such a trajectory would be
that the relative terminal-phase trajectory of consistent with the steering technique utilized
the spacecraft with respect to the target is not by the flight crew to null the line-of-si_o'ht rate to
particularly affected by reasonable dispersions zero. The analyses resulted in a choice of 130 °
in the midcourse maneuvers. On the other orbital travel of the target vehicle between the
hand, it is grossly affected when initiating from terminal-phase initiation and braking. As Call
the tangential approach. More simply stated, be seen in figure 28-2, the 130 ° transfer trajec-
the coelliptical approach affords a standardized tory not only satisfies the second desired charac-
terminal-phase trajectory, yielding obvious ben- teristic, but also fulfills a third desired condi-
efits in the establishment of flight-crew pro- tion, in that the approach of the spacecraft,
cedures and training. An(_ther benefit derived relative 'to the target, is from below, thus assur-
from this plan is that the rendezvous location ing _t star background which could be utilized
can be controlled to provide the desired lighting as _.n inertial reference.
conditions. As a consequence of these advan- After the selection of the transfer trajectory,
ta_zes, tile coelliptical mission plan was selected. the differential altitude between the two orbits
was the next decision point. Analyses were
Termlnal-Phase Considerations
4O
The above discussion leads naturally to a Final braking,,
correction
governed the plan selection. These considera- o
carried out and resulted in a decision to utilize revolutions in the nominal plan, with preestab-
a 15-nautical-mile differential altitude between lished maneuver points tocompensate for any
the orbits of the two vehicles. This choice re- of the dispersions likely to occur either in target
sulted from a trade-off between a desire to be altitude and elliptici'ty or in spacecraft inser-
close enough to insure visual acquisition of the tion. Emphasis was given to minimizing the
target prior to terminal-phase initiation, and a demands of this phase of the mission on the
desire to minimize the influence of dispersions in spacecraft propulsion system. Because the
the previous midcourse maneuvers on the de- propulsion requirements for the terminal ren-
sired location of terminal-phase initiation. Fig- dezvous phase could increase significantly from
ure 0.8-3 shows that the effect of dispersions on degraded systems performance, it was impera-
the terminal-phase initiation time increases as tive that the maximum amount of spacecraft
the differential altitude is decreased. For the propulsion capability exist at the time those
selected differential altitude of 15 nautical miles, activities were initiated. These decisions were
the 3-sigma dispersion of the timing of the ter- reflected in the following mission plan
minal-phase initiation maneuver is on the order characteristics :
of _--+-8minutes. Factors governing the choice (1) Maneuvers were carried out with the
of the desired lighting condition for terminal- Gemini VII spacecraft to provide the best pos-
phase initiation cannot be considered here; how- sible launch opportunities and optimum orbital
ever, the decision was made for the nominal conditions for rendezvous.
initiation time to be 1 minute into spacecraft (2) The Gemini launch vehicle was targeted
darkness. This condition and the selected dif- to provide a differential altitude of 15 nautical
ferential altitude of 15 nautical miles established miles between the two orbits at first spacecraft
the targeting conditions for the ground-con- apogee. The launch vehicle was targeted also to
trolled maneuvers at the time of the coelliptical l_tunch the spacecraft into the target plane ; that
nlanenver.
is, launch-vehicle guidance was utilized 'to fly a
dog-leg launch trajectory in order _ minimize
Ground-Control Midcourse-Phase
spacecraft propulsion requirements in orbit for
Considerations
making a plane change.
As previously noted, the intention was to (3) During the first orbit the flight crew
provide a plan as insensitive to dispersions and were left free of rendezvous activity. This pe-
spacecraft systems degradation as possible. riod of time was used for spacecraft systems
This led to the provision of three spacecraft checks. It was also used by the Mission Con-
trol Center--Houston to determine the precise
7O spacecraft 6 orbit.
(4) Ground tracking, computation and dis-
6O play, and command capability were provided to
carry out the ground-controlled midcourse
5O maneuvers.
Since it was necessary to plan for nonnomi-
nal situations such as delayed lift-off, a real-
time mission planning capability was imple-
mented in the Mission Control Center. This
capability consisted of various computer-
driven displays which would permit the flight
2O
controllers to assess any particular situation
and select a maneuver sequence which was
I0
compatible with the mission constraints.
two nonzero maneuvers: (1) A phase-adjust- performed at second spacecraft apogee was ad-
ment maneuver to be performed at the second justed accordingly (fig. 28-6). Because of the
spacecraft apogee to raise the perigee to ap- underspeed condition at insertion, the Gemini
proximately 117 nautical miles; and (2) the VI-A spacecraft was actually catching up too
coelliptical maneuver to be made at the third fast; therefore, during the phase-adjustment
spacecraft apogee. However, in order to maneuver at second apogee, the prelaunch
account for insertion dispersions, two additional nominal value of 53 feet per second was changed
maneuver points were esta_blished : (1) a height- to 61 feet per second. This maneuver adjusted
adjustment maneuver to be made at first space- the catchup rate to establish the correct phasing
craft perigee following first apogee; and (2) a condition at the time of the coelliptical
plane-change maneuver to be performed at a maneuver.
common node following the phase-adjustment
maneuver. Since the launch vehicle was tar-
geted to achieve the correct differential altitude
and plane location, these two maneuvers were
nominally zero.
Ground network tracking during the first
orbit revealed an underspeed condition at in-
sertion, as well as a small out-of-plane condi-
tion. This call be seen in figure 28-4. Whereas
the targeted conditkm for first apogee was a
differential altitude of 15 nautical miles, the
actual value which resulted was approximately
23 nautical miles. Consequently, the height-
adjustment maneuver at first perigee (fig. 28-5)
was 14 feet per second. The additional refine-
ment of the sl)acecraft orbit following the nmL
38§ nm_
/ .- i circular
\ -"161,_'- I io6z
nmi
\\-..,,,,/
\ _....., ,"
......
_ rl. mi. lClrCUlOr
By THOMAS P. STAFFORD, Astronaut, Astronaut Office, NASA Manned Spacecra# Center; WALTERM.
SCHmRA, Astronaut, Astronaut Office, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center; and DEAN F. GmMM, Flight
Crew Support Division, NAS,4 Manned Spacecra]t Center
283
284 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
/I rain.
subsequent maneuvers, the crew tracks the tar-
:ecraft sunset
get's artificial lighting with respect to the stars Line of sight .... Agena orbit
for inertial angular measurement or uses plat- to Ageno -Spacecraft orbit
Transfer
form angles when the optical sight is bore- Orbit
ute after sunset and the braking maneuver to /' below Sun
Closed-Loop
by sunlight.
S
Closed-loop rendezvous procedures are pre-
sented in the left column of figure 29-2 ; they are
Braking "'Spacecraft sunrise
listed in the exact order that the crew performs
them. Cockpit responsibility is assigned by the FIGURE 29-1.--Terminal-phase lighting Collditions.
(a)
RAD;_ FAILURE COFSUTEH FAILURE PLATFORM FAILURE
NOMINAL
INITIATION SUE - ANGLR/MDU OUTPUT INITIATION CUE - ANCLE/MDU INPUT INITIATION CUE - "8" BALL INITIATION CUE - RANGE (MDU) OUTPUT
0:00 APPLY CIRCULARIZATION TRANS (C) O:OO APPLY CIRCULANIZATION THANE (C) 0:OO APPLY CIRCULARIZATION TRANS (C)
0:00 APPLY CIRUULARIZATION TRANS (C)
START GET (P) START GET (P) START GET (P) START GET (P)
ZERO READOUTS PROM ADD 90,81,82 ZERO ADD 80, 81, 82 (C)
GO TO RDR ACQ AT_ AC4DIRR LOOK-ON ZERO ADD 25, 26, 27 (D) TO RDR ACQ AT% ACQUIRE LOCK_N C-O TO RDR ACQ AT% ACQUIRE LOCK-_)N
FDM - ATT
ATT CNTL - PULSE ATT CNTL - PULSE ATT UNTL - PULSE ATT CNTL - PULSE
SET E.T. TO 4:00 SET E.T. TO 4:00 (C) SET E.T. TO 4:00 SET E.T. TO 4:OO
4:00 ON M_d{K (P) START R.T. UP (C) 4:00 ON M)dLK (P) START E.T. UP (C) 4:00 ON MARK (P) START R.T. UP (C) 4:00 ON MARK (P) START E.T. UP (C)
READ @ (59) Am-Z-[ (69) CONTROL O TO NOMINAL UNTIL WHEN VISIBLE, CONTROL S/C TO W}{_2_ VISIRLE, CONTROL S/C TO
TO PT A TIME TO OBTAIN TIME OF ON MJ_HK (P) READ A_OVF/_ ON M_RK FROM (P) READ_ OVER
ADD 3:20 AND RECORD 0 (59) AT CALCULATE UP/DOWN _V CORN (P) CALCULATE UP/DOWH AND F_rD AV (P)
3:20 A/_TER PT A (PT C), READ @
(59) AND R (69) (P) THIS TIME (LABEL POINT C) (P) FWD _V NOMINAL
INPUT: 2 :_2_;
27:00000 IP) 26:90147;
MONITOR R (69) EVERY lO SRC (P)
NULL FBI'S (COMP) (ATT) BORESIGHT ON AGENA (C)
BORESIGRT ON AGENA (C)
START COMP - PUSH (C)
FWD_V NOMINAL
SET UP/DONU IVI BY MAN KNOBS (C)
ATT CNTL - RATE CMD ATT CNTL - RATE C_ ATT CNTL - RATE CMD ATT CNTL - RATE CMD
MAN CONT - ON (C) MAN CONT ON (C) MAN CONT - ON (C) MAN CC_T ON (C)
ATT C_TL - PULSE (S) ATT CNTL - PULSE <C] ATT CNTL - PULSE (C]
i:00 TRACK TARGET (C) i:OO 6N MARK (p) HOLD ST_S FIXED i:00 ON MARK (P) HOLD STARS FIXED
IN RETICLE (C)
IN RETICLE (C)
L READ @ (59) (P)
2:00 0N MARK (p) START E.T. UP (C) 2: ON MARK (P) START E.T. UP (C) 2:00 ON MARK (p) START E.T. UP (C) 2:00 ON MARE (P) DTAI_T E.T. UP (C)
4:00 l
ATT CNTL - RATE CRD ATT CNTL - RATE CMD ATP CNTL - RATE eND
5:00
BOHESIGHT ON AGENA BOHESIGHT ON AGENA BOHESI_KT ON AGENA
#i THRUST RADIALLY ASAP (C) #i ThrUST RADIALLY ASAP (C) #1 THRUST ASAP (C)
ZRRO ADD 25, 26, 27 (P)
CO_R COHR CORR
ENCDH - ON
SEND CND 270 (SPIRAL ANT EEL) MAN CORT - OFF MAN CONT - OFF MAN CONT - OFF
ENCDH - OFF (P) ATT CNTL - PULSE (C) ATT CNTL - PULSE (C) ATT CNTL PULSE (C)
SEND CMD 270 (SPIRAL ANT SE_)(P) SEND CMD 270 (SPIRAL ANT SEL)(P)
CNTL AGENA TO TOP OFRETICLE (C) CNTL AGENA TO TOP OF RETICLE (C)
':00 READ @ (59) (P) 7:00 READ @ (59) (P) 7:00 ON MARK (p) HOLD STARS 7:00 ON M&F_K (P) HOLD STARS
.o:oo ON_
IN RETICLE
(P)Rind A_
(C)
(c)
8:00HFADH
I
.0:00 OH_d< (P) RERDA_ (C)
(69) (P)
letters C for command pilot and P for pilot. records elevation angle and range to the target
The procedures start with the initiation of the vehicle. This is continued until the initiation
circularization maneuver. The stopwatch fea- cue is reached.
ture of the clock, which is located on the pilot's The initiation cue was selected to provide the
instrument panel, is started and is used through- thrust application along the elevation angle of
out the remainder of the rendezvous phase as the line of sight to the target vehicle. Two of
the basic time reference for crew procedures. the reasons for this decision were that radar
The event timer, which is located on the com- lock-on could be maintained continuously, and,
mand pilot's instrument panel, is synchronized secondly, that this provided a convenient point-
to the pilot's time and is used as a reference for ing reference for use during the thrusting ma-
the command pilot's critical events. neuver. The reasons were valid whether radar
At 4 minutes after the circularization ma- pointing commands or the optical sight was
neuver, the event timer is synchronized, and the used. An additional procedural advantage to
computer is switched to the rendezvous mode. this technique was that it was not necessary for
The command pilot controls the spacecraft at- the command pilot to switch his flight director
titude to boresight on the target, while the pilot reference from radar to computer during the
verifies the pertinent computer constants, and, rendezvous. However, this approach meant
at the specific times requested by the charts, he that, in most cases, the command pilot would
286 GEMINI M'IDPROORAMCOHERENCE
13:OO OR MAKE iF) HOLD 2TAR_ ?fRED 13:OC CN MARK (P) HOL7 STAR:; FIXED
IN RETI2Lh is)
I IR RETICLE (3)
iI,:O0 NEAI g (hO) 16:OO ON MARK (r) READ _ (C} 16:00 ON MARE (P) READ a_ (C)
J.',LC'ILAT_; UI/IOWN CCRRECTRN RE_D li FROM METER (2) HRAD R (o9) (P)
.TART CCMI - FU.S (B) CAECULATN _V CORRECTION (P) CAL&:I'I.ATE UP/RR_N - _WI/AFT
ATT CNTL - RATE eRR ATT ChTL - RATE CMD ATT ON'I% - RATE CNL
#3 THRUST RAHALLY ASAP (C) #3 THRUL,T RADIALLY ASAP (C) #3 THRUL;T ASAP (C)
ATT CNTL }ULJE (31 ATT CNTL PULSE (C "_ ATI C_L PULSE (]'l
BRRESICRT ON AGENA (C) CNTL AGENA TO CENTER OF RETICLE CNTL ASENA 1)0 CENT_ RF RETICLE
19:ooRE.-U, _ (N'_) 'P) 19:o0 _EAD Q (_,9) (P) 19:00 ON MANE (F) HOLD STAR:: ?'! !EP
I IN RETICLE (C)
ATT CNTL - RATE CMD ATT CNTL - RATE CMD ATT CNTL - RATE CND
ATT CN]L - HATE CMD
M&N CCNT - CN MAN JCNT - ON
NAN CCNT ON RAN CONT - ON
COLE CORN
CORR
AN_D RANSE RATE NCNI2ORING (C) ANI) RANGE RATE _CNITChlN_ (J)
PORESIJBT ON AgENA (C)
40>R>25 AT R = 15,0OO FT 26:30 REMOVE 15 FT/SRC 40> R >25 AT R : 15 O(K) FT 40> [{ > [)5 AT R = 15.,OO0 FT
AT 3,00(3 PT, REDUCE I_ Tt' WREN APPROACHING TARGET AT 3,000 F2, REDUC_ R TO
REq kI')
RR_ O) Rm_ (r) RR_ (P)
rection. During this time, the pilot interrogates background and null the motion. The pilot,
the computer to obtain the necessary data to meanwhile, is continuously monitoring pitch
analyze closed-loop guidance and trajectory angle, range, and range rate to determine trajec-
parameters. This information is recorded on a tory characteristics and is assisting the com-
monitor sheet (fig. 29-3). When the radar data mand pilot by giving him position reports
collection is completed by the computer at 5 min- and providing backup information. Braking
utes, the START COMP light goes off, indi- thrust at the termination of rendezvous is ap-
cating that the computer is sequencing to the plied as a function of range. The nominal
next part of its program. The crew now has range for initiation of braking is 3000 feet, and
an option of alining the platform during the at 1500 feet the range rate is reduced to 4 feet
next 5 minutes 20 seconds or of ignoring it. per second.
Their decision is based upon premission rules Backup Procedures
regarding accuracy requirements of the plat- Columns 2, 3, and 4 on figures '29-2 through
form. The pilot then takes certain data from 294 present the sequence of the backup rendez-
the computer in order to obtain the change in vous procedures in the event of radar, computer,
velocity requirements for a backup solution to or platform failure. It should be noted that the
the first midcourse maneuver. The first mid-
procedures and the arrangement of the proce-
course correction occurs at a point in the trajec- dures were specifically tailored to insure that
tory where 81.8° central angle travel of the an orderly transfer could be made in the event
target remains until intercept. Just prior to of system failure. Four midcourse corrections
the first midcourse maneuver, the spacecraft are used in the backup procedures, while only
must be boresighted for a final radar data col-
two are used in closed-loop guidance. The in-
lection by the computer. As soon as this occurs, creased number was required to detect a trajec-
the required velocities for _he first midcourse
tory error as early as possible and to make the
correction are displayed. The command pilot appropriate corrections. The second and fourth
then applies thrust to drive the displays to zero.
backup measurements provide a check of the
Upon the completion of thrusting, the first mid- first and second closed-loop maneuvers. An op-
course correction is complete, and the identical tical sight with a collimated reticle was one of
cycle is repeated for the second midcourse cor-
the essential pieces of hardware to implement
rection which occurs at 33.6 ° central angle the backup procedures. This sight was used to
travel to go to rendezvous. This maneuver
track the target and measure inertial angular
corresponds to a time of 23 minutes 40 seconds rates.
after the midpoint of the transfer maneuver. Radar Failure
When the second correction has been com-
pleted, the computer is switched from the ren- A radar failure eliminates range and range
dezvous mode to the catchup mode. This allows rate from the analog meter and the computer.
radar data to the computer to be updated every In this event, the initiation cue is based upon
one-eighth second. From this point in the tra- line-of-sight elevation angle. The spacecraft
jectory, the target motion with respect to the is controlled to a specified pitch attitude of
stars should be essentially zero; therefore, the 27.4 ° using the flight director indicators, and
command pilot is required to note any motion the target vehicle is visually observed. Visual
of the target vehicle with respect to the celestial observation is a mandatory requirement unless
thrusting is initiated on ground-calculated time.
TERMINAL PHASE BACKUP
When the target passes through the center of
TERMINAL PHASE
ELAPSE TIME the reticle, thrusting is initiated. Once again
BURN TIME
the nominal change in velocity is applied along
25:
the line of sight, and a correction normal to the
26: UP/DOWN
line of sight is based upon the measured change
I PWO
27: LT/RT
in the elevation angle as read from the com-
YAW RANGE
puter. The intermediate corrections rely upon
PITCH RANGE RATE
this capability to read elevation angle from the
FIOURE 29-3.--Terminal phase backup monitor sheet. computer to enable the pilot to calculate cor-
288 GEMINI _[IDPROGRA_I CONFERENCE
rectionsnormal to the line of sight. Since with the rendezvous evaluation pod. The Gem-
ranging information is not available, a small ini VIA charts have been refined considerably
braking maneuver is selected by time, and the from Gemini V charts due to experience gained
final braking thrust is not applied until the com- from simulations and crew training. Figure
mand pilot can visually detect size growth of 29-3 is the form used for recording the ground-
the target vehicle. computed termination phase initiation. Fig-
ure 29-4 is the form used for recording data
Computer Failure necessary to monitor the trajectory and for the
determination of the proper point for transfer.
A computer failure precludes the use of ac-
Figure 29-5 is used to determine the initial
curate elevation or pitch angle as an initiation
thrusting required for transfer as a check on the
cue. The reference then used to provide this
closed-loop solution and as a backup in case of
cue is the attitude indicator ball. Loss of the
a system failure. Figure 29-6 is used to cal-
computer also prevents use of the velocity dis-
culate intermediate corrections in the backup
plays. The transfer thrusting application is
procedures and to check the closed-loop solution
therefore based on the nominal change in veloc- for the two midcourse maneuvers. All measure-
ity along the line of sight and a calculated
ments and thrust applications are made orthog-
change normal to the line of sight. The cal-
onally with respect to an axis system oriented
culation is based on the change from nominal
along the spacecraft axes. The spacecraft X-
of the inertial elevation angle. The first two
axis is alined with the line of sight to the target.
intermediate corrections are based only upon
Figure 29-7 is the monitor sheet used for closed-
the variation of the inertial elevation angle
loop guidance. Figure 29-8 is a curve used to
from nominal, using the optical reticle as the
determine separation from the target vehicle
measuring device and the celestial background
using only range from the computer.
as the inertial reference. The last two correc-
Figure 29-9 is a polar plot of the nominal
tions include range-rate data from the analog
Gemini VI-A trajectory from the circulariza-
meter. The pilot uses the stopwatch feature of
tion maneuver to termination of rendezvous.
his wristwatch to measure the time of thrust in
Nominal range, range rates, elevation angles,
each axis which corresponds to the required
and ground elapsed times are provided at var-
change in velocity.
ious points along the trajectory.
Platform Failure
Discussion of the Gemini VIA Rendezvous
In the event of a platform failure, the initia-
The closed-loop guidance technique was used
tion cue is ranged obtained from the computer.
The initial transfer and the four intermediate satisfactorily during the Gemini VI-A rendez-
vous mission. The radar range data that were
corrections are based upon deviations in the
read from the computer were highly accurate
change of range and inertial elevation angle
throughout the entire maneuver and provided
from the nominal. The change in inertial ele-
the crew with the necessary information to mon-
vation angle is measured by using the optical
itor the trajectory, shown in figure 29-10(a).
reticle. The reticle pattern and markings were
designed to insure the required accuracy for Radar range-rate data from the analog meter
showed close correlation to computed data with
this measurement. The procedures for the tra-
less than 3-feet-per-second difference, and was
jectory from the end of the fourth backup mid-
course maneuver to termination of rendezvous limited in accuracy only by the meter markings
and readability. Angle data after the circular-
are the same as previously discussed under
ization maneuvers were slightly erratic in value
closed-loop rendezvous procedure.
(fig. 29-10(b) ). The pilot noted that the closed-
Flight Charts loop guidance solutions appeared to give values
The flight charts are an extension of the Gem- near the nominal and was concerned primarily
ini V charts and were tailored for the Gemini with the way this anomaly would affect the se-
VI-A mission. The Gemini V charts were de- lection of the correct angle to push the START
veloped specifically for the planned exercise COMP button during the transfer maneuver.
RENDEZVOUS OF GEMINI VII AND GE_IINI VI--A 289
(a)
GT-6 RENDEZVOUS FLIGHT CHARTS
NOMINAL AND ACTUAL CONDITIONS - CIRCULARIZATION T0 TERNIBAL INITIATION
(a) Between 4 minutes and 35 minutes 40 seconds from coelliptical maneuver (NSR).
FIGURE 29-4.--Transfer maneuver monitor sheet.
The backup solution calculated from the flight The ground-calculated backup solution
data charts indicates that an angle bias existed. showed close agreement with the closed-loop
The fact that range and range rate prior to data. In subsequent missions, however, ground
transfer were exactly nominal led to a belief solutions will not be available for some rendez-
that elevation angle and elevation angle rate vous transfers; hence, the requirement will con-
also should have been nominal. This difference tinue to exist to provide the crew with an inde-
pendent onboard method of calculating trans-
may have been partly due to a platform aline-
fer velocities.
ment. The cause of the remainder of the dif-
ference has not been determined. This effect The target-center polar plot was used to pro-
vide backup verification. The data are correct
caused the crew to transfer one data point later
for direction and generalized for magnitude of
than the nominal point, and also indicated that
the thrust vector. The five values that were
the two spacecraft were less than the nominal available to the crew for the transfer solution
15-nautical-mile vertical separation. This in are shown in table 29-I.
turn led to an erroneous change in velocity solu- It was noted by the pilot, immediately after
tion to be calculated along the line of sight for the final backup calculation, that the 23-foot-
the backup procedure. per-second solution along the line of sight
290 GEMINI I_IDPROGRAI_I CONFERENCE
(LOS) was in error, as the data from points tion existed onboard from the polar plot and
prior to this gave 32 feet per second. As noted A AR method to correctly determine that the
in table 29-I, the polar plot and tile change in transfer change in velocity was in fact 32 feet
range-change (/% AR) solutions indicate that per second along the line of sight. This was
32 feet per second should be applied along the the change in velocity that the crew would have
line of sight. The ground-calculated solution applied in case of a failure mode. This prob-
was additional verification of this number. lem highlights the fact that the crew must have
Had the computer failed to arrive at a solution ample onboard methods to correctly interpret
or given an erroneous value, sufficient informs- and execute the transfer maneuver.
(b) Between 37 minutes 20 seconds and 1 hour 7 minutes 20 seconds from eoelliptieal maneuver (NSR).
FIGURE 29-4.--Concluded.
Along line of sight 31 ft/sec for- 23 ft/sec for- 32 ft/sec for- 32 ft/sec for- 32 ft/sec for-
RBa _ RA RA - RC AR a AR N = e AR e A R A tAR At At AV
+2.50 NM NM NM NM NM NM NM SEC SEC FWD FWD
R A
-._O 60 SEC 47 FPS
i 40.00 4.42 RADAR -.40 _6 SEC 44 PPS
__.OO - _ 4.29
41.00 4.56 OR -.30 52 SEC 41 FPS
RANGE 42.00 4.71 COMP -.20 48 SEC 38 FPS
RATE n 43._ ............ -j.S4 --- FAILURE -.iO 44 SEC _ FPS
CORRECTION NON 43.45 4.90 _-'-------9 O 41 SEC 32 FPS
44.00 - 4.97 APPLY +. lO 37--__- SEC 29 FPS
45.00 5.11 _0MINAL +.20 _ SEC 26 FPS
+.30 29 SEC 23 FPS
III 47.00 __ .....
" - __ --_ -- 5.3_ +.40 25 SEC 20 FPS
__ 5.24
48.00 5.52 +.50 22 SEC 17 FPS
A significant problem developed when the per second up_ and 4 feet per second forward
Gemini VII spacecraft went into darkness. for the closed loop (table '29-II). The back-
The Gemini VI-A crew was not able to acquire up solution would have been adequate to provide
it visually until a range of 25.7 nautical miles, an intercept with the Gemini VII spacecraft.
when the spacecraft% docking light became After the second midcourse correction, the
faintly visible. The observed light was not computer was switched into the catchup mode
sufficient to provide tracking for the firs_ two and the pilot recorded pitch angle and range
backup midcourse corrections. The flashing data at 1-minute time intervals. The command
acquisition lights were not seen until 14.5 nauti- pilot nulled the inertial angular rate by thrust-
cal miles because the apparent intensity of the ing toward the 'target vehicle whenever it
docking light was much greater. The crew had exhibited motion with reference to the stars.
previously been briefed that the acquisition The target vehicle became illuminated in sun-
light should be visible for tracking at a range light at approximately 0.74 nautical mile.
of 30 nautical miles. Braking was initiated at 3000 feet and com-
The platform alinement performed during pleted at 1500 feet_ at which time the range rate
the period from 5 to 10 minutes after transfer had been reduced to 7 feet per second. The end
precluded any backup solution to 'the first mid- of the rendezvous occurred and station keep-
course maneuver. The backup solution for the ing was initiated when the Gemini VI-A space-
second midcourse maneuver was calculated and craft was directly below the Gemini VII
requested 6 feet per second up, versus 3 feet spacecraft at a distance of 120 feet.
292 GEMINI :_IDPROGRA_ CONFERENCE
Along line of sight ............. 7 ft/see forward Not available due to computer 5 ft/sec forward
program
Normal line of sight ............ 7 ft/sec up Not available due to platform 5 ft/sec up
alinement
Lateral line of sight ............. 5 ft/sec left Not calculated Not calculated
Along line of sight .............. 4 ft/sec forward Not available due to computer 5 ft/sec forward
program
Normal line of sight ............ 3 ft/sec up 6 ft/scc up 5 ft/sec up
Lateral line of sight ............. 6 ft/sec right Not calculated Not calculated
(a)
GT-6 RENDEZVOUS CHARTS
EADAR OTHER
MDIU 59 RFAI 69 EFA/ 59 EEAD II AV At A t
FAILURE FAILURES I III
69 I_EED N0M UP-DOWN UP-DOWN SEC
168 SEC 0
RADAR FAILURE 7.5 4.5 _ 52 FPS 145 SEC 0
126 SEC 0 V
@4N = 35"1° @4 =-----'---- 7.0
6.5 5.0
_:_ __ _ : _45 FPS 106 SEC O
A@ 4 =____.____
5.5
5.0
4.4
6.5
7.0
7.6
:
@""
0.0
v
:
0.0 0.0
•
..
20 FPS
i0 FPS
0 FPS
l 56 SEC
28 SEC
O SEC
0
O
O
v
RATE
3.5
3.0
2.5
8.5
9.0
9.5
-
@"'-- _
_ _
= -
@
.
15 FPS
24 FPS
34 FPS
!
D0_WN
42
69
97
SEC
SEC
SEe
-12
20
28
V"
CORRECTION
2.0
1.5
1.0
i0.0
10. 5
ii.0
e""_ __ --
e'"- _..-a
_ e.......-
_.
-
:
43 FPS
51 FPS
60 FPS
! 120
144 SEC 42
171 see _ I_
SEC 35 v
R2 R2 R4 _ A Ra AR n £A R eAR AV AtAR A t At
NR NN NM i NM _ I_ . NM FWD-AFT 'SEC SEC FWD-AFT
+FWD-AFT
(b)
GT-6RENDEZVOUS FLIGHT CHARTS
RADAR OTHER
MDIU 59 READ 69READ 59 REA/ II AV At
FAILURE FAILURES I III
59 REA/ NON UP-DOWN UP-DOWN SEC
AOlh
CORRECTION
5.0
4-5
4.0
7.0
7.5
8.0
@---
_
_
_
r
• ,,
&
-
12 FPS
18 FPS
24 FPS
!
DOWN
32
51
69
SEC
SEC
SEC
9
15
20
w
FIGUBE 29-6.--Continued.
closed-loop guidance, and further insure that the more consistent with operational constraints.
sametotal central angle travel is obtained. This point should not be overlooked in the
Changes to the computer program and read- design of future space applications.
out capability have decreased crew workload The flight director attitude displays were
and have increased ability to obtain key param- marked in a manner whereby the reading accu-
eters at the required times. These items are racy could be read to only ___2° in most areas and
instantaneous range, range rate, and pitch to ---5 ° when the spacecraft was within ±30 °
angle. Range and pitch angle were formerly of 90 ° pitch. The displays are presently being
available only at specified intervals and defined re-marked to 1 ° increments and will provide
times in the programing sequence. Range rate reading accuracy to within +__0.5° at all pitch
had to be calculated from range points. Moni- angles. This new marking will provide accurate
toring of the closed-loop guidance previously angle measurements for the transfer maneuver
has been restricted to only certain time inter- and for midcourse corrections in case of
vals, due to inability to obtain these parameters. computer failure.
The crew will now have access to these values
over a greatly extended time period. This Concluding Remarks
change greatly enhances monitoring of the
closed-loop guidance and provides far greater The closed-loop rendezvous guidance system
latitude in developing procedures which are performed satisfactorily. The radar range in-
(c)
GT-6 RENDEZVOUS FLIGHT CEARTS
i
GET 13:00 14:00 16:O0 3rd CCRRECTION
RADAR
MDI_ 59 READ 69 READ 59 READ OTHER II III AV A t ] At
FAILURE FAILURES I NOM UP-DOWN UP-DOWN SEC
69 READ
A@I6 • Aa 16 I
12.0 28 FPS • 80 SEC 0
RADAR FAILURE 11.5
II.0
o%
.5 20 FPS
24 FPS _UP
56
68
SEC
SEC
O
O
@I6N = 59 .4o 016 = 10.5 1.5 m'_Ib'- 16 FPS 44 SEC 0
i0.0 2.0
013 N = 51.0 ° O13 =__ 9.5 2.5 : - 8 FPS 22 SEC 0
9.0 3.0 e,.-- 4 FPS ii SEC O
A@16 = ___.=___- 0.0 0 0 0 FPS 0 $EC 0
8.4 3.6
8.0 4.0 -_"_ 3 FPS 8 SEC 2
ANGULAR
4.5 _- &--- 6 FPS 16 SEC 5
RATE 7.0 5.0 FPS 25 SEC 7
6.5 5.5 12F_ 34 SEC i0
C0_RECTION 6.0 6.0 __._.4_ 16FPS 44 SEC 13
5.5
_.0
6.5
7.0
2_40F?S 55s t
6g 16SEt 20
III 1 13.50
13_.0C 2.36 +.20 i0 FPS -17 SEC 108
14.00
(d)
GT-6 RENDEZVOUS FLIGHT CHARTS
RADAR OTHER
NDIU 59 READ 69EEAD59 READ II A V At A t
FAILURE FAILURES I III
69 READ N0N U?-DOWN UP-DOWN SEC
5822
Aa22
formation obtained through the computer was an excellent reference for both the closed-loop
very accurate and provided good data to moni- and the backup guidance systems.
tor the closed-loop solution. The angle data The optical sight is a mandatory piece of
obtained were slightly erratic and had a possi- equipment for backup guidance techniques.
ble bias prior to the transfer maneuver. The The acquisition lights used on Gemini VII
angle data alone would provide a poor basis were unsatisfactory and precluded optical
on which to base a rendezvous maneuver. tracking for transfer and the first two backup
The backup charts and the polar plot gave the midcourse corrections. The lights should pro-
crew good information on the rendezvous tra- vide adequate means of tracking the target, at
jectory and provided a means to complete ,the Lhe initiation of the transfer maneuver.
rendezvous maneuver in case system failures Orientation of the rendezvous phase was oFti-
were encountered. mally located to present the most favorable
k continuously updated local-horizontal ref- lighting conditions for target acquisition and
erence on the platform is highly desirable. The tracking, and use of the star background for
flight director attitude indicator that is refer- measurements and braking. These considera-
enced to local horizontal provides the flight crew tions are a requirement for future missions.
218-5560---66--20
296 GEMINI :_IDPROGI_k]VI CONFERENCE
14.70
R N 27.43 R N 25.80 RN 24.19 R N RN I0.89 RN 9.87 RN 8.93 RN 4.05
69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69
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I I I I I I I I I
FIeURE 29-9.--Polar plot of nominal Gemini VI-A
.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 30 :5.5 4.0 4.5
trajectory.
Z_he
-- __ --Actual
58 12
""_._"_._ ---- Nominal
d
g54
E
_ 50 8 16
E _o
18
--Nominal
_46 ---- Actual
o
ne = 20
4al
22
58 I I I I I
22 24 26 28 50 52 34 56 38 40
Data points from onboord cherts, 24
(a} 22 24 26 28 30 52 34 36 58 40
200-sec intervals
Data pointsfrom onboard charts,
_-" 200-sec intervals
(a) Range versus time output.
FIGURE 29-10.--Gemini VI-A onboard data.
(b) Angle versus time computer output.
FIGURE 29-10.--Concluded.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
30. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The preceding papers presented an interim re- weightless state for 11/_ days, perform his job
port of the Gemini Program at its midpoint, satisfactorily, and return unharmed. How-
and describe the objectives, designs, missions, ever, it is a long way from 11/2 days to the 8 days
and accomplishments to date---in short, a de- required for the lunar trip. There were some
tailed report of a successful program. The optimists, not the least of whom were the astro-
major goal of the U.S. space program is to make nauts themselves, but as recently as 1 year ago,
this country conclusively and emphatically pre- diverse medical opinions existed as to the con-
eminent in space. The Nation is indeed proud sequences of prolonged weightlessness, and
of the Gemini Program's contributions, which many were greatly concerned. The Gemini
include long-duration space flight, rendezvous, Program produced the necessary evidence to
extravehicular activities, experiments, and the prove that weightlessness would not be a limit-
demonstration of active control of reentry to ing factor in the lunar program. As was dis-
achieve a precise landing point. All the ac- cussed, the more sophisticated medical experi-
complishments have significantly contributed ments which are planned for the remainder of
to the basic technology and to a better under- the Gemini Program and for the Apollo Pro-
standing of the space environment. These con- gram will examine the total body system func-
tributions will continue to be made throughout tions rather than simply gross postflight
the remainder of the Gemini Program. The changes. This will provide necessary informa-
rapid increase in flight duration to 4 days, then tion regarding the possible effects of flights of
8 days, and finally 14 days, the extravehicular much longer duration than the lunar landing
activities, the rapid turnaround, the accomplish- mission.
ment of major events on schedule in spite of ad- The Gemini Program, because of the success-
versity, all demonstrate the greatly increased ful rendezvous mission, has also gone a long
capability of NASA, and are made even more way toward removing the second constraint on
meaningful by the policy of encouraging the the lunar landing program, that of rendezvous
world to observe the program. Much has been and docking. The successful rendezvous, as
said about rcal-time flight planning, which has well as the long-duration flight, not only proved
proved to be a requirement in the Gemini Pro- that man can survive weightlessness but demon-
gram and which the Gemini team has been able strated once and for all the vital role played by
to satisfy. The performance of the combined the astronauts in the performance of those mis-
team of the Department of Defense, the con- sions. Because development of the rendezvous
tractors, NASA, and other Government agencies and docking techniques is of vital importance to
in planning and executing the Gemini VIA the Apollo missions, subsequent Gemini flights
and VII missions is an example of real-time are being tailored to simulate the constraints
management. This is a capability that will that will be imposed by the rendezvous of the
serve the Nation well in future missions. Gem- lunar excursion module and the command and
ini, in addition to being a giant step bridging service modules in lunar orbit. The Gemini
the gap between Mercury and Apollo, is provid- VII/VI-A rendezvous was conducted under
ing a means of program qualification for Apollo ground direction in the initial phase, and by
itself, and will continue to do so. the crew using the onboard radar-computer sys-
At the close of the Mercury Program, NASA tem for the terminal phase. It has always been
had demonstrated that man could live in the considered necessary to back up any rendezvous
301
302 GEMINI MIDPROGRA_ CONFERENCE
systems with optical techniques and equipment. ity to work in space outside the spacecraft itself.
In Apollo missions, where lives may depend One result is the increased capability to perform
upon successful rendezvous, the importance of useful experiments in space which will reduce
simple reliable techniques cannot be overem- the requirement for carrying equipment in the
phasized. Future Gemini missions will con- spacecrat}t or having it immediately available
tinue to evaluate these backup techniques. to the crew from inside the spacecraft. We can
Several re-rendezvous and docking exercises on be_in formulatinz plans for activities which
each mission will explore the relative effects of will require resupply of personnel and life-sup-
light and darkness as well as the effects of stars port equipment or performance of maintenance
and earth background on vital acquisition and on unmanned equipment.
tracking of a rendezvous target. In spite of the NASA is halfway through the Gemini flight
great contributions already made to their pro- program. You have read a very optimistic se-
gram, the Apollo personnel are vitally in- ries of presentations because the results have
terested in what will be learned in the remaining been excellent to date. In order to reach this
five Gemini missions. halfway point in such an enthusiastic mood,
What has Gemini contributed to other pro- NASA has had to solve many problems along
grams? An obvious example is the transfer of the way. It cannot be overemphasized how
tecbnology to the "Manned Orbital Laboratory hard this Gemini team has had to work to make
Program. This is a bit of reverse lend-lease it look so easy. You can be assured 'that it has
to the Department of Defense as a partial re- not been a "piece of cake."
payment for the excellent support NASA has A word of general caution must be added in
received and will continue to receive in the
closing. The success of the manned space pro-
Gemini Program. In addition to Gemini's med-
gram to date is no guarantee in itself of future
ical experiments, NASA has made a modest
successes. As the Nation builds, step by step,
start, in the development and performance of
the total capability in space, con'tinued full sup-
experiments and other disciplines. This has
port and even harder work than in the past will
begun to stimulate the interest required to take
full advantage of tim capability of this pro- be required. A major setback could still require
gram, and the Apollo Program which follows, reassessmeut of the ability to meet goals on
to carry more advanced experiments. schedule. The Nation is now truly at 'the begin-
Extravehicular activity has and will con- ning of a major adventure in the exploration of
tinue to increase our knowledge of man's abil- space, but still has a long way to go.
PART II
31. EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM SUMMARY
By R. O. PILAND, Manager, Experiments Program Ol_ce , NztS.4 Manned Spacecra]t Center, and P. R.
PENROD, Experiments Program O_ice, NASH Manned Spacecra]t Center
305
306 GE)IINI )[IDPRq)GRA)I CONFERENCE
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EXPERI/_[ENTS PROGRAI_I SUM)IARY 307
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308 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
Having selected experiments which were in perimental results will be reflected. The re-
concert with the criteria in the above areas, the suits of experiments included on previous mis-
principal investigators for the proposed experi- sions which were not included on VI-A and VII
ments were "contracted" by NASA to design, have been reported previously by the principal
develop, qualify, and deliver flight equipment investigators but will be summarily reviewed
in accordance with the Gemini Program man- here. References 1 and 2 contain experiment
agement and design criteria. Included also is evaluations for the Gemini III, IV, and V mis-
the requirement to establish the necessary ex- sions, respectively. (A complete listing of ref-
periment protocol and support the preflight, erence material used by the principal investi-
flight, and postflight activities associated with gators in the publication of their results is not
the particular experiment. repeated here but is concurrently recognized.)
Activities in the immediate preflight interval The following synopsis is derived, for the
are variable and somewhat unique to the ex- most part, from the above references. It is em-
periment. Crew familiarization with objec- phasized that some of the results are tentative.
tives and training in procedures are the respon- In some cases the experimenters have not com-
sibility of the principal investigators, and the pleted their analysis of the data. Moreover, a
principal investigator was required to define number of the experiments are repeated on sev-
and assist as required in implementation. eral missions, and the total experiment is not
Similarly, where baseline data on crew physio- complete until all missions have been conducted
logical parameters are required, the principal and the results correlated and analyzed.
investigator has an equivalent responsibility.
S--1 Zodiacal Light Photography
Preparation and state of readiness of special
ground targets or ground-located participating I)ata front the Mercury Program had shown
equipment is a principal-investigator task. conclusively that experiments on extraterres-
Participation in final crew briefings, equipment trial light could be performed above 90 kilo-
cheeks, and NASA-sponsored press conferences meters without airglow contamination. The
is required. S-1 experiment flown on the Gemini V mis-
During the flight, principal-investigator sion, then, was to address the following ques-
availability for consulting on real-time adjust- tions :
ment of experimental procedures is essential. (a) What is the minimum angle from the sun
Also, the manning and operation of ground at which the zodiacal light could be studied
targets and participating equipment sites are without twilight interference?
required. (b) Can the gegenschein be detected and
Postflight activities include participation in measured above the airglow layer?
the scientific debriefing of the crew. A sum- The experiment was successfully completed,
mary compilation of experimental results is re- and it demonstrated that approximately 16 ° is
quired for incorporation in the mission report the smallest elongation angle at which zodiacal
during the immediate postflight interval. It is light may be studied without external occulting.
NASA policy to sponsor, within 90 days after Photographic results appear to show the
flight, a public report of the experimental re- gegenschein, the first time such efforts have been
suits in the degree of reduction and analysis successful. Its center appears to have an angu-
that exists at the time. A final publication of lar size of about 10 ° and is within a very few
results is required when data analysis is com- degrees of the anti-sun direction. There is no
plete and conclusions are firmly established. evidence of the westerly displacement which
might be expected if the phenomena resulted
Summary Results
from a cometlike dust tail of the earth.
The results of tile experiments included in the This single set of data (ref. 1) is interesting
Gemini VI-A and VII missions that had a sig- but does not establish firm conclusions, espe-
nificant dat a yield will be reported in detail by cially with respect to the source of the
the respective principal investigators later in gegenschein. The experiment is to be flown on
this series of papers. In the cases where those subsequent Gemini missions for additional data
experiments had flown previously, the total ex- on these two, plus other dim light phenomena.
EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM SUMMARY' 309
8-2 Sea Urchin Egg Growth men,ts will be necessary in order to confirm the
The objective of the S-2 experiment was to synergistic effect and to determine just which
evaluate the effects of subgravity fi_ds on fertil- space-flight parameter or parameters are in-
ization, cell division, differentiation, and volved, as well as the mechanism of the action.
growth of a relatively simple biological system. S-7 Cloud-Top Spectrometry
Inasmuch as the experimental results were
negated by a mechanical failure of the in- Tiros weather satellites have provided me-
flight equipment, equipment description and teorologists with information on geographic dis-
experimental protocol are not included in detail. tribution of cloudiness and a qualitative indica-
tion of cloud types. Meteorologists are further
S--4 Zero G and Radiation Effects on Blood
interested in cloud altitudes because altitude is
Biological effects of the types usually asso- indicative of the dynamic and thermodynamic
cia'ted with radiation damage have been ob- state of the atmosphere on which weather fore-
served following space flight. These effects casts are based. Basically, the method of the
include mutation, production of chromosome S-7 experiment consists of comparing the
aberrations, and cell killing. This could be due cloud's radiance in the oxygen A-band at 7600
to either or both of two things: effects of the angstroms (_), with its radiance in an atmos-
heavy-primaries component of radiation which pheric window outside the band. The ratio will
is no_ available for test in terrestrial laborato-
show the absorption or transmission of oxygen
ries, or synergistic interaction between radiation in the atmosphere above the cloud top.
and "weightlessness" or other space flight pa- The objective of the experiment was to test
rameters. The $4 experiment was to explore the feasibility of measuring cloud altitude by
such possibilities. this method. As a correlation and calibration
The procedure was to irradiate a thoroughly technique, concurrent cloud-top measurement
studied biological material wi'th a known quality by civilian and military aircraft was pro-
and quantity of radiation during the zero-g gramed.
phase of flight. This, with concurrent and During the flight of Gemini V, 36 spectro-
equivalent irradiation of a duplicate ground-lo- graphic observations were obtained on various
cated control sample, would yield a compara.tive cloud types, some for low clouds over the west
set of data and would be evidence of synergism, coast of Baja California, some for relatively
if it existed, between the radiation adminis- high clouds on a tropical storm in the Eastern
tered and some space flight parameter. Since Pacific, and some for tropical storm Doreen.
chromosomal aberration is one of the best known
From the data yield, it is quite apparent, qual-
effects of radiation, i_ was selected as a suitable itatively, that transmission in the oxygen band
response for the study. for high clouds is much larger than that for low
The equipment operated properly, and the clouds. The results (ref. 1) prove the feasi-
experimental procedures were successfully com- bility of the cloud-altitude measurement from a
pleted (ref. 3). The lack of aberrations in the spacecraft by this method. Already, system de-
postflight Mood samples from the crew makes sign requirements are being formulated for a
the possibility of residual effects of radiation more sophisticated second-generation weather
encountered on such a space flight very unlikely, satellite instrument.
at least on genetic systems. The yield of
single-break aberrations (deletions) for the D-1 Basic Object Photography, D-2 Nearby Object
Photography, D-6 Surface Photography
inflight sample was roughly twice that seen in
the ground con'trol and previous samples. All The purpose of Experiments D-l, D-9_, and
physical evidence contradicts the possibility of D-6 was to investigate man's ability to acquire,
variant radiation doses to the ground control track, and photograph objects in space and ob-
and flight samples. It appears then that some jects on the ground from earth orbit. These
space-flight parameter does interact synergis- three experiments used the same equipment, and
tically with radiation. Although this effect is the experiment numbers primarily designate the
not large from the point of view of radiation type of object which served as the aiming point.
cytogenics, it is of interest. Further experi- In D-1 the aiming points were celestial bodies
310 GEMINI _IIDPROGRA_f CONFERENCE
andthe rendezvous evaluationpod (REP) at cultation. That is, the star can be assumed to
relativelylong photographicrange. The 1)-2 be occulted when it reaches a predetermined
designated theshort-rangetrackingandphoto- percentage of its unattenuated value. The pro-
graphing of the REP, and the D-6 aiming cedure for the D-5 experiment provides the
pointswereobjectsontheground. means of measuring this attenuation with re-
Sinceinvestigationof acquisitionandtrack- spect to time in order to determine the usefulness
ing techniqueswas the primary objectiveof of the measurements for autonomous space navi-
theseexperiments, two acquisitionmodesand gation. In addition, the measurements would
threetrackingmodeswereemployed usingcom- provide a density profile of the atmosphere
merciallyavailableequipment. which could be used to update the atmospheric
OntheGeminiV flight (ref. 1), D-1 wasac- model for this system and to refine models used
complishedusing celestialbodiesas aiming for other forms of horizon-based navigation, or-
points. Distant photographyof the REP, bit prediction, and missile launches.
however, wasnot possiblebecause of spacecraft Results of this experiment were negative due
electrical-powerdifficulties which developed to a malfunction of the experimental hardware.
after REP ejection. The plannedD-2 close- A postflight analysis identified the source of
rangephotographyof theREP wasnotpossible failure. Corrective action has been imple-
for the samereason. The D-6 terrestrial mented, and the experiment will be flown again
photographywasaccomplished within thelim- later in the program.
itationsdictatedby weatherconditionsandby D-8 Radiation in the Gemini Spacecraft
spacecraftelectricalpower and thruster,con-
Prerequisite to successful completion of fu-
ditions. Thephotographs obtainedweresignif-
ture manned-space-mission planning is the
icantonlyasanelementof the datato beused
in theevaluationof techniques.Theotherele- availability of data on the radiation environ-
mentsof dataweretime-correlated positionand ment and its shielding interactions. The ])-8
pointinginformation,atmosphericconditions, experiment was for the purpose of gaining reli-
sun angle,exposuresettings,and astronauts' able empirical dosimetry data to support the
above activities.
flight logsandverbalcomments.
The quantitative and qualitative characteri-
D-5 Star Occultation Navigation zations of the radiation levels associated with the
The objectives of the 1)-5 experiment were to Gemini mission originated, in the main, with
determine the usefulness of star occultation those energetic protons and electrons present in
measurements for space navigation, and to de- the inner Van Allen belt and encountered each
termine a horizon density profile to update at- time the spacecraft passed over the South
mospheric models for horizon-based measure- Atlantic Anomaly.
ment systems. Instrumen.tation consisted of both active and
Knowledge of the time of occultation of a passive dosimetry systems. The active instru-
known star by a celestial body, as seen by an ment included tissue-equivalelxt chambers with
orbiting observer, determines a cylinder of response characteristics which match closely
position whose axis is the line through the star that of soft muscle. An active sensor was placed
and the body center, and whose radius is equal in a fixed location in the spacecraft, and another
to the occulting body radius. The times of six portable unit was used for survey purposes.
occultations provide information to uniquely de- Meticulous calibration of the instruments and
termine all orbital parameters of the orbiting inflight adherence to experimental protocol lend
body. Determination of these times of occulta- confidence in the validiCy of results (ref. 2).
tion by the earth is difficult because of atmos- The average dose rate for all "non-anomaly"
pheric attemmtion of the star light. The star revolutions analyzed was found to be 0.15
does not arbitrarily disappear but dims grad- millirad per hour.
ually into the horizon. Measurement of the Dose-rate data obtained from the South At-
percentage of dimming with respect to the alti- lantic Anomaly region shows a rapid and pro-
tude of this grazing ray from the star to the nouneed rise in magnitude over 'the cosmic
ohserver provides a percentage altitude for oc- levels ; that is, rises of two orders in magnitude,
EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM SUMMARY 311
or to more than 100 millirads per hour average. summary, the basic concept was demonstrated
This is associated with an average "anomaly" to be feasible; however, .the stability of the
transit time of 12 minutes. observables, specifically horizon determination
The five passive dosimetry packages were to on which system accuracy depends, needs
ascertain both total accumulated dose and the further investigation.
intensity of radia'tion causing it. They were
MSC-1 Electrostatic Charge
located in areas of maximum, minimum, and
intermediate shielding. Preflight investigation The objective of the MSC--1 experiment was
of the extraneous effects of onboard sources to establish a definition of the electrostatic
revealed this to be less than 1 millirad per day ; potential on an orbiting Gemini spacecraft.
therefore, all recorded data could be considered This would permit calculation of the energy
cosmic in nature.
available for an electrical discharge between the
There was a very good correlation between Gemini spacecraft and another space vehicle.
'the integrated dose readings from the active The field readings on Gemini IV (ref. 2)
and the passive dosimeters located in the same were extremely large compared with what was
area. The difference was only 12 percent for expected; however, the data gave no mason to
the discharge ionization chamber. The varia- suspect any electrical or mechanical malfunc-
tions that do exist are for known reasons, which tion of the equipment. Investigations were
will permit generation of suitable correction initiated to determine whether the apparent
factors for the passive devices so that Chey can electric field was due to some cause other than
provide a reliable assessment of radiation dose a true field at the surface of the spacecraft. A
on future missions. test series confirmed that the instrument was re-
D-9 Simple Navigation sponsive to radiated radiofrequency energy and
to charged plasma-current particles. The Gem-
The objective of the D-9 experiment was ini V instrument was modified to shield the
to demonstrate the utility of a technique for
sensor from electric fields terminating on the
manual navigation during space flight. Con-
spacecraft. However, readings obtained on
siderable efforts prior to flight had been devoted
Gemini V were as high as those from Gemini
to reducing the very complex orbital determi-
IV. Investigations are continuing to identify
nation mathematics to a rather simple model
the extraneous source of sensor stimuli. One hy-
which could be exercised by the use of tables
pothesis which is supported from a number of
or a simple handheld analog computer. The
standpoints is enhanced ionospheric charged-
solution derived consisted of dividing the nor-
particle concentrations resulting from out-
mally used six-degree-of-freedom analysis into
gassing of the spacecraft. Correlation with
two separate and distinct three-degree-of-free-
day/night cycle (thermal gradients), operation
dom problems. The first would determine the
of the water boiler, fuel-cell purging, and mis-
size and shape of the orbit, and the second
sion time profile lends emphasis to this.
would yield in-orbit orientation. All of the
data to support these calculations could be de- MSC--4 Optical Communications
rived using a simple handheld sextant for The objectives of the MSC-4 experiment were
making the necessary celestial and horizon to evaluate an optical communications system,
observations. to evaluate the crew as a pointing element, and
The role this experiment has in the program to probe the atmosphere using an optical co-
is simple procedures and technique develop- herent radiator outside the atmosphere.
ment. The equipment and experimental proto- Inasmuch as unfavorable cloud conditions
col have been reported previously and are and operating difficulties for ground-based
described in reference 1. A detailed accounting equipment all but negated a data yield, no sig-
of the sightings made is not included here, but nificant discussion is included here. It was
on both Gemini IV and VII the procedures shown, however, that the laser beacon is visible
were successfully completed, the data yield was at orbital altitudes, and static tests have shown
up to expectations, and only detailed analysis that adequate signal-to-noise ratios can be ob-
is required to arrive at the final conclusion. In tained.
218-556 0--66--21
312 OEMII_I I_IDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
MSC--10 Two-Color, Earth Limb Photography Attenuation levels were measured at ultra
The plans for guidance and navigation for high frequency (UHF) and C-band frequencies
the Apollo mission require observation of the with and without water injection. UHF sig-
earth, potentially its limb, in order to make a nals which had been blacked out were restored
navigational fix. In this case , a precise defini- to significant levels by high flow rate injection.
tion of the observable limb is essential. The The C-band signal was enhanced by medium to
uncertain state of the lower atmosphere, with high flow rates. The recovered UHF signal
its tropospheric storms and the accompanying exhibited an antenna pattern beamed in the
clouds, prompts a consideration of observing radial direction of injection from the space-
higher levels of the atmosphere that have a craft. Postflight analysis shows that the UHF
satisfactory predictability. recovery agrees very well with injection pene-
On the Gemini IV earth limb photographs, tration theory. More optimum antenna loca-
primary attention was given to the comparison tions and injection sites should minimize the
of the terrestrial elevation of the blue above the problem of resultant signal directionality.
red portion of each photographed limb. The (Ref. 1 contains a detailed report.)
profiles of the blue are more regular than the
Conclusion
red in their brighter parts. Comparative
values of the peak radiances, blue and red, of It is felt that the inflight experiments com-
the limbs vary by nearly 50 percent. This is pleted to date have been very successful and
preliminary, and work still remains to evaluate clearly indicate the desirabili.ty of fully exploit-
the densitometric photography data in order to ing the capabilities of subsequen_ spacecraft
judge the validity of scattering theory to ac- designs and missions for the conduct of an
count for the blue limb profiles. (Detailed ac- experiments program. Accordingly, the fol-
counting is included in ref. 2.) lowing programs are in effect :
MSC-12 Landmark Contrast Measurement (1) The remainder of the Gemini Program
will reflect a continued emphasis on the conduct
The objective of the MSC-12 experiment was of inflight experiments. Certain of these will be
to measure the visual contrast of landmarks
an extension of a series which has already
against their surroundings. These data were begun on missions III through VII. Others
to be compared to calculated values of land- will be introduced as new experiments, some
mark contrast in order to determine the relative
of which are of considerably increased complex-
visibility of these landmarks when viewed from
ity. As noted earlier, some 56 experimental
outside the atmosphere. The landmarks are activities are included.
potentially a source of data for the onboard
(2) A series of experiments is being incor-
Apollo guidance and navigation equipment. porated in Apollo earth-orbital flights.
This experiment depended on photometric (3) A lunar-surface experiments package is
data to be obtained by the photometer included being developed for deployment on the lunar
in the D-5 equipment complement. As noted surface during a lunar-landing mission.
earlier, a malfunction of the photometer was
(4) An experiments pallet for Apollo service
experienced, which negated a data yield from module accommodation of a heavier, more
this experiment.
sophisticated payload is being developed.
T-I Reentry Communication (5) An extensive airplane flight-test pro-
The T-1 experiment was conducted during gram for remote-sensor development has been
the Gemini III mission to determine whether developed.
water injection into the flow field around the The results of these and similar programs
spacecraft is effective in maintaining communi- should contribute immeasurably to the related
cations links during the reentry portion of the technologies as well as to the basic and applied
flight. sciences.
References
1. Manned Space Flight Experiments Symposium, 2. Manned Space-Flight Experiments Interim Report,
Gemini Mis,_ions III and IV, Oct. 18, 1965. (NASA Gemini V Mission, Jan. 6, 1966. (NASA publi-
publication. ) cation. )
A
Introduction and Summary (7) The zodiacal light was successfully ob-
served by Cooper in the last of the Mercury
The manned Mercury orbital flights con- flights but was not seen during the previous
ducted from February 6,1962, to May 16,1963, Mercury flights, presumably because of the
established the following general features cabin lights which could not then be
through visual observations by the astronauts : extinguished.
(1) The night airglow band, centered some 90 (8) A “high airglow” was observed on one
kilometers above the earth, is visible a t all times occasion on the nightside by both Schirra and
on the nightside of the earth. Visual measure- Cooper. Schirra described this as a brownish
ments were made of the altitude, width, and “smog-appearing” patch which he felt was
luminance of the airglow (ref. 1) and were highe.r and wider than the normal nightglow
confirmed by rocket observations. layer. Schirra observed this patch while over
(2) As seen through the spacecraft window, the Indian Ocean, and Cooper while over South
the faintest stars observed a t night, even under America. It is possible that this phenomenon
relatively ideal conditions, were described as of may have been a tropical 6300 angstroms (A)
the fifth magnitude. atomic oxygen emission, first reported by
(3) With no moon, the earth’s horizon is Barbier and others (ref. 2).
visible t o the dark-adapted eye. The earth’s (9) Twilight is characterized by a brilliant,
surface is somewhat darker than the space just banded, multicolored arc which exists along the
above it, which is filled with the diffuse light horizon in both directions from the position of
of airglow, zodiacal light, integrated starlight, the sun. On MA-8, during twilight an obser-
and resolved stars. vation was made, for the first time, of a very
(4) With the aid of starlight but no moon, remarkable scene. The scene is shown in figure
zodiacal light, airglow, clouds, and coastlines 32-1 (a), which is a black-and-white reproduc-
are just visible to the dark-adapted eye. tion of a color painting. The painting was made
( 5 ) With moonlight reflected on the earth, from Schirra’s description (refs. 3 and 4) of a
the horizon is still clearly defined, but, in this series of blue bands. Figure 32-1 (b) is a black-
case, the earth is brighter than the background
of space. Indeed, with moonlight, the clouds
can be seen rather clearly, and *theirmotion is
distinct enough to provide a clue to the direction
of the motion of the spacecraft.
(6) The night sky (other than in the vicinity
of the airglow band and horizon) appears quite
black, with the stars as well-defined points of - -
light which do not twinkle. Lights on the earth ( a ) Painting made from a MA-8 description of blue
do twinkle when viewed from above the bands.
atmosphere. 32-1.-Banding
FTIOURE in the twilight horizon zone.
315
316 GEM IN1 MIDPROGR4M CONFERENCE
r 0
18
Observation of Stars
Nighttime
craft, showing the area of the Pleiades with the nighttime vision. Precise experiments concern-
crew's markings of observed stars. For pur- ing brightness sensitivity required a detailed
poses of this report, the stars shown here are knowledge of such param_ers as---
identified in more detail than on the original (1) Retinal position of the image.
card used by the crew so that a comparison can (2) Contrast between point source image and
be made between the crew's markings and the background.
accompanying list of identified stars and their (3) Degree of dark adaptation.
magnitudes. The command pilot observed (4) Duration of point source exposure.
stars down to magnitudes in the range of 6.26 (5) Relative movement of the image (in-
to 6.75, while the pilot could see to at least 4.37. duced by subject or spacecraft).
Except for the pilot's observation, these compare (6) Color or hue of the image.
well with less objective, but nevertheless im-
In most cases these parameters are composite
portant, sightings by the Gemini IV crew who functions _hat can be divided into even more
carried a card showing the relative locations detailed variables.
and magnitudes of stars in more than five well-
Several purely physical parameters associ-
known constellations in their nighttime sky.
ated with sightings from the Gemini spacecraft
The constellation Corona Australis provided the
also have a great bearing on the end results.
most stringent test, with stars identified down
The effect of the transmission, absorption, and
to 5.95 magnitude. Both members of the crew
scattering of light as it passes through the
reported that they could easily see all the stars
triple-layered windowpanes is not completely
on their card as well as fainter stars, whose
known. In addition, each crewman has noted
brightness they estimated to be in the order of
deposits on the spacecraft window, primarily
the seventh magnitude. All crews have made on the outermost of the six surfaces. These de-
subjective comment that the number of night-
posits can be greatly restrictive to vision. As-
time stars seen from the spacecraft was greater
tronaut Lovell's results, which were two star
than the number seen from their ground-based
magnitudes fainter than his associate's, are
observations, and about the same or perhaps a
tentatively accredited _o a more severe case of
little more than from a high-flying jet aircraft.
The reports varied within this range from in- material deposition. Although the effect of this
dividual to individual during scientific debrief- on light transmission--so important when deal-
ings of Gemini flight crews. ing with very low light levels--is not known,
In the interest of accuracy and precision, it its effect of ligh_ scattering during Gemini V
must be noted that even the best of these re- and VII has been well documented by the
ported tests contain some subjectivity. A vig- visual acuity experimenters in section 34 of this
orous analysis of these results is simply not report. However, during the nighttime the
possible because of the many unknowns that fraction of interior spacecraft light scattered
have a great bearing on the results. Therefore, and reflected into the crewmen's line of vision
it seems appropriate at this time to briefly can present the most significant degradation to
review the variable parameters whose value
seeing, even with bright moonlight (either di-
and/or constancy must be assumed in the ab-
rect or reflected from the earth) incident on the
sence of precise supporting data on values and
heavily coated outer window surfaces. The
on test procedures.
problem of undesirable internal light, which is
The end instrument in these tests is the human
sometimes unavoidable for operational reasons,
eye itself--a device whose extreme adaptability
and whose variability makes its response charac- is clearly shown in figure 32-5. This is a night-
terization very difficult to ascertain. The sub- time photograph of the moon _aken as part of
jectivity of results is also reinforced by the the Gemini VII Dim Light Study reported
psychophysical nature of studies in vision. separately. Although full information is not
Figt, re 324 shows a collection (refs. 5 and yet available, it should be noted that the photo-
6) of relationships which have a bearing on graph is a time exposure with the light inte-
318 GE_[TNI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
Blind spot or
........ Pre-odapting luminance optic disc
-- Cones
/% ---- Rods
_ea
Adopted from How We See: A
E 16oo
Summary of Basic Principles, oOE2000' :egion__/sampled /////'#'_1 \
by A. Chopanis, in Humcn \
Factors in Undersea Warfare. of_ I I
By permission of the Notional _, O 12oo / %
l0 Academy of Sciences.
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=L
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See:
Basic
A
from
Summery
Principles,
HOW We
of
by
1 %
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E _._ Academy of Sciences__
I I
0 / I I [ I
100 = 80 ° 60 ° 40 ° 20 ° 0 o 20 ° 40 ° 60 ° 80 °
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5 I' ' c
;+
5 I I I
0 IO 20 50 40
.m
o_
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I I II I I I I I I I I
_108
_ ,0-04 :L
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Adapted from Handbook of Human
o IO -08
Cen_ra_p_ ipheral
J_ _oi05
o_, 104
03
Vialet ...... --
I I I _- 102 I I I I
0 10 20 50 40 5O
iO -I I 10
Time in dark, in minutes
Retinal illumination I, in photons
seen in the southern parts of the United States. saw.) Specifically, on June 4, 1965, at 17 : 24: 37
The significant point in this discussion is that Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.), at a spacecraft
for the Gemini flights the combination of cir- altitude of 151.41 nautical miles, at -31.89 °
cumstances favors the observation of auroras to geocentric latitude, -32.06 ° geodetic latitude,
the south of the Australia region. The favor- and 104.19 ° longitude, and with dip-of-horizon
able factors for auroral observation are: (1) of - 16.75 °, the latitude of the southern horizon
the apogee is near the southern extreme latitude, is -48.81 °, very close to the best observing lati-
thus giving the maximum dip of the horizon; tude in this region. Concerning this sighting,
(2) the orbits are such that the spacecraft Astronaut White notes "the unusual display
nights occur at longitudes near the general (June 4, 1965, 17 h. 24 m.) of night airglow
longitude of Australia; and ('3) the southern combined with some northern-lights-type effect.
auroral zone has its most equatorward excursion
The airglow looks lit up way out on the hori-
just south of Australia.
zon." Some "spacecraft nights" later, McDivitt
This report includes data from three separate
remarks :
flights in which auroral sightings to the south
of Australia were noted by astronauts. Dur- I see the same sort of curve of lights like the northern
lights except they are below us. I saw them another
ing the Gemini IV flight, McDivitt and White
time. They were great big long lines . . . looks like
saw an aurora in the form of auroral sheets
arcs parallel to direction of flight path, and they extend
projected against the earth. (See ref. 4, pp. 4 from just beh)w the airglow in the earth's horizon up
and 5, for a general description of what they a little past the top of the airglow, the same thing I
GEOASTRONO_IICAL OBSERVATIONS 321
saw the other night except not quite as bright as it was VII and VI-A (see table 32-I). This was ex-
then.
pected, as shown in figure 32--9 (also see ref. 9),
The crew of Gemini V described a similar since the number of December meteors is greatly
phenomenon in the same general location. reduced as compared with the peak for the year,
During the 2-week flight of Gemini VII, the which occurs in August.
crewmen made a sketch of an auroral arc which The number of meteors seen by the crew is a
was well defined between their apparent hori- function of a number of factors, including the
zon and the airglow layer. Their sketch is re- time interval in which they are observing
produced as figure 32-7. (which may or may not include the actual peak
of a shower), 'the nature of the Gemini window
Meteors
(their approximate angle of view is 50°), and
A brief comment on the astronauts' meteor the condition of that window (which will deter-
observations made during the early Gemini mine the limiting magnitude of the meteors
flights is given in reference 4. That Gemini V seen). The Gemini VII pilot reported that his
window was smudged, probably due to the stag-
had the expectation of seeing a good many
ing process. Thus, only 'the bright meteors,
meteors can be seen from the Hourly Plots of
within the rather small angle of view afforded
Meteor Counts for July and August 1965 (fig.
by the spacecraft window, would catch the
:32-8; also see ref. 7). Actually, tile Au_lst
meteors show more than a tenfold increase over pilot's attention. So it is not surprising that so
the rest of the year. The crew's estimate of the few meteors were reported during Gemini VII
number seen during the Gemini V flight is given in spite of the pil(_t's attention to specific ob-
iu table 32-I. A much smaller number of me- servation of them. Observation of meteors dur-
teors was observed during the flights of Gemini ing Gemini VI-A was very much a chance
| •
-,.
IV ...... June 3-7 4 days First quarter, June 6 ........... ................ Many (no number
given)
V ...... Aug. 21-28 8 days Last quarter, Aug. Perseids Aug. 10 (Aug. Numerous (20/hr
20 9-14) b estimated) _
VII ..... Dec. 4-18 14 days First quarter, Dec. Geminids Dec. 11, 12 3 total; d 1 in 30-
1; last quarter, (Dec. 9-12) minute observa-
Dec. 15 tion interval
M = corrected average no. Gemini VII, the crewmen probably were not
2OO
of meteors observed
observing during that period, which would last
Plotted from data in Smithsonion
only a few hours. Another factor might be
Contributions to Astrophysics, VoI.VIII
• i
the presence of frequent lightning flashes, which
eo could distract the crewmen's attention and
=_-
__o I00,000 r'- Plotted from data in Smithsonian
| Contributions to Astrophysics, VoI._jZ]Ti "
Flight of
Gemini V
E
ct)
0
July August
2
situation since no interval of concentrated obser-
vation of them was possible on that rendezvous
_ _ _ / _ _ -
flight. The brightness of the moon, going
through full phase during Gemini VII, may 0 I I l I I
also have in'terfered with meteor observations. d F M A M d d A S 0 N D
Month
Although the peak of tile Geminids meteor
shower definitely occurred during the flight of Fmua_. 32-9.--Monthly meteor count.
GEOASTRONO_iICAL OBSERVATIONS 323
References
1. CARPENTER, M. S. ; O'KEEFE, J. A. ; AND DUNKELMAN, periments Symposium, Gemini Missions III and
L. : Visual Observations of Nightglow From IV, October 1965, pp. 1-18.
Manned Spacecraft. Science, vol. 138, Nov. 30, 5. TOUSEY, R. ; AND KOOMEN, M. J. : The Visibility of
1962, pp. 978-980. Stars and Planets During Twilight. Opt. Soc.
2. BARBIER, D.; ANI) GLAUME, J.: Les Radiation de
Aln., vol. 43, no. 3, 1953, pp. 177-183.
L'oxyg6ne 6390 et 5577 J_ de la Luminescence du
6. WULFECK, JOSEPH W. ; ET _L. : Chapter 8 of Vision
Ciel Nocturne dans Une Station de Basse Latitude.
in Military Aviation, WADC Technical Report
Annls. Gdophys.. vol. 16, issue no. 3. 1.960, pp. 31.9-
58-399 (ASTIA AD-207780), 1958, pp. 103-164.
334.
7. DUNCAN, J. C.: Astronomy, Harper Bros., New
3. SCHIRRA, W. M.: Results of the Third United
York, 5th ed., 1955.
States Manned Orbital Space Flight. Appendix:
Air-Ground Communications of the MA-8 Flight. 8. STRUVE, OTTO ; ET AL. " Elementary Astronomy. Ox-
(NASA SP-12), 1.962, p. 104. ford University Press, New York, 1959.
4. DUNKELMAN, L.; GILL, J. R.; McDIVITT, J. A.; 9. Smithsonian Contributions to Astrophysics, vol.
ROACH, F. E.; AND WHITE, E. H.: Geo-Astro- VIII, no. 6, 1965. Second Catalog of Hourly
nomical Observations. Manned Space Flight Ex- Meteor Rates (Olivier. C. P.), pp. 171-180.
• 33. DIM LIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY
By LAWRENCE DUNKELMAN, Laboratory /or Space Sciences, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, and
ROBERT D. MERCER, Flight Crew Support Division, NASA Manned Spacecra/t Center
325
326 GEMINI MIDPROGRA_ CONFERENCE
33-1.-Crew
FIGWEE inflight checklist for dim-light study.
33-2-Gemini
FIGL-RE VI1 spacecraft as photographed 333.--Heentering Minuteman missile as pho-
FIGURE
at night by Gemini VI-A flight crew. tographed by Gemini VI1 flight crew.
218-556 0 - 6 6 2 2
328 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFEREKCE
References
L.;
1. DUNKELMAN, A N D MERCEB, R. D.: Dim Light 2. HENNEB,J.; AND DUNKELMAN, L.: Photographic
Photography and Visual Observations of Space Observations of Nightglow From a Rocket. Jour-
Phenomena From Manned Spacecraft. NASA nal of Geophysical Research, vol. 71, 1986, pp.
Goddard Space Flight Center, No. X-613-6G58. 755-762.
34. EXPERIMENT S-8/D-13, VISUAL ACUITY AND ASTRONAUT
VISIBILITY
visual acuity of the members of the Gemini V Throughout the fights of Gemini V and Gem-
and Gemini VII crews showed no statistically ini VII, the visual performance of the crew-
significant change in their visual capability. members was tested one or more times each day
Observations of a prepared and monitored pat- by means of an inflight vision tester. This was
tern of rectangles made at a ground site near a small, self-contained, binocular optical device
Laredo, Tex., confirmed that the visual per- containing a transilluminated array of 36 high-
formance of the astronau'ts in space was within contrast and low-contrast rectangles. Half of
the statistical range of their respective preflight the rectangles were oriented vertically in the
thresholds, and that laboratory visual acuity field of view, and half were oriented horizon-
data can be combined with environmental opti- tally. Rectangle size, contrast, and orientation
cal da,ta to predict correctly man's limiting were randomized; the presentation was sequen-
visual capability to discriminate small objects tial ; and the sequences were nonrepetitive. Each
on the surface of the earth in daytime. rectangle was viewed singly at the center of a
:30° adapting field, the apparent luminance of
Introduction whieh was 116 foot-lamberts. Both members
of'the fight crew made forced-choice judgments
Reports by Mercury astronauts of their
of the orientation of each rectangle and indi-
sighting small objects on the ground prompted
cated their responses by punching holes in a
the initia'tion of a controlled visual acuity exper-
iment which was conducted in both Gemini V record card. Electrical power for illumination
within the instrument was derived from the
and Gemini VII. The first objective of Experi-
ment S-8/D-13 was to measure the visual acuity spacecraft.
The space available between the eyes of the
of the crewmembers before, during, and after
astronaut and the sloping inner surface of the
long-duration space flights in order to ascertain
spacecraft window, a matter of 8 or 9 inches,
the effects of a prolonged spacecraft environ-
were important constraints on the physical size
ment. The second objective was to test the
of the instrument. The superior visual per-
use of basic visual acuity data, combined with
formanee of all crewmembers, as evidenced by
measured optical properties of ground objects
clinical test scores, made it necessary to use great
and their natural lighting, as well as of the
care in alining the instrument with the observ-
atmosphere and .the spacecraft window, for pre-
er's eyes, since the eyes and not the instrument
dicting the fight crew's limiting naked-eye must set the limit of resolution. In order to
visual capability to discriminate small objects achieve this, the permissible tolerance of decen-
on the surface of the earth in daylight. tering between a corneal pole and the eorre-
329
330 GE_IINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
spendingoptical axisof the eyepiece wasless It was also deemed desirable that the pattern
than0.005of aninch. This tolerancewasmet chosen for the inflight vision tester should be
bymeans of abiteboardequipped with theflight compatible with that used on the ground where
search contamination of the scores must be care-
crewmember's dentalimpression to takeadvan-
tageof the fixedgeometricalrelationbetween fully avoided; this consideration made any con-
ventional detection threshold test undesirable.
hisupperteethandhis eyes.Figure34-1is a
photographof the infligh'tvisiontester. The pattern on the ground was within sight for
at least 2 minutes during all usable passes, but
Selection of the Test variations due to atmospheric effects, geometri-
cal foreshortening, directional reflectance char-
The choice of test was made only after pro-
acteristics, etc., made it necessary to select a
tracted study. Many interacting requirements
test which could be completed in a 20-second
were considered. If, for example, the visual
period centered about the time of closest
capabilities of the astronauts should change dur-
approach.
ing the long-duration flight, it would be of prime
The optimum choice of test proved to be the
importance to measure the change in such a way orientation discrimination of a bar narrow
that man's inflight ability to recognize, classify,
enough to be unresolved in width but long
and identify landmarks or unknown objects on
enough to provide for threshold orientation dis-
the ground or in space could be predicted.
crimination. The size and apparent contrast
These higher-order visual discriminations de- of all of the bars used in the test were sufficient
pend upon 'the quadratic content of the differ-
to make them readily detectable, but only the
ence images between alternative objects, but
larger members of the series were above the
virtually all of the conventional patterns used threshold of orientation discrimination. These
in testing vision yield low-precision informa-
two thresholds are nmre widely separated for the
tion on this important parameter. Thus, the
bar than for any other known test object. The
prediction requirement tended to eliminate the
inherent quadratic content of the difference
use of Snellen letters, Landolt rings, checker-
image between orthogonal bars is of greater
boards, and all forms of detection threshold
magnitude than the inherent quadratic content
tests.
of the bar itself. Interpretation of any changes
The readings must not go off-scale if visual
in ,the visual performance of the astronauts is,
changes should occur during flight. This re-
therefore, more generally possible on the basis
quiremen't for a broad range of testing was not of orientation discrimination thresholds for the
readily compatible with the desire to have fine
bar than from any other known datum.
steps within the test and yet have sufficient repli-
cation to insure statistically sig'nificant resul'ts. Rectangles in the Vision Tester
Selector knob
"-.
"-.
/
the inflight vision tester were reproduced photo-
(Depress to record -Ring rototes 360 _
/// to position line for M-9 graphically on a transparent disk. Two series
of rectangles were included, the major series set
at a contrast of --1 and the minor series set at
/ about one-fourth of this value. The higher
Adjustabre interpup_llary distance j
The stringent requirements imposed by condi- the last instrument to be constructed (serial no.
tions of space flight made it impossible to use 5) was put aboard the spacecraft. The two
as many replications of each rectangle as was instruments were optically identical except for
desirable from statistical considerations. After their 12 low-contrast rectangles, which measured
much study, it was decided to display each of a contrast of -- 0.332 and - 0.233, respectively.
the six rectangular sizes four times. This com- In Gemini VII all of the reported data (pre-
promise produced a sufficient statistical sample flight, inflight, and postflight) were obtained
to make the sensitivity of the inflight test com- with serial no. 5 tester.
parable to that ordinarily achieved with the
Analysis of Correct Scores in Gemini Y
most common variety of clinical wall chart.
This sensitivity corresponds roughly to the abil- A comparison of the correct scores made by
ity to separate performance at 20/15 from per- the Gemini V crewmembers on the ground (pre-
formance at 20/20. It was judged that this flight) and in space (inflight) can be used to
compromise between the sensitivity of test and ascertain whether their observed visual per-
the range of the variables tested was the proper formance differed in the environments or
one for this exploratory investigation. changed during the 7-day mission. The cor-
A secondary test at lower contrast was in- rect scores from the low-contrast and high-
cluded as a safeguard against the possibility that contrast series in :tl_e vision tester are shown for
visual performance at low contra_ might both crewmembers in figure 34-2. The results
change in some different way. With only 12 of standard statistical tests applied to these data
rectangles assignable Within the inflight vision are shown in tables 34-I through 34-IV.
tester for the low-contrast array, it was decided Comparisons between preflight and inflight
to use only 3 widely different rectangle sizes, data are given in tables 34-I and 34-II. All
present ing each of these sizes 4 times. Student's t tests show no significant difference
Because of the accelerated launch schedule in means. All Snedecor's F tests show no sig-
of Gemini V, it was not possible to use the flight nificant difference in variances at the 0.05 level,
instrument for preflight experiments. These with the exception of Cooper's high-contrast
data were, therefore, obtained with the first of comparison, which shows no significant differ-
the inflight vision testers (serial no. 1), while ence at the 0.01 level.
Cooper Conrad
12
+
+ +
+
+
+
+ + + + 8
f +
+
+
+ +
+ +
+
i i
+ + +
+ +
C:-0.25 C=-0.23
LIIllil I I I I I I I I I I
I 1 I I I I I I 0 I I I I
+ +
+ +
+
2'I .
+ + + +
+ + + 20 +
+ + + + + +
+ + +
+ + + +
16
+
+
12
C=-I C=-I
I I [ I t I I [11IIIII Illl IIIIIIIII
0 I
2 4 6 2 4 6 8 2 4 6 2 4 6 8
Ground Space Ground Space
Comparisons between the inflight data at the (preflight) and in space (inflight) can be used
beginning of the mission with that at the end to ascertain whether their observed visual per-
are made in tables 34-III and 34-IV. All Stu- formance differed in the environments or
dent's t tests and Snedecor's F tests show no changed during the 14-day mission. The cor-
significant differences at 0.05 level, with the ex- rect scores from the low-contrast and high-con-
ception of the F test on Conrad's low-contrast trast series in the vision tester are shown for
comparison, which shows no sigmificant contrast both crewmembers in figure 34-3. The results
at 0.01 level. of standard statistical tests applied to these data
are shown in tames 34-V through 34-VIII.
TABLE 34-I.--Vision Tester (Ground Versus Comparisons between preflight and inflight
Space data are given in tables 34-V and 34-VI. All
Student's t tests show no significant difference
C=--I C=--0.23 in means. All Snedecor's F tests show no signif-
Cooper
icant difference in variances at the 0.05 level,
Ground Space with the exception of Borman's low-contrast
GrounA S p'tce
comparison, which shows a weekly significant
Number ........ 7 9 7 9 difference at the 0.01 level.
Mean ......... 17.6 18.4 8.6 8.3
Standard devia- TABLE 34-III.--Vision Tester (Inflight Trend)
tion ......... 2.3 • 96 1.31 1.4
t .............. 0. 96 0.31
C _ --1 C= --0.23
to.05............ 2.14 2.14 Cooper
F ............. 6.12 1.02
F0 .o5........... 3. 58 3. 58 First 4 Last 4 First 4 Last 4
F0.01 ........... 6. 37
Number ....... 4 4 4
Mean .......... 8.5 8.5
TABLE 34-II.--Vision Tester ( Gro_tnd Versus Standard devia- 18. 2 18. 8
Space) tion ......... .831 1.1 .87 1.8
t .............. 0. 68 0
C_--1 C= --0.23 to.os............ 2. 45 2. 45
Conrad F ............. 1.73 4. 33
F0.0G ........... 9. 28 9. 28
Ground Space
Grolnd Space
Number ....... 9 7 9 TABLE 34-IV.---Vision Tester (Inflight Trend)
Mean ........... 9.7 8.6
Standard devia- 20. 7 2O. 7
C _ --1 C= -- 0.23
tion ......... 2.7 1.7 1.2 2.0 Conrad E.
t .............. 0 1. 13
/0.05 ............ 2. 14 2. 14 'irst 4 Last 4 First 4 Last 4
F ............. 2. 79 2. 43
F0.05........... 3. 69 4. 82
Number ....... 4 4 4 4
Mean .......... 21.3 19. 5 8.8 8.75
These statistical findings support tile null Standard devia-
tion ......... 1.5 1.1 2.8 .83
hypotlmsis advanced by many scientists before
t .............. 1.64 0
the Gemini V mission wits flown.
to .0_ ............ 2. 45 2. 45
F ............. 1.96 11. 19
Analysis of Correct Scores in Gemini Yll
F0.05 ........... 9. 28 9. 28
A COml)arison of tile correct scores made by FO.Ol ........... ,.................
29. 5
+ + I- + ++
+ + + + +÷
++ + + + + + ++ + + +++ ÷ + +
++ +++ 8 + + + +
+ + + + ÷ + +
+
+
4
low Contrast Low contrast
C=-0.23 C:-0.25
i I I I I I i I i i I I i i 0 I I i I I I I I I
24
+ +
÷ + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + 20 + ++ + +
+ ++ + + + + + ++ ÷
+ + + +
÷ +
16
- i2
- 8
s 4
High contrast High contrast
C=-I C:-t
I I I t I I i I I I I I I J i 0 I I I I I t I I I I I I I
I 3 5 7 9 II I 5 5 7 9 II 15 15 5 5 7 9 I 5 5 7 9 II 15 15 I
Preflight Inflight Post- Preflight Inflight Post-
flight flight
TABLE 34-V.--Vision Tester (Ground Versus test must ,be considered next. This topic is
C _ --1 C= --0.23
Comparisons between _he inflight data at the Lovell
TABLE 34-VII.--V/sion Tester (Inflight Trend) van. Each astronaut participated in several
sessions in the laboratory van, during which
C _ --1
C=--0.23 they became experienced in the psychophysical
Barman techniques of the rectangle orientation discrim-
ination visual task. A sufficiently large num-
First 5 Last 5
First 5 Last 5 ber of presentations was made to secure a
properly numerous statistical sample. The
Number ....... 5 5 5 5 astronauts' forced-choice visual thresholds for
Mean ......... 19. 0 20. 0 8.0 9.0
tile discrimination task were measured accu-
Standard devi-
ation ........ 1.4 1.4 1.3 I. 8 rately and their response distributions deter-
t .............. 1.00 0. 91 mined so that the standard deviations and
2. 31
_o .05 ............ 2.31 confidence limits of their preflight visual
F ............. 1.00
2. oo performance were determined.
Fo .05........... 6. 39 6. 39
Figure 34-5 is a logarithmic plot of the Gem-
ini V pilot's preflight visual thresholds for the
rectangle orientation discrimination task. In
TABbE 34-VIII.--Vision Tester (Inflight Trend)
this figure the solid angular subtense of the rec-
tangles is plotted along the horizontal axis be-
C=-I C= --0. 23
Lovell cause both the inflight vision tester and the
ground observation experiments used angular
First 5 Last 5
First 5 Last 5 size as the independent variable. The solid line
in this figure represen'ts the forced-choice rec-
Number ....... 5 5 5 tangle orientation threshold of the pilot at the
Mean .......... 8.8 9.2
0.50 probability level. The dashed curves indi-
Standard devi- 19. 8 20. 4
1.2 1.6 cate the --,_,+a, and +2_ levels in terms of
ation ........ 1.31 1.5
t .............. 0. 60 0. 40 contrast. The six circled points in the upper
to.0s ............ 2.31 2.31 row indicate the angular sizes of the high-con-
F ............. 1.27 1.88 trast (C=- 1) rectangles presented by the in-
F0.05........... 6. 39 6. 39
flight vision tester. The three circled points
of the middle and lower rows show the angular
sizes of the low-con'trast rectangles used in the
Spacecraft Center a't Houston, Tex., and oper-
preflight unit (serial no. 1) and the flight unit
ated by Visibility Laboratory personnel. Fig-
(serial no. 5), respectively.
ure 34-4 is a cutaway drawing of this research
The separate discriminations recorded on the
van. The astronauts_ seated at the left, viewed
record cards in the inflight vision tester can be
rear-screen projections from an automatic pro-
used to determine a threshold of angular size.
jection system located in the opposite end of the
3
In*flight vision tester Projection apparatus /Relay panel 2.5
training apparatus (in its own darkened /
Storage
These thresholds and corresponding statistical acuity capabilities of astronauts during space
confidence limits derived with the aid of figure flight, if adequate physical information con-
34-5 are plotted for the high- and low-contrast cerning the object and its background, atmos-
tests of the Gemini V command pilot in pheric effects, and the spacecraft window
figures 34-6 and 34-7, and for the Gemini V exists. A test of such predictions was also car-
pilot in figures 34-8 and 34-9. Corresponding ried out and is described in the following
thresholds and confidence limits for the vision paragraphs.
tester data secured by the Gemini VII command
pilot are shown in figures 34-10 and 34-11. Ground Observations
Similar data secured by the Gemini VII pilot The crews of both Gemini V and Gemini VII
are shown in figures 34-12 and 34-13.
observed prepared and monitored rectangular
These eight figures also support the null patterns on the ground in order to test the use
hypothesis, and their quantitative aspect con- of basic visual acuity data, combined with
stitutes a specification of the sensitivity of the measured optical properties of ground objects
test. Thus, as planned, variations in visual per- and their natural lighting, the atmosphere, and
formance comparable with a change of one line the spacecraft window, for predicting the limit-
on a conventional clinical wall chart would have
ing naked-eye visual capability of astronauts to
been detected. Preflight threshold data can, discriminate small objects on the surface of the
therefore, be used to predict the limiting visual earth in daylight.
05 _- I I [ _ I I I I I I I i
*-__ 0 0 0 Threshold from inflight vision ,00pel
05 _-
"_- .I _ tester P=O.50
..... Boundary of confidence interval -_ ._c o
"- E J
i) _
"onral i_'
...... _.--_95 ..... i..
, iltii:i',-iI
iiiii!i,'
.llII
!!iillli'
,,ii.i i'
..... --4---1 _-.....
()-
_5 _ .5
0 0 oThreshold from in-flight
g vision tester P=O,30
Tral
==
}, }
af er
Tr _1 m
mi_ ion 5_-
,0 Tri?ls ibef_re ?_ rials duri? _nis_ior_ off er
_ Trials before mission Trioljs d_rinlg r_issilon mis_ior
16 ]7 30 I I 2 5 7 24395372849698112 Post
June July I0 _- I I I I I I
Revolution number flight 16 175030 I I 24 59 55 72 8493 98 112 Post
June July Revolution number flight
FIOURE 34-6.--Gemini V command pilot's rectangle
.O5
I
- I [ I I I I I I I I I I I I I .03- I I I I I I I I I I _ _ I
- o o o Threshold from [nflight vision I "3oper -- _
! 0 0 0 Threshold from inflight vision Conra(
c
_
g
J -
..... Boundary
tester
of
P=0.50
confidence interval
I - r
....
tester P=O.50
o
_3 /J L/l " E
=-_ .......
-- i
85 ........ -( _ .E
m
-=85- , _'
;Z
-5 ........... _ )-'" "--( _'T'-
Tri ]1 I
5 _5 -- i ( /
<_
-- Trials be :or( rr issi )n Trials during m_ssl0n mis_
- ' I at1 _r
.=r'- _o,
I0 -I I I I 'ssio
I Trials
I I during
I I mission
I I I missk n
I0 --I I I I I I I I I I I
16 17 50 I I 2 5 7 24 393572849698 ll2 Post 16 17 5030 I 24 59 53 7284 95 98 112 Post
June July Revolution number flight June July Revolution number flight
Fmu_. 34-7.--Gemini V command pilot's rectangle dis- Fmua_ 34-9.--Gemini V pilot's rectangle discrimina-
crimination thresholds, tion thresholds.
336 GEMINI M:IDPROGRA_,I CONFERENCE
.05
I I I I L I I I I ] I I II II I
0 0 0 Threshold from in-flight vision tester P=0.50
Barman
Boundary of confidence interval
O (D
Q ¢ 0 CD ( •
E
(D C C
i
m .... -( -- __ ---.80-----
_.5
o
"5
"5
<[
Trio I
LI[ II II III I [ I 1 1
45 89 156 185 251 290 Post flight
27 28 29 50 19 67 Ill 159 206 284 302
September Revolution number
.O5
I I I I I I I I I [III[T 1
0 0 0 Threshold from in-flight vision tester P=O.50
Barman
..... Boundar of confidence interval
o)
_n
c
o
.5 -
Z () q) q I () , ) () I I )
E
).....-( )-- ......... ,8 5 I -i _1-- .... "--( ...... _- ..._ )...
Trial
- Trials before mission Trials durin_ mission after mission
o5- i I I I i I i i i ] I i I I i ! I
.............
I
0
....
0 0 Threshold
Boundory
from
of
in-flight
confidence
vision
intervol
.83 .............
fester
I
P=0.50
I I
I--- ......
Lovell
.E C
E
I ' CP
,,-; _
)
==
¢= ----83----
.5 --"
"s o
"5
Triol
I Trials durim mission offer mission
llllll ILl I
43 89 156 185 231 290 Post flight
27 28 30 19 67 III 159 206 284 302
September Revolution number
ca
>
ca
--( ).--
o
"5
I
I Trial
Triols before mission Triols during mission after mission
I
28 _ _ 6 43 89 156 185 251 290 Post flight
27 29 50 19 67 Ill 159 206 284 :302
September Revolution number
Equipment
less than 19 foot-lamberts, any reading of the
The experimental equipment consists of an infligb¢ photometer was ascribable to ambient
inflight photometer to monitor the spacecraft light scattered by the window. Typical data
window, test patterns at two ground observa- acquired during passes of Gemini V over the
tion sites, instrumentation for atmospheric, Laredo site are shown in figure 34-16. This in-
lighting, and pattern measurements at both
sites, and a laboratory facility (housed in a Sighting slot- _
_-On-off lever
trailer van) for training the astronauts to per- Zero adjustment knob.
form visual acuity threshold measurements and ---Removable sun shade
for obtaining a preflight physiological baseline
"--Light entrance
descriptive of their visual performance and its Mounting rail
motes
statistical fluctuations. These equipments, ex- located
with window brack,
under coverplote
cept the last, are described in the following
paragraphs.
Spacecraft window photometer.--A photo-
electric inflight photometer was mounted near Battery pack
the lower right corner of the pilot's window of GFAE EC 34995
400_ o o o o
200_
-E 800
F
600_ Revolution 48
_.400_ o o o o
200_ o o o
= Otl I I I i I L__
-120 -80 -40 0 ÷40 ÷80 ÷120
E
o
°8o0
400_ o o o o o o
2001 _ o o o o o o o o
0_1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I L L 11 1
-120 -80 -40 0 *40 _80 .120
Time from closest opprooch, sec
3417.--Aerial
FIGURE photograph of Gemini V visual acuity experiment ground pattern at Laredo, Tex.
340 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
FIGURE34-19.-Aerial photograph of the Gemini V visual acuity experiment ground pattern a t Carnarvon,
Australia.
VISUAL ACUITY AND ASTRONAUT VISIBILITY 341
F’IQURE34-2O.-Visual acuity experiment ground pattern at Laredo, Tex., a s photographed by the Gemini VII’
flight crew during revolution 17.
photometer (figs.36-21 and 34-22) capable of form were apparently responsible for lack of
obtaining all the data needed to specify the ap- acquisition of the ground site.
parent contra& of the pattern as seen from the The second scheduled attempt t o see the pat-
spacecraft at the moment of observation. The tern near Laredo was on revolution 33. Acqui-
apparent luminance of the background squares sition of the site was achieved by the command
needed for evaluation of the contrast loss due pilot but not by the pilot, and no readout of
to the spacecraft window was also ascertained rectangle orientation was made.
by this instrument. A 14-foot-high mobile At the request of the experimenters, the third
tower, constructed of metal scaffolding and at- attempt at Laredo, scheduled originally for rev-
tached to a truck, supported the tripod-mounted olution 45, was made on revolution 48 in order
photometer high enough above the ground to to secure a higher sun and a shorter slant range.
enable the plowed surface of the background Success was achieved on this pass and is de-
squares to be measured properly. This ar- scribed in the following section.
Unfavorable cloud conditions caused the
rangement is shown in figures 34-23 and 34-24.
fourth scheduled observation at the Texas site,
Observations in Gemini V on revolntion 60, to be scrubbed. Thereafter,
lack of thrnster control made observation of
Observation of the Texas ground-pattern site the ground patterns impossible, although excel-
was first attempted on revolution 18, but fuel- lent weather conditions prevailed on tlir.ee
cell difficulties which denied the use of the plat- scheduled occasions at Lnredo (revolutions 75,
342 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
.-. .
34-22.-Ground-site
FIGURE photoelectric photometer with recording unit.
~ ~~~
34-24.-Photograph
PIQURE of truck-mounted photo-
electric photometer.
resents the preflight visual performance of photometer in the manner described in an ear-
Astrollaut Conrad as measured in the vision re- lier section. Figure 34-9_6 shows some numeri-
search Vail. The dashed lines represent the 1- cal results of this scan, and figure 34-'27 is a
and 2-sigma limits of his visual performance. photograph of a shaded pencil sketch intended
The positions of the plotted points indicate that to portray the appearance of the window de-
his visual performance at the time of revolution duced from the .telemetered scan curves. Com-
48 was within the statistical range of his pre- parison of this sketch with a similar one made
flight visual performance. by the pilot during flight shows good correla-
tion.
Observations in Gemini VII
Figures 34-_26 and 34-27 show that the com-
mand pilot's window was not measurably con-
Observations of the Texas ground-pattern
taminated on its inboard side. Successful obser-
site were made on revolutions 16, 17, and 31
vations of the ground pattern were made by
under very favorable weather conditions.
the command pilot through this clear portion
Heavy clouds blanketed the site throughout the
of his window on revolutions 17 and 31. No
remainder of the mission, however, and no fur-
direct sunlight fell on the window during those
ther observations of the site were possible. Con-
observations.
tamination of the outer surface of the pilot's
window made observation of the ground pattern Results of Observations in Gemini VII
difficult and the result uncertain. The contam-
ination, which was observed to have occurred The results of observations by the command
during launch, was mapped during revolution pilot on revolutions 17 and 31 of Gemini VII
19 by means of a window scan with tlae inflight are ghown in figure 34-'28. These observations
joi0oi,o
occurred _t "27: 0t : 49 and 49 : '26 : 48 ground The stated objectives of experiment S-8/D-
elapsed time (g.e.t.) on the second and third 13 were both achieved successfully. Data from
days of the flight, respectively. the inflight .vision tester show that no change
In figure 34-28 the circled points represent was detected in the visual performance of any
the apparent contrast and angular size of the of the four astronauts who composed the crews
largest rectangles in the ground pattern. Ap- of Gemini V and Gemini VII. Results from
parent contrast was calculated on the basis of
observations of the ground site near Laredo,
measured directional luminances of the white
Tex., confirm that the visual performance of
panels and their backgrounds of plowed soil,
the astronauts during space flight was within
of atmospheric optical properties measured in
the statistical range of their preflight visual
the direction of the path of sight to the point
performance and demonstrate that laboratory
of closest approach, and of a small allowance
visual data can be combined with environmen-
for contrast loss in the spacecraft window based
upon window scan data and readings of the tal optical data to predict correctly the limiting
inflight photometer at the time of the two visual capability of astronauts to discriminate
observations. Angular sizes and apparent con- small objects on the surface of the earth in
trast were both somewhat larger for revolution daylight.
346 GEMINI MIDPROGR4M CONFERENCE
FIGURE
34-29.-Visual acuity experiment ground pattern at Laredo, Tex., as photographed by the Gemini VI1
flight crew during revolution 31.
35. EXPERIMENT S-5, SYNOPTIC TERRAIN PHOTOGRAPHY
By PAULD. LOWMAN,
JR., Ph. D., Laboratory for Theoretical Studies, NASA Coddard Space Flight Center
Introduction
The S-5 Synoptic Terrain Photography ex-
periment was successfully conducted during the
Gemini VI-A and VI1 missions. The purpose
of this report is to summarize briefly the
methods and results of the experiment. Inter-
pretation of the large number of pictures ob-
tained will, of course, require considerable time,
and a full report is not possible now. As in
previous reports, representative pictures from
the missions will be presented and described.
Gemini VI-A
The purpose of the S-5 experiment in Gemini
VI-A was, as in previous Gemini missions, to
obtain high-quality color photographs of
selected land and near-shore areas for geologic,
geographic, and oceanographic study. The FIGURE
35-1.-Niger River and vicinity of Tombouctou,
Mali (view looking northwest).
oceanographic study is an expansion of the
scope of the experiment undertaken at the re-
quest of the Navy Oceanographic Office. The stabilized sand dunes (foreground), such as
camera, film, and filter (Hasselblad 500C, sand dunes which are no longer active and have
Planar 80-mm lens, Ektachrome SO-217, and been partly eroded (ref. 1). These dunes
haze filter) were the same as used on previous probably represent a former extension of the
flights. Camera preparation and loading were arid conditions which now characterize the
done by the Photographic Technology Labora- northern Sahara. This photograph and others
tory, Manned Spacecraft Center, as was pre- in the series should prove valuable in the study
liminary identification of the pictures. of the relation of the stabilized dunes to active
The experiment was very successful, espe- dunes and to bedrock structure.
cially in view of the changes in mission objec- Figure 35-2 shows the Air ou Azbine, a pla-
tives made after the experiment was planned. teau in Niger. The dark, roughly circular
About 60 pictures useful for study were ob- masses are Cenozoic lava flows on sandstones
tained. Areas covered include the southern and schists (ref. 2). The crater at the lower
Sahara Desert, south-central Africa, north- left would appear to be of volcanic origin in
western LZustralia, and several islands in the view of its nearness to lava flows, but Raisz
Iiidiaii Ocean. (ref. 2 ) indicates this area to be capped by
Figure 35-1, one of a continuous series taken sandstone. The picture gives an excellent view
during the 15th revolution, shows a portion of of the general geology and structure of the
central Mali including the Niger River and the uplift as a whole.
vicinity of Tombouctou. The Aouker Basin Figure 35-3, one of several extremely clear
and part of the southwestern Sahara Desert are pictures of this region, was taken over Somalia
visible in the background. The picture fur- in the vicinity of the Ras Hafun (the cape a t
nishes an excellent view of what are probably left). The area is underlain by Cenozoic
347
348 GEMINI MIDPROCR4M CONFERENCE
35-2.-Air
FIGURE ou Azbine, volcanic plateau in Niger.
FIGURE
=.-Lakes in the Rift Valley, Ethiopia, south
of Addis Ababa.
Gemini VI1
The scope of the terrain photography ex-
periment (S-5) was considerably expanded for
the Gemini VI1 mission because of the much
greater mission length, and the greater amount
of film capacity available. Requests had been
received for photography of a number of
FIGURE
3.5XL-Indian Ocean coast of Sonialia, with Ras specific areas from Government agencies, such
Hafun at left (north at bottom). as the U.S. Geological Survey, and from uni-
versities, and these were incorporated into the
marine and continental sedimentary rock (ref. flight plan. The Hasselblad 500C and Ekta-
3 ) , and appears to be relatively recently chrome SO-217 again were the major equipment
emerged. As such, it furnishes an excellent op- items, but, in addition, a Zeiss Sonnar 250-mm
portunity to study development of consequent telephoto lens and Ektachrome infrared, type
drainage, since much of the area is in a youthful 8443, film were carried.
stage of geomorphic development. The experiment \\-as highly successful. Ap-
Figure 35-4 shows several lakes in the portion proximately 250 pictures usable for geologic,
of the Rift Valley south of Addis Ababa, geographic, and oceanographic purposes were
Ethiopia. Considerable structuritl detail is obtained, covering parts of the United States,
visible, such as the presumably f racture-con- Africa, Mexico, South America, Asia, Australia,
trolled drainage on the eiist side of the Rift and various Ocean areas. However, two major
Valley. In addition, several areas of volcanic difficulties hampered the experiment. First,
rock can be distinguished. This photograph the cloud cover was exceptionally heavy over
may be helpful in testing Bucher's suggestion many of the areas selected. Second, a deposit
SYNOPTIC TERRAIN PHOTOGRAPHY 349
was left on the spacecraft windows, apparently probably joints emphasized by wind and stream
from second-stage ignition; this deposit seri- erosion, and may be tensional fractures asso-
ously degraded a number of the pictures. The ciated with the epeirogenic uplift of the Tibesti
large number of usable pictures obtained is a massif. I n addition to these structures, con-
tribute to the skill and perseverance of the crew. siderable detail can be seen in the sedimentary,
Figure 35-5 is one of a series taken over the igneous, and metamorphic rocks of the western
southern part of the Arabian peninsula. The Tibestis. The large circular features are
series provides partial stereoscopic coverage. calderas, surrounded by extensive rhyolite or
The area shown, also photographed during the ignimbrite deposits (ref. 7).
Gemini I V mission, is the Hadramawt Plateau Figure 35-7, since it w,as taken with the
with the Hadramawt Wadi a t lower right. The 250-mm lens, is of considerable interest in
plateau is underlain by gently dipping marine evaluating the usefulness of long-focal-length
shales (Geologic Map of the Arabian Peninsula, lenses. The area covered is the Tifernine
U.S. Geological Survey, 1963) deeply dissected Dunes (ref. 2) in south-central Algeria. De-
in a dendritic pattern. Several interesting ex- spite the longer focal length, the region included
amples of incipient stream piracy are visible, in in the picture is about 90 miles from side to side
which streams cutting lieadwsrd intersect other because of the camera tilt. The picture pro-
streams. (All are, of course, now dry.) vides a synoptic view of the dune field and its
Figure 35-6 W R S taken over Chad, lookiiig to relation to surrounding topography, which
the southeast over the Tibesti Mountains. This should prove valuable in studies of dune forma-
photograph was specifically requested to inves- tion.
tigate geologic features discovered on Gemini Figure 35-8 shows a portion of the Erg
I V photographs (ref. 6 ) . One of these fea- Chech in west-central Algeria, looking to the
tures is the circular structure at far left center. southeast. The dark ridges a t the lower left
Although probably an igneous intrusion, such
are the Kahal Tabelbala and Ougarta, folded
as a laccolith, its similarity to the Richat struc-
tures suggests that an impact origin be con- Paleozoic sandstones, limestones, and schists
sidered. Another structural feature whose sig- (ref. 8), separated by the Erg er Raoui, a dune
nificance is currently unknown is the series of field. Of considerable interest is the variety of
concentric lineaments at far left. These are dunes in the lower right. A t least two major
directions of dune chains at high angles to each
other are visible, suggesting a possible transi-
tion from transverse to longitudinal dunes.
the spacecraft nose (lower left) may outline the and agTiculture, since terrain photography on
60-fathom contour as shown on Coast and Geo- previous Gemini flights has shown that the color
detic Chart 1115. Also, the tone contours just response of conventional color film ill green
east of the Mississippi Delta at lower left corre- wavelengths is poor, probably due to atmos-
spond roughly to the depth of water between the pheric scattering.
delta and Breton Island. However, it is prob- Summary
able that temperature of the water and over- Tile following results have been achieved dur-
lying air influence the color response of this ing tile terrain photography on the Gemini IV
film, and more detailed analysis is needed. and VII missions :
Considerable color detail is visible in land
(1) New areas not previously photographed
areas. Differences are probably the expression have been covered.
of vegetation rather than soil or geologic units, (2) Coverage of previously photographed
since the expected color response (for example, areas has been extended or improved.
red replacing green) is present on the color (.3) The value of color infrared film in hyper-
prints. It is obvious, from this and adjoining altitude photography has been demonstrated.
pictures, that much more color discrimination (4) The effectiveness of moderately long fo-
is possible with color infrared film than with cal lengths has been demonstrated.
conventional color film. This fact is of great The experiment on both missions has been
importance for the application of hyperaltitude highly successful, despite the difficulties en-
photography to range management, forestry, countered.
References
1. SMITI:I, H. T. U.: Eolian Geomorphology, Wind Mantle Project, Programs and International
Direction, and Climatic Change in North Africa. Recommendations, 1960-63, issued by the Secre-
AFCRL-63-443. Geophysics Research Direc- tariat of the Upper Mantle Committee, Los
torate, Air Force Cambridge Research Labora- Angeles, Calif., 1963.
tories, Bedford, Mass., 1963. 6. LOWMAN, P. D., JR. : Experiment S-5, Synoptic Ter-
2. RAIsZ, E. : Landform Map of North Africa, prepare_l rain Photography During Gemini IV. Manned
for Quartermaster General, U.S. Army, 1952. Space Flight Experiments Symposium, Gemini
3. PEPPER, J. F. ; AND EVERHART, G. M. : The Indian Missions III and IV, NASA, Washington, 1965.
Ocean: The Ge_)logy of Its Bordering Lands and 7. GROVE, A. T. : Geomorphology of the Tibesti Region
the Configuration of Its Floor. Miscellaneous With Special Reference to Western Tibesti.
Geologic Investigations, U.S. Geological Survey, Geographicai Journal, vol. CXXVI, 1960, pp. 18-27.
Map 1-380, 1963. S. MORRIS0N, A. ; AND CH0WN, M. C. : Photography of
4. BueHER, W. H. : The Deformation of the Earth's the Western Sahara Desert From the Mercury
Crust. Princeton University Press, Princeton, MA-4 Spacecraft. NASA Contractor Report,
N.J., 1933 (Reprint authorized, Hafner Pub. Co., NASA CR-126, 1964.
New York). 9. LOWMAN, P. D., JR.: A Review of Photography of
5. BELOUSSOV, V. V. : The Study of the Great African the Earth From Sounding Rockets and Satellites.
Rifts : Draft Program. International Upper NASA Technical Note D-1868, 1964.
36. EXPERIMENT S-6, SYNOPTIC WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY
By KENNETH M. NAGLER, Chie/, Space Operations Support Division, Weather Bureau, Environmental
Science Services Administration, and STANLEY D. SOULES, National Environmental Satellite Center,
Environmental Science Services Administration
353
354 GEMINI MIDPROORAM CONFERENCE
I
1
Other Phenomena
FIGURE 36-8.-Seif dunes in the northwestern Sudan,
with a banded cloud structure above, one of a num-
Pictures of features other than clouds, often ber of views of dune formations taken on the Gemini
obtained from the S-5 synoptic terrain photog- flights. Photographed by Gemini VI1 flight crew at
mphy experiment, wliicli uses the same camera 12 :02 G.m.t., lk-eiiiber 11, 1WG.
and film as S-6, sometimes are of interest, in
meteorology and related fields. For example, (ref. 4). Figure 36-10 shows the dark area
smoke from forest fires or from industrial resulting from heavy rains in the previous 24
sources may indicate the low-level wind direc- hours.
tion and may yield quantitative inform a t'ion on Conclusion
the stability of the lower atmospliere. Sand
dunes of various types are of interest to those In conclusion, througli the skill of the crews
of various Gemini missions, and the assistance
working on the relationship between winds and
of many NASA individuals working in the ex-
deposition patterns. One of many dune scenes
periments program, a great many excellent, use-
is shown in figure ?&8. Similarly, the con- ful pictures of the earth's weather systems have
figuration of bottom sand in some shallow water been obtained ; however, weather systems are
areas can be related to motions in the ocean. extremely variable, and there remain a number
Figure 36-9 is one of several views of the ocmn of interesting views or combinations of views
bottom in the Bahama Islands area. Also, the which it is hoped will be obtained on future
differencesin the reflectivity of wet and dry soils manned space flights over regions of the earth,
call be related to the occiirrence of recent rainfall both within and outside the equatorial zone.
References
1. SAGLER, K. 11. ; ANI) Sorrrm, S. L). : E s l w i n i r n t S-6, 3. NAGLER,K. M. ; A N D SOULEE,
S. I). : Experiment S-6,
Synoptic Weather I'hotogrnphy Iluring Griiiiiii 1V. Weather Photography. Manned Space-Flight EX-
Manned Spare Flight Esperiinents Symposium,
periments Interim Report, Gemini V Mission,
Geniiui Missions I11 and I\', NASA, Washington,
NASA, Washington, D.C., January 1966.
D.C.. Octolier L"i.5.
2. XAGLER,K. 11. ; A N I ) S o u ~ mS.
, 1). : ('loud I'hotogra- 4. HOPR,J . R. : Path of Heavy Rninfall Photographed
phy From the Gemini 4 Spaceflight. Bnlletin of From Space, Bulletin of the American Meteoro-
the American Meteorological Society, vol. 46, no. 9, logical Society, May 1966.
September 19666.
SYNOPTIC WEATHER PHOTWRAPHY 357
By JAMES R. MARBACH, Advanced Spacecra[t Technology Division, NASA Manned Spacecra/t Center, and
WILLIAM D. WOMACK, Advanced Spacecra/t Technology Division, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
374-Loeation
FIGURE of proton/electron spectrom-
eter in Gemini VI1 spacecraft.
Preliminary data
1
-5.50 - .ni System time, hr:min
374.-Proton/electron
FIGURE spectrometer used fm 374-Flux compared with time for revolution
FIQURE
Gemini VI1 mission. 36 of Gemini IV mission.
PROTON/ELECTRON SPECTROMETER AND TRI-AXIS MAGNE_OM'ETER 361
rate of about 104 electrons/cm 2-sec and 10 pro- Figure 37-9 is a plot of magnetometer data
tons/cm2-sec. Peak counting rates encountered that were typical throughout most of the mis-
never exceeded about 6 × 104 for electrons and sion. The strongly varying direction of the
102 for protons. Figure 37-7 shows character- field lines, with respect to the spacecraft during
istic electron spectra observed through one revolutions 7 and 22, was due almost entirely
anomaly pass. As is evident in the figure, the to the tumbling motion of the spacecraft, which
speclrum changes significantly through the was free to drift in pitch, roll, and yaw through-
out most of the mission. Revolution 51 is a
anomaly. Figure 37-8 depicts the proton spec-
pass during which the pilot held pitch, roll,
trum for the same pass. The change in shape
here is much more subtle. and yaw as close to zero as possible. Figure
37-10 shows the total field strength measured
during revolution 51 as compared with the
theoretical values predicted for this region
/0,2_7_B_0,220
I I I l_ I I I
O I 2 5
Energy,
4
MeV
5 6 ?
.oo:\.f .....
"_ 50 ,- #S_'_'# _'*'_"_
Preliminary data
o I I I I I
54°W 45°W 36°W 27°W 18_W 9°W 0° 9°E 18°E 27°E
Longitude
Gemini IV
of magnetic
mission.
field during
i 48 Term expansion
o Reduced data
5OK Raw data
8
E
40K
20K
tL.
IOK
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I
60 W 45 W 30 W 15 W 0 15 E
O tO 20 30 40 50 60 70 Be
Longitude, deg
Energy, MeV
FIGURE 37-8.--Characteristic proton spectra for revolu- FIGURE 37-10.--Field strength measured during revolu-
105 - I00 -
ycleped during the launch or orbit phase of the
mission.
104 - 80 -- SS f_
70 s S _ 1 t _ _ S Several days prior to the Gemini VII launch,
the magnetometer Z-axis detector was observed
to have failed. Replacement of the sensor would
102 - _" 40
Experiment MSC-3 data for revolution 7 of Gemini liminary strip-chart data from the flight show
IV mission. the X- and :Y-axes performed as expected.
Conclusions
measured on revolution 7 with the correction in-
cluded. The point where the spacecraft Z-axis The significant variation of the spectral shape
is approximately parallel with the magnetic of charged particles, particularly electrons, in
field correlates nicely with an observed dip in manned spacecraft orbits points out the need for
charged particle intensity as observed by the simultaneous inside/outside measurements dur-
MSC-2 spectrometer. Since the flux incident ing actual missions if significant correlations of
on the spectrometer is at a minimum whenever measured and calculated dose are to be obtained.
the Z-axis of the spacecraft is alined with the The spectra measured indicate that a signif-
magnetic field, this dip would be expected if, in icant number of electrons are penetrating into
fact, the corrected data were true. the cabin, based on knowledge of the Gemini
spacecraft shielding effectiveness. Although
Dose Calculations
the dosimeters reflect very little accumulated
In order to determine what intensities and dose due to electrons, it is difficult to determine
how the gross difference in calculated and meas-
spectra were encountered throughout the entire
mission, the data in figure 37-6 were replotted ured dose can be due entirely to inadequacies in
in B and L coordinates. This plot, together the shielding calculations. A preliminary study
with figures 37-7 and 37-8, was then used in of a spacecraft hatch has been made to deter-
the MSC-developed computer code to calculate mine its transparency to incident electrons. By
what approximate dose should have been re- placing the hatch in an electron beam, it was
shown that its abili.ty to shield electrons is less
ceived by the crew for the entire mission. It
should be noted that the B, L plots are based than what the shielding program predicts.
on one revolution only and, thus, provide only Assuming that the rest of the spacecraft totally
preliminary data with corresponding uncertain- shields electron flux from the cabin, this investi-
ties in the dose estimates. The spectral data gation shows 'that sufficient electron penetration
used are good to within about a factor of 2. would occur through the spacecraft hatch area
alone to produce a measurable electron dose in
Data From Gemini VII the crew compartment. It is possible that the
design of the dosimeter packages is such that
Very few data from the Gemini VII mission
they are rela'tively insensitive to the expected
have been reduced so that little can be discussed
electron dose levels. This is presently being
at this time about the results. Quick-look,
investigated.
strip-chart data indicate the spectrometer was
operating as expected insofar as the electron The possibility of error in either or both the
measurement is concerned. Proton data, how- calculational technique and the dosimeter sys-
ever, appear to be somewhat erratic and are tem suggests that a sensitive electron spectrom-
suspected, but a detailed analysis of more data eter inside the spacecraft cabin would provide
is needed to determine if a true difficulty de- very valuable data. An effort is presently under-
PROTON/ELECTRON SPECTROMETER AND TRI-AXIS MAGNErI_)_[ETER 363
way at MSC to modify the bremsstmhlung secondary X-rays. This technique and the
spectrometer experiment equipmen_ (MSC-7), associated results will be discussed in the experi-
which is now scheduled for a later Gemini mis- ment symposia following the flights in which
sion_ to detect both electron flux as well as the equipment is installed.
38. EXPERIMENT D4/D7, CELESTIAL RADIOMETRY AND
SPACE-OBJECT RADIOMETRY
By BURDEN BRENTNALL, Air Force Systems Command Field Office, NASA Manned Spacecratt Center
The study of the spectral irradiance of nat- Two interferometer spectrometers and a mul-
ural phenomena and manmade objects has been tichannel spectroradiometer were used as the
of increasing interest in recent years both to sensing instruments in this experiment. The
the scientific community and to the Department selection of the instruments and the particular
of Defense. The purpose of the Air Force detectors in the instruments was based upon
D4/D7 experiment has been to obtain accurate the spectral bands to be investigated in each
measurements from space of emitted and re- flight (fig. 38-1) and the nature of the intended
flected radiance from a comprehensive collection measurements. The instrument characteristics
of subjects. The determination of threshold (field of view and resolution, for example) were
sensitivity values in absolute numbers, and t'he a compromise among optimization for a partic-
separation and com_lation of specific targets ular type of measurement, a need for a broad
with various backgrounds have been prime selection of spectral information, and the per-
objectives. formance and other influencing characteristics
This report is intended to provide a descrip- of the spacecraft.
tion of the equipment used on Gemini V and Since the D4/D7 experiment equipment is
VII and its operations, and a discussion of the contained in several units, it will be reviewed
measurements made. Results will be discussed first by component and then integrally as an
generally on a quantitative basis. experimental system aboard the Gemini space-
Electromagnetic spectrum
I X-Rays
•39-1 I-'_e I I I
i I I I I I
.2 to.35p I to 3u
Radiometer Gemini "WIT Ii I I
PMT PbS
I 3 12.u
I I I
Ir spectrometer
pbS BOLO
8-12p
L.-I
Cryogenic spectrometer
HgGe
365
366 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
craft. After the system has been defined, oper- The interferometer section was patterned after
ational aspects will be discussed. the Michelson interferometer (fig. 38-5).
The beam splitter splits the optical path,
D4/D7 Flight Equipment sending part of the beam to the movable mirror
Radiometer M I and the other part to a fixed mirror M,. As
One of the three measuring instruments used a result of the optical path changeability, the
in this experiment was a multichannel, direct- waves returning from the mirrors may be in
current spectroradiometer. I n this radiometer phase (additive) or may be out of phase to
(fig. 38-2), the impinging energy is focused by some degree and have a canceling effect. The
the collecting optics, mechanically chopped and total effect is to produce cyclic reinforcement
filtered to dbtain specific bands of interest, and or interference with the wave amplitude at the
then received by the three detectors. The de- detector at any given frequency. The fre-
tector signals are then amplified and demodu- quency at the detector of this alternate cancella-
lated. The resultant signals are a function of tion and reinforcement is a function of t'he
energy intensity in a given spectral band. particular spectral energy wavelength h, the
The D4/M radiometer (fig. 38-3) was made optical retardation B of the mirror, and the
by Block Engineering Associates, Cambridge,
time required to move the mirror (scan time) T.
Mass. The radiometer instrument parameters
Thus,
for each flight are presented in table 38-1.
As a result of reviewing the Gemini V flight B
Fh=z
data, a decision was made to modify the Gemini
VI1 radiometer to incorporate a more sensitive The detector puts out an alternating-current
signal which is the sum of t,he alternating-
ultraviolet, (UV) photomultiplier tube. An
ASCOP 541F-05M tube was installed in place
of the IP 28 flown on Gemini V, and the bolom-
eter detector was eliminated to make room for -
the larger photomultiplier tube.
Thirteen signals were provided from the
radiometer on Gemini V ; 11 were provided on
Gemini VII. The signals included detector
temperatures, gain, filter wheel position, and
analog signal output from the detectors.
Interferometer Spectrometer
The second sensing instrument was a dual-
channel interferometer spectrometer (fig.3 8 4 ) . FIGURE
383.-Trich~nnel spectroradiometer.
Energy -
.. c
Signal
c
- -
0-'
f --
--0-
<a
source
.'',
Mirror
-
Chopper -
c
c
I\
Signal
Signal
b
c
OPtlCS
Beam - Detectors Demodulators
splitters Filter Amplifiers
wheel
FIGURE
38-2.-Radiometer functional diagram.
CELESTIAL RADIOMETRY AND SPACE-OBJECT RADIOMETRY 367
current signals corresponding to all the wave- and an actual measurement on the California
lengths from the source. The amplitudes of coast during Gemini V is shown in figure
the signals will vary directly with the source 38-6(d).
brightness at each wavelength. The output of The D4/D7 interferometer spectrometer dis-
the interferometer is then a complex waveform cussed here (and referred to nontechnically as
called an interferogram which is the Fourier the "uncooled" or "IR" spectrometer) con-
transform of the incident radiation frequencies tained a lead sulfide detector and a bolometer
(fig. 38-6(a) ). This transform is reduced to a detector, thus providing correlative informa-
plot of wavelength versus intensity by taking tion to that of the spectroradiometer. This,
the inverse transform of the interferogram (fig. too, was a Block Engineering instrument. Its
38-6(b)). An interferogram made with the parameters are listed in table 38-II. Data
D4/D7 instrument is shown in figure 38-6(c) output from the instrument included the signals
368 GEI_IINI MIDPROGRA_ CONFERENCE
,_ n _ .transducer
Incident_ _ H [
radiation .._ _
Beamsplitter"" i
Detector./'"_ I_
spectrometer.
(a)
.-,O.eroo. m
,,r li
_.1
"'""S cQrl _ t
I
fo)
1
I I I
Me r::;Yer °::ll f_lit:Sri° n
FIGuilv 38-6.--Continued.
from the two detectors, gain settings, detector The principal difference is that the highly sen-
temperatures, and automatic calibration source, siltive detector must be cryogenically cooled to
data. Lead-sulfide signal data were handled make measurements in the region of interest
on a data channel-sharing basis with the detec- (8 to 12 microns). The cooling is accom-
tor output from the cryogenic spectrometer. plished by immersing a well containing the
detector, optics, and some of the electronics in
Cryogenic Interferometer Spectrometer
liquid neon.
The cryogenic interferometer spectrometer The cryogenic subsystem was made for Block
is similar in operation to the IR spectrometer, Engineering by AiResearch Division of Gar-
although dissimilar in appe'lrance (fig. 38-7). rett Corp. It was an open-cycl% subcritical,
CELESTIAL RADIOMETRY AND BPACE-OBJECT RADIOMETRY 369
cryogenic cooling system which maintained t.he
instrument well at a temperature of -397" F
for a period of approximately 14 hours. Fig-
ure 38-8 shows an X-ray view of the cryogenic
tank and instrument well. The parameters for
l the instrument are listed in table 38-111.
F I G3&7.--Cryogenic
~ interferometer spectrometer.
FIGURE
38-8.--X-ray view of cryogenic interferometer
spectrometer.
370 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
TABLE
3&III.-Pararneters of the Cryogenic 8
Interferometer Spectrometer
Weight (with neon) _________ 33.5 lb.
power input _________________ 6 watts
Field of view __________-_____ 2"
Optics ______________________ 4 in. Cassegrain
Detector .................... Mercury-doped germanium
Spectral band _______________ 8 to 12 microns
Dynamic range_____-________ lo3 automatic gain
changing
Coolant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Liquid neon
Eloctronics Unit
The electronics unit used in conjunction with FIGURE38-9.-Instrument panel for Experiment
the three sensing devices contained the various D4/D7.
circuits necessary for the experiment. The cir-
cuitry includes an electronic commutator, filter and V I 1 as shown in figure 38-10. The radiom-
motor logic, variable control oscillators, mixer eter and spectrometers were mounted in the
amplifier, clock pulse generator, and other sec- Gemini retroadapter section on swingout arms.
ondary electronic circuitry. After the spacecraft was in orbit, doors in the
Recorder Transport and Electronics
adapher were pyrotechnically opened, and the
three sensing units swung through the openings
The D4/D7 experiment tape recorder was sep- into boresight alinement with the spacecraft op-
arated into two modules : the tape transport and tical sight. After the sensing units had been
the recorder electronics. This was done so that erected, the spacecraft was pointed at the de-
the recorder would fit into the available space sired area for measurement. Figure 38-11
on the Gemini reentry vehicle. The recorder shows the Gemini V I 1 with the instruments ex-
provided 56 minutes of tape for three channels tended. Gemini V was similar in appearance.
of data. It was not capable of dump, and data The data from the radiometer were telem-
were stored and retrieved with the spacecraft. etered through the spacecraft pulse code mod-
ulation (PCM) system. The data from the
Frequency-Modulation Transmitter and Antenna
spectrometers were telemetered through the
I n parallel with the recorder, the D4/D7 transmitter or routed to the recorder, or both
transmitter provided three channels of real- were accomplished, if desired.
time frequency-modulated ( F M ) data to se-
lected ground stations located around the earth. D4/D7 Mission Plan
The transmitter, operating through an antenna
The desired objectives for the D4/D7 meas-
extended from the pilot's side of the spacecraft,
urements included the following :
transmitlted 2 watts on an assigned ultrahigh
frequency. Microns
______________________
E a r t h backgrounds 0.2 to 12
Control Panel Sky backgrounds ........................ 0.2 to 12
Sky-to-horizon spectral calibrations__----_ 8 to 12
The majority of the switches associated with Rocket exhaust plumes __________________ 0.2 to 3
the experiment were located on the pilot's main Natural space phenomena (stars, moon,
sun) _________________________________ 0.2t012
console (fig. 38-9). Additional functions were
Manmade objects in space_______________ 0.2 to 12
provided by a meter and some sequencing Weather phenamena (clouds, storms, light-
switches. ning) ________________________________ 0.2to10
Equatorial nadir-to-horizon spectral cali-
D4/D7 Experiment System brations__-__-___________-__-_____--___-_____-
8to10
The experiment system consisting of the fore- Since the lifdime of the cryogenic neon in the
going components was mounted in Gemini V cooled spectrometer was limited to 14 hours, 5
CELESTIAL RADIOMETRY AND SPACE-OBJECT RADIOMETRY 371
Spectrometer / interferometer
(Cryogenic cooled \ 7
TY
Panel controls - - -,
--
*
L-Spectrometer / interferometer
FIQUBE
38-lO.--Location of Experiment D4/D7 equipment in spacecraft.
ThePCM dataarereducedin termsof filter The equipment was erected and operationally
settingsandgain; then,calibrationcoefficients verified over Carnarvon, Australia, during the
first revolution.
areapplied. Both PCM andFM dataarecor-
relatedwith crewmancomments and photog- During the second revolution, the REP was
raphy,whereapplicable. ejected and measurements were made of its
separation from the spacecraft during the
From the foregoing,the magnitudeof the
data-reduction taskcanbeseen. Thedatafrom spacecraft darkness period. The primary in-
strument for this measurement was the cryo-
D4/D7on GeminiV arestill in the process of
genic spectrometer. The cover on the spectrom-
reductionand,atthepresenttime,arenot avail-
eter was jettisoned when the REP was approxi-
ablein sufficient amountstobediscussed qualita-
mately 9500 feet away from Gemini V, and
tively to anysignificantextent. All the PCM measurements were made during the remainder
datafrom the radiometerhavebeenreduced of the darkness period.
and are presentlybeing correlatedwith the After 15 minutes of operation, the filter wheel
spectrometer data as they becomeavailable. on the radiometer ceased working and remained
The process of reducingthe interferogramsis on filter settings of 4000 angstroms (_), 9.2
presently35percentcomplete.The following microns, and 4.3 microns for the remainder of
isa list of theD4/D7measurements madedur- the flight. Since the interferometers still func-
ingtheGeminiV flight: tioned satisfactorily, the restriction in radiom-
eter data was not of major concern. The main
loss of data was in the UV region--not covered
Revolu- Location Measurement by the spectrometers--where only the 4000 ,_
tion
information was available. In playing the on-
board D4/D7 recorder after its retrieval, it was
1 Carnarvon, Operational readiness discovered that no REP measurement data were
Australia. check of cryogenic
recorded on the tape. This limited the informa-
spectrometer
Africa-Australia_ Rendezvous evaluation tion from the cryogenic spectrometer to the FM
pod (REP) measure- data received during the pass over Carnarvon.
ments during darkness Review of the interferograms made at Carnar-
14 Australia ....... Night water and night
von indicates that the signal was well above the
land measurements
16 Africa .......... Mountains and land with noise level. Reduction is in process, and at-
vegetation tempts are being made to separate the back-
16 Malagasy_ ...... Night water and night ground signal and spacecraft radiance from the
land measurements
signal of the REP. This task is made more
16 Australia ....... Star measurement, Vega
difficult by the lack of data from the onboard
16 Australia ....... Equipment alinement
recorder.
check
17 Australia ....... Moon irradiance measure- Due to the date of the launch of Gemini V,
ment the moon measurements had to be made on a
31 Africa .......... Cloud blanket sweep, partially illuminated moon. The radiometer
nadir-to-horizon
data from this measurement can be seen in fig-
31/32 Florida ......... Land with vegetation
45 Australia ....... Night void-sky measure- ures 38-12(a) and 38-12(b).
ment Quick-look information on the 4000 _ radi-
47 Australia ....... Zodiacal light ometer data on Vega and Deneb is excellent.
47 Australia ....... Star measurement, Deneb
The values on that spectrum band were slightly
47 California ...... Minuteman missile launch
51 Hawaii ......... Island measurement higher than those theoretically predicted. For
61 New Mexico .... Rocket sled firing example, the value for Vega was 1.2×10 -_
62 California ...... Minuteman missile launch watts per square centimeter per micron at 4000
74 Africa .......... Water, land, mountains,
desert
88 Africa .......... Desert An example of the IR spectrometer data can
89 Africa .......... Mountains be seen in figure 38-13. This shows the return
103 Australia ....... Horizon-to-nadir scan at 1.88 microns on the California land
background.
CELESTIAL RADIOMETRY AND SPACE-OBJECT RADIOMETRY 878
ground measurement
Malagasy- Launch vehicle measure-
Australia. ment
Ascension ....... Void space measure-
ment
Ascension ....... Star measurement--
o-IO Rigel with cryo-
genic spectrometer
Ascension ....... Launch vehicle measure-
ment
South Atlantic___ Star measurement--
Sirius with cryo-
genic spectrometer
Malagasy ....... Night sky-earth
io -II 1 I I horizon calibration
24:58:50 24:59:00 24:59:20 24:59:40 25:00:00 sweep with cooled
hrm s
spectrometer
(b) Moon measurements made during alinement check, Malagasy ....... Cryogenic lifetime check
10-6
California
Revolu- Location Measurement land
tion background-.
to-?
6 Hawaii .......... Cryogenic lifetime
E
check
m
7 Hawaii ......... Cryogenic lifetime
check
8 Ascension ...... Cryogenic lifetime
io-O
check
15 Malagasy ....... Radiometer and IR
spectrometer aline-
ment check on I I I I [ I I I I 1
37:50 38:00 :10 :20 :30 :40 :50 39:00 :lO :20
nearly full moon Time, min
3O Malagasy ....... Star measurements--
Betelgeuse and Rigel FIGURE 38-13.--InterferoIneter spectrometer data
without cryogenic (1.88#).
instrument
31 Florida .......... Polaris launch
Ascension ....... Milky Way Nineteen minutes after Gemini VII lift-off
32
32 North America___ Earth background-- the D4/D7 sensors were erected, and the equip-
coastal, mountains, ment turned on. An 8-feet-per-second separa-
desert, land with
tion burn was made away from the launch vehi-
vegetation
North America___ Earth background-- cle at sunset, and measurements on the launch
45
water, mountains, vehicle were begun. Cryogenic spectrometer
plains, coastal measurements were made for the remainder of
regions correlated the night cycle as the spacecraft separated from
with IR eolor-fihn
the launch vehicle. Periodically during this
photographs
49 Malagasy ....... Night airglow period, launch vehicle background measure-
49 Malagasy ...... Large fire on earth at ments were made, and, at one point, the launch
night vehicle was measured against a moon back-
59 Malagasy ...... Full moon measure-
ground.
ment
During the second revolution, measurements
59 Australia ....... Night land, water,
cloud reflectance were performed with the cryogenic spectrom-
with full moon eter on void space, on the launch vehicle, and on
59 Australia ....... Lightning at night the stars Rigel and Sirius. At the conclusion of
74 Africa .......... Cloud blanket sweep the measurement on Sirius a slow pitch-down
with camera correla-
maneuver was made to the lmrizon. The pur-
tion
75 Africa .......... Lightning at night pose of this measurement was to do a nigh't sky-
76 Ascension ....... Horizon-to-nadir scan to-horizon calibration sweep in the 8- to
88 Africa ........... Desert 12-micron region. The radiometer gave UV
89 Malagasy ....... Celestial measure-
correlation data during this measurement.
ment--Venus
Alinement of the radiometer and IR spec-
104 Australia ........ Night land and water
117/118 Florida .......... Gemini VI-A abort trometer was performed December 5, 1965, on a
148 New Mexico ..... Rocket sled firing nearly full moon. Photographic coverage of the
149 Pacific .......... Night measurement of measurement objective was simultaneously ob-
Minuteman reentry
tained by a camera boresighted along the instru-
161/162 Florida .......... Gemini VI-A climb to
orbit ment axis (fig. 38-14). The equipment aline-
166 Hawaii .......... Gemini VI-A station ment was checked by the use of a meter in the
keeping center console. The crewmen boresighted the
169 South America___ Gemini VI-A separa- spacecraft on the moon and then made minor
tion burn
excursions in pitch and yaw to locate the aiming
193 Texas ........... Sun measurement
point for optimum signal return (fig. 38-15).
This accounts for the dips in the curves seen on
375
the lead sulfide W madings on the IR
spectrometer made on December 8 (fig. 38-20).
The values taken on December 8 are slightly
higher than those taken on December 5, as would
be expected. Figure 38-21 shows the flight
measurements from Gemini V on a predicted
25-day moon curve and those for Gemini VI1
against a full moon curve.
. _- _
- - _- - _ _
-Gemini 9Il rev 15
nearly full moon Dec 5
3000 angstrom setting during
alinement optimization
38-16.-Moon
F~QURE irradiance during alinement
optimization (3OOO angstrom setting).
/
I
I
T
I . \\
I
I- - c --c
c
- c - c - @'--4- 4-4- -I
yc8flo4UG/
- 4-4
I
------- Gemlnl UlI rev 15
nearly full moon Dec 5
1.555 micron setting during
olinernent optimizotion
10-7 _
_10-8
I I I I I I
.20 .22 24 .26 28 .30 l_)2
Wavelength, microns 10-8 I I
1.0 2 0 5.0
Wavelenglh (microns)
FIGURE 38-18.--Values of moon irradianoe from 2000
to 3060 angstronis.
FIGURE 38-20.--Comparison of PbS channel readings on
10-5
• Gemini-'V rod
® Gemini-_[/I_' rod
........... Gemini "E_ rev 15
nearly full moon Dec5 .... Gemini spect
-_31T
10-6
10-7 PbS channel, radiometer ,Full moon solar reflection
/ ,Moon self emission
10-7
Io-8
io-9
By LAWRENCEF. DIETLEIN, M.D., Assistant Chie/ /or Medical Support, Crew Systems Division, NASA
Manned Spacecra/t Center; and' WXLUAM V. JUDY, Crew Systems Division, NASA Manned Space-
crajt Center
Introduetion 140 -
Lundy
when inflated to 70 to 75 millimeters of mercury 100
for 9 out of every 6 minutes, provided protec- 90
tion against cardiovascular "deconditioning" 80
o
which was occasioned by 6 hours of water im- 70
mersion (ref. 1). Four healthy, male subjects
were immersed in water to neck level for a 6-
5O
hour period on two separate occasions, 2 days
apart. Figures 39-1, 39-2, 39-3, and 39-4 indi- I I I I I I I I I l _ i L
0 2 4 6 8 I0 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 2B 30
cate that 6 hours of water immersion resulted in
Time, min
cardiovascular "deconditioning," as evidenced Wl no.I 6-22-65 Wt no. 2 6-24-65
ond subject.
mersion, during which leg cuffs were utilized,
revealed that a definite protective effect was
achieved. Cardioacceleration was less pro-
nounced, and no syncope occurred.
14o F
14oq
13oL Tilt up Till down 1301
1201
120[- Subjecl :
.¢ II0
I00
90
80
70
T
60
_ 60 50
4-0
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
0 2 4 6 8 I0 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Time. rain
Wl no.I 6-22-65 Wl no.2 6-24-65
Wl no. I 6-22-65 Wl no.2 6-24-65 -- Pre-woter immersion .... Pre-woter immersion
--Pre-woter immersion ..... Pre-woter immersion ---- Post-woter immersion ..... Post-woter immersion
----Post-woter immersion ..... Post-woter immersion (no cuffs) (cuffs)
(no cuffs) (cuffs) Syncope
FZ¢UR_. 39-1.--Six-hour water immersion studies, first Fioua_ 39-3.--Six-hour water immersion studies, third
subject. subject.
381
382 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
140r
-:,. ..^
50 -
40 -
I I I I I I I I I ~ I ~I J
F I G U39-5.4ardiovascular
~ reflex conditioning
The physiological mechanisms responsible for system.
the observed efficacy of the cuff technique re-
main obscure. One might postulate that the
cuffs prevent thoracic blood. volume overload,
thus inhibiting the so-called Gauer-Henry re-
flex with its resultant diuresis and diminished
effective circulating blood volume. Alterna-
tively, or perhaps additionally, one might
postulate that the cuffs induce an intermittent
artificial hydrostatic gradient (by increasing
venous pressure distal t o the cuffs during in-
flation) across the walls of the leg veins, mimick- FIQUBE
39-6.-Cardiovascular conditioning pneumatic
ing the situation that results from standing cuffs.
erect in a l-g environment and thereby prevent-
ing the deterioration of the normal venomotor and 39-6). The cycling system was entirely
reflexes. Theoretically, this action should pneumatic and alternately inflated and deflated
lessen the pooling of blood in the lower extremi-
the leg cuffs attached to the pilot's thighs. The
ties and increase the effective circulating blood
system flown on Gemini V (fig. 39-7) consisted
volume upon return to a 1-g environment fol-
of three basic components :
lowing weightlessness or its simulation. The
(1) A pressurized storage vessel charged
precise mechanism, or mechanisms, of action
with oxygen to 3500 psig.
must await further study.
(2) A pneumatic control system for monitor-
ing the pressurized storage vessel.
Equipment and Methods
(3) A pneumatic oscillator system for pe-
The equipment used in Experiment M-1 con- riodically inflating and deflating the leg cuffs.
sisted of a pneumatic timing or cycling system The equipment flown on Gemini VI1 was al-
and a pair of venous pressure cuffs (figs. 39-5 most identical to that used on Gemini V and
CARDIOVASCULAR CONDITIONII_G 383
was supplied with oxygen pressure from the VII command pilot are indicated in figures 39-
spacecraft environmental control system. The 11 through 39-14, and for the Gemini VII pilot
pneumatic venous pressure cuffs were formfitted in figures 39-15 through 39-18. Figure 39-19
to the proximal thigh area of the pilot. The summarizes the Gemini VII tilt-table data.
cuffs consisted essentially of a 3- by 6-inch blad-
170
der enclosed in a soft nonstretchable fabric. Pre:tilt Tilt Post -tilt
160
The bladder portion of each cuff was positioned
i50
on the dorsomedial aspect of each thigh. The
lateral surface of the cuffs consisted of a lace 140
c_
adjuster to insure proper fit. E 150
ca
120
Cabin reference
', Relief valve opens at o
Spring-loaded _ ] 120 mm Hg
shutoff valve '_ _1 __ 9o
(manual) _ L_ ii ' t 80
" .,_ '11''_ / Timing restrlc or
70
--Regulator_ 60
5O I I I I I I I I I I I I
pressure I (90 psi) I "Cabin
-@ .......
o---o---.o
Mean
Mean
preflight
postflight
values
values
,pilot
,command pilot
------Mean preflight values, command pilot
reference , "Relief vo lye Mean postflight values ,pilot
Regulator" opens at 120 mm Hg
80 mm Hg
FIGURE 39-8.--Summary of pulse rate during tilt-table
Sys- 140
I I
tolic 130
Results
_2o
II0 .... ° _ ....
The Cardiovascular Conditioning Experi-
/--.-3/t--2 \ i-a--7
ment (M-l) was flown on the Gemini V and c_ E I00
E
VII missions. The pilots for these missions
m 80 i i
served as experimental subjects; the command
Dia- 70
pilots were control subjects. The experiment i • I I _ _ i I _ : 7"1 f I i
stolic 6C
was operative for the first 4 days of the 8-day I 2 3 4 0 I 2 3 4 0 I 2 3 4
Time from landing, days
Gemini V mission, and 13.5 days of the Gemini
VII mission. ..... Mean preflight values, pilot
_Mean postflight values, pilot
Prior to these missions, each crewmember was ------ Mean preflight values, command pilot
given a series of tilt-table tests. These control _Meon postflight values, command pilot
70 °
--Gemini flight
vertical
dole
tilt
------Bed rest data
.__ _ I00
_g _:o 70
u
50
_: 130
G
_N6o
-r_40
7O
I
._c
20 I0
.__
E
_ a
J I q I I I I
2 4 6 8 IO 12 14 f--/
Days
_ 0
d 0
FmUR_ 39-10.--Pulse-rate change after Gemini mis- 5 2
o
sions compared with bed-rest data.
2 4 6 8 I0 12 14 16 IB 20 22 24
Minutes
The Gemini V crew exhibited a higher post-
--Preflight mean Subject:Commendpilot
flight mean resting pulse rate than did the Gem-
.... Postflight Tilt: no. l
ini VII crew,' with a maximal difference of
Time: 12:00 em
12-f01d (pilot's) occurring 2 to 4 hours after re- Date: Dec 28,1965
covery. This elevated resting pulse rate grad-
FIovPm 39-11.--Data from first tilt-table study of
ually returned to the preflight levels. The
Gemini VII command pilot.
Gemini VII crew exhibited a slight increase in
postflight mean resting pulse rate over preflight
levels; these values returned to preflight levels Gemini VII pilot maintained a lower-than-pre-
approximately 24 hours after recovery. The flight systolic pressure throughout the postflight
crewmembers for both Gemini V and VII ex- test period. All crewmembers exhibited a de-
hibited changes in their resting systolic and creased resting diastolic blood pressure during
diastolic blood pressures after the missions. each postflight tilt test except during the first
These values are indicated as deviations from and last tilts for the Gemini V command pilot,
the preflight mean values in table 39-III. and during the second tilt for the Gemini VII
All crewmembers had a decreased resting pilot. Daily changes in resting blood pressures
systolic blood pressure 2 to 4 hours after re- are indicated in figures 39-9 and 39-19 as devia-
covery. The Gemini V command pilot and the tions from the preflight mean values.
Subject Mission
Pulse Blood Pulse Blood A leg Pulse Blood A leg
rate pressure rate pressure volume, rate pressure volume,
percent percent
• Positive values are above the preflight mean; negative values are below the preflight mean.
[Data in mm of mercury i]
Command pilot ............ V --9 +10 --10 --3 --13 --9 --3 --3
i
VII +11 +9 +2 --3 +5
Pilot ..................... V --3 0 -4-1 --8 -I-4 -¥;--:;
VII --8 --7 --4 --4 --14
Positive values are above the preflight mean; negative values are below the preflight mean.
b Left value is systolic; right value is diastolic.
During the postflight tilts, all the Gemini V Pulse rate increases over preflight mean values
and VII erewmembers exhibited increased pulse for each postflight tilt are indicated in table
• Positive values are above the preflight mean; negative values are below the preflight mean.
386 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
70 ° 70 °
vertical vertical
tilt tilt
Q' CllO-
o _ 9o/ e_
-., 90
_ 70 _ 7o _--_---_-_
5O
130 50-
150 -
ItO
d "_,,T
B_90 0 u_ 1=
_E _11° i
• S.E 7o 7O
10-
lO
.c_
.c 8
E E 8-"
-6
o E _
• o 4 -
L
_J u o° 2 ®_=_ 4-
t V I I I I I I I _ I I FI 1 L I I_ L_
0 2 4. 6 8 I0 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 0 2 4 6 8 I0 12 14. 16 18 20 22 24
Minutes
70 °
vertical 70 °
tilt vertical
_.=_llO G; =120
o E
"" 90
2_,oo
_ 7o
Ia_
_ 8o
50 60
150
140
_E 90 _ _2o
&E
70
"__ _,oo
__E 80
c IO 60
_ °O 4 -5
f > o 4
d 0
(p o
"S
(J
2
11 _j o 2
I I • 1 I I 1 _ I I ) I I I I I I _
0 2 4 6 8 Io 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 0 2 4 6 8 I0 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Minutes Minutes
FI6URS 39-13.--l)ata from third tilt-table study of FmUR_ 39-13.--Data from third tilt-table study of
70 °
vertical
tilt
End tilt
140F Begin tilt
_.=_lzoj-
6O
140
60
0 I I I I I I [ _ I
2 4 6 8 I0 !2 14 16 18 20 22 24 6 8 I0 12 14 16 18 20 22 2426
Minutes Minutes
FIGURE 39-16.--Data from second tilt-table study of FIGURE 39-18.--Data from fourth tilt-table study of
Gemini VII pilot. Gemini VII pilot.
70 °
vertical
tilt
o E I00 - / \
c'®80
-r.o
6O
140
I I L_"_ _J
2 4 6 8 I0 12 14 16 IB 20 22 24
Time, rain
140
Pre-titt Tilt Post-ti{t supine position at the end of 12 minutes during
130
120 the first tilt. This syncopal response was of
d_ the vasodepressor type and is illusLrated in fig-
= _,oo ure 39-15. This untoward experience on the
first tilt procedure may account for his increased
8O pulse rate during the second and third tilts.
:oi I I I I
The pulse rates of all crewmembers decreased
during succeeding tilts to near preflight levels
(figs. 39-8 and 39-19).
All crewmembers exhibited narrowed pulse
140
pressures during the first postflight tilt (com-
150
Systolic pared with the preflight tilt and the postflight
120
resting values). The Gemini V crew also ex-
hibited a marked pulse pressure narrowing dur-
_K E 9( ing the second (8 to 12 hours) postflight tilt.
B[
Diastolic The Gemini V command pilot maintained a low
70
I I --i--1 I I I I , I I I I I systolic pressure during the third and fourth
6O
I 2 0 I 2 0 t 2 tilts, whereas the Gemini V pilot returned to
Time from landing,days
Note: Pilof:Postflight tilt no. listhe mean of 12 normal preflight levels after the second post-
mi n. t i lt. Subject tilted to supine after flight tilt. The Gemini VII crew revealed no
exhibiting tendency toward fainting.
marked pulse pressure narrowing during their
second, third, or fourth postflight tilts. The
changes in systolic and diastolic pressures for
.... Mean preflight values,command pilot both crews are indicated as deviations from the
°-----oMean postflighf values,command pilot preflight mean values in table 39-V.
.... Mean preflight values, pilot
During the postflight recovery phase, the
*---*Mean postflight values,pilot
blood pressure values for the Gemini V and VII
FmURE 39-19.--Summary of tilt-table study for Gemim crewmembers returned to near pretilt resting
VII flight crew. levels (figs. 39-8 and 39-19). Leg volume
changes during the postflight tilts indicate that
The Gemini V crew had a twofold greater the pilots who wore the pneumatic cuffs did
increase in pulse rate than did the Gemini VII indeed pool significantly less blood in their legs
crew during the first two postflight tilts. Al- during the tilts than did the command pilots.
though the Gemini VII crew had a smaller in- These values are indicated at percent increase
crease in pulse rate during the tilt procedures, above the preflight control values in table
the Gemini VII pilot had to be returned to the 39-VI.
[Data in mm of mercury =]
• Positive values are above the preflight mean; negative values are below the preflight mean.
b Left value is systolic; right value is diastolic.
CARDIOVASCULAR CONDITIONING 389
Although the Gemini VII pilot exhibited a pilot, however, sustained only a 7-percent de-
vasodepressor type syncope during his first post- crease as compared with the 19- to 20-percent
flight tilt, he did not pool an excessive amount decrease of the other crewmembers. The de-
of blood in his legs (2 percent above the pre- crease in red cell mass and the increase in
flight control value). In addition, despite the plasma volume of the Gemini VII crew offset
fact that the V and VII command pilots pooled each other to give a net zero-percent change in
similar quantities of blood in their legs during total blood volume, whereas the reduction in
the first postflight tilt, they differed consider- plasma volume and the red cell mass of the
ably in the volume pooled during the remaining Gemini V crew contributed to the measured 13-
tilts. These differences, as well as those of the percent decrease in total blood volume. These
Gemini V pilot, may be a reflection primarily changes in total blood volume may reflect, in
of differences in the state of hydration. part, the state of hydration of the Gemini V
Changes in total blood volume, plasma vol- crew, but this is not true in the case of the
ume, and red cell mass were determined before Gemini VII crew. The postflight changes in
and after flight. Radioactive isotope (1125, body weight are indicated in table 39-VIII.
Cr 51) techniques were utilized in these measure-
ments. The results are indicated as percent TABLE 39-VIII.--Nude Body Weight Changes
changes in table 39-VII. [Negative values indicate weight loss]
[Data in )ercent -]
Command pilot .......... V --7.5
Total Plasma Red VII --10. 0
Subject Mission blood volume cell Pilot .................... V --8.5
volume mass VII --6.5
4 to 8 percent of their plasma volume during Gemini VII mission were notably different from
the 8-day mission. Both crews lost 7 to 20 per- those of the Gemini V flight. These variables
cent of their red cell mass. The Gemini VII or differences were of sufficient magnitude that
390 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
a comparison of the M-1 results on the two in the postflight period as shown in the
missions is difficult, if not impossible. Gemini following:
VII was decidedly different from previous
(a) Total blood volume: 0 percent versus
Gemini flights in that the Gemini VII crew did
13 percent
not wear their suits during an extensive portion
(b) Plasma volume: +15 percent and +4
of the 14-day fight. Their food and water in-
percent versus -8 percent and -4 percent.
take was more nearly optimal than in previous
(c) Red cell mass: -19 percent and -7
flights; this assured better hydration and elec-
percent versus -20 percent and -20 percent.
trolyte balance, and the Gemini VII exercise
regimen was more rigorous than that utilized on (5) The Gemini VII crew lost 10.0 pounds
previous flights. These variables, in addition to (command pilot) and 6.5 pounds (pilot) dur-
the usual individual variability always present, ing their flight, while the Gemini V crew lost
preclude any direct comparison of M-1 results 7.5 and 8.5 pounds, respectively.
on the two missions. This is particularly true (6) The Gemini VII crew regained less body
since the pulsatile cuffs were operative during weight during the first 24 hours postflight (40
only the first half of the 8-day Gemini V mis- percent and 25 percent versus 50 percent).
sion. The Gemini VII pilot's physiological The physiological findings in the Gemini V
measurements should be compared only with crew have Jheen previously reported (ref. 2) and
those of the command pilot who served as the will only be summarized here.
"control" subject. (1) The pilot's resting pulse rate and blood
It is indeed true that the postflight physio- pressure returned to preflight resting levels
logical responses of the Gemini VII crew were within 48 hours after recovery; the command
vastly different from, and generally improved pilot required a somewhat longer period.
over, those observed in the Gemini V crew. It ('2) The pilot's pulse pressure narrowed dur-
is difficult, however, to determine which of the ing tilt and at, rest was less pronounced than
previously mentioned variables were responsible that of the command pilot.
for the observed improvement. This improve- (3) The pilot's plasma volume decreased 4
ment is perhaps best shown in figure 39-8, which percent, and the command pilot's decreased 8
depicts the change in heart rate during the percent.
initial postflight tilts expressed as a percentage (4) The pilot's body weight loss was 7.5
change with respect to the preflight value. The pounds; the command pilot's was 8.5 pounds.
responses of the Gemini VII crew were far (5) The pooling of blood in the legs of the
superior to the responses observed in the Gemini pilot was generally less than that observed in
IV aed V crews, and they were very nearly com- the command pilot.
parable to the response following 14 days of The observed differences between the Gemini
recumbency. V command pilot and pilot probably reflect only
Additional comparisons between the Gemini individual variability and cannot be construed
VII and V crews may be summarized as follows : as demonstrating any protective effect of the
(1) The Gemini VII crew exhibited less in- pulsatile thigh cuffs. The Gemini V tilt data
crease in postflight mean resting pulse rate (4 are summarized in figures 89-9 and 89-10.
and 10 beats per minute versus 21 and 59 beats Tilt-table data are graphically presented in
per minute). figures 89-11 through 39-14 for the command
(2) The Gemini VII crew exhibited signs of pilot and in figures 39-15 through 39-18 for the
pilot. All the Gemini VII tilt data are sum-
orthostatic intolerance for only 24 hours post-
marized in figure 39-19. During the first post-
fight; the Gemini V crew exhibited these signs
for 24 to 48 houm. flight tilt, the pilot exhibited signs of vasode-
pressor syncope; the procedure was interrupted,
(3) The Gemini VII crew pooled less 'blood
and the pilot was returned to the supine posi-
in their lower extremities during all postflight
tion. This episode occurred despite the fact
tilts.
that there was no evidence of increased pooling
(4:) The Gemini VII crew exhibited less pro- of blood in the lower extremities. In subsequent
nounced changes in intravascular fluid volumes tilts, the pilot exhibited no further signs of syn-
CARDIOVASCULAR CONDITIONING 391
cope or impending syncope. It is of significance 39-17, and 39-18). The command pilot exhib-
that this episode of syncope occurred despite the ited moderate cardioacceleration, marked nar-
fact that the measured blood volume of both rowing of the pulse pressure, and increased pool-
crewmembers was unchanged from preflight ing of blood in the lower extremities during the
levels. initial postflight til_. Subsequent tilts revealed
It would seem possible that this syncopal epi- a rather rapid return to normal of heart rate
sode was the result of sudden vasodilitation with and pulse pressure, but a greater tendency to
• pooling of blood in the splanchnic area, dimin- pool blood in the legs than was observed in the
ished venous return, diminished cardiac output, pilot.
and decline in cerebral bloodflow.
Conclusions
As previously mentioned, there was no dim-
inution in the total blood volume of either On the basis of the preflight and postflight
crewmember after the mission. The pilot's data, it must be concluded that the pulsatile
plasm_t volume increased 4 percent; the com- cuffs were not effective in lessening postflight
mand pilot's increased 15 percent. The pilot's orthostatic intolerance. This conclusion is
red cell mass decreased 7 percent ; the command based not on the occurrence of syncope during
pilot's, 19 percent. The pilot lost 6.5 pounds the pilot's first tilt, but rather on the higher
(nude body weight) during the mission and re- heart rates observed during subsequent tilts, as
placed 25 percent of this loss during the first 24 compared with the control subject. It is well
hours after recovery. The command pilot lost established that syncope in itself is a poor indi-
10.0 pounds and replaced 40 percent of this value cator of the extent or degree of cardiovascular
within the first 24 hours following recovery. deconditioning.
The pilot's subsequent tilts revealed a moder- The pulsatile cuffs appeared to be effective
ate cardioacceleration during tilts 2 and 3, with in lessening the degree of postflight pooling of
normal pulse pressure and insignificant pooling blood in the lower extremities as judged bythe
of blood in the lower extremities (figs. 39-16, strain gage technique.
References
1. VOGT, _. B.: Effect of Extremity Cuff-Tourniquets 2. DIETLEIN, L. F. ; AND JUDY, W. V. : Experimen_ M-l,
on Tilt-Table Tolerance After Water Imlnersion. Cardiovascular Conditioning. Manned Space-
Aerospace Medicine, vol. 36, May 1965, pp. 442- Flight Experiments Interim Report, Gemini V
446. Mission, Washington, D.C., January 1966.
218-556 O 66--26
0
summary
The response of the cardiovascular system to
a quantified workload is an index of the general
physical condition of an individual. Utilizing
mild exercise as a provocative stimulus, no sig-
Stainless s t e e l hinge---
Wishbone a ssernbly---!
’ Ir “Nylon
-‘‘‘\\.
handle
Equipment
The exercise device (figs. 40-1 and 40-2) con- FIGURE@-l.-Inflight exerciser major components.
sisted of a pair of rubber bungee cords attached
to a nylon handle a t one end and to a nylon foot
strap a t the other. A stainless-steel stop cable
limited the stretch length of the rubber bungee
cords and fixed the isotonic workload of each
pull. The device could be utilized to exercise
the lower extremities by holding the feet sta-
tionary and pulling on the handle. Flight bio-
instrumentakion (fig. 40-3) was utilized to
obtain pulse rate, blood pressure, and respira-
tion rate. These data were recorded on the
onboard biomedical magnetic tape recorder and
simultaneously telemetered to the ground
monitoring stations for real-time evaluation.
Procedure
The device used in Gemini VI1 required 70
pounds of force to stretch the rubber lbungee
cords maximally through an excursion of 12 FIGWE40-2.-1nflight exerciser in use.
393
394 GEMINI MIDPROORAM CONFERENCE
Conclusions
403.-Biomedical and communications harness
FIQURE
used during Gemini IV mission. The M-3 experiment on Gemini VI1 was suc-
cessfully performed. On the basis of the data
inches. Exercise periods lasted for 30 seconds, obtained during this mission, the following con-
during which time the astronaut stretched the clusions appear warranted :
bungee cords through a full excursion once per (1) The response of the cardiovascular sys-
second. Exercise periods (crew status reports) tem to a calibrated workload is relatively con-
were scheduled twice daily for each crewmem- stant for a given individual during space flights
ber. Additional isometric-isotonic exercises lasting 14 days.
were performed by each astronaut approxi- (2) The crewmembers are able to perform
mately three times daily. Blood pressure meas- mild-to-moderate amounts of work under the
urements were obtained before and after each conditions of space flight and within the con-
exercise period (crew status report). fines of the Gemini spacecraft. This ability
continues essentially unchanged for missions up
Results
to 14 days.
The flight crew performed the exercises as (3) Using a variant of the Harvard Step
scheduled. Heart rates were determined by Test as an index, no decrement in the physical
counting 15-second periods for 2 minutes before condition of the crew was apparent during the
and following exercise, as well as the first and 14-day missions, a t least under the stress of the
last 15-second periods during each exercise. relatively mild workloads imposed in this ex-
Comparison of 1-g preflight exercise periods periment.
References
Revolutior_
140 Revolution_ i 5 ...... i 28 ...... Revo,uti@ i 57 ..... Revolutio'n i 92 .....
i I 14-- 25-49 i I 33-- 50-89 '
i I 62-- 90-122 I, I I01--
1-24 ,, 1 ,a---- I i 44----- -- I I
I 72-----
-- I '
I 106--'--
I J
,, i ," BZ............ I I, t2J..........
4
8
........
I I
I i 4'.
I -- II ,_._" "._..,_
I _ -&"
I j .-- _.'%.
_ "_
, I 1
I
t - i - 1 :
Before I _, After Before 1 I After Before I , After Before I I After
exercise i I exercise exercise t, i= exercise exercise i II exercise exercise I i
exercise
I - I
40 --Exercise Exercise E xerci s'e Exercise
Revolution I 4 ...... Revolution i, 30 ......
Revolutio,n I 58 ...... Revolution i 102 ......
1-24t ,, 15-- 25-49 I i 34-- 50-89 I i 63-- 90-1221 i
I t06--
i i 19--'-- i I
I , 48---- 73---- - I I ll6---
, ,, I
= I 88............
I
I I
,, I I I l 122 .........
I I I i :
I : I - I
s
# , ., .... - i i '
I /i_l "_" \
1
".. L// I ""% ",
. , - Ii
I ./_/
_" ,_
I I =
I i
i 'I I i i i
, - - i I
Before I I After Before ,I ,I After Before ,I l After (a) First 15 sec. of exercise
exercise _ i exercise exercise', 'I exercise exercise_ ,, exercise period.
_Exercise Exel cis'e Exercise
Revolutio'n I 132 Revolu t io'n _i 169 ....... Revolutio'n ', 190 .......
(b) Second 15 sec.ofexer-
......
I23-15I! i 135-- 152-,B2 I, ', I77-- iB3-204 i--204
I i 146---- ,, i, I cise period.
182 ....
I I I I/
I I I I [/
i "" : ',
' ' , = - ', I
I(O) (b) i 'I(O)(b)' !(e) (b)i
I _lls I i I I I I I I i J I I I I I _115 I ! 115 I I i
•45 15 45 -45 -15 15 45 -45 45
-30 0 0 30 60 -30 0 0 30 60 -30 0 0 60
200 220
-- Pre-exercise --Pre-exercise
200 --- Post-exercise a, 200
--- Post-exercise
Lso i 180
/\
£ 160 E 160
/4 E
E
140 _- 140
J
L 120 120
I00 _, ,oo
K 80 o_ 80
60
o o
40
20 20 I
40
0 [-I I L I I I I I I I L I I I 0 I I I_ I I I i I I I I I
"7-0 16 52 48 64 80 96 112 128 144 160 176 192 192 208 224 240 256 272 288 304 520 3:56 552 568:584
/ Ground elapsed time, hr Ground elapsed time, hr
---Prelaunch
_0_ pressure
Chennei
[l(G I
EKG 2
FIOUBE 40-7.--Sample of telemetered physiological data during inflight exercise. (Recorder speed, 25 mm/sec.)
E l . EXPERIMENT M-4, INFLIGHT PHONOCARDIOGRAM-MEASURE-
MENTS OF THE DURATION OF THE CARDIAC CYCLE AND ITS
PHASES DURING THE ORBITAL FLIGHT OF GEMINI V
By LAWRENCE F. DIETLEIN, M.D., Assistant Chief for Medica2 Support, Crew Systems Division, NASA
Manned Spacecraft Center, and CARLOS VALLBONA, M.D., Texas Institute of Rehabilitation and Research,
Baylor University College of Medicine
Equipment
The experimental equipment system consisted
of three distinct parts, including the. following:
(1) a phonocardiographic transducer; (2) an
electrocardiographic signal conditioner (pre- FIGURE
41-l.-Phonocardiogram transducer.
397
398 GEMINI IY[IDPROGRA]_ CONFERENCE
of its several phases throughout the mission, but minute. The lowest values were recorded on
quantitative differences between the two sub- the fourth and fifth days of the mission (50
jects warrant separate discussions. beats per minute). It is interesting that the
highest values of heart rate were recorded usu-
Results on the Command Pilot
ally a few hours before midnight, eastern stand-
Figure 41-4 indicates the serial plot of meas- ard time. This was particularly evident dur-
urements throughout the mission. In the rec- ing the last 3 days of the mission and suggests
ords that were obtained just before lift-off, the persistence of the circadian rhythmicity of heart
total duration of the cardiac cycle was 455 milli- rate based on the normal Cape Kennedy day-
night cycle. Similar observations had been
seconds (equivalent to a heart rate of 139 beats
previously made in the command pilot of Gem-
per minute). Electromechanical systole (me-
ini IV (ref. 1).
chanical systole plus excitation time) lasted 345
milliseconds; electromechanical delay (onset of
QRS to first heart sound) was 100 milliseconds ;
o o o o o o o o
and the interval between the onset of the first
1800 .........
and second heart sound was 945 milliseconds.
At lift-off, the duration of the cardiac cycle was
t6oo - _ • • • & • •
345 milliseconds (equivalent to a heart rate of
_oo- _• _mn I• I• _m _ _ ;
173 beats per minute). The cardiac cycle grad- | • • • • • |I
command pilot.
cal systole (plot S of fig. 41-4) and the time in-
terval between the first and second heart sounds
(plot X of fig. 41-4). The electromechanical
delay (time interval between the onset of QRS
and of the first heart sound) remained relatively
0 0 0 _ 0 0 0
constant throughout the mission, although, as od
Figure 41-6 illustrates the correlation be- constant at about 100 milliseconds when the
tween heart rate and the duration of electro- heart rate varies between 60 and 120 per minute.
mechanical systole and electromechanical delay. The T values for the command pilot were
The average values for the duration of the greater, and the longest duration observed was
cardiac cycle (R) at different time periods are 150 to 160 milliseconds during the fourth and
plotted along the ordinate. The corresponding fifth days of the mission. It must be empha-
average values for_the duration of electro- sized, however, that the longest delays occurred
mechanical systole (S), for electromechanical at the lowest heart rates, suggesting that a pre-
delay (T), and for the time interval between ponderance of vagal tone also influenced the
the first and second heart sounds (X) are delay. It is likely that the stressful circum-
plotted along the abscissa. It is clear that in stances of lift-off and reentry accounted for the
general the values of S, X, and T were longer observed adrenergic effects on the heart. An
when the total duration of the cardiac cycle increased heart rate and an absolute and rela-
was also longer (that is, when the heart rate tive shortening of mechanical systole and of
was lower). It is remarkable that practically electromechanical delay were the result of these
all the systolic values were longer in the case adrenergic influences.
of the command pilot than those predicted for A prolongation of the electromechanical delay
healthy subjects, using the regression equation had been reported by Baevskii and Gazenko
proposed by Hegglin and Holzmann (ref. 2). (ref. 3) during the flight of Cosmonaut Titov.
Only at the time of lift-off and reentry were The observations made of Astronaut Cooper
the values of S closer to the predicted norms. suggest that increased vagal tone accounted for
Since it has been observed that cholinergic this prolongation, but since, in the case of
influences produce a relative prolongation of Astronaut Cooper, manifestations of nausea or
mechanical systole as well as a tendency to- other untoward signs of vagal preponderance
ward lower heart rates, it may be concluded did not occur, we may conclude that the find-
that Command Pilot Cooper had a preponder- ing of prolon_,_d electromechanical delay did
ance of vagal tone throughout the mission. An not have any pathological significance, and was
increased vagal Cone was suggested also by the perhaps only a manifestation of superb physical
marked respiratory sinus arrhythmia (respira- conditioning.
tion heart rate reflex) which was evident during
Results on the Pilot
periods of reduced activity and sleep.
Scant information is available on the relation- The responses observed in Pilot Conrad were
ship between electromechanical delay and heart similar to those observed in Command Pilot
rate. In general, the value of T remains almost Cooper, but there were quantitative differences
(fig. 41-7). The duration of Conrad's cardiac
cycle just before lift-off averaged 460 milli-
1400
seconds (equivalent to a heart rate of 130 beats
_: x x SS per minute). The average duration of electro-
1200 T X S
mechanical delay (T) remained relatively con- mechanical delay (T) and the duration of the
stant_ but there was a significant shortening that cardiac cycle (R) was not as evident in the
began approximately 9.0 hours before reentry. pilot as in the command pilot, but in general
Low values for the duration of the cardiac cycle the lowest values were measured at the peak
and its various components were observed at the heart rates recorded at lift-off and at reentry.
time of reentry when the duration of the cardiac These findings suggest that vagal preponder-
cycle was 365 milliseconds (equivalent to a heart ance in Pilot Conrad was less prominent than
rate of 164 beats a minute). At that time_ that observed in the command pilot, and that
mechanical systole reached its lowest value (220 adrenergic influences may have prevailed occa-
milliseconds), and electromechanical delay was Sionally during the mission. These observa-
measured at 75 milliseconds. tions correlate well with findings of numerous
The heart rate fluctuated throughout the extrasystoles during the first hours of the mis-
mission_ but in general the average values were sion and at the time of reentry. Extrasystoles
somewhat higher than those of the command occurred at random throughout the mission but
pilot (fig. 41-8). In addition to the peak values not so frequently as during lift-off and reentry.
at lift-off and at reentry, there was also a high
value shortly after the ninth hour when the
flight schedule called for a period of physical
exercise. At that time the heart rate peaked
at 130 beats per minute. Circadian fluctua- o o o o o
t_
1600
, , _ 1400
_'=39 _-R
T
I I I I I I I I ,/
1400 T X / S
• • m • mm • mm • • m • • 1200
T:_ T =1
= X X XX X X ' SSsSs
._ 12oo
I000
g Sleepperi°ds A A R
1000
g_)
E. 800
800 T_ - xx s
E .-c600 T T_TT XX X I( X _" SS_S S_J
i: 600 E
400
.E
I.-
400 T T
xXx X xX S SS S
200 200
0 _ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
0 20 40 60 80 I00 120 140 160 180 I00 200 300 400 500
Elapsed time from start of mission, hr Time, milliseconds
FIGURE 41-7.--Cardiac measurements for Gemini V FZOUR_ 41-9.--Correlation of cardiac measurements for
References
1. DIrrLEIN, L. F. : Experiment M-4, Inflight Phono- Electrokardiogramm. Ztschr. f. klin. Med. 132:
cardiogram. Manned Space Flight Experiments 1, 1957.
Symposium, Gemini Missions III and IV, Wash- 3. BAEVS_n, R. M. ; XNV GAZE_KO, O. G. : Reaction of
ington, D.C., Oct. 18-19, 1965. the Cardiovascular System of Men and Animals
2. HEGGLIN, R.; AND HOLZMA1KN, M. : Die klinische Under Conditions of Weightlessness. Kosmich-
Bedentung der Verliingerten QT--Distanz im eskie Issledovaniya, vol. 2(2), March-April 1964.
pp. 307-319.
42. EXPERIMENT M-5, BIOASSAYS OF BODY FLUIDS
By LAWRENCEF. DIETLEIN, M.D., Assistant Chie/ for Medical Support, Crew Systems Division, NAS_
Manned Spacecra# Center, and E. HARRIS,Ph.D., Crew Systems Division, NASA Manned Space-
cra# Center
Results
TABLE
42-L-Gemini V I I Command Pilot Plasma Analysis
[All dates 19651
Preflight Postflight
Components I
Nov. 25 Dec. 2 Dec. 18 Dec. 18
(1130 hr) (1820 hr)
Plasma ADH was elevated enough for de- preflight and postflight 24-hour urine samples.
termination only in Pilot Lovell's first post- The retention of elecrolytes and water follow-
flight plasma sample, although, as can be seen in ing reentry is consistent wi_h the hypothesis that
tables 42--II and 42--IV, marked water atrial and thoracic stretch receptors are of
retention was exhibited by both crewmembers physiological importance in the change from a
immediately postflight. The water retention condition of 1 gravity to null gravity, and vice
and the rapid weight gain after flight are con- versa. A change from null gravity to an erect
sistent with the assumption that the weight lost position in 1 gravity would result in a pooling
during flight was the result of water loss. of blood in the lower extremities and an appar-
Tables 42-III and 42--IV are comparisons of ent decrease in blood volume as experienced in
Preflight Postflight
Components
Nov. 25 Dec. 2 Dec. 18 Dec. 18 Dee. 19 Dee. 21
(1230 hr) (1800 hr)
Preflight Postflight
Components
Preflight Postflight
Components
177 139 40 45
lhlorine, meq ..............................................
182 126 115 207
',alcium, mg ................................................
Tric acid, g ................................................. • 91 1.14 .45 .92
1912 1737 735 1405
'otal volume, ml ............................................
162 145 35 58
odium, meq .................................................
76 93. 0 44 58
'otassium, meq .............................................
'hosphate, g ............................................... 1.12 1.27 .80 1.07
8.0 9. 07 7.83 8.33
7-hydroxycorticosteroids ....................................
?otal nitrogen, g ............................................ 19. 94 21.6 12.81 22.8
17. 19 17. 06 11.75 21.51
3rea nitrogen, g ............................................
39. 39 43• 1 31.8 37. 4
tydroxyproline, mg .........................................
_reatinine, g ............................................... 2. 27 2. 25 1.75 2.16
Bibliography
1. PARRELL, G. : Recent Progress• Hormone Research, encing Urine Flow. Circulation Research, vol. 4,
vol. 15, 1959, pp. 27,5-298. January 1956, pp. _5-90.
2. tlENRY, J. P.; GAUER, O. H. ; AND REEVEs, J. L. : 3. HENRY, J. P.; GAUER, O. H. ; AND SIEKERT, H. O. :
Evidence of Atrial Location of Receptors Influ- Effect of Moderate Changes in Blood Volume on
Left and Right Atrial Pressure. Circulation Re-
search, vol. 4, January 1956, pp. 91-94.
43. EXPERIMENT M-6, BONE DEMINERALIZATION
By PAULINE BERRY MACK, Ph.D., Director, Nelda Childers Stark Laboratory/or Human Research, Texas
Woman's University; GEORGE P. VOSE, Nelda Childers Stark Laboratory/or Human Research, Texas
Woman's University; FRED B. VOGT, M.D., Texas Institute o/Rehabilitation and Research and Texas
Woman's University; and PAUL A. LACHANCE, Ph. D., Crew Systems Division, NASA Manned Space-
cra/t Center
218-5560---66-----27 407
408 GEMINI _IDPROGIL_M CONFERENCE
2
Q
L
a
0
m
FIGURE 43-l.-Positive print of lateral foot radiograph FIGURE 43-2.-Positive print of radiograph of os calcis
showing location of the central section of the os showing location of the multiple sections which a r e
calcis (“convention” section) which is evaluated for evaluated. These scans are made entirely across t h e
bone density changes, a s well a s t h e location of the bone, parallel with t h e conventional section. They
section of the talus which is scanned. a r e 1millimeter wide froni the center of one scan t o
the center of t h e next scan, and hence they cover all
of the 60 percent of this bone which is involved in
this evaluation.
portion of the bone. The total number of
paths scanned is, therefore, proportional to the Results
size of the bone which, of course, has individual
X-Ray Absorption Changes in Central Os Calcis
variations. For the command pilot, 38 paths Section (“Conventional” Path)
were required to cover the os calcis portion
examined, while 42 parallel scans were needed The X-ray absorption values (in terms of
for the pilot. Figure 43-2 illustrates the aline- calibration wedge equivalency) which were ob-
ment of parallel paths through the os calcis tained from the central os calcis section
portion examined (every path is not shown in throughout the Gemini VI1 mission are given
the illustration). in table 43-1 and in figure 4 3 4 . Based on a
The talus.-A single scanning path was made comparison of the calibration wedge equiva-
through the talus of the left foot, originating lency of the immediate postflight radiograph
at the interior surface and projecting anteriorly with that made immediately before the launch,
to the conspicuous landmark, shown in figure this central or “conventional” segment of the
os calcis exhibited a change during the flight of
43-1.
only -2.91 percent for the command pilot and
Xections of the phalanges 4-2 and 5-i?.--The
of -2.84 percent for the pilot.
second phalanx of the fourth and the fifth I t should be noted that, there was an increase
fingers of the left hand was scanned by parallel in bone iiiass of this :mitomica1 site before the
cross-sectional paths 1 millimeter apart alined orbital flight and for 11 days after the flight in
tangentially with the longitudinal axis and CGV- both crewmen. The postflight increase was
ering the entire bone area (fig. 43-3). more pronounced in the pilot. A t the time the
410 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
TABLe. 43-II.--Comparison o] Bo_ Changes During Flight in Total Os Cal_ From Multiple Sections
o] the Os Calds o.f the Crewmen in the Gemini VII Mission
Total ............... 311 912 304 244 X 352 394 343 427 X
27f
26
mand pilot, with a value at the time of launch
which was slightly higher than the initial pre-
flight level. The pilot showed a slight decrease
_24 in this site preflight. Both crewmen exhibited
> --
a marked increase for 11 days, after which there
g23 was a slight decrease, but with final values not
_2.
'Astronaut Sormon markedly different from the initial levels. (See
fig. 43-60
c2.
.9
_Orbitol flig ht--_
Central os calcis section
o
2.60_
1.9
IIIII I I I I I I I I I I I.jxA___
2.40 L Astronaut Lovell
0 4 8 12 16 20 24. 28 32 36 72
Time,days o
_66
_64 0 4 8 I I
12 I
16 I 20I I 24 J 28
J J 32
l I 3 16./LL_v
72
_6o
FIGURE 43-6.--Graph of the calibration wedge mass
,_58 equivalency data on the section of the talus which
_ 54
j *"_"Astronaut Barman
"g52
- hOrbitol flight-- _ Bone Mass Changes in Hand Phalanges 4.-2 and 5-2
5O 1 [ Overall as
Figure 43-7 consists of graphs of the calibra- study. The values for the command pilot did
tion wedge equivalency values for hand not experience as marked preflight and post-
phalanges 4-9 for the serial radiographs of the flight changes as those for the pilot. The values
two Gemini VII crewmen. The graph of the for the pilot took a sharp upward trend during
command pilot shows that the value for the first 7 days of the preflight period, followed
phalanx 4-2 was higher at the beginning of the by a decline during the next 3 days. The last
orbital flight than the first preflight value, with preflight value, however, was higher than the
a decline by the close of the flight. This was initial level. After the decline in X-ray mass
followed by a gradual increase after the flight. equivalency shown during the flight, there was
The graph for phalanx 4-2 for the pilot shows a sharp increase during the first 24 hours after
a marked increase in X-ray absorbence during the flight, with a continued moderate increase
the first 7 preflight days, followed by a decrease through the next 11 days, followed by a final de-
during the last 4 preflight days. Following the crease. However, the value 47 days after the
decrease during the flight, there was a sharp flight was higher than the initial value found
and then a gradual postflight increase. when the study began.
Phalan_ 5-B.--From the beginning to the
close of the orbital flight, the command pilot 2.750[
I I I I I 1 I I I I
phalanx 4-9. 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 56 72
Figure 43-8 shows graphically the overall Time, days
5.25
Discussion
5.00
"5 4.2 5
It is interesting to note how the crewmembers
J
TABLE 43-III.--Comparison o] Bone Density Comparison of Bone Density Changes in the Gemini
VII Crew With Bedrest Subjects on Similar Diets
Changes in Crewmen o] Gemini IV, Gemini V,
for 14 Days
and Gemini VII During Space Fligh_
On the basis of the tantative evaluation of
Change in bone
food intake based on the residue removed from
mass,- percent the spacecraft postflight, it is estimated that 1.00
Position of anatomical site
evaluated gram of calcium was consumed by the Gemini
Command Pilot VII crewm_n during their orbital flight. On
pilot
this basis, the os calcis and hand phalanx 5-2
were compared with subjects at supine bedrest
Conventional os calcis scan:
Gemini IV ................ --7. 80 --10. 27
for 14 days in the Texas Woman's University
Gemini V ................. --15. 10 --8. 90 (TWU) bedrest units. Bedrest men on com-
Gemini VII .................. --2. 91 --2. 84 parable diets lost slightly more in Che os calcis
Multiple os calcis scans:
Gemini IV ................
and considerably less in phalanx 5-2 than did
--6. 82 --9. 25
Gemini V ................. --10. 31 --8. 90 the crewmen on this mission, as seen by the data
Gemini VII ............... --2. 46 --2. 54 in table 43-IV.
Hand phalanx 5-2 scans:
Gemini IV ................ --11.85 --6. 24 Comparison of Bone Density Changes in Crew and
Gemini V ................. --23. 20 --16. 97 in Backup Crew of Gemini VII
Gemini VII ............... --6. 78 --7. 83
Hand phalanx 4-2 scans: The backup crew of Gemini VII, which in-
Gemini IV ................ (b) (b) cluded Edward White and Michael Collins, had
Gemini V ................. --9. 98 --11. 37
Gemini VII ............... --6. 55 --3. 82
four radiographs made in connection with this
mission on the following dates: November 24,
• Based on X-ray absorbency of calibration wedge.
1965; December 1, 1965; January 3, 1966; and
b Not done on this flight. February 3, 1966.
TABLE 43-IV.--Comparison o] Bone Density Changes in the Gemini VII Crew With Bedrest Subjects
on Similar Diets]or 14 Days
The spread from the highest to the lowest ercise with a mechanical device, and on sleep.
X-ray absorbency value in the os caleis for Also there was more time available for eating.
White was 2.5 percent covering a period of 3 By consuming a larger proportion of the diet
months and 10 days. The spread for Collins provided for them, the crewmen not only in-
was 3.2 percent over the same period. On com- creased the amount of calcium which they con-
parable dates, not involving any aspect of the sumed, but also the quantity of total energy
orbital flight, the spread in os calcis absorbency and of other essential nutrients. Furthermore,
values was 6.6 percent for Frank Borman and various foods supplied for this mission were
9.8 percent for James Lovell. This indicates provided with supplementary calcium.
that the maximum spread was less in the backup The results of the study show decreased loss
crew than in the flight crew. of X-ray density of the largest bone in the fool
No exact dietary records for the backup crew but with far less dramatic results obtained with
were kept during this period. the hand. This would indicate to the authors
the need for further attention to the develop-
Conclusion ment of exercise routines which would involve
the hands and fingers.
The Gemini VII flight crew activities were Without reducing the emphasis on dietary
calculated in part to support a metabolic study. calcium, a probable need also exists for further
Hence, tasks not related to this objective were research in which other nutrients known to be
minimized, with the result that time could be related to skeletal status would serve as vari-
spent on isometric and isotonic exercise, on ex- ables.
References
1. MACK, PAULINE BEERY ; VOSE, GEORGE P. ; AND Aeronautics and Space Administration, Mar. 31,
NELSON, JAMES DONALD: New Developments in 1965.
Equipment for the Roentgenographic Measure- 6. MACK, PAULINE BEERY; KLAPPER, ELSA A. ; PYKE,
ment of Bone Density. American Journal of RALPH E.; ALFORD, BETTy B.; AND GAULDIN,
Roentgenology, Radium Therapy, and Nuclear RUTH: Fifth Semiannual Report to the National
Medicine, vol. 82, p. 647, 1959. Aeronautics and Space Administration, Sept. 30,
2. MACK, PAULINE BEERY: Radiographic Bone Densi- 1965.
tometry. Conference under sponsorship of the 7. VOOT, F. B. ; MACK, P. B. ; BEASLEY, W. G. ; SPENCER,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration W. A.; C_d_uus, D.; ANn VALBONNA, C.: The
and the National Institutes of Health, Washington Effect of Bedrest on Various Parameters of
D.C., NASA SP-64, Mar. 25-27, 1965. Physiological Functions, Part XII. The Effect
3. MACK, PAULINE BEERY; O'BRIEN, ANNE T. ; SMITH, of Bedrest on Bone Mass and Calcium Balance.
Texas Institute of Rehabilitation and Research.
JANICE M. ; ANn BAUMAN, ARTHUR W. : A Method
Report to the National Aeronautics and Space
for Estimating the Degree of Mineralization of
Administration, NASA CR-182, Apr. 1965.
Bones from Tracing of Roentgenograms. Science,
8. VOSE, GEORGE P. ; MACK, PAULINE BEERY; BROWN,
vol. 89, p. 467,1939.
SIDNEY O.; AND MEDLEN, AMMON B.: Radio-
4. MACK, PAULINE BEERY; BROWN, WALTER N. ; AND
graphic Determination of the Rate of Bone Heal-
TRAPP, HUGHES DANIEL: The Quantitative Evalu- ing. Radiology, vol. 76, May 1961, pp. 770--776.
ation of Bone Density. American Journal of
9, VOSE, GEORGE P.; AND MACK, PAULINE BEE_RY:
Roentgenology and Radium Therapy, vol. 61, 1949, Roentgenologie Assessment of Femoral Neck
pp. 808-825. Density as Related to Fracturing. The American
5. MACK, PAULINE BEERY; KLAPPER, ELSA A. ; PYKE, Journal of Roentgenology, Radium Therapy and
RALPH E.; ALFORD, BETTY B.; AND GAULDIN, Nuclear Medicine, vol. LXXXIX, June 1963, pp.
RUTH : Fourth Semiannual Report to the National 1296--1301.
44. EXPERIMENT M-7, CALCIUM AND NITROGEN BALANCE
By G. D. WHEDON, M.D., Director, National Institute of Arthritis and Metabolic Diseases, National Institutes
o] Health; LEO LUTWAK, M.D., Ph.D., CorneU University; WILLIAMF. NEUMAN, Ph. D., University o/
Rochester; and PAUL A. LACHANCE,Ph. D., Crew Systems Division, NASA Manned Spacecra]t Center
Introduction Realistic consideration of this metabolic-bal-
ance study indicates that it was not, in any true
The primary objective of Experiment M-7
sense, an experiment on the effects of weight-
was to obtain data on the effects of space flight
lessness on body metabolism, but was rather an
of up to 14 days' duration on two of the largest
observation of biochemical changes occurring as
metabolically active tissue masses of the human
a result of several complex, interrelated in-
body, the bones and muscles, and thus on the
fluences-principally weightlessness, confine-
functional integrity of the skeletal and mus-
ment, moderate physical movement, slight hy-
cular systems.
peroxia_ and low atmospheric pressure.
From prior ground-based studies on the ef-
fects of bedrest or immobilization on normal Because of the tremendous number of analy-
ses to be carried out, specific analytical results
human subjects, it has been predicted that the
are not available at the time of this preliminary
confinement of the Gemini space vehicle, in as-
report. However, an account can be given of
sociation with the lack of physical stress and
the detailed and intricate protocol and of the
strain on muscles and bones due to weightless-
generally successful accomplishment of a very
ness, would result in substantial losses of cal-
difficult study.
cium, nitrogen, and related elements. Bedrest
studies have shown, for example, that in 2 weeks Procedure
of immobile rest, the amount of calcium ex-
The general plan of a metabolic study re-
creted in the urine was doubled, and, over longer
periods, substantial negative balance._ or losses quires continuous procurement of data during
of calcium, nitrogen, and other elements oc- a control phase at normal activity on earth for
as long a time as is feasible before flight. Com-
curred. Significant losses in a space flight con-
tinuing over a period of several weeks theoret- plete inflight data and a postflight control phase
ically could lead to a serious weakness of the are also required. In view of the numerous
bones and muscles. other requirements of the Gemini VII mission,
By use of the metabolic-balance method, the preflight control phase was limited to 9 days,
which involves precise control of the dietary in- beginning 14 days before launch. The post-
take and the collection and analysis of all ex- flight control phase was even more brief, lasting
creta, it is possible to obtain a quantitative only 4 days.
determination of the extent of change in the The method employed in obtaining quantita-
principal inorganic constituents of these sys- tive information on a metabolic system requires
tems, the degree of loss thereof being generally complete and continuous data on the dietary in-
proportional to the degree of deterioration in
take of each constituent under study and con-
function. Biomedical data on this problem
tinuous collection of all urine and stool speci-
using this quantitative method have not been
mens before, during, and after the flight.
obtained on previous American or Russian
space flights. X-ray films taken before and Since under certain circumstances the skin may
after the Gemini IV and V flights indicated be an important avenue of excretion of various
changes in the equivalent aluminum density of elements, particularly calcium, perspiration
two bones, the heel, and a finger, but these find- also had to be collected during representative
ings cannot yet be equated with calcium losses periods before and after flight, and continu-
from the whole skeleton. ously during flight.
417
418 GEMINI _IDPROGRA_ CONFERENCE
Frank Borman ................ Nitrogen .......... 27. 36 27.M 29.84 31 )2 29. 65 30.50 29}O 28.26
_1' L7
Calcium .......... • 973 •_82 • 986 }02 1 )O2 986 2_i )9
)00 • 980 _9 .990 -4-0. 011
James Lovell .................. Nitrogen .......... 23.58 23.87 26.26 70 25.87 231 26.70 25 _7 25.11
.984
Edward
Calcium ..........
White ................ Nitrogen .......... 22. 05
I.010
24.93
• 992
27.82
}01
271 T6 32 34
.958
27.62 271
)91 1.000
27f • 988
27.50
_. 109
Calcium .......... • 892 1.006 .985 1 )47 1. 007 )72 30. _224 _77 • 977 _. O46
Michael Collins............... Nitrogen .......... 24.50 24.67 31 30 30. 0,5 271 )7 31.30 30 21 28.41
Calcium .......... .998 .998 _-_ 18! 1 }01 .967 )97 1.001 1303 • 992 =t=. 012
Crewman
Oalclum
..........I "9 1"1 " 11L ll HI
Gemini VII were generally similar to those on ate the same diet as they did during the pre-
prior flights, certain foods--notably fruit drinks flight control phase.
and puddings--were supplemented with cal-
Collection of Specimens
cium lactate in order to provide as closely as
possible a mineral intake of the same level as
Bottles, a commode adaptation of toilet seats,
was taken during the control phase. In addi- and a small refrigerator setup were used in the
tion, the flight food was packaged in specific astronauts' quarters for the collection of all
meal-packs to be taken in a definite time se- urine and stool specimens during the preflight
quence so that the day-to-day dietary intake and postflight control phases. This setup was
would also remain as constant as possible under similar to that used in hospital metabolic re-
these difficult-to-control circumstances. For
search wards. All specimens were labeled by
reasons which are not presently known, the the crewmembers with the initial of their last
crewmen did not follow the prescribed meal se-
name, the date, and the time of passage. They
quence; thus, when the inflight intake data from were placed immediately in the refrigerator.
a combination of log information and diet Specimen collection stations were also set up at
analyses have been assembled, there will cer- the Gemini Mission Simulator and at two other
tainly be day-to-day fluctuations. It is possible locations at Cape Kennedy. Specimens were
that calcium fluctuations will turn out to be
picked up by the staff at regular intervals and
modest in view of the number of calcium-supple- returned to a laboratory in the Manned Space
mented food items in nearly all the meals. In Operations Building where they were prepared
any case, since the crewmen consumed the vari-
for shipment to Cornell University for analysis.
ous food items fairly consistently almost in their On 2 days prior to the flight and on 2 days
entirety, the intake of calcium and nitrogen for after the flight, perspiration collections were
the block flight period will be closely similar to made separately for each crewman. The some-
that of the control phase. what involved procedure included an initial
During the first day of the 4-day postflight washing of the subject's body with distilled
control phase, the crewmen (onboard the car- water, the wearing of cotton long underwear
rier) consumed foods previously prepared at for 24 hours, and a second body washing. The
Cape Kennedy. They returned to their quar- underwear was rinsed, and the water from this
ters at the Cape for the remaining 3 days, and rinse, along with the water from the body
420 GEMINI _IDPROGRA_[ CONFERENCE
washes, was collected and analyzed for minerals (3) Four of the specimen bags were not
and electrolytes. labeled with either the crewman's name or the
For the flight phase, collection of perspira- time.
tion and its analysis were accomplished using Aside from the deficiencies noted above, most
the cotton undergarments, which were worn of the urine specimens were properly collected
and labeled.
throughout the flight, and the distilled water
from the skin wash performed shortly after This brief summary barely hints at the con-
arrival on the carrier. siderable problems in planning and the tre-
Collection of urine and stool specimens dur- mendous detail involved in specimen collection,
ing flight was a complex procedure in the labeling, recording, and shipment. A 10-day
weightless state, and it required development of full runthrough of the methods was conducted
special equipment. It was essential to have in September 1965 at the 6570th Aerospace Med-
stool-specimen collection made with relative ical Research Laboratories, Wright-Patterson
ease to assure that fecal material would be well Air Force Base, Ohio. Members of the group
formed. Apparently helpful in this process was involved in that exercise came to Cape Kennedy
the moderately-low-residue character of the in November and December to assist in this
metabolic diet which was continued until the study.
morning of the launch. Stool specimens were Analytical Problem
wrapped securely (with preservative added) in
The principal reason that results are not yet
plastic collection devices labeled with the crew-
available lies in the ma_o_itude of the analytical
man's name and the time. They were stowed
problem in this study. Analyses are being done
in the locker for specimens.
on specimens from a total of 76 man-days of
Development of the urine collection device
study, involving approximately 300 urine
involved a great deal of effort and ingenuity,
specimens, 60 stool specimens, 14 perspiration
not merely because of the problem of collecting
samples, and an indefinite but large number of
fluids in the weightless state but also because of
diet samples. Each of these specimens is being
lack of space for storage of the total volume of
analyzed for nitrogen, calcium, phosphorus,
all specimens. It was necessary to devise a
magnesium, sodium, and potassium. In addi-
method of determining the volume of each
tion, the urine specimens are being analyzed
voided specimen and then taking an aliquot for
for creatine, creatinine, sulfate, chloride, and
storage for later analysis. Several systems were
hydroxyproline. Stool specimens are also being
tried, but the one used involved the introduc-
analyzed for fat. Added to the number of anal-
tion of a tracer quantity of tritium into an 800-
yses to be accomplished and correlated, the
milliliter plastic collection bag which received
problem is further complicated in the inflight
the urine voiding. After the tracer was well
phase by the irregular time periods from one
mixed with the full voiding, part was trans-
voiding to the next. Because of this, some diffi-
ferred to a 75-milliliter bag for storage and
culty is anticipated in relating the analytical
later analysis and the remainder was expelled
values to a regular 24-hour pattern.
from the spacecraft.
In actual experience the urine collection Relationship to Other Experiments
device worked well but with some leakage in-
A close working relationship was necessary
convenience at the point of connection between
between Experiments M-7 and M-5, the analysis
the subject and the device. The more serious
of body fluids. Blood specimens were collected
problems were as follows :
before and after flight as part of the M-5 proto-
(1) Since there was considerable concern
col for serum calcium, phosphorus, and alkaline
about adequate stowage space and about
phosphatase. In bedrest studies involving ex-
whether the volume of each specimen saved treme immobilization over several weeks, eleva-
could be controlled by thc astronauts, one of the tions in serum calcium have been noted. M-5
astronauts, during the early part of the flight, analyses of urine for electrolytes, corticoste-
provided aliquots which were much too small. roids, and catecholamines require urine collected
(2) One sample bag broke. in both Experiments M-5 and M-7, and ali-
CALC_ A_D Nm_OG_¢ BALA_rCE 421
quots of the urine specimens now at Cornell cut answers as possible. In any case, there is a
University are being sent to the Manned Space- very important need for further ground-based
craft Center for the planned M-5 analyses. studies to enable sorting out the kind and degree
Great interest will be focused on the correla- of effect of a number of the possible influences
tion between the degree of apparent mineral loss currently imposed on this experiment by various
from the os calcis and metacarpal bones in the engineering constraints, such as low atmospheric
M-6 Experiment and the total mineral loss from pressure, high oxygen tension, confinement, and
the whole skeleton, which will be indicated from exercise. Regardless of these considerations, if
the balance study. Since the skeleton varies significant changes in any of the various aspects
considerably from bone to bone in the relative of metabolism are found, they will serve as a
availability of calcium, the correlation between basis for predicting what derangements of more
the two methods, if possible, will not be simple. serious degree are likely to occur on longer
flights or in an orbiting laboratory, if well sub-
Interpretation and Significance
stantiated, effective protective procedures are
of the Study
not developed.
As indicated initially, during the space flight
Conclusion
several influences in addition to weightlessness
were present which could have had varying and
This preliminary report has attempted to de-
conflicting influences on calcium metabolism.
scribe the difficult and detailed planning, the
These included confinement, moderate physical
rather prodigious management effort required
movement, slight hyperoxia, and low atmos-
by both the investigators and the NASA staff,
pheric pressure. In interpreting the results, it
may be necessary to deal with the possible inter- and the tremendous and perceptive cooperation
fering effects of the bungee exercise procedure on the part of the crewmembers and their office
(M-3 Experiment) for both astronauts and the that are required for completion of the calcium
_i-1 alternating pneumatic cuff experiment for and nitrogen balance study. Considering the
Lovell. The need is evident for careful selec- complexity of the study, it was conducted ex-
tion of studies in future flights to assure as clear- ceptionally well.
45. EXPERIMENT M-8, INFLIGHT SLEEP ANALYSIS
By PETER KELLOWAY, Ph.D., Chie/, Neurophysics, Methodist Hospital, Texas Medical Center,
Houston, Tex.
The primary purpose of this experiment was obtaining data from another brain area) to
to obtain objective and precise information con- provide for the possibility that one or more of
cerning the number, duration, and depth of the electrodes of one pair might be dislodged
sleep periods of one of the members of the crew or become defective.
(Command Pilot Borman). The recording system consisted of two minia-
The importance of precise information con- ture transistorized amplifiers, carried by the
cerning the sleep (hence, rest) of the crew, es- astronaut in pockets of his underwear, and a
pecially during prolonged flights, is obvious. small magnetic tape recorder inside the space-
The electroencephalogram is capable of provid- craft. The tape recorder, running at a very
ing this information, as the electrical activity slow speed, was capable of recording 100 hours
of the brain undergoes clearly established and of data continuously.
consistent variations with different levels of
Preflight Tests
sleep. Using the EEG, it is possible to distin-
guish four levels of sleep ranging from drifting Preliminary tests of the electrode system,
or drowsiness to profound sleep, and a special amplifiers, and tape recorder under flight con-
state sometimes called paradoxical sleep or the ditions were made first in the altitude chamber
rapid eye movement stage of sleep, which is at McDonnell Aircraft Corp. and subsequently
believed by many investigators to be important at the Manned Spacecraft Center.
for the psychoaffective well-being of the Another dry-run test was made at Cape Ken-
individual. nedy the day before the flight, and recordings
were made at the launch pad prior to lift-off.
Approach and Technique
All of these preflight runs yielded good re-
Baseline Data cordings, clean of all artifact except that en-
gendered by the movements of the subjects them-
Baseline, multichannel EEG, and other psy-
selves.
chophysiological data were recorded on Borman
lnflight Test
and the backup command pilot, White, at the
Laboratory of Space Neurobiology at the Meth- Recording of the EEG was to be continuous
odist Hospital during all stages of sleep and throughout the first 4 days of the Gemini VII
during the waking state. These recordings were flight. During these 4 days, the command pilot
used as a baseline for comparison with record- was to keep his helmet on unless marked discom-
ings made in the altitude chamber runs at St. fort or other factors necessitated its removal.
Louis and finally with the inflight records. The electrode system was, therefore, designed
for a helmet-on arrangement.
Electrodes and Recording System
Results
Preliminary studies of 200 control subjects,
and specifically of White's and Borman's pre- The events (as determined from the medical
flight EEG's, had shown that all of these stages recorder data) from 15 minutes before lift-off
of sleep could be differentiated and identified to the time one of the second electrode pair was
in records obtained from a single pair of elec- dislodged are shown graphically in figure 45-1.
trodes placed on the scalp--one in the central, A total of 54 hours and 43 minutes of interpr_t-
and one in the occipital region. It was also able EEG data was obtained. Most of these
found that if these electrodes were placed in the data were of excellent quality from the view-
midline of the head, the least possible artifact point of visual interpretation.
from muscle activity was attained. As weight EEG channel 1 became noisy after 25 hours
and space limitations permitted only one more and 50 minutes of flight (indicated by point B),
EEG recording channel, what was essentially and no interpretable data appeared in this chan-
a duplicate of the first electrode pair was used nel after 28 hours and 50 minutes (indicated by
but displaced a few centimeters to the left of point C). EEG channel 2 gave good, artifact-
the midline. Such electrode placements reveal free data up to 43 hours and 55 minutes (point
essentially the same information as the midline D), at which time it became intermittently
pair, but this choice was made (rather than noisy. No interpretable data were recorded
IN-FLIGHT SLEEP ANALYSIS 425
after 54 hours and 98 minutes of flight (point As indicated in figure 45-1, 8 hours after lift-
E), at which time the electrodes for this channel off, the command pilot closed his eyes and re-
were inadvertently dislodged. The sleep pe- mained quiet for almost 9 hours--8:12:00 to
riods (shaded areas) will be discussed ]ater in 10:19:00 ground elapsed time (g.e.t.)--without
detail. The meals are indicated in the illustra- showing signs of drowsiness or sleep. A portion
tion because they represent periods of tempo- of the record during this period is shown in
rary interruption of the interpretability of the figure 45-2.
EEG data due to muscle and movement arti- Sleep is very easy to detect in the EEG rec-
facts produced by rhythmic chewing (fig. 45-2). ords. Figures 45-3 and 45-4 show the distinc-
® ©
I Fi
Y
i
I el
EEG I
I cl
I 'I
I
ie'I°" I,,,!!
EEG 2
0 sI°" _eo,s II
I I [ I I I I I I [ r I F [ I F l I I I ] I l I I F ] r I I F I I I ] I
! I I 1 I I I
l I I I I
-4 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56
Hours
During meol:Thrs,49min
FIGURE 45-2.--EEG recordings taken during rhythmic chewing (upper) and during eyes-closed resting condition
(lower).
496 GEMINI _IDPROGRAI_ CONFERENCE
FmURE 45-4.--Example of EEG recordings of moderate sleep (stage 3), deep sleep (stage 4), and partial arousal.
INI_LIGHT
SLEEP
ANALYSIS 497
tire patterns found at each level of sleep. These the laboratory in September 1965. This is
illustrations were taken from the second sleep shown in order to compare the rate and char-
period during flight. acter of the "falling-to-sleep" pattern, but it
The total sleep periods are graphically repre- cannot be used to compare the cyclic alterations
sented in figure 45-5. For ease of representa- occurring in a full night's sleep because the sub-
tion, each period of sleep is divided into 1- ject was awakened after 9 hours and 45 minutes.
minute epochs, and these are illustrated by the The first part of the characteristic cyclic
vertical lines. The length of this line represents changes of level can, however, be seen.
the range of sleep level variation during the The first inflight sleep period shown on the
minute it represents. right side of the graph showed marked fluctua-
The uppermost level on the vertical axis of tions between light sleep and arousal, with oc-
the graph (EO) represents the eyes-open, alert- casional brief episodes of stage 3 sleep for the
type EEG pattern. The next lower part of the first 80 minutes. At that time stage 4 sleep was
vertical axis marks the eyes-closed, resting pat- reached, but in less than 15 minutes abrupt
tern (O). Each of the next successive points arousal and termination of sleep occurred.
on the scale represents the four levels of sleep On the second day, at 33 hours and 10 min-
from light to deepest sleep. When, as often utes after lift-off, the command pilot again
happened, more than one EEG stage of sleep closed his eyes and showed immediate evidence
occurred in a 1-minute epoch, the vertical line of drowsiness. Within 34 minutes he was in
indicating stage of sleep is drawn to show the the deepest level of sleep (stage 4).
extent of the alterations of sleep level occurring During this prolonged period of sleep, there
during this time. were cyclic alterations in level similar to those
The horizontal axis of these graphs represents which occur during a full night of sleep under
the flight time in hours and minutes, translated normal conditions. Such cyclic changes are
from the time code on the recording tape. usually irregular and aperiodic, as shown in
In addition to the two sleep periods during figure 45-6, which is taken from a normal con-
flight, a similar graphic representation is shown trol series studied by Dement and Kleitman.
of the control or baseline sleep period made in Generally, each successive swing toward deeper
r_
0:0 0:50 hO0 1:50 2:00 2:30 5:00 014:00 014:30 015:00 015:30 016:00
Time, day: hr:min
Time, hr:min
Flight sleep period no,2
"6
r_
1:900 1:9:30 I:lO:O0 HO:30 I:lt:O0 1:11:30 1:]2:00 1:12:30 1:1.3:00 1:13:.301:14:00 1:14:30 I:15:001:15:03 1:16:00 1:16:30 1:17:00 I:i7:301:18:00
Time, doy:hr:min
FIGURE 45-5.--Analysis of control sleep period and two flight sleep periods.
428 GE_IINI _IDPROGIIA_I COlgFERElgCE
sleep, after the first period of stage 4 has been sional slow transients with a time course of about
obtained, only reaches successively lighter 1 second are shown in figure 45-7.
levels; but, in Barman's second night of sleep, Conclusions
stage 4 was reached and maintained for 20
This experiment has clearly demonstrated the
minutes or more at three different times after
feasibility of recording the EEG during space
the first episode. It is interesting to speculate
flight. Refinement of technique and the devel-
as to whether this increase in the number of
opment of more comfortable and efficient elec-
stage 4 periods reflected an effect of deprivation trode systems will soon permit recording
of sleep during the first .0,4hours. throughout prolonged space flights.
After approximately 7 hours of sleep, a The precise information which the EEG can
partial arousal from stage 4 sleep occurred, and, afford concerning the duration, depth, and num-
after a brief period (12 minutes) of fluctuating ber of sleep periods suggests that EEG monitor-
between stages 2 and 3, Barman remained in a ing should be considered for routine use in the
state fluctuating between drowsiness and stage prolonged space flights contemplated in the
1 sleep until finally fully roused about 1.5 hours Apollo and other programs.
later. Whether any periods of the so-called The importance of such information in the
"paradoxical" sleep, rapid eye movement sleep, direction a_td execution of the flight, both to the
medical monitors on the ground and to the crew,
or dreaming sleep occurred during this oseitant
is evident.
period cannot be determined with certainty
In the meantime, EEG studies presently
from our records because of the absence of eye
planned in the Gemini and Apollo programs,
movement records and because paradoxical
correlated in time with activity and events
sleep is generally very similar in its character aboard the space vehicle, should provide im-
to ordinary stage 1 sl_p. However, two pe- portant information for the formulation of fu-
riods of a pattern which resemble an admixture ture flight plans in relationship to scheduling
of certain characteristics of stage 1 and stage 2 of sleep periods.
sleep, and which resemble some of the activity
which this group and other investigators have
_,A7 I1
observed in paradoxical sleep, were recorded
_2
for relatively long periods in the second day's 3 ....
sleep (at 11:05 G.m.t. and 14:20 G.m.t.). Typ- _4
! ....... [ ' I' I I I_ 1
ical examples of this activity (which consists of 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7
runs of 3 per second "saw-tooth" waves, runs of Hours
FmURE 45-7.--Sample of EEG recording showing a mixture of stage 1 and stage 2 sleep (possibly representing
The analysis of sleep by EEG is a very ele- has yet to be fully explored. It is to be hoped
mentary exercise at the present state of the art. that the full exploration of the potentiality of
The possibility that monitoring electrical brain electroencephalography as an analytic tool in
activity may yield important information con- brain function can be realized through the in-
cerning higher brain functions during flight tense efforts catalyzed by the space program.
46. EXPERIMENT M-9, HUMAN OTOLITH FUNCTION
_=-_(contact )
or the roll is minimal, possibly indicating a
I0 g gravitational 1L
(contact) force / force
slight residual function (ref. 6). In its present
form this test cannot be carried out in a small
FIOURZ 46-1.--Diagram illustrating egocentric visual
431
432 GEMINI MIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
physiological deafferentation of the otolith ap- Direct-current power regulated by the instru-
paratus had changed its sensitivity of response. ment was supplied by the spacecraft.
A headbrace, as shown in figure 46-2, was
Apparatus and Procedure provided to connect the biteboard of the instru-
The apparatus for measuring the EVLH of ment to the map-board slot of the spacecraft
the spacecraft was incorporated into the onboard and thereby eliminate any rolling movement or
vision tester which was part of the S-8/D-13 displacement of the zero target setting for hori-
Experiment. This incorporation was made to zontal with respect to the spacecraft; a limited
amount of freedom around its pitch axis was
save weight and space and represented only a
permitted by the folding configuration of the
physical interface; in all other respects the two
brace as designed for storage purposes. This
experiments were completely separata entities.
method of fixing the vision tester to the space-
The inflight vision tester is a binocular instru-
craft was not used in the Gemini V mission,
ment (fig. 46-2) with an adjustable interpupil-
lary distance (IPD) but without any focusing but a similar positioning of the instrument was
adjustment. The instrument device is held at achieved by having the subject sit erect in his
the proper position, with the lines of sight coin- seat with his head alined with the headrest.
cident with the optic axes of the instrument, by The apparatus used represented a modifica-
tion and miniaturization of a target device pre-
means of a biteboard individually fitted to the
viously described (ref. 3 ) . It consisted essen-
subject. This insured that a t each use the in-
strument was similarly located with respect to tially of a collimated line of light in an other-
the subject's axes, if he had made the proper wise dark field. This line could be rotated about
IPD adjustment. I n this position the eyecups its center by means of a knurled knob. A digit
attached to the eyepieces of the instrument ex- readout of line position was easily seen and was
cluded all extraneous light from the visual field. accurate within 20.25".
The device was monocular and fabricated in
duplicate so that the astronaut in the left-hand
seat used the right eye with the readout visible
to the astronaut on his right ; and vice versa with
tho other astronaut. The readout was adjusted
so that horizontality to the apparatus was 76.6"
for the astronaut on the left and 101.6" for the
astronaut on the right. As in the Gemini V
flight, the instrument's zero was represented by
I
I
ri
a value other than a zero of 180" to eliminate
or reduce the possible influence of knowledge
of the settings upon subsequent judgments.
The- apparatus used for measuring ocular
counterrolling (CR) is essentially a tilt device
on which a camera system is mounted (ref. 7).
The main supporting part of the CR device acts
as a carrier for the stretcher-like section. This
section contains Velcro straps and a saddle
mount to secure the subject in a standing posi-
tion within the device. It can be rotated later-
ally to +90" about the optic axis of the camera
system and, when the subject is properly ad-
justed, about the visual axis of his right or left
eye. A custom fitted biteboard was also used
in CR testing to fix the subject's head with re-
FIGURE4(3-2.-Sut ct using vision tester with head
spect to the camera recording system.
brace attached to the instrument panel of the space- The camera system used to photograph the
craft. natural iris landmarks includes a motor-driven
HUMAN OTOLITH FUNCTION 433
35-millimeter camera with bellows extension and turning on the luminous target before the
and an electronic flash unit. A console located opposite eye. The target appearing against a
at the base of the tilt device contains a bank of completely dark background was initially offset
power packs which supply the electronic flash, at random by the observer pilot. The subject
a timer control mechanism, and controls for the pilot's experimental task was to adjust the tar-
flashing, round fixation light which surrounds get until it appeared horizontal with respect to
the camera lens. A triaxial accelerometer unit his immediate spacecraft environment. The
which senses and relays signals of linear ac- subject, when satisfied with each setting, closed
celeration to a galvanometer recorder was his eyes and removed his hand from the knurled
mounted to the head portion of the device for ring. This served as a signal to the observer
shipboard use. pilot to record the setting and offset the target.
A test cubicle 12 feet by 16 feet by 10 feet This procedure was repeated five times during
(height) insulated against outside sounds, light, each of the daily test sessions. The vision tester
and temperature was constructed for carrying was then handed to the other pilot and the same
out the postflight tests of EVLH and CR on- sequence was carried out after completion of the
board the recovery carrier. visual acuity test. Finally, the readings for
each pilot were tape recorded by voice. The
Method subjects were instructed to apply the same
amount of tension on their seat belts during the
The preflight testing of CR and EVLIt for
EVLH test in an attempt to keep the influence
both subjects was accomplished at Pensacola,
of secondary gravitational cues upon these
Fla., and Cape Kennedy at 19 and 6 weeks,
judgments as constant as possible.
respectively, prior to the flight.
The preflight and postflight measurements of
Immediately prior to the preflight and post-
ocular CR were accomplished according to the
flight testing of EVLH, one drop of 1 percent
standard procedure used at the U.S. Naval
pilocarpine hydrochloride ophthalmic solution
Aerospace Medical Institute. Following the
was instilled in the subject's eye which was op-
EVLH test, the subject remained in the up-
posite to the eye used for making visual orien-
right position in the tilt device. The vision
tation judgments. The subject was then placed
tester and its biteboard were removed, and
in the CR tilt device, properly adjusted, and
preparations were made for photographically
secured. The method of conducting the pre-
recording the eye position associated with a
flight and postflight EVLH test was as fol-
given position of body tilt. The CR biteboard
lows: The IPD of the vision tester was adjusted
was inserted in the subject's mouth, and the
and the device was brought into its proper posi-
position of his appropriate eye was adjusted so
tion by inserting the biteboard into the mouth
that it coincided with the optic axis of the
of the subject. The experimenter initially off-
camera system when he fixated the center of the
set the line target presented to one eye only
flashing red ring of light. Six photographic
(the other eye observed a completely dark
recordings were made at this position; then the
field). By means of the knurled wheel, the sub-
subject was slowly tilted in his lateral plane to
ject rotated the target clockwise or counter-
each of four other positions (---25 °, __+50° ) and
clockwise until it appeared to be alined
the same photographic procedure was repeated.
perpendicular to the gravitational vertical.
The accelerometer system was used during the
This procedure was repeated in each test ses-
postflight EVLH and CR tests to record con-
sion until eight settings had been made in the
tinuously the motions of the recovery ship
upright position.
around its roll, pitch, and yaw axes.
The method of testing EVLH in flight was as
During the EVLH and CR tests, readings of
follows: Immediately after completion of the
blood pressure, pulse rate, and electrocardio-
S-8/D-13 Experiment, and without removing
gram were monitored by NASA Manned
the instrument from his face, the subject pre- Spacecraft Center medical personnel. Post-
pared for EVLH testing by occluding the left flight examinations were begun for pilot D and
eyepiece (command pilot) or right eyepiece pilot C approximately 4.5 and 6 hours, respec-
(pilot) by means of the ring of the eyepiece, tively, following their recovery at sea.
434 GEMINI _fIDPROGRAM CONFERENCE
500
300
\\
o
IOO
E 0
-I00
.._
-300
- -----.r.,,,Oh,
-500
-_ -_ 0 25 50 -50 - 2_ 0L 25L I
50
L I o Pilot D
5 I
300 I lI ° II °
oF'l , _ L-' " • "/'
• I ° ° ° •
o
_sk
-I0 _
I00
"o
0 s 8
c 5 5
> 8
w 0
-ioo
-5
o
-IO
o I I I I I I I
0 50 I00 150 200 250 300
Revolution
-500 I I I
-50 -25 0 25 5O
Body tilt, degrees
with its physical correlate in the spacecraft (a
line parallel to the vehicle's pitch axis). The
FZe_RE 46-4.--Counterrolling response curves of eight data taken of pilot A, for example, revealed
astronauts (shaded area represents _'ange of response
greater than 30 ° deviation from the absolute
of 100 randomly selected subjects).
horizontal, indicating that with eyes closed the
cues furnished by virtue of contact with the
Discussion spacecraft did not allow correct perception of
the cabin vertical. The uniformity of his set-
The completion of the M-9 Human Otolith tings throughout the flight suggested, further-
Function Experiment carried out in conjunc- more, that "learning" did not occur in the
tion with the Gemini V and VII flights has absence of any knowledge of the accuracy of
provided quantitative information concerning these estimates. With one possible exception
otolithic sensitivity and orientation of four already noted on pilot C in his first inflight test
subjects exposed to an orbiting spacecraft en- session, EVLH judgments were relatively ac-
vironment for prolonged periods of time. curate and more stable than under normal
Preflight counterrolling measurements re- gravitational conditions. These data show
vealed marked differences between the Gemini that relatively accurate and consistent nonvis-
V and VII crews with regard to the magnitude ual orientation is possible throughout a pro-
of their basic response; however, after the longed period of weightless exposure so long as
flight, each pilot maintained his respective pre- secondary cues are adequate. These same cues,
flight level of response, which indicated that no however, may, in certain individuals, contribute
significant change in otolithic sensitivity oc- to rather large errors in the perception of the
curred as a result of the flight, or at least no principal coordinates of the spacecraft.
change persisted long enough to be recorded The potential influence of sensory cues on
several hours after recovery. orientation is well known to the aviator who
The EVLH data recorded for each subject has experienced the "leans," that is, the tend-
confirmed the observation made repeatedly in ency either to fly with one wing low, or, in
flight experiments that a coordinate straight and level flight using instruments, to
sense exists even in weightlessness if con= feel inclined away from the "upright." This
cues are adequate; however, it was found not uncommon illusion occurs in spite of the
that the apparent location of the horizontal relative abundance of cues in this situation com-
the spacecraft may not necessarily agree pared with those in a spacecraft. Further
436 GEMINI _IDPROGRA_I CONFERENCE
experimentation involving inflight serial edge of the role of secondary cues in orienta-
EVLH measurements is planned in conjunction tion, and the possible interindividual differences
with the Apollo flights to increase the knowl- in their influence upon the crewman.
References
1. Manned Space-Flight Experiments Interim Report, 5. MILLER, E. F., II : Counterrolling of the Human Eyes
Gemini V Mission (NASA Publication), Jan. 6, Produced by Head Tilt With Respect to Gravity.
1966. Acta Otolaryng., vol. 54, pp. 479-501, 1961.
6. MILLER, E. F., II; AND GRAYBIEL, A. : A Comparison
2. MILLER, E. F., II; AND GRAYBIEL, A. : Role of the
Otolith Organs in the Perception of Horizontality. of Ocular Counterrolling Movements Between
Normal Persons and Deaf Subjects With Bilateral
kmer. J. Psychol., vol. 79, no. 1, May 1966.
Labyrinthine Defects. Ann. Otol., vol. 72, pp. 885-
3. GRAYBIEL, A. : Oeulogravic Illusion. Arch. Ophthal.,
893, 1963.
vol. 48, pp. 605-615, 1952.
7. MILLER, E. F., II; AND GRAYmEL, A. : Otolith Func-
4. MILLER, E. F., II ; GRAYBIEL, k. ; AND KELLOGG, R. S. : tion as Measured by Ocular Counterrolling. Sym-
Otolith Organ Activity Within Earth Standard, posium on the Role of the Vestibular Organs in
One-half Standard, and Zero Gravi_ty Environ- the Exploration of Space, NASA SP-77, pp. 121-
ments. Aerospace Med., vol. 37, no. 4, May 1966. 131, 1965.
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A
NASA CENTERS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
This appendix contains a list of Government agencies participating in the Gemini Program.
This appendix contains a listing of contractors, subcontractors, and vendors that have Gemini
contracts totaling more than $100 000. It represents the best effort possible to obtain a complete
listing; however, it is possible that some are missing, such as those supporting activities not directly
concerned with Manned Spacecraft Center activities. These contractors, subcontractors, and ven-
dors are recognized as a group.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Sunnyvale, Barnes Engineering Co., Stamford, Conn.
Calif. Beech Aircraft Corp., Boulder, Colo.
Martin Co., Division of Martin-Marietta Corp., Bell Aerosystems Co., Buffalo, N.Y.
Baltimore, Md. Bendix Corp., Eatontown, N.J.
Martin Co., Division of Martin-Marietta Corp., Brodie, Inc., San Leandro, Calif.
Denver, Colo. Brush Beryllium Co., Cleveland, Ohio
441
442 GEMINI _IIDPROGRA3_ CONI_EKENCE
Brush Instrument Corp., Los Angeles, Calif. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., Akron, Ohio
Burtek, Inc., Tulsa, Okla. Gulton Industries, Hawthorne, Calif.
Cadillac Gage Co., Costa Mesa, Calif. Hamilton-Standard, Division of United Air-
Cannon Electric Co., Brentwood, Mo. craft Corp., Windsor Locks, Conn.
Cannon Electric Co., Phoenix, Ariz. Hexcel Products, Inc., Berkeley, Calif.
Calcor Space Facility, _Vhittier, Calif. H. L. Yoh Co., Philadelphia, Pa.
Captive Seal, Inc., Caldwell, N.J. Honeywell, Inc., Minneapolis, Minn.
Central Technology Corp., Herrin, Ill. Honeywell, Inc., St. Petersburg, Fla.
Clevite Corp., Cleveland, Ohio Hurletron Corp., Wheaton, Ill.
Clifton Precision Co., Clifton Heights, Pa. Hydra Electric Co., Burbank, Calif.
Collins Radio Co., Cedar Rapids, Iowa International Business Machines Corp., Owego,
Computer Controls Corp., Framingham, Mass. N.Y., and New York, N.Y.
Comprehensive Designers, Inc., Philadelphia, Johns-Manville Corp., Manville, N.J.
Pa. Kaiser Aerospace & Electronics Corp., San Le-
Consolidated Electrodynamics Corp., Monrovia, andro, Calif.
Calif. Kinetics Corp., Solvana Beach, Calif.
Cosmodyne Corp., Hawthorne, Calif. Kirk Engineering Co., Philadelphia, Pa.
Custom Printing Co., Ferguson, Mo. La Mesa Tool & Manufacturing Co., E1 Cajon,
Day & Zimmerman, Inc., Los Angeles, Calif. Calif.
De Havilland Aircraft, Ltd., Downsview, On- Leach Corp., Compton, Calif.
tario, Canada Leach Relay Corp., Los Angeles, Calif.
Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., Tulsa, Okla., and Lear-Siegler, Inc., Grand Rapids, Mich.
Santa Monica, Calif. Linde Co., Whiting, Ind.
Eagle-Picher Co., Joplin, Mo. Lion Research Corp., Cambridge, Mass.
Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier, Inc., Boston, MacGregor Manufacturing Co., Troy, Mich.
Mass. Moffett Tool and Machine Co., St. Louis, Mo.
Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc., Sarasota, Marotte Valve Corp., Boonton, N.J.
Fla. Meg Products, Inc., Seattle, Wash.
Electronic Associates, Inc., Long Branch, N.J. Missouri Research Laboratories, St. Louis, Mo.
Emerson Electric Co., St. Louis, Mo. Moog, Inc., Buffalo, I_.Y.
Emertron Information and Control Division, Motorola, Inc., Scottsdale, Ariz.
Litton Systems, Inc., Newark, N.J. National Waterlift Co., Kalamazoo, Mich.
Engineered Magnetics Division, Hawthorne, North American Aviation, Inc., Canoga Park,
Calif. Calif.
Epsco, Inc., Westwood, Mass. Northrop Corp., Van Nuys, Calif.
Explosive Technology, Inc., Santa Clara, Calif. Northrop-Ventura Corp., Newberry Park, Calif.
Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., E1 Ordnance Associates, Inc., Pasadena, Calif.
Cajon, Calif. Ordnance Engineering Associates, Inc., Des
Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., Cable Plaines, Ill.
Division, Joplin, Mo. Palomara Scientific, Redmond, Wash.
Fairchild Controls, Inc., Division of Fairchild Paragon Tool & Dye Engineering, Pacoima,
Camera & Instrument Corp., Hicksville, N.Y. Calif.
Fairchild Hiller Corp., Bayshore, N.Y. Pneumodynamics Corp., Kalamazoo, Mich.
Fairchild Stratos Corp., Long Island, N.Y. Powertron, Inc., Plainsville, N.Y.
Garrett Corp., The, AiResearch Manufacturing Pollak & Skan, Inc., Chicago, Ill.
Co. Division, Los Angeles, Calif. Rader & Associates, Inc., Miami, Fla.
General Electric Co., West Lynn, Mass. Radiation, Inc., Melbourne, Fla.
General Precision, Inc., Binghamton, N.Y. Raymond Engineering Laboratory, Middle-
General Precision Aerospace, Little Falls, N.Y. town, Conn.
Genistron, Inc., Bensenville, Ill. Reinhold Engineering Co., Santa Fe Springs,
Giannini Controls Corp., Duarte, Calif. Calif.
A_NDIX B 443
Rocket Power, Inc., Mesa, Ariz. Texas Instruments, Inc., Dallas, Tex.
Rome Cable Corp., Division of Alcoa, Rome, Thiokol Chemical Corp., Danville, N.J.
N.Y. Thiokol Chemical Corp., Elkton, Md.
Rosemount Engineering Co., Minneapolis, Union Carbide Corp, W]fiting, Ind.
Minn. Vickers, Inc._ St. Louis, Mo.
Servonics Instruments_ Inc., Costa Mesa, Calif. Weber Aircraft Corp., Burbank, Calif.
Space Corp., Dallas, Tex. Western Gear 'Corp., Lynwood, Calif.
Sperry Rand Corp., Tampa, Fla. Western Way, Inc., Van Nuys, Calif.
Sperry Rand Corp., Torrance, Calif. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Baltimore, Md.
Speidel Co., Warwick, R.I. Whiting-Turner, Baltimore, Md.
Talley Industries, Mesa, Ariz. Wyle Laboratories, E1 Segundo, Calif.
Teledyne Systems Corp., Hawthorne, Calif. Yardney Electric Corp., .New York, N.Y.